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Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
March 23, 2005, Wednesday
ROLLER-COASTER
SOURCE: Novaya Gazeta, No 20, March 21 - 23, 2005, p. 12
by Pavel Felgengauer
MOSCOW HAS LOST THE CAUCASUS
Positions of the Russian military in the Caucasus appeared invincible
only a decade ago, in 1995. An accord was signed with Azerbaijan on
the use of the Gabala radar, an element of the Soviet missile attack
early warning system that enabled Moscow to "see" the south. A
military-political alliance with Yerevan, Armenia, was made. Russia
had over 15,000 servicemen in Georgia, and Russian border guards
manned the border with Turkey in 1995.
Everything has changed. Armenia is choosing between Iran and the
United States to lean on because it does not feel it can rely on
Moscow, Azerbaijan hopes for establishment of NATO bases on its
territory, the parliament of Georgia demands withdrawal of Russian
military bases... and Moscow is at a loss.
Retaining all external tokens of military, political, and economic
domination of the Caucasus, Moscow has failed to accomplish anything
by way of solutions to the Karabakh, Abkhazian, or South Ossetian
problems. The parliament of Georgia refused to ratify the treaty on
military bases. Efforts to put the conflicts on hold were undertaken,
but these efforts did not enable Russia to retain the favorable
atmosphere or its own influence.
Hostilities in Chechnya tied up all more or less combat ready units
Russia retained and demonstrated the Kremlin's growing military
weakness. The Caucasus ruling elites got the impression that Russia
was not settling local conflicts first and foremost because it lacked
the strength and the will to do so. Traditional economic ties with
Moscow maintained the semi-impoverished condition but did not
facilitate development of the countries of the region.
In 2002, the Kremlin began distributing Russian passports in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, clearly preparing for annexation of the
territories at a more convenient moment. Georgia found itself without
a choice because Russian military bases on its territory became the
fifth column.
That was how official Moscow set up a no-win situation in the
Caucasus, a situation in which every new step would only escalate
tension. There is lots of military hardware at the Russian bases in
Georgia (the 12th in Batumi and the 62nd in Akhalkalaki) - 114 tanks,
hundreds of armored personnel carriers and battle infantry vehicles,
artillery pieces... only 4,000 or so servicemen, most of them locals.
Mixed formations comprising Russian commanders and local servicemen
are not reliable by default. Should the Georgians decide to take over
the bases, resistance will be light - if any.
The Duma in Moscow is screaming in fury, claiming that Tbilisi must
be taught a lesson. How? Russia is tied up in Chechnya where it has
to reinforce its troops in fear of Shamil Basayev and Ramzan Kadyrov
alike. Even a complete economic blockade of Georgia is impossible.
The West will come to Tbilisi's help, and particularly Turkey. Bases
in Batumi and Akhalkalaki were established against Turkey, and Ankara
will be happy to see them become history. It will only up its own
clout with the Caucasus. Along with everything else, the US Senate is
determined to demand from Moscow an unconditional withdrawal from
Georgia and Trans-Dniester region in return for its membership in the
World Trade Organization.
Russia is facing a choice between a hopeless conflict on the one hand
and a shameful but rapid withdrawal. Very soon now, Moscow will only
retain in the Caucasus small enclaves in Abkhazia and South Ossetia -
strategically pointless dens of smugglers and criminals. But even
that will not last. Sooner or later, through war or not, but Tbilisi
assisted by the West will reestablish its control over them.
As a matter of fact, the Caucasus is but a single example. The
growing discrepancy between the weakening capacities and colossal
aspirations are decidedly turning Russia into a global laughing
stock. The Russians always swell with pride over absolutely anything
nowadays only in order to cringe in shame soon afterwards and start
whining about dual standards.
Translated by A. Ignatkin
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
March 23, 2005, Wednesday
ROLLER-COASTER
SOURCE: Novaya Gazeta, No 20, March 21 - 23, 2005, p. 12
by Pavel Felgengauer
MOSCOW HAS LOST THE CAUCASUS
Positions of the Russian military in the Caucasus appeared invincible
only a decade ago, in 1995. An accord was signed with Azerbaijan on
the use of the Gabala radar, an element of the Soviet missile attack
early warning system that enabled Moscow to "see" the south. A
military-political alliance with Yerevan, Armenia, was made. Russia
had over 15,000 servicemen in Georgia, and Russian border guards
manned the border with Turkey in 1995.
Everything has changed. Armenia is choosing between Iran and the
United States to lean on because it does not feel it can rely on
Moscow, Azerbaijan hopes for establishment of NATO bases on its
territory, the parliament of Georgia demands withdrawal of Russian
military bases... and Moscow is at a loss.
Retaining all external tokens of military, political, and economic
domination of the Caucasus, Moscow has failed to accomplish anything
by way of solutions to the Karabakh, Abkhazian, or South Ossetian
problems. The parliament of Georgia refused to ratify the treaty on
military bases. Efforts to put the conflicts on hold were undertaken,
but these efforts did not enable Russia to retain the favorable
atmosphere or its own influence.
Hostilities in Chechnya tied up all more or less combat ready units
Russia retained and demonstrated the Kremlin's growing military
weakness. The Caucasus ruling elites got the impression that Russia
was not settling local conflicts first and foremost because it lacked
the strength and the will to do so. Traditional economic ties with
Moscow maintained the semi-impoverished condition but did not
facilitate development of the countries of the region.
In 2002, the Kremlin began distributing Russian passports in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, clearly preparing for annexation of the
territories at a more convenient moment. Georgia found itself without
a choice because Russian military bases on its territory became the
fifth column.
That was how official Moscow set up a no-win situation in the
Caucasus, a situation in which every new step would only escalate
tension. There is lots of military hardware at the Russian bases in
Georgia (the 12th in Batumi and the 62nd in Akhalkalaki) - 114 tanks,
hundreds of armored personnel carriers and battle infantry vehicles,
artillery pieces... only 4,000 or so servicemen, most of them locals.
Mixed formations comprising Russian commanders and local servicemen
are not reliable by default. Should the Georgians decide to take over
the bases, resistance will be light - if any.
The Duma in Moscow is screaming in fury, claiming that Tbilisi must
be taught a lesson. How? Russia is tied up in Chechnya where it has
to reinforce its troops in fear of Shamil Basayev and Ramzan Kadyrov
alike. Even a complete economic blockade of Georgia is impossible.
The West will come to Tbilisi's help, and particularly Turkey. Bases
in Batumi and Akhalkalaki were established against Turkey, and Ankara
will be happy to see them become history. It will only up its own
clout with the Caucasus. Along with everything else, the US Senate is
determined to demand from Moscow an unconditional withdrawal from
Georgia and Trans-Dniester region in return for its membership in the
World Trade Organization.
Russia is facing a choice between a hopeless conflict on the one hand
and a shameful but rapid withdrawal. Very soon now, Moscow will only
retain in the Caucasus small enclaves in Abkhazia and South Ossetia -
strategically pointless dens of smugglers and criminals. But even
that will not last. Sooner or later, through war or not, but Tbilisi
assisted by the West will reestablish its control over them.
As a matter of fact, the Caucasus is but a single example. The
growing discrepancy between the weakening capacities and colossal
aspirations are decidedly turning Russia into a global laughing
stock. The Russians always swell with pride over absolutely anything
nowadays only in order to cringe in shame soon afterwards and start
whining about dual standards.
Translated by A. Ignatkin