TURKEY IS NO MORE AZERBAIJAN'S `HOSTAGE'?
Azat Artsakh - Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR)
03 March 05
The society in Karabakh holds the opinion that Azerbaijan and Turkey
cannot have controversies in foreign policy. This opinion formed due
to Ankara's support of Baku's standpoint in the settlement of the
Karabakh conflict. However, it would not be correct to argue that
everything is smooth in the Turkish-Azerbaijani relationships, as well
as in reference to our conflict with Azerbaijan. Still Abulfaz
Elchibey was disappointed with Turkey's policy on Armenia and Nagorni
Karabakh, who relied on the military assistance of Ankara in the war
provoked by him in 1992. However, Elchibey's hopes did not come
true. Moreover, to Baku's surprise, although defending Azerbaijan in
the question of Karabakh, Ankara let the Baku authorities know that
they were interested in establishing normal relationships with
Armenia. Thus, in the same year of 1992 the foreign minister of Turkey
then Hikmet Chetin announced that Ankara was willing to set up
diplomatic relationships with Yerevan at the condition that the latter
showed `good will' towards Azerbaijan. This `good will' was, in
Turkey's opinion, withdrawal of Karabakh forces backed by Armenia from
Shushi and Lachin yet holding control over the rest of the territory
of Nagorni Karabakh. The administration of the former president of
Armenia Levon Ter-Petrossian could not take such a step. Instead, in
order to show that Yerevan was willing to setup diplomatic
relationships with Ankara Levon Ter-Petrossian stood up against the
claim of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation on the necessity of
recognition of the Republic of Nagorni Karabakh by Armenia. In answer
to this Turkey agreed to supply 100 thousand tons of grain to Armenia,
as well as secretly signed an agreement with Armenia on supply of
electricity. However, this agreement was not brought to being. The
reason was the reaction of Baku which, nevertheless, learned about the
secret Turkish-Armenian agreement called`protocol on electric
energy'. The Azerbaijani foreign minister then Tofik Kasumov evaluated
the Turkish-Armenian agreement as a stab in the back. In addition to
this, the Turkish opposition heavily criticized the policy of official
Ankara. Asa result in November 1992 Turkish authorities had to annul
the `protocol on electric energy'. There is another interesting
fact. At the beginning of April 1993 when the Karabakh forces set foot
on the region of Kelbajar, the Azerbaijani president Abulfaz Elchibey
turned to Ankara with the request of evacuating the civilians of the
region by Turkish helicopters. However, the prime ministerof Turkey
Suleiman Demirel refused to help Azerbaijan fearing direct involvement
of his country in the conflict, as well as confrontation with
Moscow. The only thing Ankara could do at that time was to forbid
shipment of humanitarian aid through the airspace of Turkey. In the
following years too, there were controversies in the
Turkish-Azerbaijani relationships. This kind of behaviour on the part
of Turkey is described first of all by the fact that regulation ofthe
Turkish-Armenian relationships would play a significant role in more
effective penetration of Turkey into Azerbaijan, and later the newly
independent countries of Central Asia. Besides, later the West
appealed to Turkey to normalize relationships with Armenia as a
condition for Turkey's membership to the European Union. After the
election of Ahmet Nejet Sezer president of Turkeythe
Turkish-Azerbaijani relationships took a real test. The actions of the
new head of the Turkish state showed that he aimed to take his country
out of the situation of Azerbaijan's `political hostage', in which it
appeared because of the Nagorni Karabakh conflict and the striving to
build the oil pipeline which would become the main export route of the
Caspian oil to the West through Azerbaijan. These two issues were
closely interwoven in the Turkish =80` Azerbaijani relationships,
because Heidar Aliev hoped that in answer to the choice of the route
Baku-Tbilisi-Geihan (Turkey) Ankara would lobby the ideas of
military-political and economic pressure on Armenia aiming to make
Yerevan surrender in the Karabakh issue, and second, would get
Turkey's support in passing power in Azerbaijan to his son Ilham
Aliev. The former Turkish president Suleiman Demirel tended to conduct
just the same policy which greatly determined the friendly
relationships between the leaders of the two states. However, as it
was mentioned above, the Turkish policy of not accepting Armenia did
not correspond to the interests of the West, first of all
Washington. In this reference it is interesting to know the opinion of
one of the leading American experts on Turkey and Iran Graham Fuller
representing the `RAND Corporation'.In his article entitled `Grand
Geopolitics for New Turkey' Mr. Fuller mentioned that in its Caucasian
policy Turkey should face Armenia. According to the author of the
article, today Armenia is Russia's hostage because of its fear of
Turkish blockade and its dependence on Moscow in the questions of its
security. Therefore, the American political scientist advised Turkey
to improve its relationships with Europe, which would relieve
Armenia's fears providing itself with an alternative way to Europe and
will offer new opportunities for the settlement of the Karabakh
issue. Ahmet Nejet Sezer and his government could not but take into
consideration the moods of the West. But how to explain Turkey's
liberation from the pressure of alliance with Azerbaijan? The chance
arose after Heidar Aliev, according to Ankara, gave too weak a
reaction to the recognition of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey
by France in January 2001. `If Aliev can negotiate with its own enemy
Armenia through Turkey's enemy France,why cannot Turkey do the same?'
asked famous Turkish publicist Fatih Altaili in the influential
Turkish newspaper `Hyuriet'. The relationships of the two countries
deteriorated after Ilham Aliev took the office in Azerbaijan. First
the Azerbaijani president was discontent with Turkey's announcement
about their willingness to set up diplomatic relationships with
Armenia and opening joint check pointsat the Turkish-Armenian
border. In answer to this Ilham Aliev aroused the anger of Turkish
authorities endorsing the variant of settlement of the issue of Cyprus
which did not favour Ankara. Then, for the aim of repayment of the
accrued debts Turkey arrested Azerbaijani ships. At the same time
under the guise of struggle against tax avoidance biased checking of
the activity of a number of Turkish companies working in this country
was launched. After this historians got into a fight. Thus, doctor of
history Farid Alekperov announced in his article that the alliance
between Lenin and Ataturk put an end to the independent state of
Azerbaijan in 1918-1920. The former foreign political adviser Vafa
Guluzadeh also accused Turkey of betrayal in those years. The
Azerbaijani journalists also did not abstain from making
accusations. For example, Elmira Akhundova in her article `Dispelled
Illusions' literally stated, `The senior brother Turk showed the
entire world that he places his personal interests above
everything. And he will never give up his interests, even if he owes
his junior blood brother after lasting separation=80¦ So it is high
time to realize that we have no `brothers' abroad. There are
companions, mutually favourable interests, not more. And all the
judgements about a `unified nation' are a mere romantic veil for their
striving to present the desirable instead of the real.' And in one of
the May 2004 issues of the newspaper `Zerkalo' ofBaku wrote the
following. `Once again it should be emphasized that an open
anti-Turkish campaign was launched in Azerbaijan,' states the
newspaper, =80=9Cit should be predicted that sooner of later it will
provoke the negative attitude of the political circles of Turkey. If
the number of people involved in the Turkish authorities interested in
breaking relationships with Azerbaijan grows, it may turn into a
disaster for us.' `There is an impression that the Turkish prime
minister R. Erdoghan and the president of Azerbaijan are not `on
brotherly terms' at all, ' supposed famous Azerbaijani journalist Rauf
Mirkadirov. Although recently the Turkish - Azerbaijani relationships
seem to have ameliorated, it does not mean that all the obstructions
in these relationships have been eliminated, including in the foreign
political sphere. At least because after on Azerbaijan will again
demand from Turkey not to establish any relationships with Armenia,
which does not correspond to the interests of Turkey for the following
reasons: a) the vacuum in the Turkish - Armenian relationships hinders
Ankara's plans of military-political and economic penetration into the
entire South Caucasus; b) the unequivocal endorsement of Baku's
standpoint in the Karabakh issue does not allow Turkey (because of the
counteraction of Yerevan and Baku) to play one of the important roles
in the mediating mission for the settlementof the problem of Nagorni
Karabakh, which would strengthen the influence of Turkey in the
region; c) the absence of normal Turkish - Armenian relationships
inevitably results in the growing military cooperation between Armenia
and Russia, which is perceived by Turkey as a direct threat to its
security; d) internal confrontation between Ankara and Yerevan favours
the regional opponent of Turkey - Islamic Iran; e) the above mentioned
circumstances contradict to the regional interests of the strategic
ally of Ankara, Washington which seeks to oust Russia from the South
Caucasus and prevent Iranian influence there. Summing up, we may
suppose that the development of Turkish - Azerbaijani relationships
will go on according to the Turkish plan. Most probably this
circumstance will come forth after the opening of the pipeline Baku -
Tbilisi =80` Geihan this year. Probably later we shall witness
dissatisfaction of the Baku authorities with the Azerbaijani policies
of Turkey.
ALEXANDER GRIGORIAN.
03-03-2005
Azat Artsakh - Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR)
03 March 05
The society in Karabakh holds the opinion that Azerbaijan and Turkey
cannot have controversies in foreign policy. This opinion formed due
to Ankara's support of Baku's standpoint in the settlement of the
Karabakh conflict. However, it would not be correct to argue that
everything is smooth in the Turkish-Azerbaijani relationships, as well
as in reference to our conflict with Azerbaijan. Still Abulfaz
Elchibey was disappointed with Turkey's policy on Armenia and Nagorni
Karabakh, who relied on the military assistance of Ankara in the war
provoked by him in 1992. However, Elchibey's hopes did not come
true. Moreover, to Baku's surprise, although defending Azerbaijan in
the question of Karabakh, Ankara let the Baku authorities know that
they were interested in establishing normal relationships with
Armenia. Thus, in the same year of 1992 the foreign minister of Turkey
then Hikmet Chetin announced that Ankara was willing to set up
diplomatic relationships with Yerevan at the condition that the latter
showed `good will' towards Azerbaijan. This `good will' was, in
Turkey's opinion, withdrawal of Karabakh forces backed by Armenia from
Shushi and Lachin yet holding control over the rest of the territory
of Nagorni Karabakh. The administration of the former president of
Armenia Levon Ter-Petrossian could not take such a step. Instead, in
order to show that Yerevan was willing to setup diplomatic
relationships with Ankara Levon Ter-Petrossian stood up against the
claim of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation on the necessity of
recognition of the Republic of Nagorni Karabakh by Armenia. In answer
to this Turkey agreed to supply 100 thousand tons of grain to Armenia,
as well as secretly signed an agreement with Armenia on supply of
electricity. However, this agreement was not brought to being. The
reason was the reaction of Baku which, nevertheless, learned about the
secret Turkish-Armenian agreement called`protocol on electric
energy'. The Azerbaijani foreign minister then Tofik Kasumov evaluated
the Turkish-Armenian agreement as a stab in the back. In addition to
this, the Turkish opposition heavily criticized the policy of official
Ankara. Asa result in November 1992 Turkish authorities had to annul
the `protocol on electric energy'. There is another interesting
fact. At the beginning of April 1993 when the Karabakh forces set foot
on the region of Kelbajar, the Azerbaijani president Abulfaz Elchibey
turned to Ankara with the request of evacuating the civilians of the
region by Turkish helicopters. However, the prime ministerof Turkey
Suleiman Demirel refused to help Azerbaijan fearing direct involvement
of his country in the conflict, as well as confrontation with
Moscow. The only thing Ankara could do at that time was to forbid
shipment of humanitarian aid through the airspace of Turkey. In the
following years too, there were controversies in the
Turkish-Azerbaijani relationships. This kind of behaviour on the part
of Turkey is described first of all by the fact that regulation ofthe
Turkish-Armenian relationships would play a significant role in more
effective penetration of Turkey into Azerbaijan, and later the newly
independent countries of Central Asia. Besides, later the West
appealed to Turkey to normalize relationships with Armenia as a
condition for Turkey's membership to the European Union. After the
election of Ahmet Nejet Sezer president of Turkeythe
Turkish-Azerbaijani relationships took a real test. The actions of the
new head of the Turkish state showed that he aimed to take his country
out of the situation of Azerbaijan's `political hostage', in which it
appeared because of the Nagorni Karabakh conflict and the striving to
build the oil pipeline which would become the main export route of the
Caspian oil to the West through Azerbaijan. These two issues were
closely interwoven in the Turkish =80` Azerbaijani relationships,
because Heidar Aliev hoped that in answer to the choice of the route
Baku-Tbilisi-Geihan (Turkey) Ankara would lobby the ideas of
military-political and economic pressure on Armenia aiming to make
Yerevan surrender in the Karabakh issue, and second, would get
Turkey's support in passing power in Azerbaijan to his son Ilham
Aliev. The former Turkish president Suleiman Demirel tended to conduct
just the same policy which greatly determined the friendly
relationships between the leaders of the two states. However, as it
was mentioned above, the Turkish policy of not accepting Armenia did
not correspond to the interests of the West, first of all
Washington. In this reference it is interesting to know the opinion of
one of the leading American experts on Turkey and Iran Graham Fuller
representing the `RAND Corporation'.In his article entitled `Grand
Geopolitics for New Turkey' Mr. Fuller mentioned that in its Caucasian
policy Turkey should face Armenia. According to the author of the
article, today Armenia is Russia's hostage because of its fear of
Turkish blockade and its dependence on Moscow in the questions of its
security. Therefore, the American political scientist advised Turkey
to improve its relationships with Europe, which would relieve
Armenia's fears providing itself with an alternative way to Europe and
will offer new opportunities for the settlement of the Karabakh
issue. Ahmet Nejet Sezer and his government could not but take into
consideration the moods of the West. But how to explain Turkey's
liberation from the pressure of alliance with Azerbaijan? The chance
arose after Heidar Aliev, according to Ankara, gave too weak a
reaction to the recognition of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey
by France in January 2001. `If Aliev can negotiate with its own enemy
Armenia through Turkey's enemy France,why cannot Turkey do the same?'
asked famous Turkish publicist Fatih Altaili in the influential
Turkish newspaper `Hyuriet'. The relationships of the two countries
deteriorated after Ilham Aliev took the office in Azerbaijan. First
the Azerbaijani president was discontent with Turkey's announcement
about their willingness to set up diplomatic relationships with
Armenia and opening joint check pointsat the Turkish-Armenian
border. In answer to this Ilham Aliev aroused the anger of Turkish
authorities endorsing the variant of settlement of the issue of Cyprus
which did not favour Ankara. Then, for the aim of repayment of the
accrued debts Turkey arrested Azerbaijani ships. At the same time
under the guise of struggle against tax avoidance biased checking of
the activity of a number of Turkish companies working in this country
was launched. After this historians got into a fight. Thus, doctor of
history Farid Alekperov announced in his article that the alliance
between Lenin and Ataturk put an end to the independent state of
Azerbaijan in 1918-1920. The former foreign political adviser Vafa
Guluzadeh also accused Turkey of betrayal in those years. The
Azerbaijani journalists also did not abstain from making
accusations. For example, Elmira Akhundova in her article `Dispelled
Illusions' literally stated, `The senior brother Turk showed the
entire world that he places his personal interests above
everything. And he will never give up his interests, even if he owes
his junior blood brother after lasting separation=80¦ So it is high
time to realize that we have no `brothers' abroad. There are
companions, mutually favourable interests, not more. And all the
judgements about a `unified nation' are a mere romantic veil for their
striving to present the desirable instead of the real.' And in one of
the May 2004 issues of the newspaper `Zerkalo' ofBaku wrote the
following. `Once again it should be emphasized that an open
anti-Turkish campaign was launched in Azerbaijan,' states the
newspaper, =80=9Cit should be predicted that sooner of later it will
provoke the negative attitude of the political circles of Turkey. If
the number of people involved in the Turkish authorities interested in
breaking relationships with Azerbaijan grows, it may turn into a
disaster for us.' `There is an impression that the Turkish prime
minister R. Erdoghan and the president of Azerbaijan are not `on
brotherly terms' at all, ' supposed famous Azerbaijani journalist Rauf
Mirkadirov. Although recently the Turkish - Azerbaijani relationships
seem to have ameliorated, it does not mean that all the obstructions
in these relationships have been eliminated, including in the foreign
political sphere. At least because after on Azerbaijan will again
demand from Turkey not to establish any relationships with Armenia,
which does not correspond to the interests of Turkey for the following
reasons: a) the vacuum in the Turkish - Armenian relationships hinders
Ankara's plans of military-political and economic penetration into the
entire South Caucasus; b) the unequivocal endorsement of Baku's
standpoint in the Karabakh issue does not allow Turkey (because of the
counteraction of Yerevan and Baku) to play one of the important roles
in the mediating mission for the settlementof the problem of Nagorni
Karabakh, which would strengthen the influence of Turkey in the
region; c) the absence of normal Turkish - Armenian relationships
inevitably results in the growing military cooperation between Armenia
and Russia, which is perceived by Turkey as a direct threat to its
security; d) internal confrontation between Ankara and Yerevan favours
the regional opponent of Turkey - Islamic Iran; e) the above mentioned
circumstances contradict to the regional interests of the strategic
ally of Ankara, Washington which seeks to oust Russia from the South
Caucasus and prevent Iranian influence there. Summing up, we may
suppose that the development of Turkish - Azerbaijani relationships
will go on according to the Turkish plan. Most probably this
circumstance will come forth after the opening of the pipeline Baku -
Tbilisi =80` Geihan this year. Probably later we shall witness
dissatisfaction of the Baku authorities with the Azerbaijani policies
of Turkey.
ALEXANDER GRIGORIAN.
03-03-2005