Press conference with political analyst Belkovsky

[Yeghisabet Arthur]

Official Kremlin Int'l News Broadcast
May 17, 2005 Tuesday

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH POLITICAL ANALYST STANISLAV BELKOVSKY

RIA NOVOSTI, 11:30, MAY 17, 2005

Moderator: Good day, and welcome to RIA Novosti press club. The topic
today is the timetable of post-Soviet revolutions and the threat of
the disintegration of Russia. Before I give the floor to our speaker
today, I will commit myself to quote a study of the American-Israeli
analytical center, Stratfor. You are probably aware of this study
which was distributed just recently. It says, among other things,
the situation is fast becoming hopeless for Russia. The itinerary
of President Bush's trips on the eve of Victory Day -- first stop in
the Baltics and then, Georgia immediately after Moscow -- was meant
to dot all the i's. Was there an attempt to compare the occupation
of the Baltics by the Soviet Union to the Nazi occupation along with
the statement of the Bush administration officials that with the fall
of Hitler infringement upon its interests stopped. All this rhetoric
is intended to put Russia on the defensive. Russia's decline and the
use of that situation by the US marked a watershed. If Moscow has lost
Ukraine, Georgia becomes the dominant country in the Caucasus and the
events in Kyrgyzstan spill over to the whole of Central Asia -- all
this can easily be imagined, by the way, the report was distributed
before the developments in Andizhan, Uzbekistan -- the survival of
Russia itself will obviously be in question. We will witness part of
the Russian Federation dissociate itself from it. The Russia we know
today will no longer exist.

This is a lurid forecast for Russia.

And our guest today is Stanislav Belkovsky, founder of the National
Strategy Institute, will comment on this view.

Belkovsky: Good afternoon. First of all, I would like to speak about
post-Soviet revolutions, their nature, content and the forecast
of further development in the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics. I must say that the official position of the presidential
administration is that the revolutions have been inspired from outside,
in the first place by the United States. And therefore limiting the
impact of these processes in various countries is key to preventing a
revolutionary change of regime. That is, a replacement of the ruling
cooperation with broad popular participation, with people taking to
the streets, which in fact can be described as a typical post-Soviet
revolution, departing from the Marxist idea of a revolution, its
nature and content.

At the same time the Kremlin is fully aware that this is not quite
so. That this propaganda doctrine does not reflect reality. As someone
who was deeply involved in the revolutionary events in Ukraine,
I can attest that America, which in June 2004 pledged to Russia not
to stand in the way of the electoral victory of Yanukovich, strictly
abided by that pledge until November 2004. Starting from June 2004 it
cut off financing of the Ukrainian opposition and on November 23 and
November 30 of last year the US Ambassador to Ukraine did everything
to prevent the rioters from occupying the buildings of the presidential
administration and the cabinet of ministers of Ukraine, which was not a
problem at all at the time. The security guards there were not ready to
resist and they were ready to disperse, especially in the latter case.

It was only when it became clear that the revolutionary processes
were irreversible and that the incumbent President, Leonid Kuchma,
had in fact lost his grip on power, and that Viktor Yanukovich would
not become the president, that the US hastily recognized the new
power thus displaying much more tactical prowess than Russia which
until last labored under the illusion that Viktor Yanukovich would win.

After analyzing the situation in Georgia and the Ukraine and in
Kyrgyzstan and the mounting conflict in Uzbekistan which is just
unfolding and it will climax within a year or two and its outcome
will be not in favor of the incumbent President, Islam Karimov,
and the emerging prerequisites for the change of regimes and ruling
corporations in other CIS countries, the National Strategy Institute
has formulated its concept of why revolutions arise.

Of course, they arise due to internal causes. External influence
is just one of the ten factors of revolution. And as I said at the
beginning, we define a revolution as a radical change of the ruling
corporation with broad popular participation. That's what makes
a revolution different from a coup which is also threatening some
CIS countries, of which I will say more. These ten factors are as
follows. First, the clogging up of the channels of vertical mobility,
young people are denied access to the ruling elite, society is unable
to influence the authorities through legal political mechanisms.
Secondly, the legitimacy gap. Unfortunately, the ruling elite in
Russia today -- and this, by the way, was part of the problem with
its assessment of events in Ukraine -- does not understand the nature
of legitimacy which was brilliant described at the turn of the 20th
century by Max Weber. Legitimacy is not a legal category. A protocol
of the election commission confirming that you have been elected
president is not enough for you to be recognized as a legitimate
ruler. The fate of the Georgian parliament in 2003, the fate of
Viktor Yanukovich in 2004, and the fate of the Kyrgyz parliament in
2005 are eloquent proof of that.

Legitimacy -- and this is a commonplace which the Kremlin for some
reason ignores -- is a category of mass consciousness and it means
the recognition by the people of the justice of the regime. It is
not connected with the former legality of power, its election or
emergence. Max Weber singled our three types of legitimacy: rational
legitimacy, arising from the fact that the people recognizes a certain
system of the transition of power; the traditional legitimacy,
whereby the people and society recognize the transfer of power in
the framework of tradition (the type of legitimacy characteristic of
monarchies) and charismatic legitimacy in which the leader's right
to rule the country is based on his charisma which, of course, is
God-given and the charismatic leader is forgiven any departures from
the law, from common sense and so on.

So, when today analysts describe as irrational or inadequate the
actions of, say, Saakashvili or Alexander Lukashenko, they discount
this key factor of charismatic legitimacy. A charismatic leader can
get away with much more than the bureaucratic mass and the gray crowd
can get away with. In this sense, delegitimization of the regime, as
happened in Ukraine and Kyrgyzia, occurred because all the three types
of legitimacy are undermined. With the exception of Russia nowhere in
the post-Soviet space is there traditional legitimacy. The tradition of
Czarism existed only in Russia. All the other states were artificial
entities created by Joseph Stalin and to a much lesser degree by
Nikita Khrushchev through his manipulations with Soviet territory,
entities that were not prepared to be independent states. The
numerous ethnic and territorial conflicts in the post-Soviet space
are due to artificial nature of post-Soviet borders. The inclusion of
Karabakh into Azerbaijan, of the Crimea and another part of the Russian
territory into Ukraine and so on; the artificial drawing of borders in
Central Asia as manifested, among other things, in the Fergana Valley.

So, post-Soviet regimes did not have traditional legitimacy. And
in this respect, their legitimacy has always been quite doubtful
in all post-Soviet countries except Russia. So, at a certain point
the peoples of these countries understood that the Soviet Union was
a thing of the past, that the period when they were part of another
community had ended, and they were emerging as political nations. So,
they started looking for legitimate authorities, whose legitimacy
would be based either on charismatic or rational and rational-legal
legitimacy. This is the main resource of revolutions.

For example, the Leonid Kuchma regime was completely de- legitimized
because people did not consider it fair. The same was with the
Eduard Shevardnadze and the Askar Akayev regimes. The probability of
revolution increases immensely in such a situation. At the same time,
the current regimes created by Turkmenbashi or Alexander Lukashenko
are legitimate to a large extent. They are legitimate charismatically
and to a lesser degree from the rational and legal point of view. I
will speak about this a bit later, but the probability of revolution
in Belarus and Turkmenistan appears to be minimal at this point.

The third factor is serious contradictions within the elites. In all
countries where revolutions have occurred, we could see the split of
the elite and its inability to follow an integral system of values,
including national values.

The fourth factor is the absence of a positive image of the future
embodied by authorities. In this respect, any promise of stability
offered by authorities work actually against the image of the
future because the current situation and current stability are
as a rule gloomy because it is positive stability for a fraction
of a percentage of people, while for the overwhelming majority,
more than 99 percent, in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan stability
means hopelessness, in other words, the impossibility of any major
improvement of their position, the impossibility of vertical social
mobility, the impossibility of attempts to stop humiliation caused by
the current situation. And I am talking not only about the financial
status. What I mean is that a person cannot go beyond the provincial
habitat into which he has been submerged by existing authorities.
Ambitions to overcome these provincial borders are a key driving
force for any person in public life and politics.

The fifth factor is the opposition as a subject, and opposition
leaders. Where such a subject exists, the change of ruling corporations
is quite possible. And where it doesn't exist, prerequisites for such
change are not there yet, as a minimum.

The sixth factor is that authorities are not prepared to use force.
And to a large extent this depends on two things: the commonness
of goals for authorities and power structures. There was none in
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Power structures were subordinated
to authorities only formally, and in a critical situation they made
it clear that they would not obey orders to suppress public unrests.
In Belarus, such commonness of goals is quite big.

The seventh factor is the existence of unsolved regional and
ethnic contradictions. In other words, in heterogeneous countries,
both ethnically and regionally, different ethnic groups and clans,
subterritories and substates can play a special role in the evolution,
like in Kyrgyzstan where the southern clans were set against the
northern clans.

Now, the merger of bureaucracy -- the eighth factor is the merger
of bureaucracy and the political class. This is a very dangerous
trend because politics and bureaucracy are two different things.
Bureaucracy is a rational class that has to implement a political
program, while politics are largely based not on professionalism but
on morals and appealing to the fundamental principles of the state
system. If we take Ukraine, we could see that when bureaucrats became
political leaders and began to embody political leadership in the
ruling class, it meant a merger of bureaucracy and the political class,
which always requires the formation of a new alternative political
class outside the ruling bureaucracy.

The ninth and the tenth factors are technical factors: external
interest in the change of the regime. This is a factor but it is not
a key or a critical one. It is only one of the 10 factors. Where
America is interested in changing the regime, revolution is more
probable, but only by several fractions of a percentage point, not
two or three times. And the tenth factor is a crisis as a trigger
of revolution: elections that are not considered fair or any other
historical milestones.

So, we have singled out three groups of countries in terms of
the risk of revolution in these countries or the probability of
revolution. The first group includes Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan. The probability of revolution in these countries in
the foreseeable future is quite big. However, this does not mean that
if the ruling classes refuse to extend their mandates, if they leave,
revolutions may develop peacefully without excesses. If Armenian
President Kocharyan or Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev decides
all of a sudden to leave, there will be no revolution.

The second group includes Russia and Azerbaijan. And the third group
includes Belarus and Turkmenistan. We think that revolutions in these
countries are least probable. Using Belarus as an example and taking
the 10 factors I have mentioned above, I would like to explain why
we think so.

Last week FSB director Nikolai Patrushev said the US was investing a
certain amount of money, more than $10 million, in the Belarussian
opposition. Given this and the condemnation of Belarus by the US,
Ukraine, Georgia and so on, speculations about the inevitability
of revolution increased. But we think it is not so because of the
10 factors that lead to revolution and are necessary conditions and
prerequisites for revolutions, only two exist in Belarus. One, partly,
is blocked vertical mobility. But only partly. And external interests.

The Belarussian regime has no deficit of legitimacy because
Lukashenko's charismatic legitimacy is obvious. Moreover, to some
extent Belarus had a revolution in 1994 when the post-Soviet regime
left the stage because the post-Soviet regime was not the Lukashenko
regime, it was the regime of Shushkevich and then of Kebich. So, we
can see no serious contradictions within the elite. A positive image
of the future is there. It's a neo-Soviet project that Lukashenko
is implementing. We can see no strong opposition or its leaders. But
we can see the full readiness of authorities to use force, and they
have done so many times. In this respect, there is the unity of
authorities and power structures. We can see no unsolved regional
or ethnic contradictions. And we can see no signs of a crisis. If
free elections were held in Belarus tomorrow, absolutely free of
any manipulation and based on free access of political subjects to
information and administrative resources, Alexander Lukashenko would
win these elections, even not by a landslide.

So, regimes like the Lukashenko regime or the Turkmenbashi regime can
fall in two cases: if there is direct external intervention, and if
there is a coup d'etat organized by the closest allies of the current
rulers. Motives for such a coup always exist. And the main motive
is to break the isolation because such regimes inevitably doom their
loyal servants to international isolation, to certain isolation from
the consumption society, globalization, the US system of values. And
if the closest aides of a strong leader think that this isolation
should be broken, leaders like Lukashenko or Turkmenbashi may be
liquidated physically. In this case we can speak of a coup.

However, we can't speak of any prerequisites for a revolution in
these countries similar to those that occurred in Georgia, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan. And the experts who think that a revolution
in Belarus is probable in fact are thinking on the same lines as the
Kremlin experts who attach far too much importance to the influence
of the United States on processes happening in the world and in the
post-Soviet space.

Basically, the role of the United States consists in taking over from
Russia the status of a regional power. In 1990s, after the break up
of the Soviet Union, Russia was a classic regional power and a source
of legitimacy for the post-Soviet regimes.

We can think of many historical examples when regimes that were
aggressive anti-Russian, for example, the Gamsakhurdia regime in
Georgia or the Popular Front of Azerbaijan under Abulfaz Elchibei
suffered a political debacle largely due to the direct or indirect
role of Russia in toppling them. They were replaced with regimes
which made their first visit to Moscow, not formally, like Yushchenko,
but they drew their legitimacy from the capital of the regional power.

13 years on, we can recognize that Russia has lost such status, that
today the post-Soviet regimes draw their legitimacy directly from the
United States, while Russia remains the biggest country in terms of
territory and population, but politically is no different from all the
other post-Soviet countries. Both the strikingly aggressive stand of
the post-Soviet countries with regard to Russia and today's position
of Georgia on Russian bases, and the position of the Baltic countries,
though they are not classic post-Soviet countries, all this shows
that Russia is no longer perceived as a regional power in the top
league of world politics, assuming that there are three leagues. The
top league now is constituted by the sole super power, the United
States. Perhaps, China will soon join that league, but not yet.

The first league is regional powers such as India or Brazil or, until
recently, Russia. And the third league are the ordinary isolated
states such as Ecuador or Bangladesh. So, it can be said today that
Russia has been delegated from the first league to the second. One
can welcome this fact, as do some liberal circles in Russia; one can
regret and lament the fact, like my co-thinkers do, but the fact has
to be recognized. Without recognizing it, it is impossible to analyze
and predict further developments in the post- Soviet space.

To sum up the first part of my remarks, I would like to say that
revolution in the post-Soviet space stems from internal causes and the
external factor is certainly secondary. In that sense practically all
the post-Soviet countries are revolution-prone, with the exception of
those where the revolutions have already taken place -- from below
or from above. Russia is not an exception, it certainly belongs to
the risk group.

There is, of course, one fundamental way in which Russia differs from
all the other post-Soviet countries. In Russia from the start Russian
power -- Boris Yeltsin -- were heirs and proponents of traditional
legitimacy, they were the heirs to the power of the Czars. While
in other post-Soviet countries revolutions were to a large extent
connected with nation building, they were left-wing and nationalist
in their nature and had basically a creative thrust -- because one
can say in general that the Georgian and Ukrainian states emerged
strengthened and not weakened after the revolutions, in any case
the idea of statehood was certainly strengthened. In this case the
state of the economy or the bureaucratic institutions cannot be an
indicator because it is a temporary phenomenon. By contrast, in Russia
a revolution will become the final stage in the delegitimization of
power. It will not be cause of disintegration of the country, but
its consequence. That is an important point to be borne in mind. So,
preventing revolution and preventing the disintegration of Russia
are virtually synonyms. Russia can be prevented in Russia only by
peacefully transferring power from the current ruling class to a new
generation of the nationally-oriented elite.

This brings us to the question of the disintegration of Russia. For
the last two centuries many scholars have paid much attention to the
problems of disintegration of the state. Starting from 1992 Russia
has not been an empire, it has been a regional power. Now it has lost
that status too. But the disintegration of the state always occurs
when the central government does not send strong enough messages and
does not provide enough incentives for keeping a territory within a
single state.

Today Russia is held together by the traditional legitimacy of the
Kremlin as the heir to the Czar's power. The moment the Kremlin system
falls apart -- and trends leading in that direction are mounting --
and again I mean internal trends. This is not some outside conspiracy,
and not an attempt of few dozen protestors to pelt somebody with
eggs. It will be brought about by the sustained trend of decomposition
of the state that was initiated in the 1990s, when much of Russia
will lose any incentive for staying within Russia. I don't mean only
the national republics, such as Tatarstan or Yakutia which can well
be an independent state under a Japanese umbrella. As far as the
elite in Yakutia is concerned, there is nothing to prevent it from
assuming that new status. But large chunks of Siberia and the Far East,
where China's influence is already great, where Chinese immigration,
coupled with the low density of the population and falling population,
is emerging as an ever more significant social and economic factor. And
in four or five years the Chinese population in the Russian regions
in Siberian and the Far East will be able to form its political
structures and establish de facto, if not de jure power. And if,
against that background, the central Russian government disintegrates,
one would have to admit that Russia will have collapsed not only in
fact, but formally as well.

The only alternative to the mounting destructive trends which, I
repeat, are not connected with external factors because today, if
the United States was interested in a change of regime in Ukraine or
Georgia, although, let me stress, it did not play the decisive role
in that change, but only a secondary role, the United States is not
interested in a change of regime in Russia today. This is because the
growing Chinese threat worries the US much more than Russia and the
US interest today is, first, in a united and integral Russia being
a buffer between China and Europe and a restraining factor on the
geopolitical ambitions of China; on the other hand, America is afraid
that Vladimir Putin will be succeeded by a left-wing nationalist
regime with far greater geopolitical ambitions for Russia than the
present regime.

In both cases America is absolutely right. There are no grounds
to question the quality of analytical support of American policy
in these areas. So, the decay and disintegration of the regime will
happen exclusively due to internal causes, and it has to be prevented
because I think that an alternative to revolution in Russia, in the
medium term, is a government coup, an absolutely peaceful coup, in
which power will pass from the present ruling corporation, which is
a successor to Yeltin's, to a new ruling corporation which will be
undoubtedly left-wing and nationalist.

If such a transformation of power is possible within the next three
years, then an optimistic forecast regarding the fate and integrity
of Russia is possible. If not, no such scenario. Thank you.

Anchor: Well, thank you. I now open it up for question. I understand
that you have heard quite an earful and you are at a loss what
questions to ask.

Q: Who in your opinion, Stanislav Alexandrovich, could be the subject
of such a coup and who could provide the broad support? What forces?

Belkovsky: At present it is a coalition including Motherland and
the CPRF. And I see Dmitry Rogozin as the person who can embody that
coalition. But because this process will take between a year and a
half, and two years and a half, it is very likely that new figures
will come forward against the background of the paralysis of the
political system. So, it is an open ended list.

Q: I would like to ask you about Ukraine. Half of the petrol pumps
in Ukraine today are without petrol, and there is a conflict between
Russian oil tycoons and the Ukrainian government. Are there political
implications and how will be problem influence the internal political
situation in Ukraine?

Belkovsky: There are of course, political. As I have always said,
the problem of the new Ukrainian authorities is that they are not a
single team in managerial terms. Clearly, in objective conditions of
a crisis the Ukrainian economy has found itself in -- not provoked
by anyone, and I cannot share the view of those representatives of
the Ukrainian authorities who say that Russia has purposefully done
something to worsen the economic situation in Ukraine. In my opinion,
Russia has not done anything in particular for that. It has neither
supported Ukraine nor has it intentionally provoked the crisis. Under
those conditions, when the authorities are not balanced and each
minister in the Cabinet actually plays his own game and the Cabinet
cannot pursue a single course, naturally all sorts of governance
problems emerge, including in the economy.

Was it necessary to start a conflict with Russian oil companies from
the point of view of Ukraine's interests? I am not sure about that.

Q: In your opinion, how probable is that Russia will shift from the
presidential system to a parliamentary system?

Belkovsky: Russia will never have a classical parliamentary republic.
This is at odds with the Russian historic tradition. But I would
certainly support as I find it adequate for Russia dividing power
and governance. In line with the Russian traditions, the power should
be flawless. It should be a source of law and values. In this sense
and for this reason, it should not deal with political and economic
issues. It should not deal with such problems as, for example, the fuel
crisis in Ukraine or monetization of benefits. Such issues should be
dealt with by the government formed by parliament. The power should
stay aside from those processes. In this sense, the constitutional
monarchy model would be optimal for Russia, in my opinion, but as
it can hardly be implemented, the presidential power model, with
the presidential power staying outside the economy, outside social
problems and would be reelected rather conditionally, so to say,
would be appropriate. For instance, the Egyptian variant of election
of the president could be used. But certainly there should be a strong
parliament and a strong government, and they should be responsible
for the economy and the social sphere.

Q: We have witnessed something similar to a cold war between Russia
and Georgia about military bases. In your opinion, how long could this
situation last with the language of ultimatums used? Will Russia pull
out its bases from Georgia?

Belkovsky: Russia will certainly move its bases out of Georgia by
2008. I have no doubt about that. The decision has actually been
made. As for the cold war, the main factors, in my opinion, are
Russia's loss of its regional power status, which Georgia realizes well
enough, and the realization by Mikhail Saakashvili of his doctrine,
according to which -- initially, when Saakashvili came to power, as far
as I know, he had an inner conviction that Georgia cannot survive as
a self-reliant country and it needed an elder brother or sponsor. At
the initial stage of his rule, he regarded Russia as such a country,
but Russia's ruling class proved not ready to accept Georgia. This
explains why he has made his choice of America as such a sponsor.

I have always regarded Saakashvili as a Lenin type leader, who
reviews his priorities depending on the current situation, political
and economic. So, I would not be surprised to see the situation in
relations between Georgia and Russia radically change again in a
couple of years. But as Russia is unprepared to use firm levers of
pressure it has, I think that the bases will be pulled out and this
will not happen later than in 2008. And the current ruling class will
try to present this as Russia's victory.

Q: After the bloodshed in Andizhan, is it possible to avoid a
bloodletting revolution in Uzbekistan?

Belkovsky: No, I think this cannot be avoided. The thing is that out
of ten factors, all ten are present there, of all those ten factors
I have listed. They all apply to today's Uzbekistan. What happened in
Andizhan is just the beginning. And the Islamic factor matters here.
Even though Uzbekistan cannot be described as an Islamic country and
confrontation in Uzbekistan has a social and clan nature, Islam is
a very strong ideology, a very strong factor, and it will certainly
fill the gaps which have emerged in the ideological sphere as a result
of the Islam Karimov regime's activities. Therefore, I think that an
Islamic revolution and Islamization is inevitable in Uzbekistan in
the coming two or three years. Naturally, blood will be let, because
transfer of power from one ruling corporation to another never happens
in a different way.

Q: What do the events in Uzbekistan mean for Russia, for the Kremlin?
What conclusions should the Kremlin draw from that? Has the reaction
by Putin and Russia been adequate?

Belkovsky: I would make a difference between the Kremlin and Russia
here, because they are no longer the same today. There are objective
interests of Russia and there is a subjective position of the Kremlin,
and they far from always coincide.

As for the Kremlin, I think the Kremlin was unprepared for this course
of events, which testifies to a crisis in the intelligence apparatus
first and foremost. This indicates that the Russian intelligence
services have not worked efficiently enough. You may have noticed
that statements on clear support for Islam Karimov were only made
by the Friday night, when the situation changed in favor of the
incumbent authorities. This actually means that before the Friday
night, the Kremlin had no scenario for its behavior and wanted to see
what this may lead to. This also concerns the question of whether or
not the country needs intelligence services which have been steadily
financed and have worked even in regions which are not seen as priority
regions today.

As for further developments in Uzbekistan, from the point of
view of Russia's current status as a provincial country, this
is not important. This was important as long as Russia remained a
regional power. It can no longer influence decisively developments in
Uzbekistan for subjective reasons. Had Putin really wanted to act as
an intermediary in the Uzbekistan conflict, he could have become an
intermediary. But we can see absolute lack of this willingness and
it will not emerge, particularly for psychological specifics of the
main players.

Q: Is a revolutionary scenario possible in Transdniestria? In this
connection, what do you think of a plan drawn up by your colleagues
at the Chisinau National Strategy Institute? They have proposed
moving Russian troops out next fall and arranging a free election in
December in the Dniester region, monitored by the West. Depending
on the results, the Dniester left bank could be given a certain
autonomy status.

Belkovsky: Did you mean Kiev or Chisinau? Which institute?

Q: Chisinau.

Belkovsky: I know quite well the plan developed in Kiev, which I think
will prevail in the settlement of this conflict. It calls for holding
a free election which would be followed by Igor Smirnov's stepping down
and the post of president would be scrapped by December 31, 2005. Then
Russian troops would be moved out by June 30, 2006. I think it will
happen more or less this way. In my opinion, this would be satisfactory
-- if all political ambitions and rhetoric are dropped -- this would
objectively be satisfactory for both Moldova and Transdniestria,
because this plan does not call for a review of the principles of
Moldova's state system. It would remain a Unitarian state. It would
not turn into a federation, because there would be no power bodies
where constituent territories would be represented. The President
and the Moldovan parliament would be formed on the same principles as
today. There would be no bicameral parliament. But at the same time,
there would remain a Transdniestrian autonomy with all attributes of
that autonomy such as three official languages, the emblem and the
anthem, as well as certain economic levers. The modernization of the
Transdniestrian elites has been made a cornerstone because one of the
problems of this region is partial de-legitimization of the ruling
elite, based on the understanding of legitimacy that I described above.

Since Russia is losing initiative, actually lost it after the failure
of the Dmitry Kozak plan, and the Ukrainian clan will provide the basis
for the settlement, and if Moldova does not want to preserve the status
quo forever, and there are some doubts about that, it will accept
the Ukrainian plan, and I believe that that's exactly what's going
to happen, that is, Transdniestria will hold parliamentary elections
and will get a legitimate parliament expressing the interests of its
people, and in this respect all speculations that there is a criminal
enclave in Transdniestria created by three former KGB officers
will become a thing of the past, and it will be acknowledged that
the emergence of Transdniestria is an objective historical process
generated by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fact that
the borders of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic drawn by Stalin
were not organic, after which Moldova will have to give Transdniestria
sufficient sovereignty in exchange for the recognition of Moldova's
integrity as an unitary state.

I think the change of power in Transdniestria will take place on
December 31, and Russian troops will be withdrawn on June 30 of
next year.

Q: Do you have credible information about the number of Chinese in
the Far East and Siberia? And the second question is, we know that
there is almost half a million Chinese in the US, without historically
American Chinese, but they don't fear them. Why does Russia fear them?

Belkovsky: No, I don't have credible figures. I think no one have
them. But I think we should be talking about millions. As for the
difference between America and Russia, it is fundamental. In America,
the Chinese are integrated into the existing political system and
the national American project, and at the same time they preserve
the ethnic and cultural independence. In Russia, the Chinese are not
integrated into anything like that simply because there are no such
institutes and infrastructure here. But that's a problem of Russia,
not of China.

Since nature abhors vacuum, there is always someone to fill it. The
lack of national projects and political power, and the absence of
development impulses in Siberia and the Far East may be filled in
by Chinese. I do not consider it an objective threat, and I am not
taking anti-Chinese positions. I think it's a problem of Russia, not of
China. But as far as China's interests are concerned, I think it acts
correctly by encouraging, or at least doing nothing to discourage,
migration to Russia because objectively scarcely populated Russian
territories, rich with natural resources, are needed by China. And
the Chinese elite is acting in accordance with its national interests,
and it must not be censured for that.

Q: If your forecast comes true and power in Russia is taken by the
nationally oriented elite through a coup or revolution, how will
Russia's policy in the post-Soviet space change? And in particular,
how will Russia's policy with regard to so-called unrecognized
states change?

Belkovsky: I emphasize the word coup, not revolution because a
revolution will be the last event before Russia's disintegration that
may lead to some new state forms, but not the Russian Federation, as
we know it. I think that objectively, not subjectively, not from the
viewpoint of the current elites but objectively, from the viewpoint
of political, historical and economic factors, Russia remains an
attractive center of gravity for half of former CIS. And these
former CIS countries may be brought together into a community that
we tentatively call SSSR, or a commonwealth of Russia's allies. This
community will have dual citizenship and offer great mobility, while
preserving the national sovereignty of all participating countries.
Unrecognized states that still exist by that time may join this
community. I think these will be Abkhazia and South Ossetia because
the fate of Transdniestria will be decided next year.

Q: Don't you think that the ruling elite may change not as a result
of a coup but through elections and constitutional procedures?

Belkovsky: By coup I meant a constitutional change of power. In
this case a coup means that the ruling bureaucracy that associates
itself with the political class and that does not want to leave the
political stage will have to give up the reigns of power. The very
fact of holding free elections, which will mostly likely be won by
the left nationalist forces, means a coup because no other political
forces in modern Russia can compete with the left nationalist forces
through free and democratic elections.

As for prerequisites for a revolution, let us go over the 10
above-mentioned ones. Blocked vertical mobility: this is the biggest
problem in Russia today, which was exacerbated by the abolition
of gubernatorial elections; the deficit of regime legitimacy: it
is obvious on all fronts; there are serious contradictions within
the elite; there is no positive image of the future embodies by
authorities; there are no opposition leaders, and this is why we are
not talking about a revolution today. Authorities are not prepared
to use force, and the creation of all these structures like Nashi
testifies to this. Authorities know that official power structures
will not obey orders to use force. This is why they are creating
these mobile combat brigades, which, I think, will not be effective
at a critical moment. Unresolved regional and ethnic contradictions
exist. There is an obvious merger of bureaucracy and the political
class.

So, there are lots of prerequisites, but not all of them are there,
and this is why we put Russia in the second group, not the first one.

Q: I would like to ask a question about Afghanistan. You said that
a bloody revolution may occur in a year or two years from now. How
will it affect the regions? Because the Fergana Valley is shared
by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. And another question. Maybe related
to the first one. Do you think that a colored revolution may occur
in Kazakhstan any time soon since it will have elections next year,
and there are those who think they should be next?

Belkovsky: I think a revolution in Uzbekistan, a coup in Uzbekistan
will lead to accelerated Islamization of the region because there
are no ideological and fundamental factors in the region that could
compete with spreading Islam.

As for Kazakhstan, I think a revolution there is quite probable even
though Nursultan Nazarbayev still has certain charismatic legitimacy
and a certain positive image of the future. But still, the rest of
the 10 factors are quite obvious. This is why I wouldn't rule out
uncontrolled developments if Nazarbayev does not take sharp and tough
measures to neutralize prerequisites for a revolution in the very near
future. I think Nazarbayev is a serious and intelligent political
leader, and I think he may as well neutralize and curb revolution,
basically do it from top to bottom rather than the other way
round. This is why I don't think that the Nazarbayev regime is doomed.

Q: I have two questions, if you don't mind. First, how much does the
Kremlin fear a coup by the left nationalistic forces, the forces you
mentioned? And second, do you think that Russia and the US may come
together against the background of the Belarussian elections?

Belkovsky: Well, the Kremlin fears a revolution very much. Not a coup
by the scenario I described, but a revolution because it knows what
it's like. According to the Kremlin's logic, Yushchenko's victory
and Yanukovich's defeat were absolutely impossible, because three
critical resources, those the presidential team find critical, namely
money, the media and administrative resources -- the latter allowing
rigging the results of the vote by citizens -- were on Yanukovich's
side. The defeat created an absolutely extraordinary situation,
because it ruined the Kremlin's traditional understanding of realities.

This explains why they fear a revolution as something unknown, as
something failing to fit in the Kremlin's program of existence and
development. In this sense, the Kremlin itself has made a substantial
contribution to the creation of a revolutionary entity. There is no
revolution, but there has been too much talk about it.

Despite the fact that such figures as Nevzlin or Berezovsky cannot
have any relation to the revolution, because that revolution will
be an anti-Nevzlin, anti-Berezovsky revolution, it will undoubtedly
be a leftist and nationalist revolution, the Kremlin is making big
political figures out of Nevzlin and Berezovsky as figures allegedly
influencing something, even though this is not true, in my opinion.

All chaotic efforts by the Kremlin have not been the result of
its understanding of where revolutions come from. It is rather
a simulation. They have promoted the preservation of trends which
lead to a destruction of the power machinery. And the destruction of
the power machinery and a revolution are synonyms. When the power
machinery is eventually ruined, this is called a revolution. This
happened in Russia in February 1917. In February 1917, there was no
Nevzlin or Berezovsky, who would knock on the Emperor's door to say:
"Give the power to me." There was no such an individual. The Emperor's
power just collapsed. And this became a revolution de facto.

It also happened the same way in October 1917, when the Bolsheviks
picked up power, even though they were not direct successors of the
Emperor's power. They started gathering the country from scratch,
via a chain of bloodletting events.

The same happened in 1991, and it turned out that there was not
anyone in the Soviet Union who would drive Gorbachev out. Yeltsin
was not the Soviet Union. He was rather Russia, a totally different
geopolitical player. And the Soviet Union as the legal successor of
the Russian Empire collapsed.

The revolution is a synonym of disintegration which does not require
any player that would organize it. When everything goes to pieces,
when entropy reaches its peak, this is what is known as the Russian
revolution. This moment has never been pleasant in Russian history
for those who lived through this tragic moment.

I find it very important from the point of view of Russia's objective
interests to retain the Lukashenko regime. But I cannot rule out
that in exchange for certain concessions, Putin may agree to blockade
Lukashenko, and this will be a factor of foreign intervention which,
even in the absence of domestic preconditions, may at least result
in a serious destabilization of the regime in Belarus.

Q: Is there a serious split in the Kremlin about the strategy for
Russia's future? What is your attitude to National Bolsheviks as a
party? Have they been a serious factor in Russian politics?

Belkovsky: There is no split in the Kremlin in terms of strategy,
but they are divided about tactics. There is a good Soviet joke.
Rabinovich is summoned to the KGB and they tell him: "Comrade
Rabinovich, is it true that you have serious differences with
the Soviet power?" "No, comrades, on the whole, I do not have any
differences with the Soviet power," Rabinovich replies. "There is
just one small difference on the land issue." "What is it?" "The
Bolsheviks want me to be in the grave, and I want the Bolsheviks to
be in the grave."

Something similar is now happening in the Kremlin. Every public
servant in the Kremlin wants the rest to be in the grave. But those
contradictions have nothing to do with the country's development
strategy. They concern redistribution of administrative rent and
financial flows. This explains why the system is absolutely unstable
and cannot stand any catastrophic impact of the historic magnitude.

As for National Bolsheviks, we are witnessing their
demarginalization. While five years ago they were an absolutely
marginal group, they are now close to becoming a model for a
substantial share of young people, and the attitude to them has
changed radically in the liberal community. This does not mean that
I regard them as a real political force. This is not true, but this
means at least that, first, political mechanisms have qualitatively
changed and their direct action model is very effective -- not as an
acting political party, but as a way to resolve political issues in
modern Russia. This directly reflects the talents of the founder of
that party, Eduard Limonov.

Q: When listing self-proclaimed states which could join a new union,
you have not mentioned Nagorno-Karabakh. What do you think about
its future?

Belkovsky: As America has become a direct source of legitimacy for all
regimes and processes in the post-Soviet space, Karabakh's future --
I believe that Karabakh's independence was to a great measure gained
due to Russia in the early 1990s, due to its military support for
Armenia and Karabakh in their war against Azerbaijan -- will be
decided by America's position. If the Armenian community in America
manages to safeguard their position, Karabakh's de facto statehood
will last very long. At least, we will not see its end.

I think it will happen this way. I cannot see Azerbaijan's having
sufficient potential for destroying this statehood, because despite the
fact that the late Geidar Aliyev made a geopolitical step of genius
by selling a bluff on resources available on the Caspian shelf in
exchange for America's direct interest in Azerbaijan's statehood, there
is no Geidar Aliyev any longer, and this is a substantial factor. His
successor is not strong enough. Second, I believe that the Armenian
community in the US factor will be very important when the Karabakh
issue is decided in favor of its actual, yet informal independence.

Q: Leonid Ivashov said yesterday that Russian bases could be moved
to Abkhazia. Is it just a plan or is it the Kremlin's decision? How
pragmatic for Russia and the Caucasian region would that decision be?

Belkovsky: No, Leonid Ivashov has not expressed the Kremlin's
position. It is his personal position which I quite share, to a
certain measure. That is, he expressed the position of a certain
share of the expert community.

As for whether or not this decision would be pragmatic, it is first
necessary to define a political strategy for Abkhazia. If the fate
of Abkhazia is to be decided by 2008 or 2009, clearly this will
concern legalization, in some or other way, within a state common
with Georgia. Most likely, it will be established anew. The issue of
Russian bases will be decided depending on that. I just fear that
Russia will not have priority in decision-making and will not have
the right of political initiative when deciding the issue on its own
bases. Under those conditions it will be hard to decide where Russia
may move its bases. Ivashov and me, we can say what we think. But the
official Kremlin does not have such a position. It will act in line
with basic trends that will be laid without the Kremlin's involvement.

Q: Speaking about external interests, you have only spoken about
the United States. But the European Union will likely have its
own interests. European organizations could intervene in all those
processes.

Belkovsky: Actually not. They can only be a source of external
legitimization. But the European Union is not a global super power.
Many of the United States' efforts are aimed at preventing it from
turning into such a superpower. In particular, they have stirred up
differences between new and old Europe, which also exist objectively,
irrespective of any external will, and the United States have
subjectively promoted this. So, the European Union will not be a
factor in the change of regimes. It will only serve as a factor for
legitimization of regimes.

As for other factors than the United States, I would mention the Iran
factor in deciding the fate of Azerbaijan and Central Asian regimes.
I would mention the China factor. They are the countries that will
be more important players in some countries than the European Union.

Q: What is your attitude to unprecedented economic sanctions now being
introduced against Moldova? Do they reflect any reasonable policy or is
it just that the Kremlin feels insulted by Moldova, because it let down
Vladimir Putin's friend Dmitry Kozak during talks on Transdniestria?

Belkovsky: I think the latter is right. Unfortunately, the Kremlin
does not have any sensible policy with respect to Moldova and it could
not influence the situation. We met with you here, dear colleagues,
about six weeks ago and we discussed whether or not Voronin would
be president. In my opinion, our forecast has been confirmed that
Voronin would not face any problems being reelected, even though he
failed to get an absolute majority.

The Kremlin had important levers at the election stage, but it failed
to use them. This indicates that they do not have any policy. What
sense does it make imposing sanctions, if the Kremlin, had there
been a strategy, could fully control Moldova's authorities? They were
political and economic levers, and they are still very important. But
they have lacked willingness and skills to use them.

In my opinion, this is a typical demarche which is the result of
personal insult, especially given that Moldova is now considering
naming Ukraine as the key intermediary for the Transdniestria
settlement.

Moderator: I have a question that is somewhat off topic. It is known
that you were at the start of the Khodorkovsky affair.

Belkovsky: That is an overstatement.

Moderator: What do you think about the way the verdict is being
announced? When will it be over, in your opinion?

Belkovsky: In my opinion, the reading of the verdict will end
tomorrow night. As far as I know, as of last week, there were two
positions in the Kremlin about Khodorkovsky's fate. One was five
years, a suspended sentence. The other is six years of imprisonment.
I do not know which of the two has prevailed at the moment. We will
know it by tomorrow night.

Moderator: Let me thank our guest for this meeting. Thank you all.

Belkovsky: Thank you.