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RIA Novosti, Russia
May 03, 2005
IT'S A LIE THAT WE FOUGHT WITHOUT SKILL
World War II did not end in May 1945 in Berlin. It ended in September
in the Far East after the rout of militaristic Japan, in which both
American and Soviet forces fought. The Manchurian operation, which
was conducted on land by the Zabaikalsky Front, the 1st and 2nd Far
Eastern fronts and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, and at
sea by the Pacific Fleet and the Soviet Amur Flotilla, has gone down
in history as an example of great military planning and skill.
President of the Russian Academy of Military Science, Army General
Makhmut GAREYEV took part in this offensive. In an interview with RIA
Novosti military analyst Viktor LITOVKIN he shares some little known
facts about the operation.
LITOVKIN: I'd like to start with a question that a lot of people are
asking today. Did the Soviet Union, which was already exhausted by
the war against Nazi Germany, really have to go to war against Japan?
Japan did not pose a big threat to us. It was reasonably neutral
throughout the war, whereas the Americans, whom we had promised to
help, did all they could to delay the opening of the second front.
They cynically waited to see whether it was Germany or the USSR that
came out on top. Why did we have to help them in the war against
Japan? Couldn't they have managed without us?
GAREYEV: I think that saying the Americans could have managed without
us in the Far East is like saying we could have managed without them
in the West. You must remember, it was a world war. On the one side
there were the aggressors, the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, and on the
other side there was the Allied coalition led by the USSR, the US and
Britain. Neither we, nor the Americans, could have ended the war
without having eliminated the threat from both the West and the East.
I'd like to point out that despite the conduct of our allies, Britain
and the US, and despite there being many flaws in Stalin's policies,
especially in his domestic policies, our leader was very consistent
in his international relations and he observed the Allied agreements.
Even his critics abroad cannot find fault with him in this respect.
But of course it was not just about the will or lack of will of
certain leaders. From the very start of the war we were exposed to
threats from both the West and the East. From the mid 1930s all of
the USSR's strategic plans were dominated by the need to be ready to
fight on two fronts: against Germany in the West and against Japan in
the Far East. Soviet policy, diplomacy and military operations were
all aimed at avoiding a simultaneous war on two fronts. We wanted to
be able to fight the two wars one after the other.
In this respect the rout of militaristic Japan was never removed from
the Soviet agenda. Why not? You will remember Russia's shameful
defeat by Japan in 1905. This had left the peoples of the Soviet
Union deeply embittered and the older generation had waited for
decades for the chance to erase humiliating memory. When Russians
feel their desire for revenge is just, they cannot let it go. It is
also important to remember that Russia lost a lot of land to Japan
during that war. Japan took Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and other
territories away from us, with little regard for international law.
During the Civil War the Japanese seized a large area of the Far East
and wreaked havoc there. They shot thousands of people, and in
effect, were openly aggressive toward us. The Soviet Union had to
respond.
But maybe what mattered most here is that Stalin believed in keeping
his word. During all our negotiations with our allies, they called on
the USSR to enter the war against Japan. Stalin refused to give a
definite answer right up until the Tehran Conference when he finally
promised that the Soviet Union would join the war in the East. Then
at the Yalta Conference Stalin gave a firm commitment that the Soviet
Union would go to war against Japan two to three months after the
defeat of Germany. And he kepthis word: the war in Europe ended on
May 9, 1945, and exactly three months later, on August 9, 1945, we
attacked Japan.
L: Were you a young Captain then?
G: No, by that time I was a Major.
L: But in any case, you fought in the West and then you went to fight
in the Far East. What about the other men who did this? Weren't they
tired of fighting? They had been lucky to survive one war. How did
they react to the news that they had to fight another war, that they
had to put their lives at risk again?
G: I'll answer your question but first I'd like to finish what I was
saying.
So, exactly three months after the victory over Nazi Germany, Stalin
declared war on Japan. Much of what happened then is misinterpreted
today, distorted even. Many people claim that the Soviet Union should
not have entered that war. They say that we violated the
Non-Aggression Pact. But the USSR had announced its withdrawal from
this treaty back in April 1945, and so there was nothing to violate.
We abided by the standards of international law.
Furthermore, it was known (from American studies and assessments
carried out at US Army headquarters) that the Japanese would not stop
fighting even if the Americans seized their islands. The Japanese
said they would continue fighting for decades under the patronage of
the Kwantung Army. Tokyo planned to keep Manchuria as a bridgehead
for a lengthy campaign. The Japanese were determined not to be
beaten.
Obviously, the Soviet Union wanted this bridgehead to be destroyed,
as it posed a threat not only to the US but also to Soviet territory
in the Far East. This bridgehead had to be destroyed at all costs and
the Japanese Army had to be defeated.
American specialists informed President Roosevelt that if the USSR
did not enter the war the campaign could drag on for 12-18 months and
would cost the lives of a million U.S. soldiers. This is what the
situation was. Japan did not surrender even after the US dropped the
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9,
1945. The Japanese wanted to continue fighting.
When we look at all these facts it is clear that the Soviet Union had
to join the war. It was in the interests of the USSR and in the
interests of the whole of mankind that World War II be brought to an
end. The quick defeat of the Kwantung Army eliminated the causes for
concern I mentioned earlier. In effect, we saved the lives of
hundreds of thousands of American and British soldiers who were going
to fight there till the end. Regrettably, people often forget this,
especially in America.
Now I'll go back to your question about how the front line troops
felt. After the capture of Konigsberg, on April 11, 1945, which I was
involved in...
L: Sixty years ago...
G: Yes. At that time I was in the operations department of the 5th
Army Headquarters. We were redeploying our troops from East Prussia
to other places. The 28th Army, which had assaulted Konigsberg, was
sent to Berlin. Others were sent to the south...
L: To Czechoslovakia?
G: Not quite. Now this is a very interesting point. We actually
started moving the troops eastward in the fall of 1944, straight
after Finland left the war. What lay at the heart of the Manchurian
operation? The only way we could bring about the end of the war in
the Far East and destroy the Kwantung Army without incurring heavy
losses was to use the element of surprise. This was a difficult task
for the Red Army given that the Soviet Union had withdrawn from the
Non-Aggression Pact, giving Japan reason to believe that we were
going to attack. It was virtually impossible to transfer such large
numbers of troops from the West to the East without the Japanese
noticing. So they were waiting for us to attack, but what they didn't
know was when we would attack.
There are some "analysts" who claim that we fought without skill.
This is a lie. Our military leaders had a lot of very inspired ideas.
Chief of the General Staff, Army General Alexei Antonov, together
with Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, planned the Manchurian operation
so skillfully that the Japanese were barely aware of what was
happening. (When Chernyakhovsky was killed in action, Marshal
Vasilevsky was appointed Commander of the 3rd Belarussian Front,
firstly, so he could help speed up the defeat of the Nazis in East
Prussia and free up troops for the East, and secondly, so he could
gain experience of front command.)
They started sending divisions from the West to the East in 1944.
They sent divisions from the Karelian Front and Hungary, as these
were divisions which had been previously based in the East. This was
a ploy. Both the Japanese and our civilians saw this as the
triumphant return of our troops to their permanent bases. They were
greeted at the railway stations with flowers and music. This
homecoming was used to cover up the large-scale redeployment of other
units, in particular, tank and air force units. No one spotted them
anywhere. They were kept in railroad sidings.
Sometimes people ask, "How was it possible to mount a surprise attack
when such long distances and such large numbers of troops were
involved?" But it was a surprise attack. You can do a lot with
misinformation and military ingenuity.
What else is it important to know? About a month before August 9, the
Japanese Government asked us to act as a mediator at peace talks
between Toyko and Washington. In exchange, Japan promised to return
South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. This would have provided us
with a political solution to our territorial problems, and the only
lives lost would have been American ones. But Stalin was so
consistent in his international relations that he chose to act
honorably and keep his promise to the Allies. He rejected Japan's
attractive proposal and the Soviet Union went to war.
L: You have not answered my question about how the soldiers felt.
G: Yes, let's go back to Konigsberg. Some of our units were ordered
to board a train. Nobody knew where we were going, and we were
exhausted after heavy fighting. We were told to stick up maps showing
the routes to Berlin and Prague, and so everyone thought that was
where we were going. But it turned out that we were bound for Moscow.
The 5th Army Staff arrived in the capital on May 2. We waited in
sidings. But that night, for the first time ever, I saw a salute
given in honor of the capture of Berlin. It was rumored that we were
going to fight Turkey. It was only after we had crossed the Volga
that it dawned on us where we were going. Our journey was shrouded in
secrecy.
L: Did you move only at night?
G: No, we traveled round the clock, stopping only briefly at night.
We stopped in railroad sidings, some distance from the stations. Not
even all of the commanders knew where we were going. This massive
transfer of military forces was very well planned and executed. By
that time Stalin had full trust in his generals and he allowed them
to use their initiative. This is why the operation was so well
prepared.
The Japanese had built very strong defenses on the Manchurian-Soviet
border. The Front Staff had planned a three-day preliminary
bombardment to destroy them. It would take a day or two just to get
rid of the thickets that concealed their fortifications. But the 5th
Army Commander, Colonel General Nikolai Krylov, approached Vasilevsky
with an alternative strategy. He proposed an immediate, surprise
offensive, using advance battalions. The strategy was approved.
At 1 a.m. local time on August 9, under the cover of heavy rain, we
crossed the border together with our frontier guards and seized the
Japanese pillboxes (during training sessions all the advance units
had repeatedly practised border crossings with the frontier guards).
The Japanese soldiers were resting in wooden huts some 500 to 600
meters away: soldiers don't stay in pillboxes unless they are
expecting an attack. By the time they rushed outside we had already
occupied their pillboxes. We didn't have to fire a single shot.
Our fortified base was in Gradekovo, to the north of Mount Verblyud
and Mount Garnizonnaya. It was under the command of General Shurshin.
The general decided to allow a ten-minute artillery strike to cheer
up his troops. As soon as the attack was over, the Japanese rushed
out and occupied their pillboxes. After the war had ended, I was
crossing the border to deliver a report to the Front Staff, and I saw
that the Japanese were still sitting in their pillboxes, firing. What
does that tell you? If General Krylov's strategy had been rejected we
would have had to attack like we did in the Finnish war. Just
breaking down the enemy defenses would have taken six or seven
months. Our commander's smart decision saved us from that.
The Kwantung Army had one million men. 690,000 of them were taken
prisoner. We, on the other hand, lost just 12,000 soldiers and
officers during the Manchurian operation. Some people in the West
prefer to overlook this fact, because it gives the lie to their
claims that we fought without skill and used our men as cannon
fodder.
L: There's another side to this issue and I'll ask you about it
later. But I'd still like you to tell me: How did the soldiers who
had captured Berlin and Konigsberg feel about being sent to fight in
the Far East?
G: A lot depended on how old they were. To digress slightly. When the
war broke out on June 22, I was studying at the Tashkent Military
College. We stood on the parade ground and listened to Molotov's
speech. Cadet Garkavtsev, who was standing next to me, said, "By the
time we graduate the war will be over. It'll be just like it was with
Khasan and Khalkin-Gol. We won't get the chance to fight."
Garkavtsev was killed near Stalingrad in late 1942. The reason I
mention him is that he voiced what many of us young officers were
thinking. I was 22 years old in 1945, and I was already a Major. I
actually felt excited when I heard the news about the war against
Japan. There were some older people among us, middle-aged people, and
they agreed that we ought to take revenge on the Japanese. But there
were some men who had been at war for four years, and there were lots
of men who should have been transferred to the reserves before the
war because they had served their terms, but who had to stay on. Some
of them had been in the army for seven or eight years. They had
families and had been hoping that with the end of the war in Europe
they would soon go home... But I was single. So we reacted
differently.
I remember that when we arrived at our destination, Battalion
Commander Georgy Gubkin, who was later awarded the Hero Star, started
showing us how to throw grenades. He said, "You shouldn't throw them
the way you did in Konigsberg. The land's flat there, but in
Manchuria it's hilly. If you throw it upward, it will roll back under
your feet before it's exploded. After you pull out the safety pin,
you should count to two before throwing it." Front line soldiers had
to be trained as well.
Now, after Gubkin had told us how to throw grenades he asked us
whether we had any questions. One soldier, who was about 45 years
old, asked, "When will we be demobilized?" Some of the men were very
concerned about this.
L: Let's go back to the figures you gave: almost 700,000 Japanese
were taken prisoner while the Soviet Union sustained relatively low
losses - 12,000 men. This is not surprising. The Red Army commanders
had acquired the necessary experience, they wanted to save lives, and
they were skilled in the art of war. But people in the West do not
give the Red Army due credit. They claim that the Kwantung Army was
demoralized by Hiroshima and Nagasaki and did not pose such a serious
threat after August 6. They say that whole regiments and divisions
surrendered, and that the Russians did nothing to distinguish
themselves. What do you think about this?
G: These are absurd allegations and they bear no relation to the
historical facts, some of which I've already mentioned. If we had
used a standard military strategy in Manchuria, the campaign would
have dragged on for a very long time, regardless of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. We arrived in the Far East with all the experience that we
had gained in the previous four years of war. Our military skills
were second to none. Even today when you undergo three or four days
of training at a military college you leave feeling that you've
learnt something. And we had had four years of command post
exercises, during which we simulated real life situations, and of
course you learn a great deal from them. There was a world of
difference between our capabilities in 1941/1942 and our capabilities
in 1945.
If it hadn't been for our military skill, we would have been faced
with "a second Gradekovo." The Japanese went on firing from their
pillboxes on Mount Verblyud for another six months. They had enough
food, water and ammunition. They had everything they needed. The war
was over but they were still firing.
All this goes to show that it was purely thanks to our military skill
that we did not sustain heavy losses. The Japanese were determined to
resist, and they did put up a good fight. I had to rescue the 84th
Cavalry Division commanded by General Dedeugly.
L: Was it a Mongolian division? The commander's name sounds
Mongolian.
G: No, the commander was an Armenian. I read a book recently called
"Armenians in the Great Patriotic War", and there was a picture of
him and his short biography in it. His division was encircled from
August 15-18 to the northeast of the Chinese town of Nenang. The
Japanese fought fiercely, as they did in other places. But once again
the military skill of our troops won out. Large numbers of airborne
troops landed in the enemy territory and took the Japanese by
surprise.
There was a stone fortress, called Rehe, on the TransBaikal Front, in
a city with a population of half a million. If we had had to assault
it, it would have taken us a long time and both sides would have
suffered heavy losses. And of course there would have been civilian
losses as well. So what did the Corps Commander, General Issa Pliyev,
decide to do? He came up with a plan that no one would have thought
of in 1941.
He took seven or eight guards and one Dodge and two Willises. They
drove at high speed right through the fortress gates and went
straight to the headquarters. Pliyev said, "I've sent for the planes
to bomb you. Surrender if you don't want to die!" After bargaining
for an hour and a half, the whole garrison of 25,000 officers and men
surrendered to one general and several guards. He was the perfect
example of a bold and daring commander.
L: But the Japanese Emperor had ordered his Army to stop fighting on
August 14.
G. Yes, he did, but not all of the garrisons and units of the
Kwantung Army had received his order. Moreover, not everyone was
going to obey it, and there was a tacit order to surrender to the
Americans and the Chinese but to continue fighting the Russians. This
was to prevent us from seizing more land in Korea, Manchuria and
other Chinese regions. But we still managed to achieve our
objectives.
I will repeat that if it hadn't been for the military skill of our
commanders, we would have sustained much heavier losses. There was
every indication that we would be met by fierce Japanese resistance.
There is absolutely no evidence that the Japanese panicked and
marched to surrender.
L: There were two armies fighting Japan: the Red Army and the
American Army. Obviously they coordinated their strategic plans in
some way. But what about the tactical and operational plans at the
level of regiments and divisions?
G: I was not privy to such information. But of course when I was
working in the 5th Army headquarters I did see and hear things. We
were told, for instance, that the Americans were not supposed to go
to Port Arthur or Port Dairen because it had been agreed that these
were our deployment areas. The Americans were to stay south of the
38th Parallel in Korea. Battalions of our 25th Army, under the
command of Colonel-General Ivan Chistyakov, approached the northern
outskirts of Seoul and waited for two days for the Americans to
arrive. When they did, we withdrew to the 38th Parallel. So we did
know a bit about the military agreements. But when our 39th Army
approached Port Arthur, two American units tried to disembark from
high-speed landing craft. Our troops had to open fire in order to
prevent their landing. They didn't fire at them though; they fired
upward.
The Americans had thought they could seize and occupy Port Arthur.
But generally the agreements were observed. Well, actually, there
were a lot of agreements that Washington did not honor. For example,
it had been agreed that we would take part in the occupation of
Japan, and that we would send one or two Soviet brigades to Tokyo.
Our 35th Army, commanded by Colonel-General Nikolai Zakhvatayev, was
being trained for service in Japan and was planning to land on
Hokkaido. But General Douglas MacArthur, who was a very strong
character and had a lot of influence in the White House, went back on
the agreement. Apparently, President Harry Truman was not very
confident and so allowed MacArthur to make a lot of the decisions
relating to the Far East. MacArthur did everything he could to
prevent the Red Army from landing in Japan.
The Americans wanted to build bases on Soviet territory for the war
against Japan, on the Kuril Islands for example. But it was obvious
that if they did that, it would be very hard to get them to leave
after the war. So these proposals were rejected.
I have to admit that our postwar diplomatic efforts left much to be
desired. We were wrong to leave the San Francisco Conference. We
should either have signed the treaty or postponed signing it together
with other nations. But we left and so it was signed without us. That
decision still troubles us.
L: And now here is my last question. How did the Chinese people react
to the Red Army? And what did you think of the Chinese communists?
Whether it was intentional or not, you helped them defeat the
Kuomintang and carry out a socialist revolution.
G: This is a whole different subject. Basically, it has never been
studied. There are a lot of issues that journalists and historians
are yet to investigate. But what I myself can tell you is that we
were never so well received as we were in Korea and China, except
perhaps in Belarus.
I could give you countless examples of how well planned the
Manchurian operation was. But here is a particularly interesting
historical fact.. The Head of Reconnaissance of the 5th Kwantung Army
(they had a 5th army as well) gave Commander Yamada a report on
Soviet troop concentrations. They had agents gathering this
information. The Commander wrote on the report, "Only mad men would
attack during the rainy season." The rains began in August. But we
decided to start the offensive at precisely that time when it would
least be expected. This created enormous difficulties for the troops.
Their supplies were interrupted at once.
L: Artillery gets stuck, tanks...
G: Everything got stuck in the mud. I saw it myself in North Korea,
mainly in Nenang, Girin and Donghua. All of the villagers came to our
rescue. They helped us pull out our guns, tanks and other vehicles
that had sunk in the mud. They even carried tanks from one village to
another. Nobody forced them to help us, but they hated the Japanese
so much that they were willing to do anything to get them to leave
their country. The Japanese were notoriously cruel to the Chinese.
Both the Chinese and the Koreans were only allowed to eat rice once a
month. Meat products were rationed. The Japanese harassed the local
population in many other ways as well. Their occupational regime was
extremely harsh.
But this is a separate subject. We are often criticized for not
having released the Japanese prisoners of war straightaway. We are
asked why we took them to the USSR. I was in charge of an operations
group in northern Manchuria that was tasked with controlling the POW
camps. Our troops were about to leave in 1945, but then we had to
stay on for another few months. In anticipation of our withdrawal, we
had handed a number of camps over to the Chinese. And what did the
Chinese do? They took all the food away from the POWs. When a Chinese
soldier walked past a camp, he considered it his duty to shoot at it.
L: At the Japanese?
G: Yes. The Japanese went down on their knees and begged us not to
leave them. Regrettably, even some journalists resort to demagoguery
and say that we violated international law. But what could we do with
650,000 people? We didn't have the transportation to take them back
to Japan. Besides, there were mines everywhere. And we could not have
left them in China because the Chinese would have slaughtered them.
They themselves asked us to take them with us. People who are not in
full possession of the facts should not be so quick to pass
judgement. Life is far more complicated than they make out.
Many complex issues arose. Before the start of the war against Japan
the Soviet Union had signed an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek on Port
Arthur and the Chinese Military Railway, among others things. The
Communists reacted very badly to this. I used to meet Gao Gang,
Chairman of the Military Council of North East China, a revolutionary
and very clever man. He was absolutely furious about the agreement.
L: If this was the case why did we help Mao Zedong rather than Chiang
Kai-shek?
G: All of the initial pre-war agreements were signed with Chiang
Kai-shek. One of the conditions we set was that neither the
Communists, nor the Kuomintang were allowed to enter territory
occupied by Soviet troops. Under the agreement with Chiang we were
meant to withdraw from Manchuria in October-November 1945. But Chiang
suddenly realized that as soon as we left, the Communists would seize
all the towns. He didn't want this to happen but he didn't have the
troops to replace us. He became embroiled in the Special District and
in other places. Besides, his troops were allowing Japanese soldiers
to surrender. Anyway, he asked Stalin not to withdraw the Red Army,
and this immediately caused Mao to take issue with the Soviet policy.
But our relations with the Chinese leaders are a different matter.
Let's talk about them on another occasion.
May 03, 2005
IT'S A LIE THAT WE FOUGHT WITHOUT SKILL
World War II did not end in May 1945 in Berlin. It ended in September
in the Far East after the rout of militaristic Japan, in which both
American and Soviet forces fought. The Manchurian operation, which
was conducted on land by the Zabaikalsky Front, the 1st and 2nd Far
Eastern fronts and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, and at
sea by the Pacific Fleet and the Soviet Amur Flotilla, has gone down
in history as an example of great military planning and skill.
President of the Russian Academy of Military Science, Army General
Makhmut GAREYEV took part in this offensive. In an interview with RIA
Novosti military analyst Viktor LITOVKIN he shares some little known
facts about the operation.
LITOVKIN: I'd like to start with a question that a lot of people are
asking today. Did the Soviet Union, which was already exhausted by
the war against Nazi Germany, really have to go to war against Japan?
Japan did not pose a big threat to us. It was reasonably neutral
throughout the war, whereas the Americans, whom we had promised to
help, did all they could to delay the opening of the second front.
They cynically waited to see whether it was Germany or the USSR that
came out on top. Why did we have to help them in the war against
Japan? Couldn't they have managed without us?
GAREYEV: I think that saying the Americans could have managed without
us in the Far East is like saying we could have managed without them
in the West. You must remember, it was a world war. On the one side
there were the aggressors, the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, and on the
other side there was the Allied coalition led by the USSR, the US and
Britain. Neither we, nor the Americans, could have ended the war
without having eliminated the threat from both the West and the East.
I'd like to point out that despite the conduct of our allies, Britain
and the US, and despite there being many flaws in Stalin's policies,
especially in his domestic policies, our leader was very consistent
in his international relations and he observed the Allied agreements.
Even his critics abroad cannot find fault with him in this respect.
But of course it was not just about the will or lack of will of
certain leaders. From the very start of the war we were exposed to
threats from both the West and the East. From the mid 1930s all of
the USSR's strategic plans were dominated by the need to be ready to
fight on two fronts: against Germany in the West and against Japan in
the Far East. Soviet policy, diplomacy and military operations were
all aimed at avoiding a simultaneous war on two fronts. We wanted to
be able to fight the two wars one after the other.
In this respect the rout of militaristic Japan was never removed from
the Soviet agenda. Why not? You will remember Russia's shameful
defeat by Japan in 1905. This had left the peoples of the Soviet
Union deeply embittered and the older generation had waited for
decades for the chance to erase humiliating memory. When Russians
feel their desire for revenge is just, they cannot let it go. It is
also important to remember that Russia lost a lot of land to Japan
during that war. Japan took Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and other
territories away from us, with little regard for international law.
During the Civil War the Japanese seized a large area of the Far East
and wreaked havoc there. They shot thousands of people, and in
effect, were openly aggressive toward us. The Soviet Union had to
respond.
But maybe what mattered most here is that Stalin believed in keeping
his word. During all our negotiations with our allies, they called on
the USSR to enter the war against Japan. Stalin refused to give a
definite answer right up until the Tehran Conference when he finally
promised that the Soviet Union would join the war in the East. Then
at the Yalta Conference Stalin gave a firm commitment that the Soviet
Union would go to war against Japan two to three months after the
defeat of Germany. And he kepthis word: the war in Europe ended on
May 9, 1945, and exactly three months later, on August 9, 1945, we
attacked Japan.
L: Were you a young Captain then?
G: No, by that time I was a Major.
L: But in any case, you fought in the West and then you went to fight
in the Far East. What about the other men who did this? Weren't they
tired of fighting? They had been lucky to survive one war. How did
they react to the news that they had to fight another war, that they
had to put their lives at risk again?
G: I'll answer your question but first I'd like to finish what I was
saying.
So, exactly three months after the victory over Nazi Germany, Stalin
declared war on Japan. Much of what happened then is misinterpreted
today, distorted even. Many people claim that the Soviet Union should
not have entered that war. They say that we violated the
Non-Aggression Pact. But the USSR had announced its withdrawal from
this treaty back in April 1945, and so there was nothing to violate.
We abided by the standards of international law.
Furthermore, it was known (from American studies and assessments
carried out at US Army headquarters) that the Japanese would not stop
fighting even if the Americans seized their islands. The Japanese
said they would continue fighting for decades under the patronage of
the Kwantung Army. Tokyo planned to keep Manchuria as a bridgehead
for a lengthy campaign. The Japanese were determined not to be
beaten.
Obviously, the Soviet Union wanted this bridgehead to be destroyed,
as it posed a threat not only to the US but also to Soviet territory
in the Far East. This bridgehead had to be destroyed at all costs and
the Japanese Army had to be defeated.
American specialists informed President Roosevelt that if the USSR
did not enter the war the campaign could drag on for 12-18 months and
would cost the lives of a million U.S. soldiers. This is what the
situation was. Japan did not surrender even after the US dropped the
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9,
1945. The Japanese wanted to continue fighting.
When we look at all these facts it is clear that the Soviet Union had
to join the war. It was in the interests of the USSR and in the
interests of the whole of mankind that World War II be brought to an
end. The quick defeat of the Kwantung Army eliminated the causes for
concern I mentioned earlier. In effect, we saved the lives of
hundreds of thousands of American and British soldiers who were going
to fight there till the end. Regrettably, people often forget this,
especially in America.
Now I'll go back to your question about how the front line troops
felt. After the capture of Konigsberg, on April 11, 1945, which I was
involved in...
L: Sixty years ago...
G: Yes. At that time I was in the operations department of the 5th
Army Headquarters. We were redeploying our troops from East Prussia
to other places. The 28th Army, which had assaulted Konigsberg, was
sent to Berlin. Others were sent to the south...
L: To Czechoslovakia?
G: Not quite. Now this is a very interesting point. We actually
started moving the troops eastward in the fall of 1944, straight
after Finland left the war. What lay at the heart of the Manchurian
operation? The only way we could bring about the end of the war in
the Far East and destroy the Kwantung Army without incurring heavy
losses was to use the element of surprise. This was a difficult task
for the Red Army given that the Soviet Union had withdrawn from the
Non-Aggression Pact, giving Japan reason to believe that we were
going to attack. It was virtually impossible to transfer such large
numbers of troops from the West to the East without the Japanese
noticing. So they were waiting for us to attack, but what they didn't
know was when we would attack.
There are some "analysts" who claim that we fought without skill.
This is a lie. Our military leaders had a lot of very inspired ideas.
Chief of the General Staff, Army General Alexei Antonov, together
with Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky, planned the Manchurian operation
so skillfully that the Japanese were barely aware of what was
happening. (When Chernyakhovsky was killed in action, Marshal
Vasilevsky was appointed Commander of the 3rd Belarussian Front,
firstly, so he could help speed up the defeat of the Nazis in East
Prussia and free up troops for the East, and secondly, so he could
gain experience of front command.)
They started sending divisions from the West to the East in 1944.
They sent divisions from the Karelian Front and Hungary, as these
were divisions which had been previously based in the East. This was
a ploy. Both the Japanese and our civilians saw this as the
triumphant return of our troops to their permanent bases. They were
greeted at the railway stations with flowers and music. This
homecoming was used to cover up the large-scale redeployment of other
units, in particular, tank and air force units. No one spotted them
anywhere. They were kept in railroad sidings.
Sometimes people ask, "How was it possible to mount a surprise attack
when such long distances and such large numbers of troops were
involved?" But it was a surprise attack. You can do a lot with
misinformation and military ingenuity.
What else is it important to know? About a month before August 9, the
Japanese Government asked us to act as a mediator at peace talks
between Toyko and Washington. In exchange, Japan promised to return
South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. This would have provided us
with a political solution to our territorial problems, and the only
lives lost would have been American ones. But Stalin was so
consistent in his international relations that he chose to act
honorably and keep his promise to the Allies. He rejected Japan's
attractive proposal and the Soviet Union went to war.
L: You have not answered my question about how the soldiers felt.
G: Yes, let's go back to Konigsberg. Some of our units were ordered
to board a train. Nobody knew where we were going, and we were
exhausted after heavy fighting. We were told to stick up maps showing
the routes to Berlin and Prague, and so everyone thought that was
where we were going. But it turned out that we were bound for Moscow.
The 5th Army Staff arrived in the capital on May 2. We waited in
sidings. But that night, for the first time ever, I saw a salute
given in honor of the capture of Berlin. It was rumored that we were
going to fight Turkey. It was only after we had crossed the Volga
that it dawned on us where we were going. Our journey was shrouded in
secrecy.
L: Did you move only at night?
G: No, we traveled round the clock, stopping only briefly at night.
We stopped in railroad sidings, some distance from the stations. Not
even all of the commanders knew where we were going. This massive
transfer of military forces was very well planned and executed. By
that time Stalin had full trust in his generals and he allowed them
to use their initiative. This is why the operation was so well
prepared.
The Japanese had built very strong defenses on the Manchurian-Soviet
border. The Front Staff had planned a three-day preliminary
bombardment to destroy them. It would take a day or two just to get
rid of the thickets that concealed their fortifications. But the 5th
Army Commander, Colonel General Nikolai Krylov, approached Vasilevsky
with an alternative strategy. He proposed an immediate, surprise
offensive, using advance battalions. The strategy was approved.
At 1 a.m. local time on August 9, under the cover of heavy rain, we
crossed the border together with our frontier guards and seized the
Japanese pillboxes (during training sessions all the advance units
had repeatedly practised border crossings with the frontier guards).
The Japanese soldiers were resting in wooden huts some 500 to 600
meters away: soldiers don't stay in pillboxes unless they are
expecting an attack. By the time they rushed outside we had already
occupied their pillboxes. We didn't have to fire a single shot.
Our fortified base was in Gradekovo, to the north of Mount Verblyud
and Mount Garnizonnaya. It was under the command of General Shurshin.
The general decided to allow a ten-minute artillery strike to cheer
up his troops. As soon as the attack was over, the Japanese rushed
out and occupied their pillboxes. After the war had ended, I was
crossing the border to deliver a report to the Front Staff, and I saw
that the Japanese were still sitting in their pillboxes, firing. What
does that tell you? If General Krylov's strategy had been rejected we
would have had to attack like we did in the Finnish war. Just
breaking down the enemy defenses would have taken six or seven
months. Our commander's smart decision saved us from that.
The Kwantung Army had one million men. 690,000 of them were taken
prisoner. We, on the other hand, lost just 12,000 soldiers and
officers during the Manchurian operation. Some people in the West
prefer to overlook this fact, because it gives the lie to their
claims that we fought without skill and used our men as cannon
fodder.
L: There's another side to this issue and I'll ask you about it
later. But I'd still like you to tell me: How did the soldiers who
had captured Berlin and Konigsberg feel about being sent to fight in
the Far East?
G: A lot depended on how old they were. To digress slightly. When the
war broke out on June 22, I was studying at the Tashkent Military
College. We stood on the parade ground and listened to Molotov's
speech. Cadet Garkavtsev, who was standing next to me, said, "By the
time we graduate the war will be over. It'll be just like it was with
Khasan and Khalkin-Gol. We won't get the chance to fight."
Garkavtsev was killed near Stalingrad in late 1942. The reason I
mention him is that he voiced what many of us young officers were
thinking. I was 22 years old in 1945, and I was already a Major. I
actually felt excited when I heard the news about the war against
Japan. There were some older people among us, middle-aged people, and
they agreed that we ought to take revenge on the Japanese. But there
were some men who had been at war for four years, and there were lots
of men who should have been transferred to the reserves before the
war because they had served their terms, but who had to stay on. Some
of them had been in the army for seven or eight years. They had
families and had been hoping that with the end of the war in Europe
they would soon go home... But I was single. So we reacted
differently.
I remember that when we arrived at our destination, Battalion
Commander Georgy Gubkin, who was later awarded the Hero Star, started
showing us how to throw grenades. He said, "You shouldn't throw them
the way you did in Konigsberg. The land's flat there, but in
Manchuria it's hilly. If you throw it upward, it will roll back under
your feet before it's exploded. After you pull out the safety pin,
you should count to two before throwing it." Front line soldiers had
to be trained as well.
Now, after Gubkin had told us how to throw grenades he asked us
whether we had any questions. One soldier, who was about 45 years
old, asked, "When will we be demobilized?" Some of the men were very
concerned about this.
L: Let's go back to the figures you gave: almost 700,000 Japanese
were taken prisoner while the Soviet Union sustained relatively low
losses - 12,000 men. This is not surprising. The Red Army commanders
had acquired the necessary experience, they wanted to save lives, and
they were skilled in the art of war. But people in the West do not
give the Red Army due credit. They claim that the Kwantung Army was
demoralized by Hiroshima and Nagasaki and did not pose such a serious
threat after August 6. They say that whole regiments and divisions
surrendered, and that the Russians did nothing to distinguish
themselves. What do you think about this?
G: These are absurd allegations and they bear no relation to the
historical facts, some of which I've already mentioned. If we had
used a standard military strategy in Manchuria, the campaign would
have dragged on for a very long time, regardless of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. We arrived in the Far East with all the experience that we
had gained in the previous four years of war. Our military skills
were second to none. Even today when you undergo three or four days
of training at a military college you leave feeling that you've
learnt something. And we had had four years of command post
exercises, during which we simulated real life situations, and of
course you learn a great deal from them. There was a world of
difference between our capabilities in 1941/1942 and our capabilities
in 1945.
If it hadn't been for our military skill, we would have been faced
with "a second Gradekovo." The Japanese went on firing from their
pillboxes on Mount Verblyud for another six months. They had enough
food, water and ammunition. They had everything they needed. The war
was over but they were still firing.
All this goes to show that it was purely thanks to our military skill
that we did not sustain heavy losses. The Japanese were determined to
resist, and they did put up a good fight. I had to rescue the 84th
Cavalry Division commanded by General Dedeugly.
L: Was it a Mongolian division? The commander's name sounds
Mongolian.
G: No, the commander was an Armenian. I read a book recently called
"Armenians in the Great Patriotic War", and there was a picture of
him and his short biography in it. His division was encircled from
August 15-18 to the northeast of the Chinese town of Nenang. The
Japanese fought fiercely, as they did in other places. But once again
the military skill of our troops won out. Large numbers of airborne
troops landed in the enemy territory and took the Japanese by
surprise.
There was a stone fortress, called Rehe, on the TransBaikal Front, in
a city with a population of half a million. If we had had to assault
it, it would have taken us a long time and both sides would have
suffered heavy losses. And of course there would have been civilian
losses as well. So what did the Corps Commander, General Issa Pliyev,
decide to do? He came up with a plan that no one would have thought
of in 1941.
He took seven or eight guards and one Dodge and two Willises. They
drove at high speed right through the fortress gates and went
straight to the headquarters. Pliyev said, "I've sent for the planes
to bomb you. Surrender if you don't want to die!" After bargaining
for an hour and a half, the whole garrison of 25,000 officers and men
surrendered to one general and several guards. He was the perfect
example of a bold and daring commander.
L: But the Japanese Emperor had ordered his Army to stop fighting on
August 14.
G. Yes, he did, but not all of the garrisons and units of the
Kwantung Army had received his order. Moreover, not everyone was
going to obey it, and there was a tacit order to surrender to the
Americans and the Chinese but to continue fighting the Russians. This
was to prevent us from seizing more land in Korea, Manchuria and
other Chinese regions. But we still managed to achieve our
objectives.
I will repeat that if it hadn't been for the military skill of our
commanders, we would have sustained much heavier losses. There was
every indication that we would be met by fierce Japanese resistance.
There is absolutely no evidence that the Japanese panicked and
marched to surrender.
L: There were two armies fighting Japan: the Red Army and the
American Army. Obviously they coordinated their strategic plans in
some way. But what about the tactical and operational plans at the
level of regiments and divisions?
G: I was not privy to such information. But of course when I was
working in the 5th Army headquarters I did see and hear things. We
were told, for instance, that the Americans were not supposed to go
to Port Arthur or Port Dairen because it had been agreed that these
were our deployment areas. The Americans were to stay south of the
38th Parallel in Korea. Battalions of our 25th Army, under the
command of Colonel-General Ivan Chistyakov, approached the northern
outskirts of Seoul and waited for two days for the Americans to
arrive. When they did, we withdrew to the 38th Parallel. So we did
know a bit about the military agreements. But when our 39th Army
approached Port Arthur, two American units tried to disembark from
high-speed landing craft. Our troops had to open fire in order to
prevent their landing. They didn't fire at them though; they fired
upward.
The Americans had thought they could seize and occupy Port Arthur.
But generally the agreements were observed. Well, actually, there
were a lot of agreements that Washington did not honor. For example,
it had been agreed that we would take part in the occupation of
Japan, and that we would send one or two Soviet brigades to Tokyo.
Our 35th Army, commanded by Colonel-General Nikolai Zakhvatayev, was
being trained for service in Japan and was planning to land on
Hokkaido. But General Douglas MacArthur, who was a very strong
character and had a lot of influence in the White House, went back on
the agreement. Apparently, President Harry Truman was not very
confident and so allowed MacArthur to make a lot of the decisions
relating to the Far East. MacArthur did everything he could to
prevent the Red Army from landing in Japan.
The Americans wanted to build bases on Soviet territory for the war
against Japan, on the Kuril Islands for example. But it was obvious
that if they did that, it would be very hard to get them to leave
after the war. So these proposals were rejected.
I have to admit that our postwar diplomatic efforts left much to be
desired. We were wrong to leave the San Francisco Conference. We
should either have signed the treaty or postponed signing it together
with other nations. But we left and so it was signed without us. That
decision still troubles us.
L: And now here is my last question. How did the Chinese people react
to the Red Army? And what did you think of the Chinese communists?
Whether it was intentional or not, you helped them defeat the
Kuomintang and carry out a socialist revolution.
G: This is a whole different subject. Basically, it has never been
studied. There are a lot of issues that journalists and historians
are yet to investigate. But what I myself can tell you is that we
were never so well received as we were in Korea and China, except
perhaps in Belarus.
I could give you countless examples of how well planned the
Manchurian operation was. But here is a particularly interesting
historical fact.. The Head of Reconnaissance of the 5th Kwantung Army
(they had a 5th army as well) gave Commander Yamada a report on
Soviet troop concentrations. They had agents gathering this
information. The Commander wrote on the report, "Only mad men would
attack during the rainy season." The rains began in August. But we
decided to start the offensive at precisely that time when it would
least be expected. This created enormous difficulties for the troops.
Their supplies were interrupted at once.
L: Artillery gets stuck, tanks...
G: Everything got stuck in the mud. I saw it myself in North Korea,
mainly in Nenang, Girin and Donghua. All of the villagers came to our
rescue. They helped us pull out our guns, tanks and other vehicles
that had sunk in the mud. They even carried tanks from one village to
another. Nobody forced them to help us, but they hated the Japanese
so much that they were willing to do anything to get them to leave
their country. The Japanese were notoriously cruel to the Chinese.
Both the Chinese and the Koreans were only allowed to eat rice once a
month. Meat products were rationed. The Japanese harassed the local
population in many other ways as well. Their occupational regime was
extremely harsh.
But this is a separate subject. We are often criticized for not
having released the Japanese prisoners of war straightaway. We are
asked why we took them to the USSR. I was in charge of an operations
group in northern Manchuria that was tasked with controlling the POW
camps. Our troops were about to leave in 1945, but then we had to
stay on for another few months. In anticipation of our withdrawal, we
had handed a number of camps over to the Chinese. And what did the
Chinese do? They took all the food away from the POWs. When a Chinese
soldier walked past a camp, he considered it his duty to shoot at it.
L: At the Japanese?
G: Yes. The Japanese went down on their knees and begged us not to
leave them. Regrettably, even some journalists resort to demagoguery
and say that we violated international law. But what could we do with
650,000 people? We didn't have the transportation to take them back
to Japan. Besides, there were mines everywhere. And we could not have
left them in China because the Chinese would have slaughtered them.
They themselves asked us to take them with us. People who are not in
full possession of the facts should not be so quick to pass
judgement. Life is far more complicated than they make out.
Many complex issues arose. Before the start of the war against Japan
the Soviet Union had signed an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek on Port
Arthur and the Chinese Military Railway, among others things. The
Communists reacted very badly to this. I used to meet Gao Gang,
Chairman of the Military Council of North East China, a revolutionary
and very clever man. He was absolutely furious about the agreement.
L: If this was the case why did we help Mao Zedong rather than Chiang
Kai-shek?
G: All of the initial pre-war agreements were signed with Chiang
Kai-shek. One of the conditions we set was that neither the
Communists, nor the Kuomintang were allowed to enter territory
occupied by Soviet troops. Under the agreement with Chiang we were
meant to withdraw from Manchuria in October-November 1945. But Chiang
suddenly realized that as soon as we left, the Communists would seize
all the towns. He didn't want this to happen but he didn't have the
troops to replace us. He became embroiled in the Special District and
in other places. Besides, his troops were allowing Japanese soldiers
to surrender. Anyway, he asked Stalin not to withdraw the Red Army,
and this immediately caused Mao to take issue with the Soviet policy.
But our relations with the Chinese leaders are a different matter.
Let's talk about them on another occasion.