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POLITICAL CHANGE IN POST-SOVIET REPUBLICS
21:09
RIA Novosti, Russia
May 20 2005
MOSCOW (Anatoly Beliayev, the head of analysis at the Center for
Current Politics in Russia, for RIA Novosti) -
A series of color revolutions in the former Soviet states, as well
as the fundamental change in the foreign policy of Moldova and the
latest events in Uzbekistan, raise the question of the reasons for and,
most importantly, the possible consequences of these developments.
The majority of experts who analyze the reasons for these events note
general poverty, acute social problems and corrupt regimes in these
countries. Indeed, any mass movement or unrest develops against the
backdrop of acute discontent of a considerable or larger part of the
population with their situation and their belief that there will be
no positive changes under the current regime.
However, if these were decisive factors, Ukraine, which has the second
or third best living standards in the CIS, would have been one of the
last to have its "orange revolution." The revolutionary trailblazers
would have been Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
The answer to this seeming discrepancy is simple: the latter
countries have harsh, authoritarian regimes, which suppresses public
discontent and, above all, the emergence and consolidation of political
organizations that could become the driving forces of revolutions.
But what is "authoritarianism"? The answer is also evident: It is
a form of government in societies that lag far behind the social
and economic standards of Western countries. It may seem strange,
but, owing to the logical nature of "traditional" authoritarianism,
the attempts to apply democratic Western standards in the most
underdeveloped countries (Africa and Afghanistan) resulted in the
establishment of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes that only
pretend to be Western-type democracies. These regimes are regularly
overthrown in coups, which are frequently complemented with public
unrest. Hence, the West should not have any illusions about the
democratic nature and, most importantly, the stability of such
"revolutionary" regimes, especially in the Transcaucasus and Central
Asia.
But the development of democracy, which the West understands as the
creation and formal operation of Western-type political institutions
that introduce market economies open to foreign expansion, is a
condition of the Western economic and political expansion.
The CIS countries can be divided into three geographic groups,
depending on the people's readiness for Western values and real
incorporation into the Western civilization and economic and political
structures.
European CIS Countries
>>From the socio-economic and cultural-historical viewpoint,
this region is better prepared for accepting the Western type of
democracy. Besides, the crucial assistance to the implementation of
US plans in the region will be provided by the European Union, which
has adopted a policy of extensive development and eastward enlargement.
The joint operation of these two global players has brought the
expected results in Ukraine. It is one of the socially and economically
better developed republics of the former Soviet Union; after the
"orange revolution," it will quickly reap the economic fruits of the
Western expansionist policies.
Re-nationalization in Ukraine will result in the redistribution of
property owned by the local oligarchs in favor of not so much the
local medium-sized business as the European and American companies,
depending on Ukraine's incorporation into Western structures.
In this case, Ukraine will soon see, just as the other East European
countries did, a connection between the Western form of democracy,
the open market economy, and the advantages of big U.S. and European
economic entities over the local operators.
As for Moldova, its incorporation in the West may proceed by way of
special relations with Romania, which is a member of Greater Europe.
But first the Moldovan leaders will have to settle the problem of
Transdnestria.
Belarus, where President Lukashenko uses harshly authoritarian measures
and populist policies to control the political situation, presents
a serious obstacle to Western expansionism. A chance to overthrow
Lukashenko could appear only if problems become markedly worse in
relations with Moscow, when Minsk would not be able any longer to
use the economic advantages of Russia's special ally.
Transcaucasus
Apart from fulfilling the challenging task of spreading Western
standards, this region is of particular interest to the West because of
the strategic gas and oil pipelines that run across it from the Caspian
shore and Central Asia. Besides, this region is located next to the
"soft underbelly" of Russia - the North Caucasus, where instability
can be always used as the trump card in the global foreign policy
game. But the Caucasus is not Europe. The social, economic, ethnic,
religious and political problems of that region are a major hindrance
to the development of Western values.
Proof of this is the pro-Western regime in Georgia: Over 90% of votes
cast for President Mikhail Saakashvili and the strange death of premier
Zurab Zhvania, a politician of the same magnitude, whose seat was
quickly filled by a figurehead suggested by the president, show that
the region is not ready to accept the pluralist values of the West.
This is also the main reason for the weakness of the Armenian
opposition, which is energetically supported by American and
European funds. For the second consecutive year, it has been trying to
materialize the Tbilisi scenario in Yerevan. Armenia has been retained
in the Russian orbit so far thanks to Moscow's military-technical and
economic assistance in the confrontation with Azerbaijan over Karabakh.
As for Azerbaijan, though American state and non-governmental
structures criticize the Aliyev regime and the West (above all the
U.S.) supports the local opposition, the Baku authorities need not fear
a color revolution. There is a vast distance between the authoritarian
regime of Aliyev and the standards of democracy. But U.S. foreign
policy strategists maintain very cautious relations with the country,
keeping the democratic opposition on a short leash. The reason is their
fear of possible chaos provoked by revolutionary cataclysms in that
country, which the U.S. oil companies view as one of the world's most
important sources of hydrocarbons and the key area for the potential
transit of these reserves from even richer Central Asian fields.
Central Asia
This region is prepared for Western economic and political values even
less than the Transcaucasus. The local regimes control the situation
in their countries with a different degree of authoritarianism (or
totalitarianism, as in Turkmenistan). Despite the temptation to try
to bring democracy to these countries, the top leaders of the West
seem to be aware of risks entailed in provoking an outbreak of social
activity in the underdeveloped Central Asian states.
The example of the "revolutionary-democratic" Kyrgyzstan, where the
Akayev regime had tried, without success, to follow the Western rules
of democracy and which had the largest number of Western funds and
societies in the CIS, shows that the territorial/clan contradictions
are decisive for that region.
The recent social explosion in the Ferghana Valley, which was certainly
provoked by the "secular" dissatisfaction of the people with their
leadership, can, with much greater degree of probability, be led by
Islamic fundamentalists and drug barons connected with them, rather
than pro-Western democracies.
The totalitarian regime of Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan can
only be overthrown with the country's leader (which is both simple
and difficult). But such a coup would push the country into a dark
period of conflict in the struggle of the elite groups for raw
materials. The disintegration of the country, where clan connections
camouflaged as the modern "local" protectionism remain very strong,
does not seem probable.
The bloody civil war in Tajikistan in the first half of the 1990s,
which began under the banner of democracy, showed what mindless
copying of Western political institutions can do to a regional country.
Kazakhstan has a special place in this group of critically
explosion-prone countries. Rich in material resources, Kazakhstan could
become a strong candidate for integration into the Western economic
and military-strategic system. Besides, despite the domination of
traditional relations in the masses, the new Kazakh elite is rather
well educated and accepts Western values (but not the West), and a
part of it would like to take the leading posts of "senior comrades."
But the regime of Nursultan Nazarbayev has vast raw material resources,
which allow socio-economic maneuvers, and learned to control the
political ambitions of the New Kazakhs by repeatedly reproducing
a tame opposition. Besides, revolutionary cataclysms may split the
country into "the Russian North" and "the Kazakh South."
Therefore, any implementation of the "color revolutions" scenario in
Central Asia could have highly negative consequences.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
21:09
RIA Novosti, Russia
May 20 2005
MOSCOW (Anatoly Beliayev, the head of analysis at the Center for
Current Politics in Russia, for RIA Novosti) -
A series of color revolutions in the former Soviet states, as well
as the fundamental change in the foreign policy of Moldova and the
latest events in Uzbekistan, raise the question of the reasons for and,
most importantly, the possible consequences of these developments.
The majority of experts who analyze the reasons for these events note
general poverty, acute social problems and corrupt regimes in these
countries. Indeed, any mass movement or unrest develops against the
backdrop of acute discontent of a considerable or larger part of the
population with their situation and their belief that there will be
no positive changes under the current regime.
However, if these were decisive factors, Ukraine, which has the second
or third best living standards in the CIS, would have been one of the
last to have its "orange revolution." The revolutionary trailblazers
would have been Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
The answer to this seeming discrepancy is simple: the latter
countries have harsh, authoritarian regimes, which suppresses public
discontent and, above all, the emergence and consolidation of political
organizations that could become the driving forces of revolutions.
But what is "authoritarianism"? The answer is also evident: It is
a form of government in societies that lag far behind the social
and economic standards of Western countries. It may seem strange,
but, owing to the logical nature of "traditional" authoritarianism,
the attempts to apply democratic Western standards in the most
underdeveloped countries (Africa and Afghanistan) resulted in the
establishment of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes that only
pretend to be Western-type democracies. These regimes are regularly
overthrown in coups, which are frequently complemented with public
unrest. Hence, the West should not have any illusions about the
democratic nature and, most importantly, the stability of such
"revolutionary" regimes, especially in the Transcaucasus and Central
Asia.
But the development of democracy, which the West understands as the
creation and formal operation of Western-type political institutions
that introduce market economies open to foreign expansion, is a
condition of the Western economic and political expansion.
The CIS countries can be divided into three geographic groups,
depending on the people's readiness for Western values and real
incorporation into the Western civilization and economic and political
structures.
European CIS Countries
>>From the socio-economic and cultural-historical viewpoint,
this region is better prepared for accepting the Western type of
democracy. Besides, the crucial assistance to the implementation of
US plans in the region will be provided by the European Union, which
has adopted a policy of extensive development and eastward enlargement.
The joint operation of these two global players has brought the
expected results in Ukraine. It is one of the socially and economically
better developed republics of the former Soviet Union; after the
"orange revolution," it will quickly reap the economic fruits of the
Western expansionist policies.
Re-nationalization in Ukraine will result in the redistribution of
property owned by the local oligarchs in favor of not so much the
local medium-sized business as the European and American companies,
depending on Ukraine's incorporation into Western structures.
In this case, Ukraine will soon see, just as the other East European
countries did, a connection between the Western form of democracy,
the open market economy, and the advantages of big U.S. and European
economic entities over the local operators.
As for Moldova, its incorporation in the West may proceed by way of
special relations with Romania, which is a member of Greater Europe.
But first the Moldovan leaders will have to settle the problem of
Transdnestria.
Belarus, where President Lukashenko uses harshly authoritarian measures
and populist policies to control the political situation, presents
a serious obstacle to Western expansionism. A chance to overthrow
Lukashenko could appear only if problems become markedly worse in
relations with Moscow, when Minsk would not be able any longer to
use the economic advantages of Russia's special ally.
Transcaucasus
Apart from fulfilling the challenging task of spreading Western
standards, this region is of particular interest to the West because of
the strategic gas and oil pipelines that run across it from the Caspian
shore and Central Asia. Besides, this region is located next to the
"soft underbelly" of Russia - the North Caucasus, where instability
can be always used as the trump card in the global foreign policy
game. But the Caucasus is not Europe. The social, economic, ethnic,
religious and political problems of that region are a major hindrance
to the development of Western values.
Proof of this is the pro-Western regime in Georgia: Over 90% of votes
cast for President Mikhail Saakashvili and the strange death of premier
Zurab Zhvania, a politician of the same magnitude, whose seat was
quickly filled by a figurehead suggested by the president, show that
the region is not ready to accept the pluralist values of the West.
This is also the main reason for the weakness of the Armenian
opposition, which is energetically supported by American and
European funds. For the second consecutive year, it has been trying to
materialize the Tbilisi scenario in Yerevan. Armenia has been retained
in the Russian orbit so far thanks to Moscow's military-technical and
economic assistance in the confrontation with Azerbaijan over Karabakh.
As for Azerbaijan, though American state and non-governmental
structures criticize the Aliyev regime and the West (above all the
U.S.) supports the local opposition, the Baku authorities need not fear
a color revolution. There is a vast distance between the authoritarian
regime of Aliyev and the standards of democracy. But U.S. foreign
policy strategists maintain very cautious relations with the country,
keeping the democratic opposition on a short leash. The reason is their
fear of possible chaos provoked by revolutionary cataclysms in that
country, which the U.S. oil companies view as one of the world's most
important sources of hydrocarbons and the key area for the potential
transit of these reserves from even richer Central Asian fields.
Central Asia
This region is prepared for Western economic and political values even
less than the Transcaucasus. The local regimes control the situation
in their countries with a different degree of authoritarianism (or
totalitarianism, as in Turkmenistan). Despite the temptation to try
to bring democracy to these countries, the top leaders of the West
seem to be aware of risks entailed in provoking an outbreak of social
activity in the underdeveloped Central Asian states.
The example of the "revolutionary-democratic" Kyrgyzstan, where the
Akayev regime had tried, without success, to follow the Western rules
of democracy and which had the largest number of Western funds and
societies in the CIS, shows that the territorial/clan contradictions
are decisive for that region.
The recent social explosion in the Ferghana Valley, which was certainly
provoked by the "secular" dissatisfaction of the people with their
leadership, can, with much greater degree of probability, be led by
Islamic fundamentalists and drug barons connected with them, rather
than pro-Western democracies.
The totalitarian regime of Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan can
only be overthrown with the country's leader (which is both simple
and difficult). But such a coup would push the country into a dark
period of conflict in the struggle of the elite groups for raw
materials. The disintegration of the country, where clan connections
camouflaged as the modern "local" protectionism remain very strong,
does not seem probable.
The bloody civil war in Tajikistan in the first half of the 1990s,
which began under the banner of democracy, showed what mindless
copying of Western political institutions can do to a regional country.
Kazakhstan has a special place in this group of critically
explosion-prone countries. Rich in material resources, Kazakhstan could
become a strong candidate for integration into the Western economic
and military-strategic system. Besides, despite the domination of
traditional relations in the masses, the new Kazakh elite is rather
well educated and accepts Western values (but not the West), and a
part of it would like to take the leading posts of "senior comrades."
But the regime of Nursultan Nazarbayev has vast raw material resources,
which allow socio-economic maneuvers, and learned to control the
political ambitions of the New Kazakhs by repeatedly reproducing
a tame opposition. Besides, revolutionary cataclysms may split the
country into "the Russian North" and "the Kazakh South."
Therefore, any implementation of the "color revolutions" scenario in
Central Asia could have highly negative consequences.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.