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Outside View: Russia's Georgia strategy
By Anatoly Belyayev, Outside View Commentator
Washington Times, DC
May 4 2005
Moscow, Russia, May. 4 (UPI) -- The foreign ministers of Russia
and Georgia have announced their countries might soon agree on the
timeframe for the withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from
Georgia, to begin this year and end by Jan. 1, 2008.
This only looked like a sensation at first sight. In fact,
this decision corresponds to changes in Russia's strategy toward
post-Soviet states. These changes are the logical element of the
"curtailment" of Russia's geopolitical ambitions in the post-Soviet
era, that were crowned with the symbolic and unconditional closure
of Russian military bases in Cuba and Vietnam at the beginning of
President Vladimir Putin's first term.
That decision formalized the new reality: unlike the Soviet Union,
Russia as a global power could not maintain foreign policy competition
with the United States and had to limit its foreign policy activity
and influence to the Commonwealth of Independent States countries.
At the same time, though too late, Russia began a policy of creating
conditions for developing economic relations with friendly CIS
countries, designed to accelerate integration in the bloc under
Russian auspices. This policy took the form of special economic
relations with Belarus, the collection of valued added tax in the
country of destination for the countries of the Common Economic Space,
and other actions.
But internal political developments in several neighboring states
removed the elite groups on which Moscow relied in the advance of its
integration projects. It appears the Russian leadership has become
wary of supporting the really and formally friendly elite groups in
the other neighboring states.
Unfortunately, Russia is not nurturing friendly elite groups in the
other countries because it does not have a relevant strategy or a
system of foreign policy and financial support for such a project. In
this situation, its only hope is a policy of differentiated foreign
economic relations with the post-Soviet states, which calls for
gradually eliminating the foreign policy legacy that prevents this
new policy from being implemented consistently.
The development of relations with Georgia could become a pilot project
of the new Russian foreign policy in post-Soviet countries. >>From the
military-strategic viewpoint, bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki do
nothing more than mark Russian military presence in the Caucasus
region. They could be an element of the system of support for the
serious and politically important presence of Russia in Armenia
but can hardly fulfill this function because they are located in
unfriendly Georgia.
An agreement with Georgia on the status of these bases during the
withdrawal period and especially after it could give Russia a chance
to establish more appropriate and equitable economic relations with
Georgia. That country is financed by Russian energy supplied at prices
that are several times lower than global rates. Georgia might threaten
to establish an energy and foreign trade blockade of Armenia, which
is friendly with Russia, if Russia refuses to deliver cheap energy
to Georgia. But an attempt to turn this purely economic issue into
a foreign policy problem would spotlight the anti-Russian nature of
the policy.
A consistent policy pursued by Russia, the weakening of President
Mikhail Saakashvili's regime, and the presence of a hostile neighbor
could create a situation where Georgia would be unable to develop
without Russia. This would show any Georgian government, if it wants
to remain in power for a long time, should maintain good relations
with its northern neighbor.
--
(Anatoly Belyayev is the head of analysis for the Center for Current
Politics in Russia. This article is reprinted by permission of the
RIA Novosti news agency. The opinions expressed in this article are
those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions
of the RIA Novosti editorial board.)
By Anatoly Belyayev, Outside View Commentator
Washington Times, DC
May 4 2005
Moscow, Russia, May. 4 (UPI) -- The foreign ministers of Russia
and Georgia have announced their countries might soon agree on the
timeframe for the withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from
Georgia, to begin this year and end by Jan. 1, 2008.
This only looked like a sensation at first sight. In fact,
this decision corresponds to changes in Russia's strategy toward
post-Soviet states. These changes are the logical element of the
"curtailment" of Russia's geopolitical ambitions in the post-Soviet
era, that were crowned with the symbolic and unconditional closure
of Russian military bases in Cuba and Vietnam at the beginning of
President Vladimir Putin's first term.
That decision formalized the new reality: unlike the Soviet Union,
Russia as a global power could not maintain foreign policy competition
with the United States and had to limit its foreign policy activity
and influence to the Commonwealth of Independent States countries.
At the same time, though too late, Russia began a policy of creating
conditions for developing economic relations with friendly CIS
countries, designed to accelerate integration in the bloc under
Russian auspices. This policy took the form of special economic
relations with Belarus, the collection of valued added tax in the
country of destination for the countries of the Common Economic Space,
and other actions.
But internal political developments in several neighboring states
removed the elite groups on which Moscow relied in the advance of its
integration projects. It appears the Russian leadership has become
wary of supporting the really and formally friendly elite groups in
the other neighboring states.
Unfortunately, Russia is not nurturing friendly elite groups in the
other countries because it does not have a relevant strategy or a
system of foreign policy and financial support for such a project. In
this situation, its only hope is a policy of differentiated foreign
economic relations with the post-Soviet states, which calls for
gradually eliminating the foreign policy legacy that prevents this
new policy from being implemented consistently.
The development of relations with Georgia could become a pilot project
of the new Russian foreign policy in post-Soviet countries. >>From the
military-strategic viewpoint, bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki do
nothing more than mark Russian military presence in the Caucasus
region. They could be an element of the system of support for the
serious and politically important presence of Russia in Armenia
but can hardly fulfill this function because they are located in
unfriendly Georgia.
An agreement with Georgia on the status of these bases during the
withdrawal period and especially after it could give Russia a chance
to establish more appropriate and equitable economic relations with
Georgia. That country is financed by Russian energy supplied at prices
that are several times lower than global rates. Georgia might threaten
to establish an energy and foreign trade blockade of Armenia, which
is friendly with Russia, if Russia refuses to deliver cheap energy
to Georgia. But an attempt to turn this purely economic issue into
a foreign policy problem would spotlight the anti-Russian nature of
the policy.
A consistent policy pursued by Russia, the weakening of President
Mikhail Saakashvili's regime, and the presence of a hostile neighbor
could create a situation where Georgia would be unable to develop
without Russia. This would show any Georgian government, if it wants
to remain in power for a long time, should maintain good relations
with its northern neighbor.
--
(Anatoly Belyayev is the head of analysis for the Center for Current
Politics in Russia. This article is reprinted by permission of the
RIA Novosti news agency. The opinions expressed in this article are
those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions
of the RIA Novosti editorial board.)