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Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
March 30, 2005, Wednesday
"WE TAKE SABOTEURS IN BY THE DOZENS"
SOURCE: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 10, March 23 - 29, 2005, p. 2
by Andrei Moskovsky
HARRY SAMANBA, CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE
PARLIAMENT OF ABKHAZIA, ON THE GEORGIAN-ABKHAZIAN CONFLICT
Georgian secret services moved the gang of Chechen field commander
Ruslan Gelayev from the Panki Gorge of Georgia to the Kodor Gorge in
Abkhazia in late summer 2001. Abkhazian troops repelled the attack.
Some terrorists were wiped out, others taken prisoner. Here is an
interview with Harry Samanba, Chairman of the National Security
Committee of the parliament of Abkhazia who fought the Chechens in
the Kodor Gorge then as second-in-command of the Northern Army Group
of the Abkhazian Defense Ministry.
Question: Pressure applied to Abkhazia greatly increased with the
triumph of the Revolution of Roses in Georgia. Military experts even
assumed that it was a propagandistic campaign against Abkhazia,
usually a predecessor of outright hostilities. What does Abkhazian
society think of the possibility of renewal of the conflict with
Georgia?
Harry Samanba: The end of the war in Abkhazia in September 1993 gave
us a respite, a month long or so. After that Georgia renewed pressure
and has not eased off even now. Tbilisi openly admits that it plans
to re-conquer our territory. The Georgian military is training with
the help from American and NATO instructors. The new battalions of
the Georgian army are drilled in American tactics. Yes, we do have
this information.
Certain personnel changes await the Abkhazian security structures. A
recent meeting of the Political Council of the Amtsakhara Movement
resolved for example to make an emphasis on the men who held actual
posts of importance during the war.
Question: Georgian secret services dealing with Abkhazia are
extremely active nowadays. Among other things, they "run" the so
called guerrillas operating in the Gal district.
Harry Samanba: We know. As for the guerrillas from the so called
Forest Brothers and other units, they were under Georgian secret
services' total control once. In the past, however, they were
financed via structures of the so called "Autonomous Republic of
Abkhazia in exile". These days, they are officially sponsored by
Tbilisi.
Question: Tbilisi is contemplating various scenarios of the use of
force as a solution to the problem of Abkhazia.
Harry Samanba: Georgian secret services and the military had a lot of
plans to conquer Abkhazia after 1993. Key objects and targets are to
be overrun from the coast where a force is to be landed. These days,
the Georgians chart their plans with help from the Americans. Their
objective is clear: conquest of Abkhazia from the sea and by land.
The Kodor Gorge remains a danger because of the Georgians in it. On
the other hand, attacks backed by armored vehicles from this
direction are impossible. Mountains are not the best terrain for
tanks, artillery pieces, and battle infantry vehicles, you know.
Georgia deployed battalions of mountaineers in Kodori. All locals
there are armed to the last man. They know the paths, they are
experts in mountainous warfare. At the same time, the Svans do not
want to fight. We hope that our relations with Svanetia will develop
normally.
Another plan the Georgians came up with stipulates annexation of the
Gal and Ochamchira districts as geographically the closest to
Georgia. Secret services of Georgia never abandon attempts to drive a
wedge between western and eastern Abkhazia. They even tried these
methods during the election. In fact, the use of these dirty tricks
dates back to the Soviet era. No wonder the Georgians set up Georgian
settlements between Abkhazian villages in the hope to assimilate
residents of the Ochamchira and Gudauta areas. They failed. Tbilisi
cannot understand that the Abkhazian are consolidated now, that they
have never been so consolidated. Yes, there were plans in Yeltsin's
era to divide Abkhazia along the Gumista, and even Moscow accepted
these plans once. The river was supposed to provide a natural buffer
between the warring sides, and the capital, Sukhumi, was to be a zone
open for everyone including peacekeepers. The plan failed. And
annexation of two districts looks all the more absurd now.
Question: What forms and methods do foreign intelligence services
prefer?
Harry Samanba: Provocations, that's the only word that leaps to mind
when I try to appraise their actions in Abkhazia. They tried to drive
a wedge between the Abkhazians and Armenians once. It's the latest
election that showed all futility of these provocations. By the way,
the brigade I commanded in the war included an Armenian battalion.
They are good fighters. We do not have any problems with the Armenian
diaspora nowadays.
Question: What is the numerical strength of the Georgian forces
concentrated in the conflict area and in the vicinity?
Harry Samba: Our estimates put its numerical strength at over 10,000
men. Their quality and prowess is a different matter. Underestimating
them will be a mistake. Tbilisi became elated and euphoric with the
overthrow of Aslan Abashidze in Adjaria, and this euphoria has not
worn off even now. Perhaps, the death of Zhvania will bring some
changes, but we expect everything from these revenge-mongers. They
may feign an attack on South Ossetia, for example, and try to
accomplish something in Abkhazia in the meantime. We should face it.
It is Abkhazia that Tbilisi is particularly mad at. Myself as an
officer, I expect aggression any moment.
But Georgia has other problems as well. Its leaders desperately want
membership in the European Union and NATO and that has its time
limits. Had it been possible to conquer Abkhazia inside of a week,
Tbilisi would not have hesitated. But that's a sheer impossibility,
and everyone in Georgia knows it.
So, time is not on Georgia's side. I talked to representatives of the
authorities of Georgia in Germany; I met with Khaindrava and deputies
of the parliament of Georgia. That's what I noticed: young men
considered democrats are dangerous because unlike us, they have not
seen wars. They may prove stupid enough to launch an invasion. It is
whoever has never fought in a war that usually aspires for a
blitzkrieg.
Question: Explosions regularly rocked Sukhumi and other cities barely
years ago - thanks to saboteurs sent in by your restive neighbor...
Harry Samanba: They were taken in by the dozens. There was the so
called Six-Day War in the Gal district several years ago, when we
were fighting extremists. Georgian saboteurs had tried to destabilize
the situation in other districts of Abkhazia before that. There were
9 of them in the Gal district, and 5 remained there forever.
I repeat: we are ready for everything. Whenever needed, I'd say that
we will draft 20,000 fighters. They are reservists with combat
experience. That's our advantage. But we have a new generation in
Abkhazia now, and Georgia itself is keeping us honed - it was so in
1998, it was so in the Kodor Gorge in 2001. We are not permitted the
luxury of relaxing or taking it easy.
Translated by A. Ignatkin
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
March 30, 2005, Wednesday
"WE TAKE SABOTEURS IN BY THE DOZENS"
SOURCE: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 10, March 23 - 29, 2005, p. 2
by Andrei Moskovsky
HARRY SAMANBA, CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE OF THE
PARLIAMENT OF ABKHAZIA, ON THE GEORGIAN-ABKHAZIAN CONFLICT
Georgian secret services moved the gang of Chechen field commander
Ruslan Gelayev from the Panki Gorge of Georgia to the Kodor Gorge in
Abkhazia in late summer 2001. Abkhazian troops repelled the attack.
Some terrorists were wiped out, others taken prisoner. Here is an
interview with Harry Samanba, Chairman of the National Security
Committee of the parliament of Abkhazia who fought the Chechens in
the Kodor Gorge then as second-in-command of the Northern Army Group
of the Abkhazian Defense Ministry.
Question: Pressure applied to Abkhazia greatly increased with the
triumph of the Revolution of Roses in Georgia. Military experts even
assumed that it was a propagandistic campaign against Abkhazia,
usually a predecessor of outright hostilities. What does Abkhazian
society think of the possibility of renewal of the conflict with
Georgia?
Harry Samanba: The end of the war in Abkhazia in September 1993 gave
us a respite, a month long or so. After that Georgia renewed pressure
and has not eased off even now. Tbilisi openly admits that it plans
to re-conquer our territory. The Georgian military is training with
the help from American and NATO instructors. The new battalions of
the Georgian army are drilled in American tactics. Yes, we do have
this information.
Certain personnel changes await the Abkhazian security structures. A
recent meeting of the Political Council of the Amtsakhara Movement
resolved for example to make an emphasis on the men who held actual
posts of importance during the war.
Question: Georgian secret services dealing with Abkhazia are
extremely active nowadays. Among other things, they "run" the so
called guerrillas operating in the Gal district.
Harry Samanba: We know. As for the guerrillas from the so called
Forest Brothers and other units, they were under Georgian secret
services' total control once. In the past, however, they were
financed via structures of the so called "Autonomous Republic of
Abkhazia in exile". These days, they are officially sponsored by
Tbilisi.
Question: Tbilisi is contemplating various scenarios of the use of
force as a solution to the problem of Abkhazia.
Harry Samanba: Georgian secret services and the military had a lot of
plans to conquer Abkhazia after 1993. Key objects and targets are to
be overrun from the coast where a force is to be landed. These days,
the Georgians chart their plans with help from the Americans. Their
objective is clear: conquest of Abkhazia from the sea and by land.
The Kodor Gorge remains a danger because of the Georgians in it. On
the other hand, attacks backed by armored vehicles from this
direction are impossible. Mountains are not the best terrain for
tanks, artillery pieces, and battle infantry vehicles, you know.
Georgia deployed battalions of mountaineers in Kodori. All locals
there are armed to the last man. They know the paths, they are
experts in mountainous warfare. At the same time, the Svans do not
want to fight. We hope that our relations with Svanetia will develop
normally.
Another plan the Georgians came up with stipulates annexation of the
Gal and Ochamchira districts as geographically the closest to
Georgia. Secret services of Georgia never abandon attempts to drive a
wedge between western and eastern Abkhazia. They even tried these
methods during the election. In fact, the use of these dirty tricks
dates back to the Soviet era. No wonder the Georgians set up Georgian
settlements between Abkhazian villages in the hope to assimilate
residents of the Ochamchira and Gudauta areas. They failed. Tbilisi
cannot understand that the Abkhazian are consolidated now, that they
have never been so consolidated. Yes, there were plans in Yeltsin's
era to divide Abkhazia along the Gumista, and even Moscow accepted
these plans once. The river was supposed to provide a natural buffer
between the warring sides, and the capital, Sukhumi, was to be a zone
open for everyone including peacekeepers. The plan failed. And
annexation of two districts looks all the more absurd now.
Question: What forms and methods do foreign intelligence services
prefer?
Harry Samanba: Provocations, that's the only word that leaps to mind
when I try to appraise their actions in Abkhazia. They tried to drive
a wedge between the Abkhazians and Armenians once. It's the latest
election that showed all futility of these provocations. By the way,
the brigade I commanded in the war included an Armenian battalion.
They are good fighters. We do not have any problems with the Armenian
diaspora nowadays.
Question: What is the numerical strength of the Georgian forces
concentrated in the conflict area and in the vicinity?
Harry Samba: Our estimates put its numerical strength at over 10,000
men. Their quality and prowess is a different matter. Underestimating
them will be a mistake. Tbilisi became elated and euphoric with the
overthrow of Aslan Abashidze in Adjaria, and this euphoria has not
worn off even now. Perhaps, the death of Zhvania will bring some
changes, but we expect everything from these revenge-mongers. They
may feign an attack on South Ossetia, for example, and try to
accomplish something in Abkhazia in the meantime. We should face it.
It is Abkhazia that Tbilisi is particularly mad at. Myself as an
officer, I expect aggression any moment.
But Georgia has other problems as well. Its leaders desperately want
membership in the European Union and NATO and that has its time
limits. Had it been possible to conquer Abkhazia inside of a week,
Tbilisi would not have hesitated. But that's a sheer impossibility,
and everyone in Georgia knows it.
So, time is not on Georgia's side. I talked to representatives of the
authorities of Georgia in Germany; I met with Khaindrava and deputies
of the parliament of Georgia. That's what I noticed: young men
considered democrats are dangerous because unlike us, they have not
seen wars. They may prove stupid enough to launch an invasion. It is
whoever has never fought in a war that usually aspires for a
blitzkrieg.
Question: Explosions regularly rocked Sukhumi and other cities barely
years ago - thanks to saboteurs sent in by your restive neighbor...
Harry Samanba: They were taken in by the dozens. There was the so
called Six-Day War in the Gal district several years ago, when we
were fighting extremists. Georgian saboteurs had tried to destabilize
the situation in other districts of Abkhazia before that. There were
9 of them in the Gal district, and 5 remained there forever.
I repeat: we are ready for everything. Whenever needed, I'd say that
we will draft 20,000 fighters. They are reservists with combat
experience. That's our advantage. But we have a new generation in
Abkhazia now, and Georgia itself is keeping us honed - it was so in
1998, it was so in the Kodor Gorge in 2001. We are not permitted the
luxury of relaxing or taking it easy.
Translated by A. Ignatkin