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May 4 2005
US allied with Sudan govt despite Darfur genocide
Wednesday May 4th, 2005 02:30.
By Democracy Now
The Los Angeles Times has revealed that the U.S. has quietly forged a
close intelligence partnership with Sudan despite the government's
role in the mass killings in Darfur. We speak with Ken Silverstein,
the reporter who broke the story, Salih Booker, the director of
Africa Action as well as Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ). [includes rush
transcript]
NEW YORK, May 3, 2005 -- In the days after the Sept. 11 attacks,
President Bush issued an ultimatum to the world: "Either you are with
us, or you are with the terrorists." Three and half years later, it
has been revealed that the Bush administration has allied itself with
a government listed as a state sponsor of terrorism and one that the
administration has accused of committing genocide against its own
people - Sudan. A major expose in the Los Angeles Times on Friday
revealed that the U.S. has quietly forged a close intelligence
partnership with Sudan despite the government's role in the mass
killings in Darfur. The Sudanese government has since publicly
confirmed it is working with the Bush administration and the CIA.
Eight months ago, former Secretary of State Colin Powell accused the
Sudanese of carrying out a genocide in Darfur. Already 180,000 have
died in the region from fighting or hunger. But relations appear to
have since changed -- for the better. One senior Sudanese official
the LA Times that the country had achieved "complete normalization"
of relations with the CIA.
The Times reported that the CIA sent an executive jet last week to
Khartoum to ferry the chief of Sudan's intelligence agency to
Washington for secret meetings sealing Khartoum's sensitive and
previously veiled partnership with the administration.
Salah Gosh (SMC)
The Sudanese intelligence chief - Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh -
has been accused by members of Congress of directing military attacks
against civilians in Darfur. He also had regular contacts with Osama
bin Laden during the 1990s.
Last month, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sent a letter to the
Sudanese government calling for steps to end the conflict in Darfur.
But the letter, reviewed by the Times, also said the administration
hoped to establish a "fruitful relationship" with Sudan and looked
forward to continued "close cooperation" on terrorism.
Ken Silverstein, reporter for the Los Angeles Times. Read article:
Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on Terrorism.
Salih Booker, Director of Africa Action.
Rep. Donald Payne, Democratic Congressman from New Jersey.
TRANSCRIPT
AMY GOODMAN: We're joined in our Washington studio by Ken
Silverstein, reporter for the Los Angeles Times who broke the story.
And we welcome you, Ken, to Democracy Now!
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Thank you.
AMY GOODMAN: It's good to have you with us. Well, why don't you lay
out for us exactly what you've learned about the U.S.-Sudan
relationship.
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, the relationship really started even pre-9/11.
In July of 2001, former Assistant Secretary of State Walter
Kansteiner traveled to Nairobi, where he had a public meeting with
the rebel leader John Garang and then privately met with the Sudanese
Foreign Minister. Then approximately the following month there was a
secret meeting in London with Yahia Hussein Babiker, who at the time
was the Deputy Chief of Sudanese Intelligence, at which the topic of
cooperation on counter-terrorism was broached. But the relationship
really took off post-9/11, for both sides had pragmatic reasons. And
I think that's really at the heart of this. The U.S. after 9/11
wanted to obtain information on al Qaeda and Islamic extremists from
whenever and wherever it could. And it decided that it would
cooperate with any regime that was willing to provide that
information, including Sudan. For the Sudanese there was fear that
after Afghanistan they might be next on the list of U.S. targets for
military action. And so both sides had grounds to cooperate. By
November of 2001, the collaboration was very strong. I spoke to a
former F.B.I. agent who traveled to Khartoum in November of 2001 at
the time the C.I.A had an active station, which it had been shut down
-- their last station had been shut down in late 1995. By November of
2001 they had a very active station. They were tracking Islamic
extremists with the cooperation of the Mukhabarat, which is the
Sudanese equivalent of the C.I.A. The F.B.I. agent actually had gone
to Khartoum to interview long-time members of al Qaeda who have very
close ties to Osama bin Laden. The Mukhabarat made these suspects
available to the F.B.I. They arranged safehouses for the interviews
to be conducted. The F.B.I. agent went to the al Shamal Bank, where
bin Laden had multiple business accounts when he lived in Sudan
between 1991 and 1996. They turned over all the banking records. And,
you know, that really kicked off the relationship which has deepened
ever since.
AMY GOODMAN: Now, you talked to Gosh?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: I was able to interview him. And he simply confirmed
that the Mukhabarat had an ongoing close partnership with the C.I.A.
He was very open about that. I also spoke to a number of former top
officials at the Mukhabarat, who are still -- two of them in
particular who were among the most powerful men in the country. They
both had offices in the Presidential Palace in Khartoum. And they
were very open about the relationship. They said -- one of them said
that we have completely normalized our relationships with the C.I.A.
He said the C.I.A. was helping to try to smooth the broader political
relationship between Sudan and the Bush administration. They were
open about the relationship. I think, in fact, that they feel that
they -- I think to a certain extent they cooperated with me and
allowed me access because they feel that they want recognition for
some of their efforts that they feel have not been noted. And they
want rewards. I mean, there's no question about it. The United
States, Sudan, all governments, no one does anything for free. The
Sudanese are hoping that we will lift long-standing economic
sanctions that were imposed during the Clinton Administration. And
they want to get off the list of state sponsors of terrorism where
they've been since 1993. So this is a pragmatic deal for both sides.
And the Sudanese want to be rewarded for it.
AMY GOODMAN: Ken Silverstein. The Intelligence Chief, Major General
Salah Abdallah Gosh, who talks about, boasts about the relationship
he has with the C.I.A., what is his role in the killings in Darfur?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, you know, I think maybe your other guests
might be able to better address that. I know that the Congressional
Research Service has put out a report that lists him as somebody
who's directly involved in the counterinsurgency strategy that the
Sudanese government has employed in Darfur. I spoke to Sudanese
officials who deny that Gosh or any other senior Sudanese officials
are involved in such atrocities. They blame those on militias that
they say that they don't exercise control over. So they would say he
has no role in the atrocities. I know that there are other observers
who have said he has been involved.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, Ken Silverstein, we are joined on the phone by
Salih Booker, who is the Executive Director of Africa Action. We'll
also be joined by New Jersey Congress member Donald Payne of New
Jersey. But, Salih Booker, can you talk about the significance of the
information that Ken Silverstein has revealed in the Los Angeles
Times of the relationship between the Intelligence Chief -- not only
the Intelligence Chief of Sudan but the Sudanese government and the
United States?
SALIH BOOKER: Well, I think it's very significant that it gets a
public airing. This growing relationship of cooperation has been, you
know, somewhat of a public secret, if you will, or fairly well known
within the foreign policy community, within the Africa advocacy and
analyst community. We have to bear in mind that this is very much
like the Cold War, this so-called war on terrorism. The U.S.
government has established a hierarchy of U.S. national interests, as
defined by the administration, the U.S. establishment. And in that
hierarchy essentially African lives are at the bottom while
collecting intelligence, even dubious intelligence on possible
terrorists attacks on American targets is clearly at the top of the
hierarchy. So this administration has really wanted to normalize ties
with the government in Khartoum since shortly, almost immediately
after September 11. Because of bin Laden's presence in Sudan, the
Sudanese government felt it always had something to sell to the
United States. And that its offers of intelligence cooperation which
go back to the Clinton years could be a tool they would use to
prevent the United States from applying pressure, whether on settling
the conflict with southern Sudanese and now more recently, of course,
as a way of sort of shunting pressure aside because of the genocide
in Darfur. And the Sudanese government has manipulated this very
well.
AMY GOODMAN: We're talking to Salih Booker, Director of Africa
Action. And in Washington in the studio, Ken Silverstein,
investigative reporter for the Los Angeles Times. We'll go to break
and then come back.
[break]
AMY GOODMAN: We are talking about the expose in the Los Angeles
Times, "Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on
Terrorism." Despite once harboring bin Laden, Khartoum regime has
supplied key intelligence, officials say. And now we're joined by Ken
Silverstein in the studio in Washington. Congress member Donald Payne
of New Jersey on the telephone. And Salih Booker, Director of Africa
Action. It was a few months after September 11, three and a half
years ago, the C.I.A. had an active station in Khartoum, according to
multiple sources. Among other programs the agency was running
surveillance on suspected foreign extremists with the knowledge and
assistance of the Mukhabarat. Material obtained by Sudanese
intelligence was turned over to U.S. investigators. And it goes on
from there. Ken Silverstein, how did you find out this information?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, there have been some allusions to the
cooperation previously. And oddly enough if one goes to the State
Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism reports the last few years,
they have referred explicitly to Sudanese cooperation that they've
made -- they've provided access to individuals. It's been very vague,
but it's been stated. And I had seen those references, and I started
calling sources and learned that, in fact, the cooperation is pretty
extensive and decided this is an obvious story. I mean, it's not a
surprise if the Jordanians are cooperating with the C.I.A., or if,
you know, the British are cooperating with the C.I.A., but the fact
that Sudan, where bin Laden lived for five years and which has a
reputation for Islamic radicalism, and which is, as I mentioned, on
the list of state sponsors of terror, I mean, that to me is a man
bites dog story, as opposed to the other way around, so it seemed
like an obvious story to pursue. And I just started looking into it,
developing -- working with sources here and traveled over to Khartoum
and was able to interview some fairly senior people in the government
there.
AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about the role of U.S. officials, U.S.
emissaries for the Bush administration? Who has met with these
Sudanese officials?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, the former Sssistant Secretary of State for
Africa Walter Kansteiner sort of led the opening, even as I mentioned
earlier, pre-9/11. But post-9/11, as well. There was this secret
meeting in late September at the American Embassy in London, where
Kansteiner met with Yahia Hussein Babiker, then the deputy head of
the Sudanese intelligence. And basically there was an agreement
struck. The Bush administration agreed that there would soon be a
vote. In fact, the vote took place three days later at the U.N. on
whether to lift sanctions against Sudan that had been imposed in 1995
over its role in the assassination attempt on Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak that took place in Ethiopia in 1995. And the Bush
administration abstained on that vote. And by abstaining, the
sanctions were lifted. If they had voted no, of course, the sanctions
would have remained. And not long afterwards the Sudanese turned
over, you know, a significant amount of information, files on Islamic
extremists who had been residing in Khartoum in the 1990s and even
beyond. So that was really the basis for the -- or the first step, I
think. But, you know, clearly other officials in the U.S. government
met with the Sudanese. I mean, Yahia Hussein Babiker came here to
Washington in January of 2002 and held meetings with senior officials
at the C.I.A. The Sudanese official who handles the liaison
relationship with the C.I.A. traveled here late last year and met
with C.I.A. officials to discuss Iraq. So there has been extensive
consultations between the parties. And in fact, there is now an
active C.I.A. station in Khartoum. There are regular, if not daily,
contacts between the two intelligence agencies over there. So this is
an ongoing regularized channel of communication between the
intelligence agencies.
AMY GOODMAN: One last thing, Ken Silverstein, before we go to
Congressman Donald Payne. Can you describe this secret trip most
recently taken, and how you got the details of it?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: I need to be a little bit careful about that. All I
can say is that the C.I.A. sent an executive jet to Khartoum to pick
up Major General Gosh. He was brought over to Washington for three
days of meetings here. He met with very senior officials in the
C.I.A. And, you know, I don't have direct knowledge, of course, of
the talks that were held, but clearly he was here to discuss ongoing
intelligence collaboration. And I think the trip is especially
significant because they've had senior people come over before. But
to my knowledge it's the first time that the head of Sudanese
intelligence has come to Washington to meet with top officials there.
So I think that sort of speaks for the importance the C.I.A. gives to
the relationship. And it's symbolic of the importance for both sides
that the C.I.A. would send a plane over there to bring him here.
AMY GOODMAN: New Jersey Congress member Donald Payne, welcome to
Democracy Now!
REP. DONALD PAYNE: Good to be here.
AMY GOODMAN: Your response to these latest revelations about the
relationship, and did you know about it before?
REP. DONALD PAYNE: I had some idea that there was contact, and as
it's been indicated, pretty high level contact. As we were pushing
through our condemnation of the government of Sudan, as you know, the
North-South Peace Accord was going on, and a lot of energy, of
course. That was the initial 10-year push get a peace accord that the
U.S. was pretty involved in. And as that was sort of coming to
fruition, there started to be some additional meetings, high-level
meetings, as it's been indicated. I know when I introduced the
Resolution on Genocide that was passed through the House, bipartisan,
422 to zero, and then went over to the Senate to urge the Senate to
do the same thing, it was near the time that we were going on a
recess in, I think it was July, the last day of our session when the
Senate finally passed with unanimous consent. While we were doing
that and even after that, I know that there were State Department --
at least a State Department official that went over. And from what I
understand, really said, even though the Congress is doing that, and
Colin Powell came out later about two months later after our
resolution passed both Houses with the fact that genocide was
occurring, the message was, well, the Congress is annoyed, and we've
got some people that are making this a big issue. However, the
administration really would like to have some kind of cooperative
relationship. And so I was aware of that. Very disturbing, of course,
but almost like, you know, don't really pay too much attention to
those people in the House and the Senate, we want to have some kind
of relationship with you.
AMY GOODMAN: So the question is, what are you calling for now? We
also tried to reach your senator from New Jersey, Jon Corzine,
senator, democratic senator. He's in eastern Chad now with Sudanese
refugees and then headed to Iraq. He, too, quite angry about this
relationship, calling for action on Darfur. Ken Silverstein, you
wrote -- talked about in your piece what Congress is not getting from
the administration in terms of information. For example, getting a
list of war criminals -- giving a list of those who have committed
war crimes in Sudan but not a roster of government officials who have
committed these war crimes.
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, I know there are a number of steps that, you
know, Sudan's critics want taken and that sort of have not been taken
by the administration. There is -- Congress has issued a list of
senior Sudanese officials who they claim has been involved in war
crimes. The administration has not released its own list, as Congress
has requested that it do. The Congress has requested a number of
other steps, targeted sanctions on individuals so that people who are
identified as having committed war crimes would have their bank
accounts frozen and be barred from international travel. The
administration has not done that. There is, in fact, not an arms
embargo on the government of Sudan, which critics in Congress have
asked for. So there are a whole series of steps that people in
Congress want taken that the administration has not taken. I think in
terms of whether this is influencing policy, the intelligence
cooperation, you know, it's largely a question of, are there steps
that could have been taken that haven't been taken. It's not that the
administration has done -- taken a lot of active steps, although they
did allow the sanctions to come off that were imposed by the U.N.
over the attempt on Mubarak. But it's mostly a question of, you know,
from talking to critics of the Sudanese government, they have said
this is what we should have done that we haven't done, and they
suspect that the intelligence sharing is one reason why the
administration hasn't been as aggressive as it might be.
AMY GOODMAN: And pressuring the U.N. Security Council to strengthen
the mandate of the African Union observer mission?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: That's another thing. I mean, people have said,
look, the U.N. has been very slow to act. And that's primarily been
because of China and Russia, because, both of those, especially the
Chinese, have extensive economic interest in Sudan. China has a very,
very big role in the Sudanese oil industry. And so, both of those
countries have sought to block action at the U.N. Now, critics here
have said we have not really challenged the Chinese or the Russians
on that issue, that we should be pressuring them more, and that
certainly, they have said, we should be pressuring the U.N. to expand
the A.U. mandate. Right now the A.U. is there as an observer force,
but it's not really authorized to try to prevent human rights abuses
from taking place. And people want the U.N. to take -- to expand the
A.U. mandate and to strengthen its mandate. You know, people have
called for a greater logistical support to the A.U. mission and
greater funding for the A.U. mission. So, as I said, it's -- a lot of
what people are calling for are steps that they say could have been
taken but thus far the administration has not moved on.
AMY GOODMAN: Salih Booker of African Action, what are you demanding
right now of Congress, of the Bush administration, of the United
Nations?
SALIH BOOKER: Well, just to pick up where Ken left off, obviously
we're calling for the U.N. Security Council to establish a Chapter
Seven International Intervention Force. There's a genocide occurring
in Darfur. Genocide is a unique crime against humanity. Many people
would say it's the ultimate crime. It's the 90th anniversary of the
Armenian Genocide, 60 years since the Holocaust, 11 years since
Rwanda. People keep saying never again, and here we have a genocide
unfolding in slow motion since February 2003 in Darfur. What the Bush
administration is doing, it's willing to cover up genocide in favor
of an intelligence collaboration with a regime in Sudan. It is
defining bilateral relations with countries based on what their
governments can do for the U.S. in the so-called war on terrorism.
And this is a trade they're perfectly willing to make. And to
minimize the significance of the atrocities and the crimes against
humanity going on in Darfur, even while the administration was forced
to acknowledge that, in fact, what's happening there constitutes
genocide, it hasn't provided the leadership at all necessary in the
U.N. and it hasn't challenged China or Russia at all to establish an
international force. They've been washing their hands by saying
African solutions for African problems, knowing that the African
Union doesn't have the capacity, the logistics, the financing, or
even the troops to mount the kind of broad, multinational
intervention necessary to provide protection, you know, to more than
two million people in a region the size of Iraq. And one thing we
haven't mentioned is that as part of the Bush administration's
original game plan after September 11 was intelligence cooperation
with the Sudanese, who literally called up and said, hey, Bin Laden
used to live here, come get the files. They want to normalize ties,
so they focused on the negotiations between the north and the south,
got a peace agreement which they felt then would allow the U.S. to
take Sudan off the terror list to lift sanctions, and significantly,
which would then allow American oil companies to reenter Sudan and to
begin to compete with China and the other companies that are there.
That was the game plan. The genocide in Darfur has been an
inconvenience to that game plan, and they've been forced largely by
public pressure here to give more attention to and address it. But
their leadership has not been -- you know, it's not been forthcoming.
AMY GOODMAN: Salih Booker, what do you want Congress to do? What are
you demanding of Congress members like Donald Payne?
SALIH BOOKER: Right, well, of course, Congressman Payne has been
providing great leadership on the House side and broadly in the
Congress for years on Sudan. And particularly at this moment, there
are bills in both the Senate and the House, the Darfur Accountability
Acts, the efforts by members of Congress to actually impose targeted
sanctions on the Sudanese government, in addition to those that are
already there, to authorize the President and the United States
government to use greater options of force in the international
force, you know, to bring about change. But it's all that Congress
can do is to express its opinion on what the administration ought to
be doing and to try and legislate some of these sanctions. It can't
force the kind of international cooperation that the administration
should be organizing at the U.N. Security Council. And the other
thing is the Bush administration has been opposing this very
legislation. They got the Senate to take it out of the supplemental
appropriations bill, and they haven't been supportive at all on the
House legislation either.
AMY GOODMAN: Congress member Donald Payne, what do you plan to do now
with this newly released information, and the whole issue of
sanctions?
REP. DONALD PAYNE: Well, I will certainly raise the issue at our
Congressional Black Caucus annual -- I mean, weekly meeting on
Wednesday. I will be meeting with some of our colleagues who have
been very supportive. Congressman Wolf, Congressman Tancredo,
Congressman Cummings. And we will try to come up with some strategy,
as Salih Booker said. We have come out strong. You know, it was three
months after we declared genocide in the House and the Senate that
the administration declared that genocide was going on. I listed 51,
read them from the well of the House, 51 Sudanese persons, government
officials, starting with the Vice President Taha, who allegedly is
the one who orchestrated the release of the Janjaweed, supporting
them financially, equipping them. And so he was the chief negotiator
of the North-South Accord. He is alleged by Darfurans there and here
as the one who is the mastermind. Now, how do you negotiate with him
in good faith? What the U.S. government did a decade ago, the C.I.A.
in their wisdom removed practically every single C.I.A. station in
Africa, just eliminated 10, 12 years ago, as they were cutting back.
Therefore, once again, mismanaging an agency have now to rely on
government officials where if they had kept their kind of
communications that they do allegedly -- I don't know how they
actually operate, but they have operatives on the ground. By removing
them from Africa, now they have to depend on the government of Sudan.
Also, as it's been mentioned by Salih Booker, we put pressure
Talisman, which was a Canadian company, to withdraw its activities in
Sudan. The PetroChina and Malaysians went in in bigger force. We have
got to put some pressure on China. However, I believe, as Salih said,
that once you can get sanctions removed, then U.S. companies can go
in. There are still a lot of untapped oil resources in Sudan. And
that's a part of this agenda of trying to normalize relations with
Sudan, so that U.S. oil companies can go in and start exploring oil.
And so we are going to have certainly a dialogue with the supporters
of Sudan when I get back to Washington this afternoon and try once
again. We had capital market sanctions in our legislation,
Congressmen Tancredo and Bachus from Alabama. and it was removed.
Greenspan came and said capital market sanctions must be removed. And
as it's been mentioned, Senator Frist was denied a visa. Here's a
person who perhaps may run for President of the United States. How
can you have normal relations or even have conversations with a
government that said that your president -- your Senate leader does
not -- is not welcome in our country? He's not thought of enough.
Senator Corzine, I believe, also put an application. I have never
applied to the government of Khartoum, because -- in Khartoum,
because it's an illegitimate government. I don't recognize them. What
they do is to wait you out, tell you we'll get back to you, and then
decide if they will let you come in, then take you where they want
you to go and tell you when you should leave.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, on that note, Congress member Donald Payne, I want
to thank you very much for being with us, as well as Salih Booker of
Africa Action, and Ken Silverstein of the Los Angeles Times. We will
link to the Los Angeles Times expose at our website,
DemocracyNow.org.
May 4 2005
US allied with Sudan govt despite Darfur genocide
Wednesday May 4th, 2005 02:30.
By Democracy Now
The Los Angeles Times has revealed that the U.S. has quietly forged a
close intelligence partnership with Sudan despite the government's
role in the mass killings in Darfur. We speak with Ken Silverstein,
the reporter who broke the story, Salih Booker, the director of
Africa Action as well as Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ). [includes rush
transcript]
NEW YORK, May 3, 2005 -- In the days after the Sept. 11 attacks,
President Bush issued an ultimatum to the world: "Either you are with
us, or you are with the terrorists." Three and half years later, it
has been revealed that the Bush administration has allied itself with
a government listed as a state sponsor of terrorism and one that the
administration has accused of committing genocide against its own
people - Sudan. A major expose in the Los Angeles Times on Friday
revealed that the U.S. has quietly forged a close intelligence
partnership with Sudan despite the government's role in the mass
killings in Darfur. The Sudanese government has since publicly
confirmed it is working with the Bush administration and the CIA.
Eight months ago, former Secretary of State Colin Powell accused the
Sudanese of carrying out a genocide in Darfur. Already 180,000 have
died in the region from fighting or hunger. But relations appear to
have since changed -- for the better. One senior Sudanese official
the LA Times that the country had achieved "complete normalization"
of relations with the CIA.
The Times reported that the CIA sent an executive jet last week to
Khartoum to ferry the chief of Sudan's intelligence agency to
Washington for secret meetings sealing Khartoum's sensitive and
previously veiled partnership with the administration.
Salah Gosh (SMC)
The Sudanese intelligence chief - Major General Salah Abdallah Gosh -
has been accused by members of Congress of directing military attacks
against civilians in Darfur. He also had regular contacts with Osama
bin Laden during the 1990s.
Last month, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sent a letter to the
Sudanese government calling for steps to end the conflict in Darfur.
But the letter, reviewed by the Times, also said the administration
hoped to establish a "fruitful relationship" with Sudan and looked
forward to continued "close cooperation" on terrorism.
Ken Silverstein, reporter for the Los Angeles Times. Read article:
Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on Terrorism.
Salih Booker, Director of Africa Action.
Rep. Donald Payne, Democratic Congressman from New Jersey.
TRANSCRIPT
AMY GOODMAN: We're joined in our Washington studio by Ken
Silverstein, reporter for the Los Angeles Times who broke the story.
And we welcome you, Ken, to Democracy Now!
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Thank you.
AMY GOODMAN: It's good to have you with us. Well, why don't you lay
out for us exactly what you've learned about the U.S.-Sudan
relationship.
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, the relationship really started even pre-9/11.
In July of 2001, former Assistant Secretary of State Walter
Kansteiner traveled to Nairobi, where he had a public meeting with
the rebel leader John Garang and then privately met with the Sudanese
Foreign Minister. Then approximately the following month there was a
secret meeting in London with Yahia Hussein Babiker, who at the time
was the Deputy Chief of Sudanese Intelligence, at which the topic of
cooperation on counter-terrorism was broached. But the relationship
really took off post-9/11, for both sides had pragmatic reasons. And
I think that's really at the heart of this. The U.S. after 9/11
wanted to obtain information on al Qaeda and Islamic extremists from
whenever and wherever it could. And it decided that it would
cooperate with any regime that was willing to provide that
information, including Sudan. For the Sudanese there was fear that
after Afghanistan they might be next on the list of U.S. targets for
military action. And so both sides had grounds to cooperate. By
November of 2001, the collaboration was very strong. I spoke to a
former F.B.I. agent who traveled to Khartoum in November of 2001 at
the time the C.I.A had an active station, which it had been shut down
-- their last station had been shut down in late 1995. By November of
2001 they had a very active station. They were tracking Islamic
extremists with the cooperation of the Mukhabarat, which is the
Sudanese equivalent of the C.I.A. The F.B.I. agent actually had gone
to Khartoum to interview long-time members of al Qaeda who have very
close ties to Osama bin Laden. The Mukhabarat made these suspects
available to the F.B.I. They arranged safehouses for the interviews
to be conducted. The F.B.I. agent went to the al Shamal Bank, where
bin Laden had multiple business accounts when he lived in Sudan
between 1991 and 1996. They turned over all the banking records. And,
you know, that really kicked off the relationship which has deepened
ever since.
AMY GOODMAN: Now, you talked to Gosh?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: I was able to interview him. And he simply confirmed
that the Mukhabarat had an ongoing close partnership with the C.I.A.
He was very open about that. I also spoke to a number of former top
officials at the Mukhabarat, who are still -- two of them in
particular who were among the most powerful men in the country. They
both had offices in the Presidential Palace in Khartoum. And they
were very open about the relationship. They said -- one of them said
that we have completely normalized our relationships with the C.I.A.
He said the C.I.A. was helping to try to smooth the broader political
relationship between Sudan and the Bush administration. They were
open about the relationship. I think, in fact, that they feel that
they -- I think to a certain extent they cooperated with me and
allowed me access because they feel that they want recognition for
some of their efforts that they feel have not been noted. And they
want rewards. I mean, there's no question about it. The United
States, Sudan, all governments, no one does anything for free. The
Sudanese are hoping that we will lift long-standing economic
sanctions that were imposed during the Clinton Administration. And
they want to get off the list of state sponsors of terrorism where
they've been since 1993. So this is a pragmatic deal for both sides.
And the Sudanese want to be rewarded for it.
AMY GOODMAN: Ken Silverstein. The Intelligence Chief, Major General
Salah Abdallah Gosh, who talks about, boasts about the relationship
he has with the C.I.A., what is his role in the killings in Darfur?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, you know, I think maybe your other guests
might be able to better address that. I know that the Congressional
Research Service has put out a report that lists him as somebody
who's directly involved in the counterinsurgency strategy that the
Sudanese government has employed in Darfur. I spoke to Sudanese
officials who deny that Gosh or any other senior Sudanese officials
are involved in such atrocities. They blame those on militias that
they say that they don't exercise control over. So they would say he
has no role in the atrocities. I know that there are other observers
who have said he has been involved.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, Ken Silverstein, we are joined on the phone by
Salih Booker, who is the Executive Director of Africa Action. We'll
also be joined by New Jersey Congress member Donald Payne of New
Jersey. But, Salih Booker, can you talk about the significance of the
information that Ken Silverstein has revealed in the Los Angeles
Times of the relationship between the Intelligence Chief -- not only
the Intelligence Chief of Sudan but the Sudanese government and the
United States?
SALIH BOOKER: Well, I think it's very significant that it gets a
public airing. This growing relationship of cooperation has been, you
know, somewhat of a public secret, if you will, or fairly well known
within the foreign policy community, within the Africa advocacy and
analyst community. We have to bear in mind that this is very much
like the Cold War, this so-called war on terrorism. The U.S.
government has established a hierarchy of U.S. national interests, as
defined by the administration, the U.S. establishment. And in that
hierarchy essentially African lives are at the bottom while
collecting intelligence, even dubious intelligence on possible
terrorists attacks on American targets is clearly at the top of the
hierarchy. So this administration has really wanted to normalize ties
with the government in Khartoum since shortly, almost immediately
after September 11. Because of bin Laden's presence in Sudan, the
Sudanese government felt it always had something to sell to the
United States. And that its offers of intelligence cooperation which
go back to the Clinton years could be a tool they would use to
prevent the United States from applying pressure, whether on settling
the conflict with southern Sudanese and now more recently, of course,
as a way of sort of shunting pressure aside because of the genocide
in Darfur. And the Sudanese government has manipulated this very
well.
AMY GOODMAN: We're talking to Salih Booker, Director of Africa
Action. And in Washington in the studio, Ken Silverstein,
investigative reporter for the Los Angeles Times. We'll go to break
and then come back.
[break]
AMY GOODMAN: We are talking about the expose in the Los Angeles
Times, "Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on
Terrorism." Despite once harboring bin Laden, Khartoum regime has
supplied key intelligence, officials say. And now we're joined by Ken
Silverstein in the studio in Washington. Congress member Donald Payne
of New Jersey on the telephone. And Salih Booker, Director of Africa
Action. It was a few months after September 11, three and a half
years ago, the C.I.A. had an active station in Khartoum, according to
multiple sources. Among other programs the agency was running
surveillance on suspected foreign extremists with the knowledge and
assistance of the Mukhabarat. Material obtained by Sudanese
intelligence was turned over to U.S. investigators. And it goes on
from there. Ken Silverstein, how did you find out this information?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, there have been some allusions to the
cooperation previously. And oddly enough if one goes to the State
Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism reports the last few years,
they have referred explicitly to Sudanese cooperation that they've
made -- they've provided access to individuals. It's been very vague,
but it's been stated. And I had seen those references, and I started
calling sources and learned that, in fact, the cooperation is pretty
extensive and decided this is an obvious story. I mean, it's not a
surprise if the Jordanians are cooperating with the C.I.A., or if,
you know, the British are cooperating with the C.I.A., but the fact
that Sudan, where bin Laden lived for five years and which has a
reputation for Islamic radicalism, and which is, as I mentioned, on
the list of state sponsors of terror, I mean, that to me is a man
bites dog story, as opposed to the other way around, so it seemed
like an obvious story to pursue. And I just started looking into it,
developing -- working with sources here and traveled over to Khartoum
and was able to interview some fairly senior people in the government
there.
AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about the role of U.S. officials, U.S.
emissaries for the Bush administration? Who has met with these
Sudanese officials?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, the former Sssistant Secretary of State for
Africa Walter Kansteiner sort of led the opening, even as I mentioned
earlier, pre-9/11. But post-9/11, as well. There was this secret
meeting in late September at the American Embassy in London, where
Kansteiner met with Yahia Hussein Babiker, then the deputy head of
the Sudanese intelligence. And basically there was an agreement
struck. The Bush administration agreed that there would soon be a
vote. In fact, the vote took place three days later at the U.N. on
whether to lift sanctions against Sudan that had been imposed in 1995
over its role in the assassination attempt on Egyptian President
Hosni Mubarak that took place in Ethiopia in 1995. And the Bush
administration abstained on that vote. And by abstaining, the
sanctions were lifted. If they had voted no, of course, the sanctions
would have remained. And not long afterwards the Sudanese turned
over, you know, a significant amount of information, files on Islamic
extremists who had been residing in Khartoum in the 1990s and even
beyond. So that was really the basis for the -- or the first step, I
think. But, you know, clearly other officials in the U.S. government
met with the Sudanese. I mean, Yahia Hussein Babiker came here to
Washington in January of 2002 and held meetings with senior officials
at the C.I.A. The Sudanese official who handles the liaison
relationship with the C.I.A. traveled here late last year and met
with C.I.A. officials to discuss Iraq. So there has been extensive
consultations between the parties. And in fact, there is now an
active C.I.A. station in Khartoum. There are regular, if not daily,
contacts between the two intelligence agencies over there. So this is
an ongoing regularized channel of communication between the
intelligence agencies.
AMY GOODMAN: One last thing, Ken Silverstein, before we go to
Congressman Donald Payne. Can you describe this secret trip most
recently taken, and how you got the details of it?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: I need to be a little bit careful about that. All I
can say is that the C.I.A. sent an executive jet to Khartoum to pick
up Major General Gosh. He was brought over to Washington for three
days of meetings here. He met with very senior officials in the
C.I.A. And, you know, I don't have direct knowledge, of course, of
the talks that were held, but clearly he was here to discuss ongoing
intelligence collaboration. And I think the trip is especially
significant because they've had senior people come over before. But
to my knowledge it's the first time that the head of Sudanese
intelligence has come to Washington to meet with top officials there.
So I think that sort of speaks for the importance the C.I.A. gives to
the relationship. And it's symbolic of the importance for both sides
that the C.I.A. would send a plane over there to bring him here.
AMY GOODMAN: New Jersey Congress member Donald Payne, welcome to
Democracy Now!
REP. DONALD PAYNE: Good to be here.
AMY GOODMAN: Your response to these latest revelations about the
relationship, and did you know about it before?
REP. DONALD PAYNE: I had some idea that there was contact, and as
it's been indicated, pretty high level contact. As we were pushing
through our condemnation of the government of Sudan, as you know, the
North-South Peace Accord was going on, and a lot of energy, of
course. That was the initial 10-year push get a peace accord that the
U.S. was pretty involved in. And as that was sort of coming to
fruition, there started to be some additional meetings, high-level
meetings, as it's been indicated. I know when I introduced the
Resolution on Genocide that was passed through the House, bipartisan,
422 to zero, and then went over to the Senate to urge the Senate to
do the same thing, it was near the time that we were going on a
recess in, I think it was July, the last day of our session when the
Senate finally passed with unanimous consent. While we were doing
that and even after that, I know that there were State Department --
at least a State Department official that went over. And from what I
understand, really said, even though the Congress is doing that, and
Colin Powell came out later about two months later after our
resolution passed both Houses with the fact that genocide was
occurring, the message was, well, the Congress is annoyed, and we've
got some people that are making this a big issue. However, the
administration really would like to have some kind of cooperative
relationship. And so I was aware of that. Very disturbing, of course,
but almost like, you know, don't really pay too much attention to
those people in the House and the Senate, we want to have some kind
of relationship with you.
AMY GOODMAN: So the question is, what are you calling for now? We
also tried to reach your senator from New Jersey, Jon Corzine,
senator, democratic senator. He's in eastern Chad now with Sudanese
refugees and then headed to Iraq. He, too, quite angry about this
relationship, calling for action on Darfur. Ken Silverstein, you
wrote -- talked about in your piece what Congress is not getting from
the administration in terms of information. For example, getting a
list of war criminals -- giving a list of those who have committed
war crimes in Sudan but not a roster of government officials who have
committed these war crimes.
KEN SILVERSTEIN: Well, I know there are a number of steps that, you
know, Sudan's critics want taken and that sort of have not been taken
by the administration. There is -- Congress has issued a list of
senior Sudanese officials who they claim has been involved in war
crimes. The administration has not released its own list, as Congress
has requested that it do. The Congress has requested a number of
other steps, targeted sanctions on individuals so that people who are
identified as having committed war crimes would have their bank
accounts frozen and be barred from international travel. The
administration has not done that. There is, in fact, not an arms
embargo on the government of Sudan, which critics in Congress have
asked for. So there are a whole series of steps that people in
Congress want taken that the administration has not taken. I think in
terms of whether this is influencing policy, the intelligence
cooperation, you know, it's largely a question of, are there steps
that could have been taken that haven't been taken. It's not that the
administration has done -- taken a lot of active steps, although they
did allow the sanctions to come off that were imposed by the U.N.
over the attempt on Mubarak. But it's mostly a question of, you know,
from talking to critics of the Sudanese government, they have said
this is what we should have done that we haven't done, and they
suspect that the intelligence sharing is one reason why the
administration hasn't been as aggressive as it might be.
AMY GOODMAN: And pressuring the U.N. Security Council to strengthen
the mandate of the African Union observer mission?
KEN SILVERSTEIN: That's another thing. I mean, people have said,
look, the U.N. has been very slow to act. And that's primarily been
because of China and Russia, because, both of those, especially the
Chinese, have extensive economic interest in Sudan. China has a very,
very big role in the Sudanese oil industry. And so, both of those
countries have sought to block action at the U.N. Now, critics here
have said we have not really challenged the Chinese or the Russians
on that issue, that we should be pressuring them more, and that
certainly, they have said, we should be pressuring the U.N. to expand
the A.U. mandate. Right now the A.U. is there as an observer force,
but it's not really authorized to try to prevent human rights abuses
from taking place. And people want the U.N. to take -- to expand the
A.U. mandate and to strengthen its mandate. You know, people have
called for a greater logistical support to the A.U. mission and
greater funding for the A.U. mission. So, as I said, it's -- a lot of
what people are calling for are steps that they say could have been
taken but thus far the administration has not moved on.
AMY GOODMAN: Salih Booker of African Action, what are you demanding
right now of Congress, of the Bush administration, of the United
Nations?
SALIH BOOKER: Well, just to pick up where Ken left off, obviously
we're calling for the U.N. Security Council to establish a Chapter
Seven International Intervention Force. There's a genocide occurring
in Darfur. Genocide is a unique crime against humanity. Many people
would say it's the ultimate crime. It's the 90th anniversary of the
Armenian Genocide, 60 years since the Holocaust, 11 years since
Rwanda. People keep saying never again, and here we have a genocide
unfolding in slow motion since February 2003 in Darfur. What the Bush
administration is doing, it's willing to cover up genocide in favor
of an intelligence collaboration with a regime in Sudan. It is
defining bilateral relations with countries based on what their
governments can do for the U.S. in the so-called war on terrorism.
And this is a trade they're perfectly willing to make. And to
minimize the significance of the atrocities and the crimes against
humanity going on in Darfur, even while the administration was forced
to acknowledge that, in fact, what's happening there constitutes
genocide, it hasn't provided the leadership at all necessary in the
U.N. and it hasn't challenged China or Russia at all to establish an
international force. They've been washing their hands by saying
African solutions for African problems, knowing that the African
Union doesn't have the capacity, the logistics, the financing, or
even the troops to mount the kind of broad, multinational
intervention necessary to provide protection, you know, to more than
two million people in a region the size of Iraq. And one thing we
haven't mentioned is that as part of the Bush administration's
original game plan after September 11 was intelligence cooperation
with the Sudanese, who literally called up and said, hey, Bin Laden
used to live here, come get the files. They want to normalize ties,
so they focused on the negotiations between the north and the south,
got a peace agreement which they felt then would allow the U.S. to
take Sudan off the terror list to lift sanctions, and significantly,
which would then allow American oil companies to reenter Sudan and to
begin to compete with China and the other companies that are there.
That was the game plan. The genocide in Darfur has been an
inconvenience to that game plan, and they've been forced largely by
public pressure here to give more attention to and address it. But
their leadership has not been -- you know, it's not been forthcoming.
AMY GOODMAN: Salih Booker, what do you want Congress to do? What are
you demanding of Congress members like Donald Payne?
SALIH BOOKER: Right, well, of course, Congressman Payne has been
providing great leadership on the House side and broadly in the
Congress for years on Sudan. And particularly at this moment, there
are bills in both the Senate and the House, the Darfur Accountability
Acts, the efforts by members of Congress to actually impose targeted
sanctions on the Sudanese government, in addition to those that are
already there, to authorize the President and the United States
government to use greater options of force in the international
force, you know, to bring about change. But it's all that Congress
can do is to express its opinion on what the administration ought to
be doing and to try and legislate some of these sanctions. It can't
force the kind of international cooperation that the administration
should be organizing at the U.N. Security Council. And the other
thing is the Bush administration has been opposing this very
legislation. They got the Senate to take it out of the supplemental
appropriations bill, and they haven't been supportive at all on the
House legislation either.
AMY GOODMAN: Congress member Donald Payne, what do you plan to do now
with this newly released information, and the whole issue of
sanctions?
REP. DONALD PAYNE: Well, I will certainly raise the issue at our
Congressional Black Caucus annual -- I mean, weekly meeting on
Wednesday. I will be meeting with some of our colleagues who have
been very supportive. Congressman Wolf, Congressman Tancredo,
Congressman Cummings. And we will try to come up with some strategy,
as Salih Booker said. We have come out strong. You know, it was three
months after we declared genocide in the House and the Senate that
the administration declared that genocide was going on. I listed 51,
read them from the well of the House, 51 Sudanese persons, government
officials, starting with the Vice President Taha, who allegedly is
the one who orchestrated the release of the Janjaweed, supporting
them financially, equipping them. And so he was the chief negotiator
of the North-South Accord. He is alleged by Darfurans there and here
as the one who is the mastermind. Now, how do you negotiate with him
in good faith? What the U.S. government did a decade ago, the C.I.A.
in their wisdom removed practically every single C.I.A. station in
Africa, just eliminated 10, 12 years ago, as they were cutting back.
Therefore, once again, mismanaging an agency have now to rely on
government officials where if they had kept their kind of
communications that they do allegedly -- I don't know how they
actually operate, but they have operatives on the ground. By removing
them from Africa, now they have to depend on the government of Sudan.
Also, as it's been mentioned by Salih Booker, we put pressure
Talisman, which was a Canadian company, to withdraw its activities in
Sudan. The PetroChina and Malaysians went in in bigger force. We have
got to put some pressure on China. However, I believe, as Salih said,
that once you can get sanctions removed, then U.S. companies can go
in. There are still a lot of untapped oil resources in Sudan. And
that's a part of this agenda of trying to normalize relations with
Sudan, so that U.S. oil companies can go in and start exploring oil.
And so we are going to have certainly a dialogue with the supporters
of Sudan when I get back to Washington this afternoon and try once
again. We had capital market sanctions in our legislation,
Congressmen Tancredo and Bachus from Alabama. and it was removed.
Greenspan came and said capital market sanctions must be removed. And
as it's been mentioned, Senator Frist was denied a visa. Here's a
person who perhaps may run for President of the United States. How
can you have normal relations or even have conversations with a
government that said that your president -- your Senate leader does
not -- is not welcome in our country? He's not thought of enough.
Senator Corzine, I believe, also put an application. I have never
applied to the government of Khartoum, because -- in Khartoum,
because it's an illegitimate government. I don't recognize them. What
they do is to wait you out, tell you we'll get back to you, and then
decide if they will let you come in, then take you where they want
you to go and tell you when you should leave.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, on that note, Congress member Donald Payne, I want
to thank you very much for being with us, as well as Salih Booker of
Africa Action, and Ken Silverstein of the Los Angeles Times. We will
link to the Los Angeles Times expose at our website,
DemocracyNow.org.