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Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast
May 3, 2005 Tuesday
RADIO INTERVIEW WITH ALEXEI ARBATOV, HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY CENTER AT THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS MAYAK RADIO, 12:15, MAY 3, 2005
Anchor: Hello and welcome. I am Yelena Shchedrunova. Our topic today,
somewhat surprisingly for some of you, is Russian military bases in
Georgia and Ukraine, I mean the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol.
Why have we chosen this topic? As regards Georgian bases, a treaty on
the withdrawal of the remaining two bases is to be signed by May15
and there are strong rumors that the presidents of Russia and Georgia
may sign the treaty on May 9, Victory Day. What will happen to
Russian military bases in Georgia, how probable is it that such a
treaty will be signed on May 9, Victory Day? What will happen to the
Russian Black Sea Fleet? These questions will be discussed today by
the head of the International Security Center at the Institute of
World Economy and International Relations, Alexei Arbatov. Good
morning, Alexei Georgiyevich.
Arbatov: Good morning.
Anchor: My first question may sound naive. It had long been obvious
that Russian military bases would have to be withdrawn from Georgia.
But nothing was being done on Russian territory to provide
accommodation for the troops that would be withdrawn from Georgia.
Why was this? Not to allow the Georgian side to rejoice and say, "You
see, they are ready to receive these troops back." Or is it simply
because in our usual way, we neglect to think about what will happen
in a year or two?
Arbatov: Of course, as always, we don't think ahead. Our left hand
doesn't know what the right hand is doing. And secondly, when Russia
took a fairly tough stand after the agreements reached in Istanbul in
1999 and failed to fulfill its bilateral obligations to Georgia to
withdraw the bases, naturally, nobody gave orders to start building
facilities for the bases on Russian territory, just in case. And
since this was the thinking, no "landing sites" were being built. And
anyway, money is always short. No matter how much money is allocated
to the Defense Ministry it is never enough. But starting to build
accommodation would send a signal that we are ready to withdraw.
Anchor: So, morally, we have already surrendered, is that so?
Arbatov: Yes, part of the thinking was that we shouldn't let them
feel that we are prepared to give up. We will dig in and say, if you
don't agree with our withdrawal period of 14 years, we won't lift a
finger to do anything. When the negotiations were stalled, we said
that we needed 14 years to withdrawal several thousand servicemen and
several thousand pieces of weaponry. The Georgians said, no, three
years is the longest period we can negotiate. And there the
negotiations were deadlocked. Now the situation has changed and a
compromise appears to be at hand. But I gave you the explanation why
we chose not to prepare anything.
Anchor: How probable is it that the treaty on the withdrawal of
Russian bases will be signed on May 9?
Arbatov: I don't think it will be signed on May 9. After all, May 9
is a national and a global holiday. And to time the signing of a
document about which we are not too happy and which we will be
signing under heavy pressure of circumstances and from other
countries -- most probably they will choose not to mar the holiday.
But certainly, it can't be long before the treaty is signed. Because
now the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry say that we are
ready to pull out all the bases in 3-4 years. And that was the
initial demand of the Georgian side. So, the compromise will now be
found. And in addition, since we are being forced to remove these
bases, we expect that some countries will give us financial aid in
providing accommodation for these troops and the materiel in new
places. So, we have bargained and argued and our relations have
soured, but now we will be forthcoming on the issue.
Anchor: Regarding compensation. After the last round of the talks at
the end of April it was the Georgian side that declared it would not
pay any compensation and no one will pay any compensation. They said
that there was no question of any financial compensation by Georgia
or by Russia because, after all, Georgia might demand pay for hosting
the Russian military bases on its territory. I understand that this
is their approach.
Arbatov: Yes, a few years ago they demanded compensation for damage
to the environment, for the facilities that we will be leaving behind
and that no one needs. They did raise the issue of compensation for
all these things. But the Russian side said it would not pay any
compensation and that Georgia should be grateful if we just withdrew
and demanded any compensation from Georgia. The Georgians, of course,
said, we are not going to pay for it, these are your troops and you
have to withdraw them. But some European countries and the US
promised financial aid in order to expedite the resolution of this
issue.
Anchor: Now, I understand, the main bargaining will be not only over
money because the issue will be resolved without Georgia. You have
just said that the US and Europe will give us direct compensation.
Arbatov: We have been promised financial aid back in 1999. And the
fact that such aid was put on hold was one of the arguments our side
advanced to prove that we can't withdraw at such short notice.
Anchor: If I am not mistaken, the Americans have paid for the
withdrawal of our troops from the Vaziani base.
Arbatov: Yes, and the Vaziani base have been withdrawn.
Anchor: So, this time too, we can talk with the Americans without
Georgian mediation.
Arbatov: Yes, there were four bases and now there remain two:
Akhalkalaki and Batumi. Previously there were also bases in Vaziani
and Gudauta (Abkhazia). We have withdrawn from Vaziani as we
promised. The base in Batumi remains, and there are troops in
Gudauta, though much fewer than before. We are not yet ready to
withdraw all our troops from there because the Abkhazia issue has not
been solved. And besides, much of the personnel who serve there are
actually residents of Abkhazia and you cannot withdraw them anywhere.
So, if Russia suddenly leaves, these servicemen will join the
military units of Abkhazia with their weapons and that would hardly
be the best outcome.
Anchor: Certainly not for Georgia.
Arbatov: Yes, for Georgia and in terms of the conflict.
Anchor: By the way, the President of Abkhazia has said that he is
inviting Russian military to his republic. He said, if you are being
chased out of Georgia, you can come to us.
Arbatov: Abkhazia is Georgian territory and although it is a rebel
territory and not one controlled by Tbilisi, if we extend one hand to
Georgia and meet its demands and solve a number of other important
tasks, of which I will say more a bit later, by withdrawing the bases
from Batumi and Akhalkalaki, slapping Georgia with the other hand and
deploy these troops in Abkhazia which we recognize as Georgian
territory and the whole world recognizes as Georgian territory,
albeit still a rebel territory that denies the government -- that
would dramatically exacerbate the situation. Then we would end up
withdrawing the bases from Georgia and not making any gains in
Abkhazia, but losing at great deal. And if we had agreed to this, it
would have been a slap in the face of Georgia.
As for the Abkhazian President -- it is a complicated conflict and I
don't want to go into all these matters, but it is not an independent
state and he has no right to invite troops. Our peacekeepers are
still in Abkhazia. By the way, their mandate was established under
the truce of 1994, if I am not mistaken. When the conflict between
Georgia and Abkhazia ended, peacekeepers were deployed there to
prevent the conflict flaring up again. But it is not an independent
state. We do not control some of the mountainous areas in Chechnya,
but Basayev has no right to invite any foreign troops there. If he
did it, nobody would have recognized it and nobody would have agreed
to send troops.
Anchor: Now regarding the bargaining. I understand that all the
bargaining now is over the timing because the Georgian side declares
that the Russian bases should be withdrawn by January 1, 2008 and
Russia says by December 31. So, it is exactly a year that is in
contention. Which side will prevail?
Arbatov: I think both sides will cover their half of the way.
Anchor: Before June. Neither you, nor we win.
Arbatov: That's how decisions are usually taken. It is not a question
of principle.
Anchor: Why isn't it?
Arbatov: Because if slightly more money is given, the pullout can go
faster, and if less money is given, it will go slower. So, it's a
purely technical question.
Anchor: But will we be able to withdraw our troops from Georgia
during this period technically?
Arbatov: We will.
Anchor: But is it realistic?
Arbatov: It certainly is. The only question is that they should be
withdrawn not into nowhere, but that new bases are built for them.
There are not so many troops there, just several thousand personnel.
Anchor: But they can't live out there in the field.
Arbatov: I must also say that about 60 percent of those 3,000
personnel at the two bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki are local
residents.
Anchor: And they won't leave of course.
Arbatov: They will stay. So, the actual number of troops to be
withdrawn is smaller. So, it is mainly the hardware that is to be
pulled out, and there are nothing like tens of thousands of pieces of
machinery as it was in central Europe. There are just several hundred
tanks, several hundred armored fighting vehicles and artillery
systems. It's not so much.
Anchor: There has been so much concern about military base in Armenia
and it was rumored that if our military leaves Georgia, we would have
problems with our base in Armenia.
Arbatov: I don't think so. We do have a base in Armenia, it is
located in Gyumri. By the way, it is our only military base abroad
that is located there and operates not only with the consent of the
host country but also with its support. Armenia pays half of the
costs from its own budget that is not so big.
Bases abroad should operate on the basis of full consensus of the two
countries that understand that they have common security interests.
Our base in Gyumri is such a base. If our relations with Armenia do
not change, and I hope they won't, this base, like foreign bases, for
example, the majority of American foreign bases, is located there
with the consent of the host country and even with its financial
support.
Since our bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi are in Georgia, and if
Georgia is against, any redeployment from these bases will be
impossible. Indeed, they can't fight their way to Armenia. If Georgia
agrees, then it will be possible to reinforce our base and our troops
in Armenia by railway or by road if there is a serious threat to
Armenia and our troops stationed there. So, all these claims that the
two bases in Georgia play a very big role with regard to Armenia are
nothing but geographical games for those who do not really want to
look deep into the matter.
But it is true that all routes to Armenia go through Georgia, and
there is no other way to get there. Unfortunately Armenia is isolated
and has no access to the sea. Therefore it can be reached only
through Georgia. So, if we have good relations with Georgia, if we
have a similar position in concrete situations and have a consensus
with Georgia, we will send as many personnel to Armenia as necessary.
If we do not have good relations with Georgia and if Georgia acts
against us in some conflicts, we may have even 10 bases there, but
all they can do in such a situation is basically protect themselves
in a hostile environment.
Anchor: But you have said that the withdrawal of the Russian bases
from Georgia may give a boost to our relations with Georgia. In other
words, we can get some gains from this, I mean political, not
financial, of course.
Arbatov: I think this will eliminate a constant irritant in our
relations.
Anchor: But won't they find another one? Georgia needs an irritant in
relations with Russia.
Arbatov: There are enough irritants as it is. The problem is that
these bases that are located there despite the public opinion in
Georgia, despite the opinion of the parliament, the government and
President of Georgia, they have been like an eyesore and have spoiled
our relations. But of course disputable issues remain. But not all of
them depend on us. The problem is complex. Abkhazia is a complex
problem, and South Ossetia is quite complex.
Our reluctance with withdraw bases is a challenge to Georgia's
sovereignty, and of course, Georgia's constant demands to withdraw
the troops and our constant refusal to do so generated serious
disagreements. Europe, the US, and the majority of other countries
were not with us on this matter. And to us, these bases also play a
role in connection with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. But
we may get back to this in a while.
Anchor: Your position made our listener Marina quite indignant. She
described it as Kozyrev-Yeltsin-like position: "Georgia is always
right, and we must always make concessions, lose and apologize. When
will this policy stop?"
Arbatov: I did not propose to apologize. But I said that if our bases
are located in other countries, and these countries agree with that
and support them, then that's all right, our bases may either protect
these countries or our own interests away from our border. It's a
normal practice because that's how foreign bases exist everywhere in
the world, in most cases.
But if our bases are in other countries against their will, these
bases are hostages because they cannot really fulfill any military
missions, for they are basically in a hostile environment. And if we
want to build normal relations with these countries or solve some
other questions, we should remove such bases. Keeping them there is
like keeping hostages away from one's own territory and having no
possibility to help them, support them or reinforce them in the event
of a conflict.
And this, by the way, leads us to the question that we haven't
touched yet. There is the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and it
is very important for us because it determines thresholds for
conventional forces of all European countries, primarily for Russia,
but for all NATO member countries as well, and not only for their own
armies, but also for the troops that may be deployed on their soil at
military bases if they are created.
After the Baltic countries joined NATO, a gray zone appeared because
these Baltic countries were not parties to this treaty. Theoretically
all NATO troops may be redeployed to the Baltic countries in direct
proximity to Russia, and it won't violate any treaty. When Russia
agreed, albeit reluctantly, to the Baltic countries' accession to
NATO, we demanded that they should join the treaty so that we could
be confident that no large number of troops, both their own and
foreign, can be deployed on their soil.
Lack of ratification was linked by NATO countries and new NATO
members with the solution of the issue of bases in Georgia and
Moldova, but above all in Georgia. Whether the linkage is right or
not -- and we believe it is not right because these were bilateral
agreements that were singed at the Istanbul summit and they were not
in any way linked with the new treaty. But most countries hold a
different view.
And once we solve the issue with Georgia and then with Moldova we
will have the right to insist, and I am sure we will prevail upon all
the NATO countries, to ratify the treaty that is so important for us
and on the Baltic countries to sign and ratify it so that we can be
sure that there will be no more troops on our Western borders than is
acceptable to us.
Anchor: One of our listeners is asking, "When will our country
withdraw troops from Moldavia?"
Arbatov: The situation is anything but simple. As you know, there is
a conflict with Transdniestria and as far as we are concerned it is
not so much a question of troops as of the 40,000 tons of ammunition
that are still there. You cannot just abandon them and it is very
costly and difficult to withdraw them. Just imagine 40,000 tons.
So, that is another stumbling block. But I think that after Georgia
the issue will be solved quickly because it is technical. We will
probably get financial assistance and part of the ammunition will be
destroyed and part removed.
Anchor: Our listener Vladimir agrees that the base should be
withdrawn from Georgia but he thinks we should insist on a provision
that would prevent NATO troops occupying these bases. Is it
realistic?
Arbatov: Yes, we can make a reservation. We can make our statement.
But we cannot set such conditions. Georgia is an independent state.
Georgia has applied to join NATO and Georgia has the right to
disregard our wishes.
It's another question that if anything depends on us, for example, if
NATO wants us to do this or that to conclude such and such agreements
and interact with NATO in a certain field, we can then set the
condition that we will withdraw and they do not move in. Or if you
must move in, let us organize joint counterterrorist centers there.
We can make this kind of bargaining.
But if we set conditions: we do not withdraw unless NATO undertakes
not to go in, nobody would accept them.
Anchor: Alexander Savelyevich wants you to comment on the situation
with the US base at Guantanamo, Cuba. That base is kept there
contrary to Cuba's wishes.
Arbatov: Yes, but the agreement was concluded for a very long term
before Fidel Castro came to power. And just like we today --
Anchor: So, Fidel Castro hasn't renounced the obligations of the
previous government?
Arbatov: No, the treaty exists, the Americans do not recognize Cuba's
right to eject them. And of course, Cuba is unable to do it by force.
By the way, there is a similar situation in Ukraine which we will
probably discuss next. There is a treaty, a new government has been
installed, and it may not like the treaty the Kuchma government had
signed in 1997 on the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol. But
it won't be able to unilaterally renounce it and expel our fleet
until the term of the treaty, 20 years, expires.
But permit me to make one more remark on Transdniestria. As you know,
there is an Abkhazia-like conflict there and our troops are there not
only to guard the ammunition dumps, they are present there as
peacekeepers. These troops, like the troops in Abkhazia, cannot be
withdrawn until the conflict is resolved. Otherwise, war will flare
up and bloodshed will begin. Nobody wants that.
So, the withdrawal from Batumi and Akhalkalaki is not connected with
any conflicts, it's just our agreement with Georgia and financial aid
from other countries. But in Abkhazia and Transdniestria, there is a
linkage. Perhaps, peacekeepers will remain there for a long time,
even if there is a peace agreement.
Anchor: Let us briefly touch upon the issue of the Black Sea Fleet in
Sevastopol. There has been more talk recently from Kiev that it will
suffer us there until 2017, but not after that date. And it is
already been said that the Black Sea Fleet is violating many of its
obligations, sends landing parties to Ukrainian territory, uses real
estate given it for use for commercial purposes and so on.
It has even been said that the treaty may be terminated at the
Russian initiative. That's what Kiev said. What is happening? I
understand that Ukraine is moving closer to NATO.
Arbatov: Yes, Ukraine does want to move towards NATO. When it will
happen is still unclear. But because the treaty is until 2017 this is
the time period that roughly corresponds to the time period Ukraine
has in mind, and also that NATO has in mind if Ukraine moves closer
to NATO. Our fleet has the right to remain there.
All these instances of corruption and improper use of certain
facilities must be investigated above all by the Russian Defense
Ministry. Incidentally, the taxpayers' money pays for the fleet. If
these facts are confirmed, the culprits should be punished and
conclusions should be drawn.
But basically, the fleet has every right to be there until 2017. What
will happen after that will depend on Russia's relations with NATO
and Ukraine. Perhaps, relations will change so much that NATO and
Ukraine will ask our fleet to stay. In recent years I have never
heard a clear definition from our military of what our Black Sea
Fleet is doing there in addition to flying its flag and symbolizing
the status of Sevastopol as a historically glorious Russian city, as
a tribute to Russian feats of arms there. But we are paying a lot of
money for it. And you have to bear in mind that in addition to the
Black Sea Fleet we have three more fleets which are performing more
important missions, especially the Northern and Pacific fleets. And
the money comes from the common treasury.
Formerly, during the Cold War, the Black Sea fleet was there and its
mission was to break through the straits into Mediterranean and
attack NATO from the southern flank. Obviously, it does not have such
a mission any more, and it wouldn't be able to undertake it even if
it wanted to.
But I would like to know exactly what its objectives there are?
Perhaps, it does have some objectives connected with instability in
the whole region, it can perform peacekeeping functions, it can
evacuate people as it deed, by the way, during the conflict in
Abkhazia and it may even carry out some operations of coercion into
peace. But I would like to know exactly what forces are needed for
that and how much money we have to support the fleet. If the proper
number work is done and if the issue is openly discussed at the Duma,
perhaps, it may turn out that we could well do with a squadron rather
than a fleet; and perhaps that squadron may find that the
infrastructure of Sevastopol is too big and costly for it.
I repeat, I am not anticipating events, I am simply asking a
question. In all the recent years I have never heard a clear
definition of mission of our Black Sea Fleet, apart from not giving
in to Ukraine. This seems to be the mission.
Anchor: And what about national prestige?
Arbatov: Prestige can be upheld by two vessels, by ten, twenty or a
hundred. And I would like to know how many ships are need to uphold
our prestige and for other objectives. Because the Duma has to
approve heavy expenditure every time, and this is the people's money.
Anchor: Thank you.
Arbatov: Thank you.
May 3, 2005 Tuesday
RADIO INTERVIEW WITH ALEXEI ARBATOV, HEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY CENTER AT THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS MAYAK RADIO, 12:15, MAY 3, 2005
Anchor: Hello and welcome. I am Yelena Shchedrunova. Our topic today,
somewhat surprisingly for some of you, is Russian military bases in
Georgia and Ukraine, I mean the Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol.
Why have we chosen this topic? As regards Georgian bases, a treaty on
the withdrawal of the remaining two bases is to be signed by May15
and there are strong rumors that the presidents of Russia and Georgia
may sign the treaty on May 9, Victory Day. What will happen to
Russian military bases in Georgia, how probable is it that such a
treaty will be signed on May 9, Victory Day? What will happen to the
Russian Black Sea Fleet? These questions will be discussed today by
the head of the International Security Center at the Institute of
World Economy and International Relations, Alexei Arbatov. Good
morning, Alexei Georgiyevich.
Arbatov: Good morning.
Anchor: My first question may sound naive. It had long been obvious
that Russian military bases would have to be withdrawn from Georgia.
But nothing was being done on Russian territory to provide
accommodation for the troops that would be withdrawn from Georgia.
Why was this? Not to allow the Georgian side to rejoice and say, "You
see, they are ready to receive these troops back." Or is it simply
because in our usual way, we neglect to think about what will happen
in a year or two?
Arbatov: Of course, as always, we don't think ahead. Our left hand
doesn't know what the right hand is doing. And secondly, when Russia
took a fairly tough stand after the agreements reached in Istanbul in
1999 and failed to fulfill its bilateral obligations to Georgia to
withdraw the bases, naturally, nobody gave orders to start building
facilities for the bases on Russian territory, just in case. And
since this was the thinking, no "landing sites" were being built. And
anyway, money is always short. No matter how much money is allocated
to the Defense Ministry it is never enough. But starting to build
accommodation would send a signal that we are ready to withdraw.
Anchor: So, morally, we have already surrendered, is that so?
Arbatov: Yes, part of the thinking was that we shouldn't let them
feel that we are prepared to give up. We will dig in and say, if you
don't agree with our withdrawal period of 14 years, we won't lift a
finger to do anything. When the negotiations were stalled, we said
that we needed 14 years to withdrawal several thousand servicemen and
several thousand pieces of weaponry. The Georgians said, no, three
years is the longest period we can negotiate. And there the
negotiations were deadlocked. Now the situation has changed and a
compromise appears to be at hand. But I gave you the explanation why
we chose not to prepare anything.
Anchor: How probable is it that the treaty on the withdrawal of
Russian bases will be signed on May 9?
Arbatov: I don't think it will be signed on May 9. After all, May 9
is a national and a global holiday. And to time the signing of a
document about which we are not too happy and which we will be
signing under heavy pressure of circumstances and from other
countries -- most probably they will choose not to mar the holiday.
But certainly, it can't be long before the treaty is signed. Because
now the Defense Ministry and the Foreign Ministry say that we are
ready to pull out all the bases in 3-4 years. And that was the
initial demand of the Georgian side. So, the compromise will now be
found. And in addition, since we are being forced to remove these
bases, we expect that some countries will give us financial aid in
providing accommodation for these troops and the materiel in new
places. So, we have bargained and argued and our relations have
soured, but now we will be forthcoming on the issue.
Anchor: Regarding compensation. After the last round of the talks at
the end of April it was the Georgian side that declared it would not
pay any compensation and no one will pay any compensation. They said
that there was no question of any financial compensation by Georgia
or by Russia because, after all, Georgia might demand pay for hosting
the Russian military bases on its territory. I understand that this
is their approach.
Arbatov: Yes, a few years ago they demanded compensation for damage
to the environment, for the facilities that we will be leaving behind
and that no one needs. They did raise the issue of compensation for
all these things. But the Russian side said it would not pay any
compensation and that Georgia should be grateful if we just withdrew
and demanded any compensation from Georgia. The Georgians, of course,
said, we are not going to pay for it, these are your troops and you
have to withdraw them. But some European countries and the US
promised financial aid in order to expedite the resolution of this
issue.
Anchor: Now, I understand, the main bargaining will be not only over
money because the issue will be resolved without Georgia. You have
just said that the US and Europe will give us direct compensation.
Arbatov: We have been promised financial aid back in 1999. And the
fact that such aid was put on hold was one of the arguments our side
advanced to prove that we can't withdraw at such short notice.
Anchor: If I am not mistaken, the Americans have paid for the
withdrawal of our troops from the Vaziani base.
Arbatov: Yes, and the Vaziani base have been withdrawn.
Anchor: So, this time too, we can talk with the Americans without
Georgian mediation.
Arbatov: Yes, there were four bases and now there remain two:
Akhalkalaki and Batumi. Previously there were also bases in Vaziani
and Gudauta (Abkhazia). We have withdrawn from Vaziani as we
promised. The base in Batumi remains, and there are troops in
Gudauta, though much fewer than before. We are not yet ready to
withdraw all our troops from there because the Abkhazia issue has not
been solved. And besides, much of the personnel who serve there are
actually residents of Abkhazia and you cannot withdraw them anywhere.
So, if Russia suddenly leaves, these servicemen will join the
military units of Abkhazia with their weapons and that would hardly
be the best outcome.
Anchor: Certainly not for Georgia.
Arbatov: Yes, for Georgia and in terms of the conflict.
Anchor: By the way, the President of Abkhazia has said that he is
inviting Russian military to his republic. He said, if you are being
chased out of Georgia, you can come to us.
Arbatov: Abkhazia is Georgian territory and although it is a rebel
territory and not one controlled by Tbilisi, if we extend one hand to
Georgia and meet its demands and solve a number of other important
tasks, of which I will say more a bit later, by withdrawing the bases
from Batumi and Akhalkalaki, slapping Georgia with the other hand and
deploy these troops in Abkhazia which we recognize as Georgian
territory and the whole world recognizes as Georgian territory,
albeit still a rebel territory that denies the government -- that
would dramatically exacerbate the situation. Then we would end up
withdrawing the bases from Georgia and not making any gains in
Abkhazia, but losing at great deal. And if we had agreed to this, it
would have been a slap in the face of Georgia.
As for the Abkhazian President -- it is a complicated conflict and I
don't want to go into all these matters, but it is not an independent
state and he has no right to invite troops. Our peacekeepers are
still in Abkhazia. By the way, their mandate was established under
the truce of 1994, if I am not mistaken. When the conflict between
Georgia and Abkhazia ended, peacekeepers were deployed there to
prevent the conflict flaring up again. But it is not an independent
state. We do not control some of the mountainous areas in Chechnya,
but Basayev has no right to invite any foreign troops there. If he
did it, nobody would have recognized it and nobody would have agreed
to send troops.
Anchor: Now regarding the bargaining. I understand that all the
bargaining now is over the timing because the Georgian side declares
that the Russian bases should be withdrawn by January 1, 2008 and
Russia says by December 31. So, it is exactly a year that is in
contention. Which side will prevail?
Arbatov: I think both sides will cover their half of the way.
Anchor: Before June. Neither you, nor we win.
Arbatov: That's how decisions are usually taken. It is not a question
of principle.
Anchor: Why isn't it?
Arbatov: Because if slightly more money is given, the pullout can go
faster, and if less money is given, it will go slower. So, it's a
purely technical question.
Anchor: But will we be able to withdraw our troops from Georgia
during this period technically?
Arbatov: We will.
Anchor: But is it realistic?
Arbatov: It certainly is. The only question is that they should be
withdrawn not into nowhere, but that new bases are built for them.
There are not so many troops there, just several thousand personnel.
Anchor: But they can't live out there in the field.
Arbatov: I must also say that about 60 percent of those 3,000
personnel at the two bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki are local
residents.
Anchor: And they won't leave of course.
Arbatov: They will stay. So, the actual number of troops to be
withdrawn is smaller. So, it is mainly the hardware that is to be
pulled out, and there are nothing like tens of thousands of pieces of
machinery as it was in central Europe. There are just several hundred
tanks, several hundred armored fighting vehicles and artillery
systems. It's not so much.
Anchor: There has been so much concern about military base in Armenia
and it was rumored that if our military leaves Georgia, we would have
problems with our base in Armenia.
Arbatov: I don't think so. We do have a base in Armenia, it is
located in Gyumri. By the way, it is our only military base abroad
that is located there and operates not only with the consent of the
host country but also with its support. Armenia pays half of the
costs from its own budget that is not so big.
Bases abroad should operate on the basis of full consensus of the two
countries that understand that they have common security interests.
Our base in Gyumri is such a base. If our relations with Armenia do
not change, and I hope they won't, this base, like foreign bases, for
example, the majority of American foreign bases, is located there
with the consent of the host country and even with its financial
support.
Since our bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi are in Georgia, and if
Georgia is against, any redeployment from these bases will be
impossible. Indeed, they can't fight their way to Armenia. If Georgia
agrees, then it will be possible to reinforce our base and our troops
in Armenia by railway or by road if there is a serious threat to
Armenia and our troops stationed there. So, all these claims that the
two bases in Georgia play a very big role with regard to Armenia are
nothing but geographical games for those who do not really want to
look deep into the matter.
But it is true that all routes to Armenia go through Georgia, and
there is no other way to get there. Unfortunately Armenia is isolated
and has no access to the sea. Therefore it can be reached only
through Georgia. So, if we have good relations with Georgia, if we
have a similar position in concrete situations and have a consensus
with Georgia, we will send as many personnel to Armenia as necessary.
If we do not have good relations with Georgia and if Georgia acts
against us in some conflicts, we may have even 10 bases there, but
all they can do in such a situation is basically protect themselves
in a hostile environment.
Anchor: But you have said that the withdrawal of the Russian bases
from Georgia may give a boost to our relations with Georgia. In other
words, we can get some gains from this, I mean political, not
financial, of course.
Arbatov: I think this will eliminate a constant irritant in our
relations.
Anchor: But won't they find another one? Georgia needs an irritant in
relations with Russia.
Arbatov: There are enough irritants as it is. The problem is that
these bases that are located there despite the public opinion in
Georgia, despite the opinion of the parliament, the government and
President of Georgia, they have been like an eyesore and have spoiled
our relations. But of course disputable issues remain. But not all of
them depend on us. The problem is complex. Abkhazia is a complex
problem, and South Ossetia is quite complex.
Our reluctance with withdraw bases is a challenge to Georgia's
sovereignty, and of course, Georgia's constant demands to withdraw
the troops and our constant refusal to do so generated serious
disagreements. Europe, the US, and the majority of other countries
were not with us on this matter. And to us, these bases also play a
role in connection with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. But
we may get back to this in a while.
Anchor: Your position made our listener Marina quite indignant. She
described it as Kozyrev-Yeltsin-like position: "Georgia is always
right, and we must always make concessions, lose and apologize. When
will this policy stop?"
Arbatov: I did not propose to apologize. But I said that if our bases
are located in other countries, and these countries agree with that
and support them, then that's all right, our bases may either protect
these countries or our own interests away from our border. It's a
normal practice because that's how foreign bases exist everywhere in
the world, in most cases.
But if our bases are in other countries against their will, these
bases are hostages because they cannot really fulfill any military
missions, for they are basically in a hostile environment. And if we
want to build normal relations with these countries or solve some
other questions, we should remove such bases. Keeping them there is
like keeping hostages away from one's own territory and having no
possibility to help them, support them or reinforce them in the event
of a conflict.
And this, by the way, leads us to the question that we haven't
touched yet. There is the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and it
is very important for us because it determines thresholds for
conventional forces of all European countries, primarily for Russia,
but for all NATO member countries as well, and not only for their own
armies, but also for the troops that may be deployed on their soil at
military bases if they are created.
After the Baltic countries joined NATO, a gray zone appeared because
these Baltic countries were not parties to this treaty. Theoretically
all NATO troops may be redeployed to the Baltic countries in direct
proximity to Russia, and it won't violate any treaty. When Russia
agreed, albeit reluctantly, to the Baltic countries' accession to
NATO, we demanded that they should join the treaty so that we could
be confident that no large number of troops, both their own and
foreign, can be deployed on their soil.
Lack of ratification was linked by NATO countries and new NATO
members with the solution of the issue of bases in Georgia and
Moldova, but above all in Georgia. Whether the linkage is right or
not -- and we believe it is not right because these were bilateral
agreements that were singed at the Istanbul summit and they were not
in any way linked with the new treaty. But most countries hold a
different view.
And once we solve the issue with Georgia and then with Moldova we
will have the right to insist, and I am sure we will prevail upon all
the NATO countries, to ratify the treaty that is so important for us
and on the Baltic countries to sign and ratify it so that we can be
sure that there will be no more troops on our Western borders than is
acceptable to us.
Anchor: One of our listeners is asking, "When will our country
withdraw troops from Moldavia?"
Arbatov: The situation is anything but simple. As you know, there is
a conflict with Transdniestria and as far as we are concerned it is
not so much a question of troops as of the 40,000 tons of ammunition
that are still there. You cannot just abandon them and it is very
costly and difficult to withdraw them. Just imagine 40,000 tons.
So, that is another stumbling block. But I think that after Georgia
the issue will be solved quickly because it is technical. We will
probably get financial assistance and part of the ammunition will be
destroyed and part removed.
Anchor: Our listener Vladimir agrees that the base should be
withdrawn from Georgia but he thinks we should insist on a provision
that would prevent NATO troops occupying these bases. Is it
realistic?
Arbatov: Yes, we can make a reservation. We can make our statement.
But we cannot set such conditions. Georgia is an independent state.
Georgia has applied to join NATO and Georgia has the right to
disregard our wishes.
It's another question that if anything depends on us, for example, if
NATO wants us to do this or that to conclude such and such agreements
and interact with NATO in a certain field, we can then set the
condition that we will withdraw and they do not move in. Or if you
must move in, let us organize joint counterterrorist centers there.
We can make this kind of bargaining.
But if we set conditions: we do not withdraw unless NATO undertakes
not to go in, nobody would accept them.
Anchor: Alexander Savelyevich wants you to comment on the situation
with the US base at Guantanamo, Cuba. That base is kept there
contrary to Cuba's wishes.
Arbatov: Yes, but the agreement was concluded for a very long term
before Fidel Castro came to power. And just like we today --
Anchor: So, Fidel Castro hasn't renounced the obligations of the
previous government?
Arbatov: No, the treaty exists, the Americans do not recognize Cuba's
right to eject them. And of course, Cuba is unable to do it by force.
By the way, there is a similar situation in Ukraine which we will
probably discuss next. There is a treaty, a new government has been
installed, and it may not like the treaty the Kuchma government had
signed in 1997 on the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol. But
it won't be able to unilaterally renounce it and expel our fleet
until the term of the treaty, 20 years, expires.
But permit me to make one more remark on Transdniestria. As you know,
there is an Abkhazia-like conflict there and our troops are there not
only to guard the ammunition dumps, they are present there as
peacekeepers. These troops, like the troops in Abkhazia, cannot be
withdrawn until the conflict is resolved. Otherwise, war will flare
up and bloodshed will begin. Nobody wants that.
So, the withdrawal from Batumi and Akhalkalaki is not connected with
any conflicts, it's just our agreement with Georgia and financial aid
from other countries. But in Abkhazia and Transdniestria, there is a
linkage. Perhaps, peacekeepers will remain there for a long time,
even if there is a peace agreement.
Anchor: Let us briefly touch upon the issue of the Black Sea Fleet in
Sevastopol. There has been more talk recently from Kiev that it will
suffer us there until 2017, but not after that date. And it is
already been said that the Black Sea Fleet is violating many of its
obligations, sends landing parties to Ukrainian territory, uses real
estate given it for use for commercial purposes and so on.
It has even been said that the treaty may be terminated at the
Russian initiative. That's what Kiev said. What is happening? I
understand that Ukraine is moving closer to NATO.
Arbatov: Yes, Ukraine does want to move towards NATO. When it will
happen is still unclear. But because the treaty is until 2017 this is
the time period that roughly corresponds to the time period Ukraine
has in mind, and also that NATO has in mind if Ukraine moves closer
to NATO. Our fleet has the right to remain there.
All these instances of corruption and improper use of certain
facilities must be investigated above all by the Russian Defense
Ministry. Incidentally, the taxpayers' money pays for the fleet. If
these facts are confirmed, the culprits should be punished and
conclusions should be drawn.
But basically, the fleet has every right to be there until 2017. What
will happen after that will depend on Russia's relations with NATO
and Ukraine. Perhaps, relations will change so much that NATO and
Ukraine will ask our fleet to stay. In recent years I have never
heard a clear definition from our military of what our Black Sea
Fleet is doing there in addition to flying its flag and symbolizing
the status of Sevastopol as a historically glorious Russian city, as
a tribute to Russian feats of arms there. But we are paying a lot of
money for it. And you have to bear in mind that in addition to the
Black Sea Fleet we have three more fleets which are performing more
important missions, especially the Northern and Pacific fleets. And
the money comes from the common treasury.
Formerly, during the Cold War, the Black Sea fleet was there and its
mission was to break through the straits into Mediterranean and
attack NATO from the southern flank. Obviously, it does not have such
a mission any more, and it wouldn't be able to undertake it even if
it wanted to.
But I would like to know exactly what its objectives there are?
Perhaps, it does have some objectives connected with instability in
the whole region, it can perform peacekeeping functions, it can
evacuate people as it deed, by the way, during the conflict in
Abkhazia and it may even carry out some operations of coercion into
peace. But I would like to know exactly what forces are needed for
that and how much money we have to support the fleet. If the proper
number work is done and if the issue is openly discussed at the Duma,
perhaps, it may turn out that we could well do with a squadron rather
than a fleet; and perhaps that squadron may find that the
infrastructure of Sevastopol is too big and costly for it.
I repeat, I am not anticipating events, I am simply asking a
question. In all the recent years I have never heard a clear
definition of mission of our Black Sea Fleet, apart from not giving
in to Ukraine. This seems to be the mission.
Anchor: And what about national prestige?
Arbatov: Prestige can be upheld by two vessels, by ten, twenty or a
hundred. And I would like to know how many ships are need to uphold
our prestige and for other objectives. Because the Duma has to
approve heavy expenditure every time, and this is the people's money.
Anchor: Thank you.
Arbatov: Thank you.