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An era of change
The Messenger, Georgia
May 20 2005
Virtually all post-Soviet countries have struggled with the transition
to democracy and free market economy. That democratic development had
been slow-paced is shown by the recent upheavals in Georgia, Ukraine
and Kyrgyzstan. Regional analysts believe that it is only a matter
of time before similar changes take place in other former-Soviet
countries like Belarus, but currently the international spotlight is
on Uzbekistan, where last weekend's protests were brutally put down.
In the euphoria arising from newly-achieved independence following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, many thought that western democracy would
be able to easily replace Communist totalitarianism. However, it soon
became clear that, with the exception of the Baltic countries, a quick
transition to democracy was unrealistic. In most countries, former
Communist nomenclature remained in power, setting up authoritarian
regimes under the guise of democracy.
Today few are under the illusion that these post-Soviet authoritarian
regimes will be able to continue to exist, and across post-Soviet
space there is a strong popular impulse for change. It is obvious that
undemocratic political systems are not able to maintain social-economic
stability. Fifteen years of such regimes has been quite enough to
inspire public protest against them. Society does not want to stand
for unfair social-economic conditions and pseudo-democracy any more.
Because the old authoritarian regimes were viewed in Moscow as
reliable allies, this impulse for democratic development is seen by
Moscow as a threat which may undermine Russian influence in the CIS.
The Kremlin's attempts to prevent political change across the region
have come in for criticism in the Russian media. Izvestia, for example,
argues that, "Russia's efforts to resist the processes in Ukraine
and Georgia were absolutely inadequate. It then missed the chance
to prevent such events from spreading to other former Soviet Union
countries [such as Kyrgyzstan] and now all it can do is to try to
maintain the status-quo - for example in Belarus, a country where
many feel instability is on the horizon."
Some analysts have tended to view the political changes solely
through the lens of a post-Cold War Western-Russian struggle for
influence in the region. But attempts to see the Rose and Orange
revolutions as imposed from outside overlook the clear discontent
felt by ordinary people with the corruption, the lack of democracy,
the economic stagnation and high levels of unemployment. Russian
analyst Stanislav Belkovski was quite right when he argued on May 17
that "the revolutions in post-Soviet sphere are caused by internal
problems. External factors are of secondary importance."
As Rezonansi reports, Belkovski went on to argue that similar
political changes can be expected elsewhere in post-Soviet space. He
believes that Armenia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are the most likely
to experience velvet revolutions, and that Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbaev will try to avoid revolution by passing reforms. Azerbaijan
and Russia, he believes, are less likely to witness such political
upheavals, while Turkmenistan and Belarus are less likely still.
Many analysts would disagree with his prognosis regarding Belarus,
however, which many believe will be the next to fall to revolutionary
change. Whether this will be velvet or not analysts are unsure,
several arguing that the authorities will not hesitate in using
force in an effort to hold on to power. This has, of course, been
the case in Uzbekistan, and it is unclear at the moment what effect
that bloody crackdown on protests, which left several hundred dead,
according to reports, will have on pro-democracy movements elsewhere.
Such processes of change in other CIS countries are clearly very
important for Georgia. What happens in neighboring Armenia and
Azerbaijan is clearly of the greatest importance for Georgia,
especially if any future political change there was to create the
conditions for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
something which would completely alter the geopolitical situation in
the South Caucasus.
The Messenger, Georgia
May 20 2005
Virtually all post-Soviet countries have struggled with the transition
to democracy and free market economy. That democratic development had
been slow-paced is shown by the recent upheavals in Georgia, Ukraine
and Kyrgyzstan. Regional analysts believe that it is only a matter
of time before similar changes take place in other former-Soviet
countries like Belarus, but currently the international spotlight is
on Uzbekistan, where last weekend's protests were brutally put down.
In the euphoria arising from newly-achieved independence following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, many thought that western democracy would
be able to easily replace Communist totalitarianism. However, it soon
became clear that, with the exception of the Baltic countries, a quick
transition to democracy was unrealistic. In most countries, former
Communist nomenclature remained in power, setting up authoritarian
regimes under the guise of democracy.
Today few are under the illusion that these post-Soviet authoritarian
regimes will be able to continue to exist, and across post-Soviet
space there is a strong popular impulse for change. It is obvious that
undemocratic political systems are not able to maintain social-economic
stability. Fifteen years of such regimes has been quite enough to
inspire public protest against them. Society does not want to stand
for unfair social-economic conditions and pseudo-democracy any more.
Because the old authoritarian regimes were viewed in Moscow as
reliable allies, this impulse for democratic development is seen by
Moscow as a threat which may undermine Russian influence in the CIS.
The Kremlin's attempts to prevent political change across the region
have come in for criticism in the Russian media. Izvestia, for example,
argues that, "Russia's efforts to resist the processes in Ukraine
and Georgia were absolutely inadequate. It then missed the chance
to prevent such events from spreading to other former Soviet Union
countries [such as Kyrgyzstan] and now all it can do is to try to
maintain the status-quo - for example in Belarus, a country where
many feel instability is on the horizon."
Some analysts have tended to view the political changes solely
through the lens of a post-Cold War Western-Russian struggle for
influence in the region. But attempts to see the Rose and Orange
revolutions as imposed from outside overlook the clear discontent
felt by ordinary people with the corruption, the lack of democracy,
the economic stagnation and high levels of unemployment. Russian
analyst Stanislav Belkovski was quite right when he argued on May 17
that "the revolutions in post-Soviet sphere are caused by internal
problems. External factors are of secondary importance."
As Rezonansi reports, Belkovski went on to argue that similar
political changes can be expected elsewhere in post-Soviet space. He
believes that Armenia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are the most likely
to experience velvet revolutions, and that Kazakh President Nursultan
Nazarbaev will try to avoid revolution by passing reforms. Azerbaijan
and Russia, he believes, are less likely to witness such political
upheavals, while Turkmenistan and Belarus are less likely still.
Many analysts would disagree with his prognosis regarding Belarus,
however, which many believe will be the next to fall to revolutionary
change. Whether this will be velvet or not analysts are unsure,
several arguing that the authorities will not hesitate in using
force in an effort to hold on to power. This has, of course, been
the case in Uzbekistan, and it is unclear at the moment what effect
that bloody crackdown on protests, which left several hundred dead,
according to reports, will have on pro-democracy movements elsewhere.
Such processes of change in other CIS countries are clearly very
important for Georgia. What happens in neighboring Armenia and
Azerbaijan is clearly of the greatest importance for Georgia,
especially if any future political change there was to create the
conditions for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
something which would completely alter the geopolitical situation in
the South Caucasus.