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Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
May 23, 2005, Monday
WHY DO WE NEED THESE BASES, GENTLEMEN?[]
SOURCE: Russia, No. 18, May 19-25, 2005, p. 10
by Vladimir Chesnokov
IT APPEARS FROM MOSCOW-LED POLICY THAT RUSSIA DOESN'T ACTUALLY NEED
BASES IN GEORGIA
We're bored to death watching Russia butting Georgia with regard to
the issue of military bases. This mess, which is helplessness, is
evident in everything - starting from indistinct interpretation of
the geopolitical need for our being there and ending with daily
contacts to the Georgian authorities.
It appears that Russia doesn't actually need bases in Georgia, since
they are only recalled when Tbilisi demands for its quick withdrawal
again. Not in vain, servicemen decipher GRVZ (the Russian Group of
Forces in the Caucasus) as: "Citizens of Russia Forgotten by
Everybody."
Take the 62nd Base of Akhalkalaki for example. It is located in
Javakhetia - the region populated by Armenians 95%. The military
knows that this base is not a serious combatant element, especially
given the fact that locals pass service there - some 70% of contract
servicemen at the base are Armenians. One could only guess how they
would behave in critical circumstances.
This doesn't prevent the Javakhetian leaders from subconsciously
viewing the Russian base as joint property with Russia. Attempting
withdrawal of the military hardware we may encounter a situation
similar to that of Transnistria, when the republican leaders warned
it wouldn't let us withdraw the military equipment. However, the
equipment is so old that leaving or scrapping it is easier than
withdrawing.
The entire life in Javakhetia is linked to the Russian bases. (...)
Besides, our presence in Javakhetia is a powerful stabilizing factor
in the region, which borders Turkey. I think the General Staff
members know about the tense relations between Armenia and Turkey.
(...)
Our generals are dragging things out, covertly hoping that the
Armenian factor would benefit them and Tbilisi would give up.
However, the Georgians led by their aggressive president seem to be
in the mood for fighting. By means of withdrawing our Russian base
they also intend to solve the problem of the separatist moods in
Javakhetia since they maintain that the Russian military base is the
basis for them.
Each base must have convenient approaches. There must be no
interruptions in the delivery of the personnel, munitions,
foodstuffs. Based on this fact, the bases in Gudauta and Vaziani were
of bigger significance for Russia. They had airfields, which received
both fighting and transport aviation. However, we returned them to
Georgia first of all. (...)
It must be reminded that Lyudvig Chibirov, president of South Ossetia
offered in 2000, that Russia might station its military bases in the
republic. He used to explain that the Russian troops there would
become the basis for a peaceful and constructive dialog with Georgia.
Chibirov then didn't seem to be opposed to being in the structure of
Georgia.
Five years have passed and Sergei Bagapsh, new president of Abkhazia,
addressed a similar proposal to Moscow. Like Tskhinvali, official
Sukhumi stressed that Russian business would inevitably come to the
republics following the Russian military.
To all appearances, nobody in official Russia showed concern for
these proposals. Moscow still thinks that politics must be played
with clean hands and that dual standards are bad, although the entire
world is living in compliance with dual standards. (...)
"As soon as our bases are withdrawn from Georgia, they will be
replaced by US bases. If the Americans invaded Iraq, station their
troops in Afghanistan I don't think they will miss this opportunity.
Strengthening our positions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia could alone
mend the situation. Otherwise, this would mean another surrender of
strategic positions and, as a consequence, tangible damage to the
national security of Russia. We shall have to account for this sooner
or later," maintains Fedor Barmin, an expert at the Institute for
Terrorism and Local Conflicts Studies.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
May 23, 2005, Monday
WHY DO WE NEED THESE BASES, GENTLEMEN?[]
SOURCE: Russia, No. 18, May 19-25, 2005, p. 10
by Vladimir Chesnokov
IT APPEARS FROM MOSCOW-LED POLICY THAT RUSSIA DOESN'T ACTUALLY NEED
BASES IN GEORGIA
We're bored to death watching Russia butting Georgia with regard to
the issue of military bases. This mess, which is helplessness, is
evident in everything - starting from indistinct interpretation of
the geopolitical need for our being there and ending with daily
contacts to the Georgian authorities.
It appears that Russia doesn't actually need bases in Georgia, since
they are only recalled when Tbilisi demands for its quick withdrawal
again. Not in vain, servicemen decipher GRVZ (the Russian Group of
Forces in the Caucasus) as: "Citizens of Russia Forgotten by
Everybody."
Take the 62nd Base of Akhalkalaki for example. It is located in
Javakhetia - the region populated by Armenians 95%. The military
knows that this base is not a serious combatant element, especially
given the fact that locals pass service there - some 70% of contract
servicemen at the base are Armenians. One could only guess how they
would behave in critical circumstances.
This doesn't prevent the Javakhetian leaders from subconsciously
viewing the Russian base as joint property with Russia. Attempting
withdrawal of the military hardware we may encounter a situation
similar to that of Transnistria, when the republican leaders warned
it wouldn't let us withdraw the military equipment. However, the
equipment is so old that leaving or scrapping it is easier than
withdrawing.
The entire life in Javakhetia is linked to the Russian bases. (...)
Besides, our presence in Javakhetia is a powerful stabilizing factor
in the region, which borders Turkey. I think the General Staff
members know about the tense relations between Armenia and Turkey.
(...)
Our generals are dragging things out, covertly hoping that the
Armenian factor would benefit them and Tbilisi would give up.
However, the Georgians led by their aggressive president seem to be
in the mood for fighting. By means of withdrawing our Russian base
they also intend to solve the problem of the separatist moods in
Javakhetia since they maintain that the Russian military base is the
basis for them.
Each base must have convenient approaches. There must be no
interruptions in the delivery of the personnel, munitions,
foodstuffs. Based on this fact, the bases in Gudauta and Vaziani were
of bigger significance for Russia. They had airfields, which received
both fighting and transport aviation. However, we returned them to
Georgia first of all. (...)
It must be reminded that Lyudvig Chibirov, president of South Ossetia
offered in 2000, that Russia might station its military bases in the
republic. He used to explain that the Russian troops there would
become the basis for a peaceful and constructive dialog with Georgia.
Chibirov then didn't seem to be opposed to being in the structure of
Georgia.
Five years have passed and Sergei Bagapsh, new president of Abkhazia,
addressed a similar proposal to Moscow. Like Tskhinvali, official
Sukhumi stressed that Russian business would inevitably come to the
republics following the Russian military.
To all appearances, nobody in official Russia showed concern for
these proposals. Moscow still thinks that politics must be played
with clean hands and that dual standards are bad, although the entire
world is living in compliance with dual standards. (...)
"As soon as our bases are withdrawn from Georgia, they will be
replaced by US bases. If the Americans invaded Iraq, station their
troops in Afghanistan I don't think they will miss this opportunity.
Strengthening our positions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia could alone
mend the situation. Otherwise, this would mean another surrender of
strategic positions and, as a consequence, tangible damage to the
national security of Russia. We shall have to account for this sooner
or later," maintains Fedor Barmin, an expert at the Institute for
Terrorism and Local Conflicts Studies.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress