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Erdogan Arrives
By Efraim Inbar
Jerusalem Post
May 1 2005
The May 1-2 official visit by Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan to Israel demonstrates the resiliency of Israeli-Turkish
relations. These ties are based on a strategic partnership developed
at the end of the Cold War and rooted in a common strategic agenda.
The two states share similar regional concerns: Syria, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the challenge of
Islamic radicalism and the geopolitical destiny of Central Asia.
At the global level, both states are pro-American in their foreign
policy, have had a problematic relationship with Europe and remain
suspicious of Russian aspirations.
Diplomatic ties were upgraded to embassy level in 1992. Moreover,
a multi-faceted Turkish-Israeli defense collaboration has evolved
that includes the sale of Israeli arms, weapons upgrading, technology
transfer, joint military training and intelligence cooperation.
Similarly, economic relations are booming. Annual trade between the
two nations grew to $2 billion in 2004, up from $200 million in 1993,
and Turkey since the mid-1990s has been the number-one destination
for Israeli tourists.
The Israeli-Turkish entente weathered several important tests
even under previous governments. It overcame vocal criticism from
Arab quarters and Iran. Ankara was subjected to increasing pressure
to lower the profile of its relations with Jerusalem during Yasser
Arafat's war against Israel (2000-2004). The war resonated throughout
the Muslim world. At the same time, Islamic elements gradually gained
greater influence in Turkish politics, reinforcing Turkish sympathy
for the Palestinians.
Fortunately, these domestic constraints have had little impact on our
bilateral relations ~V except for official protests over how Israel
has dealt with the Palestinian conflict.
Then in the October 2002 elections, the AKP, a conservative party
with Islamic roots, won power. That held out the prospect of a
rapprochement between non-Arab Turkey and its Muslim neighbors,
and a cooling of ties with Israel.
But the alliance with Israel has held up.
Erdogan made it clear to US Jewish organizations, with whom he met
immediately after his electoral victory, that he favored continuing
Ankara's bond with Israel. And, indeed, the AKP government has
maintained high-level contacts and visits, both military and
political. Turkey even hosted a high-profile visit by President Moshe
Katsav in July 2003 which generated much rhetoric about the virtues
of the relationship and hopes for further cooperation.
The international war on terror brings the two states even closer.
They widened security cooperation following a string of bomb attacks
in Istanbul in November 2003. It was Prime Minister Erdogan who urged
strengthened intelligence cooperation.
Similarly, the Turkish arms market remained open to Israeli firms.
Under AKP rule Turkey did not cancel its contract to upgrade M-60
tanks, despite campaign promises to do so. Moreover, just this month
Turkey selected an Israeli consortium for the Heron Unmanned Air
Vehicles project, estimated to be worth $200 million. In addition,
military exercises continued as planned, the most recent being held
in January 2005.
Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister of the AKP government, visited
Israel in January 2005 ~V after several postponements ~V refuting
rumors of a crisis in bilateral relations. Justice Minister Cemil Cicek
paid an important, symbolic visit in March 2005 when he attended the
opening of the new Yad Vashem museum in Jerusalem.
Those visits helped mend fences after a chilly period marked by
Erdogan's harsh criticism of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's security
policies toward the Palestinians in the spring of 2004.
Significantly, Erdogan's visit to Jerusalem this week makes clear
that business is as usual.
Despite increasing anti-Americanism and spreading anti-Semitism at
home, Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP is still determined by
geopolitical factors.
Erdogan's visit reflects a Turkish understanding that the Middle East
is still an unruly neighborhood, where Turkey needs friends such as
Israel. The visit also reflects a Turkish assessment that attempts to
improve relations with Iran have been only partially successful and
that Teheran's nuclear program constitutes a security threat to Ankara.
Israel appears to have convinced Turkey that it has no intention of
supporting Kurdish aspirations for independence in northern Iraq, and
that Jerusalem shares Turkey's interest in the territorial integrity
of Iraq. That defused a potentially major issue of discord, allowing
for fruitful bilateral cooperation.
Nor did Ankara's link to Jerusalem become redundant because of
its seemingly better fortunes vis-a-vis Europe. A cautious Turkey,
engaged in protracted membership talks with the EU, is unlikely to
put all its eggs in the European basket. Erdogan's visit, which
takes place at a low ebb in American-Turkish relations, may also
serve to score points with the Bush administration. And, finally,
Ankara believes that Jerusalem can be useful in neutralizing hostile
Greek and Armenian lobbies in Washington.
With Erdogan in Jerusalem, Ariel Sharon has an opportunity to buttress
the common strategic agenda fueling the relationship with the personal
touch that is often useful, even in high-level diplomacy.
The writer is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University
and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.
By Efraim Inbar
Jerusalem Post
May 1 2005
The May 1-2 official visit by Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan to Israel demonstrates the resiliency of Israeli-Turkish
relations. These ties are based on a strategic partnership developed
at the end of the Cold War and rooted in a common strategic agenda.
The two states share similar regional concerns: Syria, the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the challenge of
Islamic radicalism and the geopolitical destiny of Central Asia.
At the global level, both states are pro-American in their foreign
policy, have had a problematic relationship with Europe and remain
suspicious of Russian aspirations.
Diplomatic ties were upgraded to embassy level in 1992. Moreover,
a multi-faceted Turkish-Israeli defense collaboration has evolved
that includes the sale of Israeli arms, weapons upgrading, technology
transfer, joint military training and intelligence cooperation.
Similarly, economic relations are booming. Annual trade between the
two nations grew to $2 billion in 2004, up from $200 million in 1993,
and Turkey since the mid-1990s has been the number-one destination
for Israeli tourists.
The Israeli-Turkish entente weathered several important tests
even under previous governments. It overcame vocal criticism from
Arab quarters and Iran. Ankara was subjected to increasing pressure
to lower the profile of its relations with Jerusalem during Yasser
Arafat's war against Israel (2000-2004). The war resonated throughout
the Muslim world. At the same time, Islamic elements gradually gained
greater influence in Turkish politics, reinforcing Turkish sympathy
for the Palestinians.
Fortunately, these domestic constraints have had little impact on our
bilateral relations ~V except for official protests over how Israel
has dealt with the Palestinian conflict.
Then in the October 2002 elections, the AKP, a conservative party
with Islamic roots, won power. That held out the prospect of a
rapprochement between non-Arab Turkey and its Muslim neighbors,
and a cooling of ties with Israel.
But the alliance with Israel has held up.
Erdogan made it clear to US Jewish organizations, with whom he met
immediately after his electoral victory, that he favored continuing
Ankara's bond with Israel. And, indeed, the AKP government has
maintained high-level contacts and visits, both military and
political. Turkey even hosted a high-profile visit by President Moshe
Katsav in July 2003 which generated much rhetoric about the virtues
of the relationship and hopes for further cooperation.
The international war on terror brings the two states even closer.
They widened security cooperation following a string of bomb attacks
in Istanbul in November 2003. It was Prime Minister Erdogan who urged
strengthened intelligence cooperation.
Similarly, the Turkish arms market remained open to Israeli firms.
Under AKP rule Turkey did not cancel its contract to upgrade M-60
tanks, despite campaign promises to do so. Moreover, just this month
Turkey selected an Israeli consortium for the Heron Unmanned Air
Vehicles project, estimated to be worth $200 million. In addition,
military exercises continued as planned, the most recent being held
in January 2005.
Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister of the AKP government, visited
Israel in January 2005 ~V after several postponements ~V refuting
rumors of a crisis in bilateral relations. Justice Minister Cemil Cicek
paid an important, symbolic visit in March 2005 when he attended the
opening of the new Yad Vashem museum in Jerusalem.
Those visits helped mend fences after a chilly period marked by
Erdogan's harsh criticism of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's security
policies toward the Palestinians in the spring of 2004.
Significantly, Erdogan's visit to Jerusalem this week makes clear
that business is as usual.
Despite increasing anti-Americanism and spreading anti-Semitism at
home, Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP is still determined by
geopolitical factors.
Erdogan's visit reflects a Turkish understanding that the Middle East
is still an unruly neighborhood, where Turkey needs friends such as
Israel. The visit also reflects a Turkish assessment that attempts to
improve relations with Iran have been only partially successful and
that Teheran's nuclear program constitutes a security threat to Ankara.
Israel appears to have convinced Turkey that it has no intention of
supporting Kurdish aspirations for independence in northern Iraq, and
that Jerusalem shares Turkey's interest in the territorial integrity
of Iraq. That defused a potentially major issue of discord, allowing
for fruitful bilateral cooperation.
Nor did Ankara's link to Jerusalem become redundant because of
its seemingly better fortunes vis-a-vis Europe. A cautious Turkey,
engaged in protracted membership talks with the EU, is unlikely to
put all its eggs in the European basket. Erdogan's visit, which
takes place at a low ebb in American-Turkish relations, may also
serve to score points with the Bush administration. And, finally,
Ankara believes that Jerusalem can be useful in neutralizing hostile
Greek and Armenian lobbies in Washington.
With Erdogan in Jerusalem, Ariel Sharon has an opportunity to buttress
the common strategic agenda fueling the relationship with the personal
touch that is often useful, even in high-level diplomacy.
The writer is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University
and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.