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Turks may look back with anger at Israel
By Bulent Aras
The Daily Star, Lebanon
May 6 2005
Friday, May 06, 2005
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Israel earlier
this week had more symbolic than practical meaning for the future of
Turkish foreign policy. After all, the Turkish-Israeli relationship
has its limits, and the expectations that came out of the military
rapprochement of the late-1990s have not been met and were subsequently
followed by a cooling of relations.
One reason for this was that the Turkish-Israeli-American axis was
an extension of the national security apparatuses in both Israel and
Turkey and did not necessarily serve Ankara's interests as it embarked
on a reform process to achieve democratization, improve human rights
and freedoms and establish the rule of law. Turkey's putting its
house in order gave it self-confidence in its regional policies, and
its diplomacy sought to minimize problems with neighboring states. It
also aimed to become a peace promoter and altered its policies toward
a number of problems in the Middle East.
Will this new foreign policy approach last? Where do Turkish-Israeli
relations, and indeed Turkish regional policy, stand in its shadow?
In the recent past, Erdogan was openly critical of the policies of
the Sharon government in the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time,
Turkey did not join the U.S-led coalition in Iraq, even as it has
exerted enormous effort to mobilize regional support for a stable
Iraqi state, with Turkish policymakers on a regular basis bringing
together the countries bordering Iraq to address the situation there.
On the other side, Syria and Iran have looked positively on Turkey's
accession process to the European Union, and believe a European Turkey
will offer them a chance to develop their own relations with the EU.
These examples underline that Turkey's new orientation prioritizes
the notion of democratic legitimacy in its foreign relations and
supports multilateralism and the critical role played by the United
Nations in world politics. However, two developments have generated
suspicion among observers about the durability of this new approach:
first, Turkey has not been as active as expected in pushing Syria to
fulfill the demands of the international community, in particular,
initially, its withdrawal from Lebanon. Second, Turkish-Israeli
relations seem to be returning to what they were, shaped by the
premises of power politics.
During a visit to Israel in January, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah
Gul indicated that there had been serious talks on Turkey's playing
a possible mediation role between Israel and the Palestinians,
but also between Syria and Israel in the future. However, Erdogan
toned down such ambitions during his visit to Israel and focused,
more generally, on the necessity of peace and stability in the Middle
East. In response, his counterpart, Ariel Sharon, praised Turkish
efforts to promote regional peace.
The friendly atmosphere was mostly due to the reality of bilateral
political, economic and military relations. However, it also seems
that Turkey has eased up in pushing Israel to be more sensitive to
regional balances and to be more responsible and constructive with
the Palestinians. The Turkish agenda it seems is now to use Israel
as a gateway to the United States and against the pro-Greek and
pro-Armenian lobbies there.
Turkey must maintain a delicate balance between its new orientation and
its old-style security-first regional policies. If Turkey is to be a
multicultural and democratic state which prioritizes the rule of law,
the new political elite should pay attention to international laws,
norms and principles as well as the tendencies of its own society
in foreign policy formulation. Most Turks are very sensitive to
the Palestinian problem and would be unhappy if their government
sided with Israel. They have no problem with pursuing legitimate
relations with the Israelis and calling for peace between them and
the Palestinians. What they would find much more problematic is that
their policymakers tolerate Sharon's maneuvers, Israel's violence in
the Occupied Territories and its ignoring the legitimate concerns of
other actors in the region.
Turkey's new foreign policy orientation opened new horizons in
its relations with neighboring states and was closely linked to
the transformation in the domestic Turkish landscape. Turkey saw
considerable progress in its move toward EU membership and gained
enough leverage to emerge as a civil-economic power in the Middle
East. Relations with Syria and Israel, perhaps later with Iran,
will be test cases for Turkey's emergence as an active peacemaker in
the Middle East. It is the only country in the region that has some
leverage over both Palestinians and Israelis.
On the other hand, if Turkey revives the power politics approach
toward regional affairs that was visible in the 1990s, and if this
leads to its overlooking the Palestinians and the legitimate demands of
Israel's other neighbors, most Turks will regard this as an unwelcome
return to the past. There are other ways of improving relations with
the U.S. The current Erdogan government is both a cause and a result
of the recent transformation of Turkish society. Its hold on power
is very much dependent on its ability to understanding this reality
when it formulates both its domestic and foreign policies.
Bulent Aras is associate professor of international relations at Fatih
University in Istanbul. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.
By Bulent Aras
The Daily Star, Lebanon
May 6 2005
Friday, May 06, 2005
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Israel earlier
this week had more symbolic than practical meaning for the future of
Turkish foreign policy. After all, the Turkish-Israeli relationship
has its limits, and the expectations that came out of the military
rapprochement of the late-1990s have not been met and were subsequently
followed by a cooling of relations.
One reason for this was that the Turkish-Israeli-American axis was
an extension of the national security apparatuses in both Israel and
Turkey and did not necessarily serve Ankara's interests as it embarked
on a reform process to achieve democratization, improve human rights
and freedoms and establish the rule of law. Turkey's putting its
house in order gave it self-confidence in its regional policies, and
its diplomacy sought to minimize problems with neighboring states. It
also aimed to become a peace promoter and altered its policies toward
a number of problems in the Middle East.
Will this new foreign policy approach last? Where do Turkish-Israeli
relations, and indeed Turkish regional policy, stand in its shadow?
In the recent past, Erdogan was openly critical of the policies of
the Sharon government in the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time,
Turkey did not join the U.S-led coalition in Iraq, even as it has
exerted enormous effort to mobilize regional support for a stable
Iraqi state, with Turkish policymakers on a regular basis bringing
together the countries bordering Iraq to address the situation there.
On the other side, Syria and Iran have looked positively on Turkey's
accession process to the European Union, and believe a European Turkey
will offer them a chance to develop their own relations with the EU.
These examples underline that Turkey's new orientation prioritizes
the notion of democratic legitimacy in its foreign relations and
supports multilateralism and the critical role played by the United
Nations in world politics. However, two developments have generated
suspicion among observers about the durability of this new approach:
first, Turkey has not been as active as expected in pushing Syria to
fulfill the demands of the international community, in particular,
initially, its withdrawal from Lebanon. Second, Turkish-Israeli
relations seem to be returning to what they were, shaped by the
premises of power politics.
During a visit to Israel in January, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah
Gul indicated that there had been serious talks on Turkey's playing
a possible mediation role between Israel and the Palestinians,
but also between Syria and Israel in the future. However, Erdogan
toned down such ambitions during his visit to Israel and focused,
more generally, on the necessity of peace and stability in the Middle
East. In response, his counterpart, Ariel Sharon, praised Turkish
efforts to promote regional peace.
The friendly atmosphere was mostly due to the reality of bilateral
political, economic and military relations. However, it also seems
that Turkey has eased up in pushing Israel to be more sensitive to
regional balances and to be more responsible and constructive with
the Palestinians. The Turkish agenda it seems is now to use Israel
as a gateway to the United States and against the pro-Greek and
pro-Armenian lobbies there.
Turkey must maintain a delicate balance between its new orientation and
its old-style security-first regional policies. If Turkey is to be a
multicultural and democratic state which prioritizes the rule of law,
the new political elite should pay attention to international laws,
norms and principles as well as the tendencies of its own society
in foreign policy formulation. Most Turks are very sensitive to
the Palestinian problem and would be unhappy if their government
sided with Israel. They have no problem with pursuing legitimate
relations with the Israelis and calling for peace between them and
the Palestinians. What they would find much more problematic is that
their policymakers tolerate Sharon's maneuvers, Israel's violence in
the Occupied Territories and its ignoring the legitimate concerns of
other actors in the region.
Turkey's new foreign policy orientation opened new horizons in
its relations with neighboring states and was closely linked to
the transformation in the domestic Turkish landscape. Turkey saw
considerable progress in its move toward EU membership and gained
enough leverage to emerge as a civil-economic power in the Middle
East. Relations with Syria and Israel, perhaps later with Iran,
will be test cases for Turkey's emergence as an active peacemaker in
the Middle East. It is the only country in the region that has some
leverage over both Palestinians and Israelis.
On the other hand, if Turkey revives the power politics approach
toward regional affairs that was visible in the 1990s, and if this
leads to its overlooking the Palestinians and the legitimate demands of
Israel's other neighbors, most Turks will regard this as an unwelcome
return to the past. There are other ways of improving relations with
the U.S. The current Erdogan government is both a cause and a result
of the recent transformation of Turkish society. Its hold on power
is very much dependent on its ability to understanding this reality
when it formulates both its domestic and foreign policies.
Bulent Aras is associate professor of international relations at Fatih
University in Istanbul. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.