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WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN BASES FROM GEORGIA: CONCESSION OR REGULARITY?
RIA Novosti, Russia
May 03, 2005
MOSCOW. (Anatoly Belyayev, head of analysis, Center for Current
Politics in Russia, for RIA Novosti) - The foreign ministers of Russia
and Georgia have announced that their countries might soon agree on
the timeframe for the withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from
Georgia, to begin this year and end by January 1, 2008.
This only looked like a sensation at first sight. In fact, this
decision on the part of Russia corresponds to changes in its strategy
with regard to the post-Soviet states. These changes are the logical
element of the "curtailment" of Russia's geopolitical ambitions
in the post-Soviet era, which were crowned with the symbolic and
unconditional closure of Russian military bases in Cuba and Vietnam
at the beginning of Putin's first term.
That decision formalized the new reality: unlike the Soviet Union,
Russia as a global power could not maintain foreign policy competition
with the U.S. and had to limit its foreign policy activity and
influence to the CIS countries.
At the same time (though too late), Russia launched a policy of
creating conditions for developing economic relations with the
friendly CIS countries, designed to accelerate integration in the
CIS under Russian auspices. This policy took the form of special
economic relations with Belarus, the collection of VAT in the country
of destination (for the countries of the Common Economic Space),
and several other actions.
But internal political developments in several neighboring states
removed the elite groups on which Moscow relied in the advance of
its integration projects. It appears that the Russian leadership
has become wary of supporting the really and formally friendly elite
groups in the other neighboring states.
Unfortunately, Russia is not nurturing friendly elite groups in the
other countries because it does not have a relevant strategy or a
system of foreign policy and financial support for such a project.
In this situation, Russia's only hope is a policy of differentiated
foreign economic relations with the post-Soviet states, which calls
for gradually eliminating the foreign policy legacy that prevents
this new policy from being implemented consistently.
The development of relations with Georgia could become a pilot project
of the new Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet countries. From
the military-strategic viewpoint, bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki
do nothing more than mark Russian military presence in the Caucasus
region. They could be an element of the system of support for the
serious and politically important presence of Russia in Armenia
but can hardly fulfill this function because they are located in
unfriendly Georgia.
An agreement with Georgia on the status of these bases during the
withdrawal period and especially after it could give Russia a chance
to establish more appropriate and equitable economic relations with
Georgia. That country is financed by Russian energy supplied at prices
that are several times lower than global rates.
Georgia might threaten to establish an energy and foreign trade
blockade of Armenia, which is friendly with Russia, if Russia refuses
to deliver cheap energy to Georgia. But an attempt to turn this
purely economic issue into a foreign policy problem would spotlight
the anti-Russian nature of the policy.
A consistent policy pursued by Russia, the weakening of the Saakashvili
regime, and the presence of a hostile neighbor could create a situation
where Georgia would be unable to develop without Russia. This would
show that any Georgian government, if it wants to remain in power for
a long time, should maintain good relations with its northern neighbor.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
RIA Novosti, Russia
May 03, 2005
MOSCOW. (Anatoly Belyayev, head of analysis, Center for Current
Politics in Russia, for RIA Novosti) - The foreign ministers of Russia
and Georgia have announced that their countries might soon agree on
the timeframe for the withdrawal of Russian troops and equipment from
Georgia, to begin this year and end by January 1, 2008.
This only looked like a sensation at first sight. In fact, this
decision on the part of Russia corresponds to changes in its strategy
with regard to the post-Soviet states. These changes are the logical
element of the "curtailment" of Russia's geopolitical ambitions
in the post-Soviet era, which were crowned with the symbolic and
unconditional closure of Russian military bases in Cuba and Vietnam
at the beginning of Putin's first term.
That decision formalized the new reality: unlike the Soviet Union,
Russia as a global power could not maintain foreign policy competition
with the U.S. and had to limit its foreign policy activity and
influence to the CIS countries.
At the same time (though too late), Russia launched a policy of
creating conditions for developing economic relations with the
friendly CIS countries, designed to accelerate integration in the
CIS under Russian auspices. This policy took the form of special
economic relations with Belarus, the collection of VAT in the country
of destination (for the countries of the Common Economic Space),
and several other actions.
But internal political developments in several neighboring states
removed the elite groups on which Moscow relied in the advance of
its integration projects. It appears that the Russian leadership
has become wary of supporting the really and formally friendly elite
groups in the other neighboring states.
Unfortunately, Russia is not nurturing friendly elite groups in the
other countries because it does not have a relevant strategy or a
system of foreign policy and financial support for such a project.
In this situation, Russia's only hope is a policy of differentiated
foreign economic relations with the post-Soviet states, which calls
for gradually eliminating the foreign policy legacy that prevents
this new policy from being implemented consistently.
The development of relations with Georgia could become a pilot project
of the new Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet countries. From
the military-strategic viewpoint, bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki
do nothing more than mark Russian military presence in the Caucasus
region. They could be an element of the system of support for the
serious and politically important presence of Russia in Armenia
but can hardly fulfill this function because they are located in
unfriendly Georgia.
An agreement with Georgia on the status of these bases during the
withdrawal period and especially after it could give Russia a chance
to establish more appropriate and equitable economic relations with
Georgia. That country is financed by Russian energy supplied at prices
that are several times lower than global rates.
Georgia might threaten to establish an energy and foreign trade
blockade of Armenia, which is friendly with Russia, if Russia refuses
to deliver cheap energy to Georgia. But an attempt to turn this
purely economic issue into a foreign policy problem would spotlight
the anti-Russian nature of the policy.
A consistent policy pursued by Russia, the weakening of the Saakashvili
regime, and the presence of a hostile neighbor could create a situation
where Georgia would be unable to develop without Russia. This would
show that any Georgian government, if it wants to remain in power for
a long time, should maintain good relations with its northern neighbor.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.