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Between Brussels and Moscow: Only Democratic and Legalistic Russia Can Be the
EU's Strategic Partner
Polish News Bulletin
Jun 08, 2005
Where are the boundaries of the Europe of common values and standards?
Defining its borders in the north, south (except Turkey perhaps), and
west is not particularly difficult. It is the east that causes
problems.
For some, Europe ends with the last European baroque churches, others
set its border on the Ural, and the greatest optimists see it in
Vladivostok, writes Moscow correspondent Slawomir Popowski in
Rzeczpospolita.
The problem is that Europe's eastern borders have always been
artificial. Whether it was the Roman "limes," the Berlin wall
separating the European democracies from the Soviet bloc, or the
Schengen treaty barring Europe against the hordes of new "barbarians":
impoverished, feeling inferior, with a mentality deformed by decades
of Soviet conditioning.
So can Europe turn away from them? The question is basically rhetoric.
Especially in the wake of the Ukrainian orange revolution which became
a challenge both for the EU and for Russia. For Moscow, because it
challenged Russia's position as the Soviet Union's political heir.
For Europe, because it put on the agenda the question of the EU's role
in an area which until then it had silently regarded as Russia's zone
of influence, if only to avoid the problems and burdens associated
with the necessity of maintaining a relatively stable political
situation in the potentially explosive area.
The Ukrainians, voting against the rigged elections, turned all that
upside down. For the first time, Europe was forced to involve itself
so directly and so openly in solving a conflict in the post-Soviet
area.
It was a special conflict, where one of the parties, acting under
Moscow's dictation and in defence of its interests, strived, at any
prices, not excluding electoral falsifications, to maintain the
political status quo. The other, supported by the protest of hundreds
of thousands of Ukrainians, fought for a European future for Ukraine.
It is not particularly important that it was Poland, in cooperation
with Lithuania, that mobilised the European politicians to offer their
mediation. What is important is the Europe finally noticed Ukraine and
its European aspirations, and, above all ? that it was the only thing
it could do.
For a dozen years following the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia did
not have to fear any competition. Though the Moscow-led Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) was an amorphous structure, criticised for
its weakness, one thing seemed certain ? that the post-Soviet states
had no choice and sooner or later would have to merge with Russia;
they were sentenced to integration on Moscow's terms, and the Russian
diplomacy's only goal was to prevent anyone from mingling with their
affairs.
Shortly speaking, Moscow did not have to worry, it could wait calmly
for the situation to become ripe for more decisive solutions, making
only sure that power in the satellite countries remained in the hands
of people loyal to Moscow.
The Ukrainian elections, won by Victor Yuschenko, meant a failure of
that strategy. The new Kiev government proclaimed euroatlantic
integration the priority of its policy, and the Kremlin's project of
the Common Economic Space, which was supposed to become the foundation
of a new economic and political community as well as help Russia
rebuild its former position as a global power, was in effect dumped.
The Russian political elites interpreted that as the greatest,
strategic defeat of Putin's Russia and their reaction was
understandable. The earlier "revolution of roses" in Georgia could
have been ignored. The orange, Ukrainian one cannot.
Firstly, because Ukraine has always been a crucial element of Russia's
strategic concepts (in line with Zbigniew Brzezinski's thesis that
without Ukraine, Russia will never be an empire).
Secondly, there are a lot of indications to believe that we are having
to do with a new process here: having moved its borders eastwards, the
united Europe for the first time gained a direct border with the
post-Soviet space.
As a result, perhaps involuntarily on the EU's part, a new,
alternative integration project emerged in the post-Soviet space. It
was that project that won in Ukraine. Moldova was another stage of the
same process. The same, Russian analysts believe, will now happen with
Belarus, and then possibly with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In all, this amounts to a fundamentally changed geopolitical
situation. The EU has virtually no choice but to accept the European
aspirations of one after another post-Soviet country breaking free of
Russian hegemony.
The EU's power of attraction, according to Fiodor Lukyanov, editor in
chief of Russia in Global Politics, a periodical published in Moscow
together with Foreign Affairs, lies in its unwavering conviction that
it represents the most progressive, democratic, and fair development
model, and that its neighbours will sooner or later choose the same
path and adopt the same values and standards as their basis.
It is thanks to such an approach, writes Lukyanov, that the EU
overcame the consecutive crises and achieved goals that had previously
looked fantasy, i.e. the euro. However, such a philosophy only makes
sense if the EU ? even when imposing tough, or actually restrictive
conditions ? remains open to those who want to join it. And that us
why it could not leave Ukraine to its fate.
That is something one can hardly disagree with. The alternative would
be to build a new wall in the east, knowing perfectly well that a
decisive "no" for Kiev" would mean a "yes" for Moscow and its imperial
ambitions, with all the consequences of that, including Europe's new,
inevitable division into a "Brussels," western one, and "Moscow,"
eastern one.
The former would be ruled by its own principles and values, and so
would the latter. While the latter's values and standards could be
somewhat similar to those of the former, they would still be
different, filtered by Moscow depending on its needs and interests.
Thus, at the EU's silent consent, a new, powerful, and independent
"power pole" would grow at its side, directly referring to the Soviet,
imperial political doctrine ? a very dangerous one for Europe and its
security, even if free of any communist ideology.
Without a power base in the shape of the CIS, without Ukraine,
Georgia, Moldova and other post-Soviet countries ? this will be
impossible, or at least highly unlikely. And that us an additional,
strategic reason why the EU must not be indifferent to what happens
beyond its eastern border and, if need be, will have to become
increasingly involved. Even at the cost of tough political competition
with Russia in the area.
One can hardly be surprised by Russia's irritation following the lost
battle in Ukraine. Russia had long perceived the post-Soviet countries
at its borders as the so called "close abroad" ? an area requiring
special treatment, formally separate from Russia but tied to it in
various ways and one that, when the time is right, will be
reunited. In other words, Russia had never accepted the Soviet Union's
collapse and perceived it as temporary.
Vladimir Putin's recent interpretation of its collapse as the 20th
century's "greatest catastrophe" only confirms this.
This raises the question what Russia can do to oppose the EU's
expected growing presence in the CIS area? Contrary to what it might
seem, it can do little, though, it needs to be admitted, it is not
utterly helpless.
One of the methods is trying to divide the EU. Moscow has been
stubbornly trying to prove that the main culprits are the new member
states, which, having old scores to settle with Russia, are trying to
"squeeze it out of Europe." Therefore, it is necessary to limit to
the minimum the new member states' influence over the EU eastern
policy.
This fundamentally false assumption does not stand up to criticism. It
is not the new member states who are isolating Russia, and it is not
the EU ? contrary to what Russian politicians are saying ? that is
"building new lines of division in Europe," but Russia itself,
rejecting the European standards of the rule of law and democracy, or
demanding that Europe accepts its special rights in the post-Soviet
area.
But Russia also has its "realists," looking at the future more soberly
than the radical nationalists or the political constituencies tied to
the special services do. In April, a report on Russia-EU relations was
published, drawn up by a team led by Sergey Kaganov of the influential
Foreign and Defence Policy Council.
The report says that if the present trends, including in Russia's
domestic policy, continue, then within the next couple of years most
(if not all) former republics of the Soviet Union's western part will
"find themselves part of the euroatlantic military-political system,"
and striving for EU membership. In other words, the process of the
EU's expansion in the post-Soviet area cannot be stopped and Russia
has to accept that "in the longer term, the civilisational,
military-political, and economic border will run alongside Russia's
western borders."
Above all, however, the report stresses that Moscow has to define a
clear strategy towards the EU. This will be the most difficult task of
all. At the very beginning of its transformation, Russia made a
fundamental assumption that it would remain a separate centre of
power.
This principle remains valid to this day. Though Russia officially
declares that it wants to have closer relations with the West, and
stresses that cooperation with the EU is of strategic importance for
it, it has kept demanding special treatment and recognition for what
it calls the "Russian specificity." Moscow realises the need for
bringing Russian regulations more in line with the EU ones, and yet it
does not want to "share" its sovereignty and refuses to accept
regulations over whose adoption, as it says, it had no say. In
reality, it rejects the very idea of integration with the EU for a
simple reason:
it would have to accept the position of one of many member (or at
least associated) states, and that, putting aside the question of
Russia's size, is irreconcilable with its ambitions and effort to
regain global power status, which is one of Putin's main goals.
In this situation, the only thing that the EU can do is to firmly
continue its policy of bundling cooperation with Russia with pressure
for democracy, human rights, and regulatory harmonisation. That Russia
cannot become an EU member does not mean it can do whatever it wants,
and the EU has to make it clear to the Kremlin, in its own, well-meant
interest.
After all, the policy of integration towards Russia will only be
successful if the EU and Russia develop similar models of democracy
and socio-economic development. That is why the EU should keep asking
the Kremlin about Yukos, Chechnya, the freedom of press, electoral law
reforms, and even the attitude towards history. Only a democratic and
legalistic Russia (in the European sense of the words) can be a
strategic partner for the united Europe.
At the same time, the EU has to remember that Russia is not the only
subject in the post-Soviet area. There is also Ukraine, Moldova,
Georgia, as well as Belarus, even with its grotesque dictator
Lukashenka. Let alone the others. The only thing that those countries
had until recently had in common was a Soviet way of thinking about
the state and about politics.
Georgia and Ukraine have made only their first step towards
Europe. The EU, and, more broadly, the West have to make sure now that
they continue on this path. If they keep building genuine civic
societies, the door to Europe has to be open increasingly wide for
them.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
EU's Strategic Partner
Polish News Bulletin
Jun 08, 2005
Where are the boundaries of the Europe of common values and standards?
Defining its borders in the north, south (except Turkey perhaps), and
west is not particularly difficult. It is the east that causes
problems.
For some, Europe ends with the last European baroque churches, others
set its border on the Ural, and the greatest optimists see it in
Vladivostok, writes Moscow correspondent Slawomir Popowski in
Rzeczpospolita.
The problem is that Europe's eastern borders have always been
artificial. Whether it was the Roman "limes," the Berlin wall
separating the European democracies from the Soviet bloc, or the
Schengen treaty barring Europe against the hordes of new "barbarians":
impoverished, feeling inferior, with a mentality deformed by decades
of Soviet conditioning.
So can Europe turn away from them? The question is basically rhetoric.
Especially in the wake of the Ukrainian orange revolution which became
a challenge both for the EU and for Russia. For Moscow, because it
challenged Russia's position as the Soviet Union's political heir.
For Europe, because it put on the agenda the question of the EU's role
in an area which until then it had silently regarded as Russia's zone
of influence, if only to avoid the problems and burdens associated
with the necessity of maintaining a relatively stable political
situation in the potentially explosive area.
The Ukrainians, voting against the rigged elections, turned all that
upside down. For the first time, Europe was forced to involve itself
so directly and so openly in solving a conflict in the post-Soviet
area.
It was a special conflict, where one of the parties, acting under
Moscow's dictation and in defence of its interests, strived, at any
prices, not excluding electoral falsifications, to maintain the
political status quo. The other, supported by the protest of hundreds
of thousands of Ukrainians, fought for a European future for Ukraine.
It is not particularly important that it was Poland, in cooperation
with Lithuania, that mobilised the European politicians to offer their
mediation. What is important is the Europe finally noticed Ukraine and
its European aspirations, and, above all ? that it was the only thing
it could do.
For a dozen years following the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia did
not have to fear any competition. Though the Moscow-led Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) was an amorphous structure, criticised for
its weakness, one thing seemed certain ? that the post-Soviet states
had no choice and sooner or later would have to merge with Russia;
they were sentenced to integration on Moscow's terms, and the Russian
diplomacy's only goal was to prevent anyone from mingling with their
affairs.
Shortly speaking, Moscow did not have to worry, it could wait calmly
for the situation to become ripe for more decisive solutions, making
only sure that power in the satellite countries remained in the hands
of people loyal to Moscow.
The Ukrainian elections, won by Victor Yuschenko, meant a failure of
that strategy. The new Kiev government proclaimed euroatlantic
integration the priority of its policy, and the Kremlin's project of
the Common Economic Space, which was supposed to become the foundation
of a new economic and political community as well as help Russia
rebuild its former position as a global power, was in effect dumped.
The Russian political elites interpreted that as the greatest,
strategic defeat of Putin's Russia and their reaction was
understandable. The earlier "revolution of roses" in Georgia could
have been ignored. The orange, Ukrainian one cannot.
Firstly, because Ukraine has always been a crucial element of Russia's
strategic concepts (in line with Zbigniew Brzezinski's thesis that
without Ukraine, Russia will never be an empire).
Secondly, there are a lot of indications to believe that we are having
to do with a new process here: having moved its borders eastwards, the
united Europe for the first time gained a direct border with the
post-Soviet space.
As a result, perhaps involuntarily on the EU's part, a new,
alternative integration project emerged in the post-Soviet space. It
was that project that won in Ukraine. Moldova was another stage of the
same process. The same, Russian analysts believe, will now happen with
Belarus, and then possibly with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
In all, this amounts to a fundamentally changed geopolitical
situation. The EU has virtually no choice but to accept the European
aspirations of one after another post-Soviet country breaking free of
Russian hegemony.
The EU's power of attraction, according to Fiodor Lukyanov, editor in
chief of Russia in Global Politics, a periodical published in Moscow
together with Foreign Affairs, lies in its unwavering conviction that
it represents the most progressive, democratic, and fair development
model, and that its neighbours will sooner or later choose the same
path and adopt the same values and standards as their basis.
It is thanks to such an approach, writes Lukyanov, that the EU
overcame the consecutive crises and achieved goals that had previously
looked fantasy, i.e. the euro. However, such a philosophy only makes
sense if the EU ? even when imposing tough, or actually restrictive
conditions ? remains open to those who want to join it. And that us
why it could not leave Ukraine to its fate.
That is something one can hardly disagree with. The alternative would
be to build a new wall in the east, knowing perfectly well that a
decisive "no" for Kiev" would mean a "yes" for Moscow and its imperial
ambitions, with all the consequences of that, including Europe's new,
inevitable division into a "Brussels," western one, and "Moscow,"
eastern one.
The former would be ruled by its own principles and values, and so
would the latter. While the latter's values and standards could be
somewhat similar to those of the former, they would still be
different, filtered by Moscow depending on its needs and interests.
Thus, at the EU's silent consent, a new, powerful, and independent
"power pole" would grow at its side, directly referring to the Soviet,
imperial political doctrine ? a very dangerous one for Europe and its
security, even if free of any communist ideology.
Without a power base in the shape of the CIS, without Ukraine,
Georgia, Moldova and other post-Soviet countries ? this will be
impossible, or at least highly unlikely. And that us an additional,
strategic reason why the EU must not be indifferent to what happens
beyond its eastern border and, if need be, will have to become
increasingly involved. Even at the cost of tough political competition
with Russia in the area.
One can hardly be surprised by Russia's irritation following the lost
battle in Ukraine. Russia had long perceived the post-Soviet countries
at its borders as the so called "close abroad" ? an area requiring
special treatment, formally separate from Russia but tied to it in
various ways and one that, when the time is right, will be
reunited. In other words, Russia had never accepted the Soviet Union's
collapse and perceived it as temporary.
Vladimir Putin's recent interpretation of its collapse as the 20th
century's "greatest catastrophe" only confirms this.
This raises the question what Russia can do to oppose the EU's
expected growing presence in the CIS area? Contrary to what it might
seem, it can do little, though, it needs to be admitted, it is not
utterly helpless.
One of the methods is trying to divide the EU. Moscow has been
stubbornly trying to prove that the main culprits are the new member
states, which, having old scores to settle with Russia, are trying to
"squeeze it out of Europe." Therefore, it is necessary to limit to
the minimum the new member states' influence over the EU eastern
policy.
This fundamentally false assumption does not stand up to criticism. It
is not the new member states who are isolating Russia, and it is not
the EU ? contrary to what Russian politicians are saying ? that is
"building new lines of division in Europe," but Russia itself,
rejecting the European standards of the rule of law and democracy, or
demanding that Europe accepts its special rights in the post-Soviet
area.
But Russia also has its "realists," looking at the future more soberly
than the radical nationalists or the political constituencies tied to
the special services do. In April, a report on Russia-EU relations was
published, drawn up by a team led by Sergey Kaganov of the influential
Foreign and Defence Policy Council.
The report says that if the present trends, including in Russia's
domestic policy, continue, then within the next couple of years most
(if not all) former republics of the Soviet Union's western part will
"find themselves part of the euroatlantic military-political system,"
and striving for EU membership. In other words, the process of the
EU's expansion in the post-Soviet area cannot be stopped and Russia
has to accept that "in the longer term, the civilisational,
military-political, and economic border will run alongside Russia's
western borders."
Above all, however, the report stresses that Moscow has to define a
clear strategy towards the EU. This will be the most difficult task of
all. At the very beginning of its transformation, Russia made a
fundamental assumption that it would remain a separate centre of
power.
This principle remains valid to this day. Though Russia officially
declares that it wants to have closer relations with the West, and
stresses that cooperation with the EU is of strategic importance for
it, it has kept demanding special treatment and recognition for what
it calls the "Russian specificity." Moscow realises the need for
bringing Russian regulations more in line with the EU ones, and yet it
does not want to "share" its sovereignty and refuses to accept
regulations over whose adoption, as it says, it had no say. In
reality, it rejects the very idea of integration with the EU for a
simple reason:
it would have to accept the position of one of many member (or at
least associated) states, and that, putting aside the question of
Russia's size, is irreconcilable with its ambitions and effort to
regain global power status, which is one of Putin's main goals.
In this situation, the only thing that the EU can do is to firmly
continue its policy of bundling cooperation with Russia with pressure
for democracy, human rights, and regulatory harmonisation. That Russia
cannot become an EU member does not mean it can do whatever it wants,
and the EU has to make it clear to the Kremlin, in its own, well-meant
interest.
After all, the policy of integration towards Russia will only be
successful if the EU and Russia develop similar models of democracy
and socio-economic development. That is why the EU should keep asking
the Kremlin about Yukos, Chechnya, the freedom of press, electoral law
reforms, and even the attitude towards history. Only a democratic and
legalistic Russia (in the European sense of the words) can be a
strategic partner for the united Europe.
At the same time, the EU has to remember that Russia is not the only
subject in the post-Soviet area. There is also Ukraine, Moldova,
Georgia, as well as Belarus, even with its grotesque dictator
Lukashenka. Let alone the others. The only thing that those countries
had until recently had in common was a Soviet way of thinking about
the state and about politics.
Georgia and Ukraine have made only their first step towards
Europe. The EU, and, more broadly, the West have to make sure now that
they continue on this path. If they keep building genuine civic
societies, the door to Europe has to be open increasingly wide for
them.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress