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RETURN OF REFUGEES INSTEAD RESOLUTION
Azat Artsakh - Nagorno Karabakh Republic [NKR]
16 May 05
In several of my articles I have touched upon the problem of refugees
in the post-Soviet space, as well as outside it in the context of
resolution of ethnic and political conflicts. It was mentioned that
the degree of urgency of this problem is determined by the degree
of willingness of the conflicts sides, as well as the international
mediators, to accept a resolution through compromise. This equally
refers to the problem of resolution of the conflict of Nagorno
Karabakh. One can hardly find an ethnic and political conflict during
which the military actions do not result in partial or complete
ethnic cleansing, that is emergence of refugees and deportees (we
will use the word 'refugee' for both). However, in the process of
settlement of these conflicts the problem of return of refugees to
their former places of residence is either considered as one of the
pressing problems or is not touched upon at all. For example, in the
peace process of the conflicts of Nagorno Karabakh and Abkhazia the
problem of refugees is drown to the foreground. This problem once
used to be primary in the conflicts between Osetia and Ingushia,
Georgia and Osia. Whereas, so far no one has insisted on the return
of the Russian-speaking population of Chechnya (Russians, Ukrainians,
Armenians, Georgians, etc.) as one of the primary steps in conflict
resolution. Moreover, the question of return of tens of thousand
native Chechens who had had to leave for Ingushetia and other places
in the Russian Federation was not discussed at all. This is not
accidental. The emergence of the factor of refugees is determined
by the reluctance of one or all the parties of the conflict to solve
it through peace talks, no matter how long it may last. In so far as
mainly the problem of status of this or that state (in other words,
the problem of self-determination of the nation) underlies ethnic
and political conflicts, ethnic cleansing represents to the conflict
parties an extremely effective method of accelerating the political
resolution of the conflict in favour of one of the parties. For
example, there was a time when the Communist leaders of Azerbaijan
adopted a line of artificially changing the demographic state of
the Autonomous Region of Nagorno Karabakh (NKAR) in favour of the
Azerbaijani population, aiming to dissolve the Armenian sovereignty
on the basis of the will of the majority of inhabitants of NKAR, which
would be represented ethnic Azerbaijanis, as the Baku authorities had
planned. However, they did not manage to fulfil their plan. Facing
the constitutional decision of the February 20, 1988 meeting of
the NKAR Soviet of People's Deputies containing a request to the
central authorities of the Union to join the autonomous region to
the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, the Baku authorities
undertook ethnic cleansings of Armenians both in the territory of the
autonomous region and in the entire republic of Azerbaijan presenting
their actions as the consequences of the territorial claims of Armenia
against Azerbaijan. Thereby the Azerbaijani authorities tried hard
(as they do now) to reshape the problem of self-determination into
a territorial dispute. And as the government of the Union came to a
legal deadlock because of the imperfection of the Constitution of the
USSR, not only it did not prevent the ethnic cleansing of Armenians
in Azerbaijan, but also actively accelerated the process through the
military action named "Koltso" in NKAR and the district of Getashen
in May 1991 to maintain passport control there. However, the plan
was not brought into being; first because of the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in December 1991, and second, the pull-out of Russian
troops from Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. This was followed by
military actions between the two states, Azerbaijan and NKR, as a
resultof which the Azerbaijani population left Nagorno Karabakh. Here
is another example. Before the military actions in Abkhazia (before the
Georgian population leaved Abkhazia) the constitutional solution of the
Abkhazian issue supposed that the sovereign republic would remain in
Georgia because the majority of the population of the Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic of Abkhazia were ethnic Georgians. Consequently,
the resolution of the Abkhazian issue on the basis of the will of the
native population of the sovereignty (that is, the Abkhazians, reduced
from an ethnic majority to an ethnic minority in their home land under
the Soviet rule) required a change in the demographic picture of the
republic in favour of the Abkhazian population, which was achieved
through military actions. I gave these two examples to clarify why
in the case of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and Georgian - Abkhazian
conflict Azerbaijan and Georgia insist on the return of the refugees,
while Karabakh and Abkhazia demand the solution of the question of
status. The party for whom the demographic situation is favourable
demands the discussion of the question of status. And vice versa, the
party for whom the demographic picture is unfavourable is first of all
concerned about changing the situation by this parameter. The proof
to the vital interest of Baku in re-drawing the demographic picture
in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict was the OSCE monitoring
of the territories controlled by the NKR authorities undertaken by
official Baku, its aim being finding facts on settlement there. Taken
by surprise by the information of the OSCE fact-finding group that
the region of Kelbajar is inhabited by a small group of Armenian
citizens who had been deported from Sumgait, Baku, Kirovabad and
other areas in the neighbour republic, the vice foreign minister of
Azerbaijan Araz Azimov demanded from the OSCE mission to take actions
at deporting those people. Azimov's actions can be understood as the
reluctance of Azerbaijan to have Armenians living in their territory
even as citizens of Azerbaijan. Whereas, the return of the refugees
is practically impossible without the final political (or political
and legal) resolution of the ethnic and political conflict, because
the voluntary return of refugees to their former places of residence
is possible only in case of providing guarantees for political, legal
and social security there. However, no one can give such guarantees
to the refugees unless the final political and legal resolution of
the issue is reached. In this respect it is interesting to read the
letter of the Georgian refugee from South Osia Henrich Geladze in the
Georgian newspaper "Sakartvelo " (# 53, 1998). He writes that despite
the pledges of the Tbilisi authorities that the Georgians who had left
South Osia could be sure to go back to their homes, they will never go
back unless the full authority of Georgia is restored there. Moreover,
Geladze writes that they still remember the tragic fate of the Georgian
refugees who hurried to return to the region of Gali of Abkhazia.
In reference to the Karabakh issue the words of Henrich Geladze mean
that the Azerbaijani refugees from Nagorno Karabakh will never come
back unless Azerbaijan gets full control of Nagorno Karabakh. This
answers the question why not very long ago Baku authorities turned down
the proposal of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, at the heart of which
the idea of a "common state" was placed which excluded relationships
of subordination between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. It turned
out that the authorities of Baku were rather interested in a resolution
which would enable changing the demographic picture of Nagorno Karabakh
in favour of the Azerbaijani population by subsequent dissolution
of the Armenian statehood which is still unrecognized than in the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan actually presupposed by the idea
of a "common state". It is clear that no single Armenian of Nagorno
Karabakh will accept such a scenario of "resolution". Thus we come to
the conclusion that including the issue of return of refugees in the
resolution plan as one of the primary steps on the way of conciliation,
in fact, drags the process of political resolution of the issue into
a deadlock. Experience shows that in those cases when the conflict
parties are sincerely willing to discuss the fundamental issue of
ethnic and political conflicts, the issue of formation of a national
state with territorial integrity, the problem of refugees immediately
loses its relevance and sometimes it is even forgotten. Currently,
the same state of affairs is in Transdnestria. What is more, the
issue of refugees is even forgotten in the cases when a resolution
through military force is imposed on one of the conflict parties.
For instance, today no one remembers the refugees who used to live
in Serbian Krajina because Croatia has once and for withdrawn all
the problems of this state from the agenda by occupying this area
inhabited with Serbs with the tacit approval of the international
community. At present no one speaks about the refugees in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It is notable that the new authorities in the face of the
president Mikhail Sahakashvili who seems to sincerely want to solve
the problem of Abkhazia and South Osia as rapidly as possible, have
come to speak about more frequently about the necessity of economic
and democratic development of Georgia as the primary condition for the
voluntary return of Abkhazians to the Georgian republic than to extend
unreal ultimatums to the Abkhazian party. To sum up we can say that
all the efforts to solve such a sensitive humanitarian problem as the
return of refugees in the course of peace resolution practically do not
have any prospect. This statement is based on the thing that the fact
of existence of refugees is an immediate consequence of the absence
of a final political and legal resolution of this or that ethnic and
political conflict which lies on two planes: "self-determination
of nations" and "territorial integrity of the country". It goes
without saying that the voluntary return of refugees (which can be
only voluntary) is possible only after the final resolution of the
conflict is reached.
ALEXANDER GRIGORIAN. 16-05-2005
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Azat Artsakh - Nagorno Karabakh Republic [NKR]
16 May 05
In several of my articles I have touched upon the problem of refugees
in the post-Soviet space, as well as outside it in the context of
resolution of ethnic and political conflicts. It was mentioned that
the degree of urgency of this problem is determined by the degree
of willingness of the conflicts sides, as well as the international
mediators, to accept a resolution through compromise. This equally
refers to the problem of resolution of the conflict of Nagorno
Karabakh. One can hardly find an ethnic and political conflict during
which the military actions do not result in partial or complete
ethnic cleansing, that is emergence of refugees and deportees (we
will use the word 'refugee' for both). However, in the process of
settlement of these conflicts the problem of return of refugees to
their former places of residence is either considered as one of the
pressing problems or is not touched upon at all. For example, in the
peace process of the conflicts of Nagorno Karabakh and Abkhazia the
problem of refugees is drown to the foreground. This problem once
used to be primary in the conflicts between Osetia and Ingushia,
Georgia and Osia. Whereas, so far no one has insisted on the return
of the Russian-speaking population of Chechnya (Russians, Ukrainians,
Armenians, Georgians, etc.) as one of the primary steps in conflict
resolution. Moreover, the question of return of tens of thousand
native Chechens who had had to leave for Ingushetia and other places
in the Russian Federation was not discussed at all. This is not
accidental. The emergence of the factor of refugees is determined
by the reluctance of one or all the parties of the conflict to solve
it through peace talks, no matter how long it may last. In so far as
mainly the problem of status of this or that state (in other words,
the problem of self-determination of the nation) underlies ethnic
and political conflicts, ethnic cleansing represents to the conflict
parties an extremely effective method of accelerating the political
resolution of the conflict in favour of one of the parties. For
example, there was a time when the Communist leaders of Azerbaijan
adopted a line of artificially changing the demographic state of
the Autonomous Region of Nagorno Karabakh (NKAR) in favour of the
Azerbaijani population, aiming to dissolve the Armenian sovereignty
on the basis of the will of the majority of inhabitants of NKAR, which
would be represented ethnic Azerbaijanis, as the Baku authorities had
planned. However, they did not manage to fulfil their plan. Facing
the constitutional decision of the February 20, 1988 meeting of
the NKAR Soviet of People's Deputies containing a request to the
central authorities of the Union to join the autonomous region to
the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, the Baku authorities
undertook ethnic cleansings of Armenians both in the territory of the
autonomous region and in the entire republic of Azerbaijan presenting
their actions as the consequences of the territorial claims of Armenia
against Azerbaijan. Thereby the Azerbaijani authorities tried hard
(as they do now) to reshape the problem of self-determination into
a territorial dispute. And as the government of the Union came to a
legal deadlock because of the imperfection of the Constitution of the
USSR, not only it did not prevent the ethnic cleansing of Armenians
in Azerbaijan, but also actively accelerated the process through the
military action named "Koltso" in NKAR and the district of Getashen
in May 1991 to maintain passport control there. However, the plan
was not brought into being; first because of the dissolution of the
Soviet Union in December 1991, and second, the pull-out of Russian
troops from Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. This was followed by
military actions between the two states, Azerbaijan and NKR, as a
resultof which the Azerbaijani population left Nagorno Karabakh. Here
is another example. Before the military actions in Abkhazia (before the
Georgian population leaved Abkhazia) the constitutional solution of the
Abkhazian issue supposed that the sovereign republic would remain in
Georgia because the majority of the population of the Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic of Abkhazia were ethnic Georgians. Consequently,
the resolution of the Abkhazian issue on the basis of the will of the
native population of the sovereignty (that is, the Abkhazians, reduced
from an ethnic majority to an ethnic minority in their home land under
the Soviet rule) required a change in the demographic picture of the
republic in favour of the Abkhazian population, which was achieved
through military actions. I gave these two examples to clarify why
in the case of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and Georgian - Abkhazian
conflict Azerbaijan and Georgia insist on the return of the refugees,
while Karabakh and Abkhazia demand the solution of the question of
status. The party for whom the demographic situation is favourable
demands the discussion of the question of status. And vice versa, the
party for whom the demographic picture is unfavourable is first of all
concerned about changing the situation by this parameter. The proof
to the vital interest of Baku in re-drawing the demographic picture
in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict was the OSCE monitoring
of the territories controlled by the NKR authorities undertaken by
official Baku, its aim being finding facts on settlement there. Taken
by surprise by the information of the OSCE fact-finding group that
the region of Kelbajar is inhabited by a small group of Armenian
citizens who had been deported from Sumgait, Baku, Kirovabad and
other areas in the neighbour republic, the vice foreign minister of
Azerbaijan Araz Azimov demanded from the OSCE mission to take actions
at deporting those people. Azimov's actions can be understood as the
reluctance of Azerbaijan to have Armenians living in their territory
even as citizens of Azerbaijan. Whereas, the return of the refugees
is practically impossible without the final political (or political
and legal) resolution of the ethnic and political conflict, because
the voluntary return of refugees to their former places of residence
is possible only in case of providing guarantees for political, legal
and social security there. However, no one can give such guarantees
to the refugees unless the final political and legal resolution of
the issue is reached. In this respect it is interesting to read the
letter of the Georgian refugee from South Osia Henrich Geladze in the
Georgian newspaper "Sakartvelo " (# 53, 1998). He writes that despite
the pledges of the Tbilisi authorities that the Georgians who had left
South Osia could be sure to go back to their homes, they will never go
back unless the full authority of Georgia is restored there. Moreover,
Geladze writes that they still remember the tragic fate of the Georgian
refugees who hurried to return to the region of Gali of Abkhazia.
In reference to the Karabakh issue the words of Henrich Geladze mean
that the Azerbaijani refugees from Nagorno Karabakh will never come
back unless Azerbaijan gets full control of Nagorno Karabakh. This
answers the question why not very long ago Baku authorities turned down
the proposal of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, at the heart of which
the idea of a "common state" was placed which excluded relationships
of subordination between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh. It turned
out that the authorities of Baku were rather interested in a resolution
which would enable changing the demographic picture of Nagorno Karabakh
in favour of the Azerbaijani population by subsequent dissolution
of the Armenian statehood which is still unrecognized than in the
territorial integrity of Azerbaijan actually presupposed by the idea
of a "common state". It is clear that no single Armenian of Nagorno
Karabakh will accept such a scenario of "resolution". Thus we come to
the conclusion that including the issue of return of refugees in the
resolution plan as one of the primary steps on the way of conciliation,
in fact, drags the process of political resolution of the issue into
a deadlock. Experience shows that in those cases when the conflict
parties are sincerely willing to discuss the fundamental issue of
ethnic and political conflicts, the issue of formation of a national
state with territorial integrity, the problem of refugees immediately
loses its relevance and sometimes it is even forgotten. Currently,
the same state of affairs is in Transdnestria. What is more, the
issue of refugees is even forgotten in the cases when a resolution
through military force is imposed on one of the conflict parties.
For instance, today no one remembers the refugees who used to live
in Serbian Krajina because Croatia has once and for withdrawn all
the problems of this state from the agenda by occupying this area
inhabited with Serbs with the tacit approval of the international
community. At present no one speaks about the refugees in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It is notable that the new authorities in the face of the
president Mikhail Sahakashvili who seems to sincerely want to solve
the problem of Abkhazia and South Osia as rapidly as possible, have
come to speak about more frequently about the necessity of economic
and democratic development of Georgia as the primary condition for the
voluntary return of Abkhazians to the Georgian republic than to extend
unreal ultimatums to the Abkhazian party. To sum up we can say that
all the efforts to solve such a sensitive humanitarian problem as the
return of refugees in the course of peace resolution practically do not
have any prospect. This statement is based on the thing that the fact
of existence of refugees is an immediate consequence of the absence
of a final political and legal resolution of this or that ethnic and
political conflict which lies on two planes: "self-determination
of nations" and "territorial integrity of the country". It goes
without saying that the voluntary return of refugees (which can be
only voluntary) is possible only after the final resolution of the
conflict is reached.
ALEXANDER GRIGORIAN. 16-05-2005
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress