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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
March 8, 2005 Tuesday
CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN BLACK SEA AREA
TESTIMONY-BY: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
AFFILIATION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Statement of Ambassador John F. Tefft Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs Department of State
Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European
Affairs
March 8, 2005
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senators, I am delighted to be with you this afternoon
to discuss the current state of democracy in the Black Sea region and
the prospects for further democratic evolution there. While we
address aspects of this important issue in one way or another
literally every day at the State Department, occasions for reflecting
comprehensively on the region in its entirety are rare. So I
especially value the chance to share my thoughts with you today on
where we are with U.S. policy towards the countries of the region and
where we are headed. The topic is certainly timely, with this past
Sunday's parliamentary elections in Moldova, and the memory of
Ukraine's dramatic presidential contest still fresh.
Overview The nine nations of the Black Sea region - Romania,
Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Russia - are diverse and hard to characterize as a group.
Geographical proximity and overlapping histories have created rivalry
and friction as well as cooperation and alliance; centrifugal forces
impelling countries outward compete with a strong pull towards
greater regional integration. U.S. policy by necessity takes the
specific characteristics of each country and its unique geopolitical
situation into account and deals with each accordingly. There are
some broad commonalities: Black Sea states are all members of the
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and either
members of NATO or NATO's Partnership for Peace. They belong,
together with Greece, Albania, and Serbia-Montenegro, to the
Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Incidentally,
we are now considering, in consultation with BSEC members, the
possibility of U.S. participation as an observer at the BSEC. Energy
transport is one of the strongest links among the Black Sea nations.
Energy pipelines; existing, (Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Blue
Stream, Odesa-Brody), under construction, (Baku- Tblisi-Ceyhan) and
planned (multiple Bosphorus bypass plans) crisscross the region and
create real opportunities for cooperation and the development of a
regional dialogue. Coordination between energy exporting states and
transit nations is needed to solve Bosphorus bottlenecks and develop
efficient solutions to ensure that energy supplies reach the world
market.
The United States has consistently worked towards this goal through
encouragement of multiple pipelines and export routes. But with a
closer look, the similarities among these countries start to break
down: They vary in size from huge (Russia over 140 million people,
next is Turkey with 70 + million) to rather small (Moldova some 4
million, Armenia 3 million). They are also at different stages of
economic development. For example Turkey, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria
fall firmly in the World Bank's middle income category, with annual
GDP per capita well over two thousand dollars. Others, such as
Moldova and the Caucasus countries, lag behind, with yearly income
under one thousand dollars per person. Most of the countries belong
to the World Trade Organization - Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan are
the exceptions. On the other end of the economic integration scale,
Romania and Bulgaria are solid candidates for EU membership this
decade; Turkey, already an OECD member, is likely to be next after
them.
Geostrategic differences are also striking. Three countries: Turkey
since the Cold War, and Romania and Bulgaria since last year - are
NATO members; the others, former republics of the USSR, belong,
however loosely, to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Four of these CIS states, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova,
together with Uzbekistan, form GUUAM, an organization with projects
on law enforcement cooperation and development of essential economic
infrastructure. Last week (March 2) in Chisinau Presidents
Saakashvili, Yushchenko, and Voronin jointly called for revitalizing
GUUAM as Moldova assumes chairmanship next month. Separatist
conflicts impede nation- building and democratization in a number of
the Black Sea region's countries, and the United States is actively
engaged in solving those conflicts. Significant differences remain
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, but Presidents
Kocharian and Aliyev are committed to a peaceful resolution. We
support the OSCE Minsk Group's efforts to advance towards a
settlement there, and are encouraged by discussions over the last
year towards a negotiated settlement. Transnistrian provocations
caused the collapse of Moldovan political settlement talks last
summer. Nevertheless we continue to work with Moldova and OSCE
partners, to press Russia to work with us and the international
community to promote progress on settlement in Moldova. In Georgia,
we support President Saakashvili's goal of reuniting the country, and
encourage Georgia to resolve the conflicts in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in a peaceful manner. We also continue to insist that Russia
fulfill its remaining Istanbul commitments on the withdrawal of its
forces from Moldova and on reaching agreement with Georgia on the
duration and status of Russia forces there. Throughout these
protracted conflicts, the United States has been consistent in
supporting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and
Georgia, as well as of the Russian Federation with respect to the
Chechen separatist movement. These facts provide a context for the
discussion of these countries' different levels of democratic
development as well. Freedom House, in its 2005 comparative ranking
of the world's countries, found two of the Black Sea states (Romania,
Bulgaria) meet its standards for "Free" countries, another two
(Russia, Azerbaijan) fall so far short of those standards that they
rated "Not Free." The other five fall in between; Freedom House
categorizes them as "Partly Free. Our Human Rights Report for 2004,
just released to Congress on February 28, while it does not use such
specific categories, also reflects the divergence Freedom House found
in the democracy and human rights records of these countries.
I'd like to consider democracy and democratization in each of these
countries, and what the U.S. Government is doing to improve the
record. Romania In December 2004, Romania underwent a democratic
transition, with the candidate representing an alliance of opposition
parties winning a very close presidential runoff election. Civil
society organizations (including some that received U.S. assistance)
played a strong role as election monitors, in advocating an
"issue-based" political campaign, and in pressing for non-biased
media coverage of the campaign. President Basescu is scheduled to
meet with President Bush on March 9. The leaders of the former
government, including the former President and Prime Minister, now
serve in Romania's parliament. Romania believes its location on the
Black Sea, its membership in NATO (since May 2004), and its
prospective membership in the EU (projected for January 2007) leave
it well- placed to provide a bridge to Europe for the countries of
the Caucasus. In particular, the Romanians believe they can serve as
a model for these democratizing countries. To this end, Romania has
been active in the Community of Democracies initiative, and recently
organized an international mission to Georgia of NGO and other
experts to discuss media freedom, judicial reform, and other
democracy issues. Romania also sees opportunities to reach out to its
Black Sea neighbors on economic and security issues.
Romania is the host country for the Southeast Europe Cooperative
Initiative (SECI), and is involved in outreach efforts to Black Sea
littoral and regional states on cooperative law enforcement
initiatives, including customs and border security initiatives,
anti-narcotics and trafficking-in-persons initiatives. The United
States has provided assistance for these regional, cooperative
efforts. We continue to press the Government of Romania to promote
media freedom, and combat corruption. Bulgaria Bulgaria's sixth
national elections since 1990 are scheduled for June 2005 with a
wide, but moderate, political spectrum expected to participate.
Elections since 1990 have met acceptable standards and reflect the
will of the Bulgarian people. Over the last 15 years Bulgaria has
established a fully functioning, free-market democracy, marked by
strong public support for full Euro-Atlantic integration. Bulgaria
entered NATO in March 2004, and is scheduled to sign an EU accession
agreement in April 2005 leading to full membership in 2007. Aside
from supporting Euro-Atlantic integration, U.S.
Government efforts to ensure stable democratic focus on strengthening
local governments, civil society and a free press. Bulgaria is a
natural route for trafficking in narcotics, contraband and persons.
Like many countries in the region, Bulgaria suffers from substantial
organized crime and corruption that threatens democratic development
and successful Euro- Atlantic integration. Reform of the weak
judicial system is a pressing need, as is greater transparency in
public procurement and privatizations. Bilateral law enforcement
cooperation with the United States has expanded significantly over
the past two years; the Embassy now hosts the U.S. Secret Service,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation plans to open an office in
early FY 2005. The U.S. Government has assisted in legal reforms,
including legislation to combat trafficking in persons, witness
protection, anti-money laundering and regulation of public
procurement. An important USAID legacy mechanism is the National
Institute of Justice (NIJ), which opened last year and is already one
of the leading institutions in Eastern Europe for training
magistrates. Ambassador Pardew is vocal about the need for the
Bulgarian government to face these challenges; just this week the
Ambassador publicly expressed support for a declaration by 14 NGOs
calling for all political forces to commit themselves to judicial
reform. On the border between NATO/EU countries and Eurasia, Bulgaria
sees itself playing a significant role in the region. Bulgaria
considers democratic reform and development of market economies and
free trade in the region, and good neighborly relations with
countries to its east, as important to its own national interest,
placing a priority on the development of NATO's role in the regional
security system. Turkey Turkey, a staunch NATO ally, is a functioning
secular democracy with a constitutional government. In an effort to
meet the requirements for EU membership, the Government carried out
extensive democratic legal reforms during this past year. For example
in September 2003 Parliament adopted a new Penal Code, and in May
2004 adopted a new package of constitutional amendments. These
reforms were designed to crack down on torture and "honor killings,"
and expand freedom of religion and association. Turkey has made rapid
progress in meeting the EU political criteria laid out during the
Copenhagen Summit in 2002, and on December 17, 2004 the EU decided
that accession talks with Turkey would start in October this year.
The European Union's historic decision to start accession talks for
Turkey is a major success not only for the Turkish people, but for
Europe as well. Nonetheless, some problems remain. We continue to
press Turkey to resolve Greek Orthodox Church property issues and
open the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary.
Alevis, a heterodox offshoot of Shi'a Islam, is concerned with
discrimination by the majority Sunni population and Sunni-run
Religious Affairs Directorate, and Kurdish rights within general
civil rights remain a sensitive issue. The United States supports
Turkey's efforts to implement the reforms instituted in order to gain
accession to the European Union. We continue to urge full respect for
human rights, including freedom of speech and the press, freedom of
religion, as well as rule of law. Ukraine In one of the most
significant events of 2004, an event marking a victory for democracy,
the Ukrainian people succeeded in overturning a fraudulent
presidential election and achieving a final outcome that reflected
the will of the voters. Ukraine's democratic institutions
demonstrated surprising strength in the face of persistent attempts
by elements within the previous government and among oligarchic clans
to subvert democratic processes.
When confronted with allegations of widespread fraud, the judicial
system ultimately acted in an independent manner, and the legislative
branch behaved responsibly in helping to broker a political solution
to the crisis. Many journalists at state- and oligarch-owned media
enterprises stopped taking instructions from the Presidential
Administration and started to report news accurately and objectively.
NGOs and civil society organizations took the lead in organizing
peaceful demonstrations in support of a democratic outcome. It is not
true, as some have said, that the U.S. funded or otherwise supported
any candidate or party in the election. However, over a decade of
U.S. assistance for a democratic process was a contributing factor to
the positive outcome. Over a period of many months, the U.S. and our
European allies repeatedly advised Ukrainian authorities, publicly
and privately, that we were watching the election closely and
considered it a test of Ukraine's commitment to democracy. The United
States funded local civil society groups to conduct voter education
and get-out-the-vote campaigns. We supported the work of independent
media to improve coverage of campaign issues. We provided nonpartisan
training to political parties and leaders, trained election officials
and observers, and more. Our election- related assistance to Ukraine
was approximately $18 million. Of particular note, the U.S. funded
what we believe was an unprecedented election-observer effort,
domestic and international, which turned out to be critical in
spotlighting electoral fraud, particularly in the November 21 second
round. As Yushchenko and his team turn to the task of governing, they
face a great many challenges. The "Orange Revolution" spurred a
reaction in eastern and southern Ukraine, where some officials began
speaking of federation, autonomy, and even secession and
independence. This would be disastrous for Ukraine and for the
region.
Fortunately, then-President Kuchma summoned these governors and
ordered them to cease and desist. Nevertheless, there is disaffection
in Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine which Yushchenko needs to
address. He also has his work cut out for him in combating endemic
corruption, reforming the economy, consolidating democratic reforms
and promoting human rights. Managing relations with Russia will also
be critical. We look forward to President Yushchenko's visit to the
United States early next month. Moldova Moldova's campaign period in
advance of the March 6 parliamentary elections has been blemished
with irregularities, such as media access issues, harassment of
opposition, and misuse of administrative resources. However,
international criticism, including the Department's engagement and a
Sense of the Senate resolution, prior to election day positively
encouraged the Moldovan Government to take corrective measures. The
United States has provided some $1.7 million for election related
assistance in the past year to support development of the Moldovan
electoral administration and legal framework, independent media,
civic involvement, nonpartisan political party training, and election
monitoring. Again, our focus is on a free and fair electoral process,
not on any particular party or candidate. The results of Sunday's
election show to what extent the Moldovan leadership's late
corrective measures to make the campaign more fair allowed OSCE/ODIHR
to assess the elections as generally meeting international standards.
(Note: Oral testimony will update the Subcommittee on the results of
the March 6 elections.) Moldova's foreign policy priority is to
integrate with the European Union, as manifested by its recent
conclusion of an EU Action Plan. We support Moldova's efforts towards
this goal, and we would hope that its participation in the GUUAM
regional group could be deepened even further after Moldova assumes
the rotating presidency later this spring. The repressive
Transnistrian separatists are an impediment to regional stability and
democracy. We are therefore actively looking for ways to resolve the
Transnistria conflict in a manner that would strengthen Moldova's
territorial integrity and also be supported by its people and have
international credibility. We believe enhanced international
participation could give new impetus to the stalled negotiation
process, and are consulting with our EU, OSCE, Ukrainian, and Russian
partners as to the most effective way forward. Equally important,
Moldova, the United States, and our NATO allies continue to press
Russia to fulfill its commitments made at the 1999 OSCE Summit in
Istanbul to complete the withdrawal of its military forces from
Moldova. Georgia The Rose Revolution of 2003 demonstrated that
Georgians desire fair elections and good governance, and are capable
of holding their government accountable. Since the Rose Revolution,
Georgia has made significant internal reforms to fight official
corruption, consolidate bureaucracy and increase revenue collection
in order to provide better services to its own citizens. Progress in
Georgia is hampered by ongoing separatist conflicts in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia; the international community should stand firm to
encourage Georgia to resolve these conflicts peacefully. Internal
reform will strengthen the economy and create incentives for the
separatist regions to integrate into Georgia.
Georgia clearly aspires to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions; the
United States welcomes the EU's Wider Europe program in the South
Caucasus and encourages Europe to work closely with Georgia and its
neighbors in support of civil society, human rights, and democratic
development. We also continue to support talks between Georgia and
Russia on the 1999 Istanbul commitments to reach agreement on the
status and duration of remaining Russian bases in Georgia. Armenia
Armenia has made significant economic and social progress since its
independence; however, the flawed presidential and parliamentary
elections of 2003 demonstrate that it has some way to go to
strengthen its democratic institutions and ensure an equitable
balance of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial
branches. Armenia needs to take steps to improve its poor human
rights record. The United States is providing extensive assistance to
strengthen the National Assembly, the judiciary and local government
institutions in Armenia. Further reform is hampered by Armenia's
relatively isolated position and the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, which has been an enormous drain on the government's
resources for over ten years.
We welcome Armenia's attempt to work within the BSEC to expand its
economic and other ties to the region, including with Turkey.
Azerbaijan The flawed presidential elections of 2003 demonstrate that
Azerbaijan has far to go to strengthen its democratic institutions
and ensure an equitable balance of powers between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches. We are focusing on assistance
programs and diplomacy on improving election procedures and
strengthening Azerbaijan's democratic institutions as parliamentary
elections approach this fall. These elections will be an important
test of Azerbaijan's progress toward democratization. Azerbaijan also
needs to take steps to improve its poor human rights record.
Azerbaijan's economic progress in the next year will depend on its
ability to direct oil funds toward non-oil sector development.
Political and economic reform is hampered by the ongoing
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as in Armenia, an enormous drain on the
government's resources for over ten years. Azerbaijan continues to
offer extensive and invaluable support to the United States for the
Global War on Terror, including but not limited to blanket overflight
rights, the use of Azerbaijan military bases, information sharing,
and law enforcement cooperation.
We welcome Azerbaijan's attempt to work within the BSEC to expand its
economic and other ties to the region. Russia Russia is experiencing
an erosion of its democratic institutions and processes. Especially
over the past two years, checks and balances among the branches of
government have weakened. The Duma offers no meaningful counterweight
to the executive, national television networks are under state
control, and democratic values have yet to be inculcated in Russia's
political culture. At the same time, there has been little resistance
to this situation within Russia. While the electoral process was
flawed, President Putin was re-elected last year with a solid
majority. Independent polling indicates that as living standards
improve and the threat of terrorism increases, a majority of the
population continues to favor order and stability above all else. The
Russian Government's efforts to centralize control have taken
advantage of this popular sentiment, further postponing the
development of democratic, accountable governance. Despite some
indications that the situation in Chechnya has improved, basic
security is lacking as terrorists and insurgents continue to battle
pro-Moscow Chechens and federal forces, and human rights violations
continue with impunity. A flawed presidential election in August 2004
did not advance a political solution to the conflict. Terrorist
attacks at Beslan and elsewhere pose a threat to the region. Conflict
appears to be spreading across the North Caucasus, due to a
combination of terrorist activities, religious extremism,
criminality, and the weakness of state structures in the region. As
the situation on the ground allows, we will look for opportunities to
provide development assistance to people in the North Caucasus.
Russia and the United States have shared interests in stability and
economic development in the Black Sea region but differ over how
these goals should be interpreted and pursued. We both want to fight
weapons trafficking, narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money
laundering, and terrorist organizations in the Black Sea region. To
achieve this goal, the U.S. wants to encourage regional stability.
Russia shares the U.S. desire for stability, but appears to interpret
stability in a fundamentally different way. Russia has been critical
of the programs the EU is pursuing under its Neighborhood Policy to
create a string of well-governed states on the EU's border and that
in the Black Sea region, which explicitly includes Georgia and
Ukraine. Russia defines stability as preservation of the status quo,
with regimes it knows well. Russian support for separatists in other
countries appears to be means in part of maintaining levers of
influence in Moldova and Georgia.
For the same reason, Russia has been slow to close its remaining
bases in Georgia and remove its troops from Transnistria. U.S. and
Russian goals overlap more closely on the practical matter of
shutting down transshipment and smuggling routes on the Black Sea.
The U.S. supports and encourages Russia's participation in the Black
Sea Force, its cooperation with coast guards of littoral states, and
its participation in Operation Active Endeavor. Russian and U.S.
views also overlap on the issue of Russia's Black Sea Fleet as an
important element in regional security. The U.S. encourages continued
Russian-Ukrainian cooperation that will allow Russia to lease port
facilities at Sevastopol at least through the current agreement's end
in 2017. The U.S. and Russia have a shared interest in economic
development and trade, in particular as concerns projects to bring
Russian and Caspian Basin oil and gas to European and world markets.
We hope President Putin's December 2004 visit to Turkey and President
Erdogan's visit to Russia the following month will help advance such
cooperation. At the same time, conflicts over the direction of the
Odesa-Brody pipeline and other projects demonstrate that tensions
exist over questions of whose oil and gas will get to market over
whose territory.
Moscow continues to react strongly over a possible U.S. military role
in the region. This can be seen particularly in the pressure that
Russia has placed on Georgia to agree to a "no foreign bases" clause
in a Georgia Russia Framework Treaty, and it can be seen also in
Russia's displeasure over the U.S. Georgia Train and Equip Program
(GTEP) and Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) to
train Georgian forces. We have made clear to Moscow at very senior
levels that we have no plans for establishing U.S. bases in Georgia.
Russia's concerns are likely to increase as Ukraine moves closer to
NATO. We are also urging Russia to stop obstructing an Organization
of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) border monitoring operation
along the Chechnya portion of the Russian-Georgian border. We believe
this monitoring operation has played an important role in deterring
the possible movement of international terrorists and Chechen
fighters between Russia and Georgia. Assistance Finally a word on
U.S. assistance programs to the region. U.S. Government assistance
targets enhancing regional cooperation and development as well as to
support reform bilaterally. Our support for the GUUAM organization is
enabling these countries to cooperate in law enforcement and
harmonize their trade and transportation regimes. The Southeast
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which includes Bulgaria,
Romania, and Moldova (in addition to other countries that are not
"Black Sea states"), serves as a regional assistance model for GUUAM
projects. Since 2000, SECI has promoted cross-border cooperation in
Southeast Europe in the fight against organized crime, as well as
reform and harmonization of customs services to promote economic
development and facilitate trade. Democracy assistance is key to our
broader bilateral assistance programs in this region that, with the
exception of Turkey, are funded through the Support for East European
Democracy (SEED) and FREEDOM Support Acts. Under these accounts we
will be providing approximately $126 million in FY 2005 to support
civil society, access to information, pluralistic political
processes, local governance and rule of law in these countries.
Political changes in Georgia and Ukraine in the past year reflect a
desire by these countries - and their people - to establish
themselves as democratic market economies. Our assistance continues
to support their efforts to combat corruption and integrate them into
the world economy, including the Black Sea region.
I welcome your comments and questions.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
March 8, 2005 Tuesday
CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN BLACK SEA AREA
TESTIMONY-BY: AMBASSADOR JOHN F. TEFFT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
AFFILIATION: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Statement of Ambassador John F. Tefft Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs Department of State
Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European
Affairs
March 8, 2005
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senators, I am delighted to be with you this afternoon
to discuss the current state of democracy in the Black Sea region and
the prospects for further democratic evolution there. While we
address aspects of this important issue in one way or another
literally every day at the State Department, occasions for reflecting
comprehensively on the region in its entirety are rare. So I
especially value the chance to share my thoughts with you today on
where we are with U.S. policy towards the countries of the region and
where we are headed. The topic is certainly timely, with this past
Sunday's parliamentary elections in Moldova, and the memory of
Ukraine's dramatic presidential contest still fresh.
Overview The nine nations of the Black Sea region - Romania,
Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Russia - are diverse and hard to characterize as a group.
Geographical proximity and overlapping histories have created rivalry
and friction as well as cooperation and alliance; centrifugal forces
impelling countries outward compete with a strong pull towards
greater regional integration. U.S. policy by necessity takes the
specific characteristics of each country and its unique geopolitical
situation into account and deals with each accordingly. There are
some broad commonalities: Black Sea states are all members of the
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and either
members of NATO or NATO's Partnership for Peace. They belong,
together with Greece, Albania, and Serbia-Montenegro, to the
Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). Incidentally,
we are now considering, in consultation with BSEC members, the
possibility of U.S. participation as an observer at the BSEC. Energy
transport is one of the strongest links among the Black Sea nations.
Energy pipelines; existing, (Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Blue
Stream, Odesa-Brody), under construction, (Baku- Tblisi-Ceyhan) and
planned (multiple Bosphorus bypass plans) crisscross the region and
create real opportunities for cooperation and the development of a
regional dialogue. Coordination between energy exporting states and
transit nations is needed to solve Bosphorus bottlenecks and develop
efficient solutions to ensure that energy supplies reach the world
market.
The United States has consistently worked towards this goal through
encouragement of multiple pipelines and export routes. But with a
closer look, the similarities among these countries start to break
down: They vary in size from huge (Russia over 140 million people,
next is Turkey with 70 + million) to rather small (Moldova some 4
million, Armenia 3 million). They are also at different stages of
economic development. For example Turkey, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria
fall firmly in the World Bank's middle income category, with annual
GDP per capita well over two thousand dollars. Others, such as
Moldova and the Caucasus countries, lag behind, with yearly income
under one thousand dollars per person. Most of the countries belong
to the World Trade Organization - Russia, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan are
the exceptions. On the other end of the economic integration scale,
Romania and Bulgaria are solid candidates for EU membership this
decade; Turkey, already an OECD member, is likely to be next after
them.
Geostrategic differences are also striking. Three countries: Turkey
since the Cold War, and Romania and Bulgaria since last year - are
NATO members; the others, former republics of the USSR, belong,
however loosely, to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Four of these CIS states, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova,
together with Uzbekistan, form GUUAM, an organization with projects
on law enforcement cooperation and development of essential economic
infrastructure. Last week (March 2) in Chisinau Presidents
Saakashvili, Yushchenko, and Voronin jointly called for revitalizing
GUUAM as Moldova assumes chairmanship next month. Separatist
conflicts impede nation- building and democratization in a number of
the Black Sea region's countries, and the United States is actively
engaged in solving those conflicts. Significant differences remain
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, but Presidents
Kocharian and Aliyev are committed to a peaceful resolution. We
support the OSCE Minsk Group's efforts to advance towards a
settlement there, and are encouraged by discussions over the last
year towards a negotiated settlement. Transnistrian provocations
caused the collapse of Moldovan political settlement talks last
summer. Nevertheless we continue to work with Moldova and OSCE
partners, to press Russia to work with us and the international
community to promote progress on settlement in Moldova. In Georgia,
we support President Saakashvili's goal of reuniting the country, and
encourage Georgia to resolve the conflicts in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia in a peaceful manner. We also continue to insist that Russia
fulfill its remaining Istanbul commitments on the withdrawal of its
forces from Moldova and on reaching agreement with Georgia on the
duration and status of Russia forces there. Throughout these
protracted conflicts, the United States has been consistent in
supporting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Moldova, and
Georgia, as well as of the Russian Federation with respect to the
Chechen separatist movement. These facts provide a context for the
discussion of these countries' different levels of democratic
development as well. Freedom House, in its 2005 comparative ranking
of the world's countries, found two of the Black Sea states (Romania,
Bulgaria) meet its standards for "Free" countries, another two
(Russia, Azerbaijan) fall so far short of those standards that they
rated "Not Free." The other five fall in between; Freedom House
categorizes them as "Partly Free. Our Human Rights Report for 2004,
just released to Congress on February 28, while it does not use such
specific categories, also reflects the divergence Freedom House found
in the democracy and human rights records of these countries.
I'd like to consider democracy and democratization in each of these
countries, and what the U.S. Government is doing to improve the
record. Romania In December 2004, Romania underwent a democratic
transition, with the candidate representing an alliance of opposition
parties winning a very close presidential runoff election. Civil
society organizations (including some that received U.S. assistance)
played a strong role as election monitors, in advocating an
"issue-based" political campaign, and in pressing for non-biased
media coverage of the campaign. President Basescu is scheduled to
meet with President Bush on March 9. The leaders of the former
government, including the former President and Prime Minister, now
serve in Romania's parliament. Romania believes its location on the
Black Sea, its membership in NATO (since May 2004), and its
prospective membership in the EU (projected for January 2007) leave
it well- placed to provide a bridge to Europe for the countries of
the Caucasus. In particular, the Romanians believe they can serve as
a model for these democratizing countries. To this end, Romania has
been active in the Community of Democracies initiative, and recently
organized an international mission to Georgia of NGO and other
experts to discuss media freedom, judicial reform, and other
democracy issues. Romania also sees opportunities to reach out to its
Black Sea neighbors on economic and security issues.
Romania is the host country for the Southeast Europe Cooperative
Initiative (SECI), and is involved in outreach efforts to Black Sea
littoral and regional states on cooperative law enforcement
initiatives, including customs and border security initiatives,
anti-narcotics and trafficking-in-persons initiatives. The United
States has provided assistance for these regional, cooperative
efforts. We continue to press the Government of Romania to promote
media freedom, and combat corruption. Bulgaria Bulgaria's sixth
national elections since 1990 are scheduled for June 2005 with a
wide, but moderate, political spectrum expected to participate.
Elections since 1990 have met acceptable standards and reflect the
will of the Bulgarian people. Over the last 15 years Bulgaria has
established a fully functioning, free-market democracy, marked by
strong public support for full Euro-Atlantic integration. Bulgaria
entered NATO in March 2004, and is scheduled to sign an EU accession
agreement in April 2005 leading to full membership in 2007. Aside
from supporting Euro-Atlantic integration, U.S.
Government efforts to ensure stable democratic focus on strengthening
local governments, civil society and a free press. Bulgaria is a
natural route for trafficking in narcotics, contraband and persons.
Like many countries in the region, Bulgaria suffers from substantial
organized crime and corruption that threatens democratic development
and successful Euro- Atlantic integration. Reform of the weak
judicial system is a pressing need, as is greater transparency in
public procurement and privatizations. Bilateral law enforcement
cooperation with the United States has expanded significantly over
the past two years; the Embassy now hosts the U.S. Secret Service,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation plans to open an office in
early FY 2005. The U.S. Government has assisted in legal reforms,
including legislation to combat trafficking in persons, witness
protection, anti-money laundering and regulation of public
procurement. An important USAID legacy mechanism is the National
Institute of Justice (NIJ), which opened last year and is already one
of the leading institutions in Eastern Europe for training
magistrates. Ambassador Pardew is vocal about the need for the
Bulgarian government to face these challenges; just this week the
Ambassador publicly expressed support for a declaration by 14 NGOs
calling for all political forces to commit themselves to judicial
reform. On the border between NATO/EU countries and Eurasia, Bulgaria
sees itself playing a significant role in the region. Bulgaria
considers democratic reform and development of market economies and
free trade in the region, and good neighborly relations with
countries to its east, as important to its own national interest,
placing a priority on the development of NATO's role in the regional
security system. Turkey Turkey, a staunch NATO ally, is a functioning
secular democracy with a constitutional government. In an effort to
meet the requirements for EU membership, the Government carried out
extensive democratic legal reforms during this past year. For example
in September 2003 Parliament adopted a new Penal Code, and in May
2004 adopted a new package of constitutional amendments. These
reforms were designed to crack down on torture and "honor killings,"
and expand freedom of religion and association. Turkey has made rapid
progress in meeting the EU political criteria laid out during the
Copenhagen Summit in 2002, and on December 17, 2004 the EU decided
that accession talks with Turkey would start in October this year.
The European Union's historic decision to start accession talks for
Turkey is a major success not only for the Turkish people, but for
Europe as well. Nonetheless, some problems remain. We continue to
press Turkey to resolve Greek Orthodox Church property issues and
open the Greek Orthodox Halki Seminary.
Alevis, a heterodox offshoot of Shi'a Islam, is concerned with
discrimination by the majority Sunni population and Sunni-run
Religious Affairs Directorate, and Kurdish rights within general
civil rights remain a sensitive issue. The United States supports
Turkey's efforts to implement the reforms instituted in order to gain
accession to the European Union. We continue to urge full respect for
human rights, including freedom of speech and the press, freedom of
religion, as well as rule of law. Ukraine In one of the most
significant events of 2004, an event marking a victory for democracy,
the Ukrainian people succeeded in overturning a fraudulent
presidential election and achieving a final outcome that reflected
the will of the voters. Ukraine's democratic institutions
demonstrated surprising strength in the face of persistent attempts
by elements within the previous government and among oligarchic clans
to subvert democratic processes.
When confronted with allegations of widespread fraud, the judicial
system ultimately acted in an independent manner, and the legislative
branch behaved responsibly in helping to broker a political solution
to the crisis. Many journalists at state- and oligarch-owned media
enterprises stopped taking instructions from the Presidential
Administration and started to report news accurately and objectively.
NGOs and civil society organizations took the lead in organizing
peaceful demonstrations in support of a democratic outcome. It is not
true, as some have said, that the U.S. funded or otherwise supported
any candidate or party in the election. However, over a decade of
U.S. assistance for a democratic process was a contributing factor to
the positive outcome. Over a period of many months, the U.S. and our
European allies repeatedly advised Ukrainian authorities, publicly
and privately, that we were watching the election closely and
considered it a test of Ukraine's commitment to democracy. The United
States funded local civil society groups to conduct voter education
and get-out-the-vote campaigns. We supported the work of independent
media to improve coverage of campaign issues. We provided nonpartisan
training to political parties and leaders, trained election officials
and observers, and more. Our election- related assistance to Ukraine
was approximately $18 million. Of particular note, the U.S. funded
what we believe was an unprecedented election-observer effort,
domestic and international, which turned out to be critical in
spotlighting electoral fraud, particularly in the November 21 second
round. As Yushchenko and his team turn to the task of governing, they
face a great many challenges. The "Orange Revolution" spurred a
reaction in eastern and southern Ukraine, where some officials began
speaking of federation, autonomy, and even secession and
independence. This would be disastrous for Ukraine and for the
region.
Fortunately, then-President Kuchma summoned these governors and
ordered them to cease and desist. Nevertheless, there is disaffection
in Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine which Yushchenko needs to
address. He also has his work cut out for him in combating endemic
corruption, reforming the economy, consolidating democratic reforms
and promoting human rights. Managing relations with Russia will also
be critical. We look forward to President Yushchenko's visit to the
United States early next month. Moldova Moldova's campaign period in
advance of the March 6 parliamentary elections has been blemished
with irregularities, such as media access issues, harassment of
opposition, and misuse of administrative resources. However,
international criticism, including the Department's engagement and a
Sense of the Senate resolution, prior to election day positively
encouraged the Moldovan Government to take corrective measures. The
United States has provided some $1.7 million for election related
assistance in the past year to support development of the Moldovan
electoral administration and legal framework, independent media,
civic involvement, nonpartisan political party training, and election
monitoring. Again, our focus is on a free and fair electoral process,
not on any particular party or candidate. The results of Sunday's
election show to what extent the Moldovan leadership's late
corrective measures to make the campaign more fair allowed OSCE/ODIHR
to assess the elections as generally meeting international standards.
(Note: Oral testimony will update the Subcommittee on the results of
the March 6 elections.) Moldova's foreign policy priority is to
integrate with the European Union, as manifested by its recent
conclusion of an EU Action Plan. We support Moldova's efforts towards
this goal, and we would hope that its participation in the GUUAM
regional group could be deepened even further after Moldova assumes
the rotating presidency later this spring. The repressive
Transnistrian separatists are an impediment to regional stability and
democracy. We are therefore actively looking for ways to resolve the
Transnistria conflict in a manner that would strengthen Moldova's
territorial integrity and also be supported by its people and have
international credibility. We believe enhanced international
participation could give new impetus to the stalled negotiation
process, and are consulting with our EU, OSCE, Ukrainian, and Russian
partners as to the most effective way forward. Equally important,
Moldova, the United States, and our NATO allies continue to press
Russia to fulfill its commitments made at the 1999 OSCE Summit in
Istanbul to complete the withdrawal of its military forces from
Moldova. Georgia The Rose Revolution of 2003 demonstrated that
Georgians desire fair elections and good governance, and are capable
of holding their government accountable. Since the Rose Revolution,
Georgia has made significant internal reforms to fight official
corruption, consolidate bureaucracy and increase revenue collection
in order to provide better services to its own citizens. Progress in
Georgia is hampered by ongoing separatist conflicts in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia; the international community should stand firm to
encourage Georgia to resolve these conflicts peacefully. Internal
reform will strengthen the economy and create incentives for the
separatist regions to integrate into Georgia.
Georgia clearly aspires to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions; the
United States welcomes the EU's Wider Europe program in the South
Caucasus and encourages Europe to work closely with Georgia and its
neighbors in support of civil society, human rights, and democratic
development. We also continue to support talks between Georgia and
Russia on the 1999 Istanbul commitments to reach agreement on the
status and duration of remaining Russian bases in Georgia. Armenia
Armenia has made significant economic and social progress since its
independence; however, the flawed presidential and parliamentary
elections of 2003 demonstrate that it has some way to go to
strengthen its democratic institutions and ensure an equitable
balance of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial
branches. Armenia needs to take steps to improve its poor human
rights record. The United States is providing extensive assistance to
strengthen the National Assembly, the judiciary and local government
institutions in Armenia. Further reform is hampered by Armenia's
relatively isolated position and the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, which has been an enormous drain on the government's
resources for over ten years.
We welcome Armenia's attempt to work within the BSEC to expand its
economic and other ties to the region, including with Turkey.
Azerbaijan The flawed presidential elections of 2003 demonstrate that
Azerbaijan has far to go to strengthen its democratic institutions
and ensure an equitable balance of powers between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches. We are focusing on assistance
programs and diplomacy on improving election procedures and
strengthening Azerbaijan's democratic institutions as parliamentary
elections approach this fall. These elections will be an important
test of Azerbaijan's progress toward democratization. Azerbaijan also
needs to take steps to improve its poor human rights record.
Azerbaijan's economic progress in the next year will depend on its
ability to direct oil funds toward non-oil sector development.
Political and economic reform is hampered by the ongoing
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as in Armenia, an enormous drain on the
government's resources for over ten years. Azerbaijan continues to
offer extensive and invaluable support to the United States for the
Global War on Terror, including but not limited to blanket overflight
rights, the use of Azerbaijan military bases, information sharing,
and law enforcement cooperation.
We welcome Azerbaijan's attempt to work within the BSEC to expand its
economic and other ties to the region. Russia Russia is experiencing
an erosion of its democratic institutions and processes. Especially
over the past two years, checks and balances among the branches of
government have weakened. The Duma offers no meaningful counterweight
to the executive, national television networks are under state
control, and democratic values have yet to be inculcated in Russia's
political culture. At the same time, there has been little resistance
to this situation within Russia. While the electoral process was
flawed, President Putin was re-elected last year with a solid
majority. Independent polling indicates that as living standards
improve and the threat of terrorism increases, a majority of the
population continues to favor order and stability above all else. The
Russian Government's efforts to centralize control have taken
advantage of this popular sentiment, further postponing the
development of democratic, accountable governance. Despite some
indications that the situation in Chechnya has improved, basic
security is lacking as terrorists and insurgents continue to battle
pro-Moscow Chechens and federal forces, and human rights violations
continue with impunity. A flawed presidential election in August 2004
did not advance a political solution to the conflict. Terrorist
attacks at Beslan and elsewhere pose a threat to the region. Conflict
appears to be spreading across the North Caucasus, due to a
combination of terrorist activities, religious extremism,
criminality, and the weakness of state structures in the region. As
the situation on the ground allows, we will look for opportunities to
provide development assistance to people in the North Caucasus.
Russia and the United States have shared interests in stability and
economic development in the Black Sea region but differ over how
these goals should be interpreted and pursued. We both want to fight
weapons trafficking, narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money
laundering, and terrorist organizations in the Black Sea region. To
achieve this goal, the U.S. wants to encourage regional stability.
Russia shares the U.S. desire for stability, but appears to interpret
stability in a fundamentally different way. Russia has been critical
of the programs the EU is pursuing under its Neighborhood Policy to
create a string of well-governed states on the EU's border and that
in the Black Sea region, which explicitly includes Georgia and
Ukraine. Russia defines stability as preservation of the status quo,
with regimes it knows well. Russian support for separatists in other
countries appears to be means in part of maintaining levers of
influence in Moldova and Georgia.
For the same reason, Russia has been slow to close its remaining
bases in Georgia and remove its troops from Transnistria. U.S. and
Russian goals overlap more closely on the practical matter of
shutting down transshipment and smuggling routes on the Black Sea.
The U.S. supports and encourages Russia's participation in the Black
Sea Force, its cooperation with coast guards of littoral states, and
its participation in Operation Active Endeavor. Russian and U.S.
views also overlap on the issue of Russia's Black Sea Fleet as an
important element in regional security. The U.S. encourages continued
Russian-Ukrainian cooperation that will allow Russia to lease port
facilities at Sevastopol at least through the current agreement's end
in 2017. The U.S. and Russia have a shared interest in economic
development and trade, in particular as concerns projects to bring
Russian and Caspian Basin oil and gas to European and world markets.
We hope President Putin's December 2004 visit to Turkey and President
Erdogan's visit to Russia the following month will help advance such
cooperation. At the same time, conflicts over the direction of the
Odesa-Brody pipeline and other projects demonstrate that tensions
exist over questions of whose oil and gas will get to market over
whose territory.
Moscow continues to react strongly over a possible U.S. military role
in the region. This can be seen particularly in the pressure that
Russia has placed on Georgia to agree to a "no foreign bases" clause
in a Georgia Russia Framework Treaty, and it can be seen also in
Russia's displeasure over the U.S. Georgia Train and Equip Program
(GTEP) and Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP) to
train Georgian forces. We have made clear to Moscow at very senior
levels that we have no plans for establishing U.S. bases in Georgia.
Russia's concerns are likely to increase as Ukraine moves closer to
NATO. We are also urging Russia to stop obstructing an Organization
of Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) border monitoring operation
along the Chechnya portion of the Russian-Georgian border. We believe
this monitoring operation has played an important role in deterring
the possible movement of international terrorists and Chechen
fighters between Russia and Georgia. Assistance Finally a word on
U.S. assistance programs to the region. U.S. Government assistance
targets enhancing regional cooperation and development as well as to
support reform bilaterally. Our support for the GUUAM organization is
enabling these countries to cooperate in law enforcement and
harmonize their trade and transportation regimes. The Southeast
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), which includes Bulgaria,
Romania, and Moldova (in addition to other countries that are not
"Black Sea states"), serves as a regional assistance model for GUUAM
projects. Since 2000, SECI has promoted cross-border cooperation in
Southeast Europe in the fight against organized crime, as well as
reform and harmonization of customs services to promote economic
development and facilitate trade. Democracy assistance is key to our
broader bilateral assistance programs in this region that, with the
exception of Turkey, are funded through the Support for East European
Democracy (SEED) and FREEDOM Support Acts. Under these accounts we
will be providing approximately $126 million in FY 2005 to support
civil society, access to information, pluralistic political
processes, local governance and rule of law in these countries.
Political changes in Georgia and Ukraine in the past year reflect a
desire by these countries - and their people - to establish
themselves as democratic market economies. Our assistance continues
to support their efforts to combat corruption and integrate them into
the world economy, including the Black Sea region.
I welcome your comments and questions.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress