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RIA Novosti, Russia
May 26 2005
RUSSIA NEEDS A STABLE CAUCASUS
16:08
MOSCOW (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - The Russian military
presence in Georgia has become the key issue of the Caucasian Big
Game in the last few months.
Discussions of the timeframe and speed of their withdrawal from
Georgia overshadowed the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
But the Russian presence (including military) in the South Caucasus
is not an element of its "imperial resurgence." Ensuring stability in
the former Soviet republics of the Transcaucasus is a fundamental
condition of Russia's peaceful domestic development and the
preservation of its integrity.
Russia is a Caucasian state because ten of its Federation members are
located in the North Caucasus. Another three (Volgograd and Astrakhan
regions and the Republic of Kalmykia) are part of its South Federal
District and have become involved in the Caucasian socio-economic,
political and cultural projects in the last decade. The territory of
Russia's North Caucasus is bigger than the independent states of the
South Caucasus.
Nearly all ethnic-political conflicts in South Russia are closely
connected with conflicts in the former Soviet republics of the
Transcaucasus and vice versa (the Georgia-Ossetia and the
Ossetia-Ingush conflicts, the Georgia-Abkhazia confrontation, the
Chechen problem, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and the difficult
relations between the "indigenous" population of the Kuban and
Stavropol territories and migrant Armenians).
Besides, the Russian North Caucasus and the states of the South
Caucasus have a common problem of "divided nations" (Lezghinians,
Ossetians and Avars) and persecuted nations (Meskhetian Turks).
Hence, security in the Russian Caucasus cannot be ensured without
restoring stability in the neighboring Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia took
over the burden of geopolitical leadership in the former Soviet area.
The Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed by the
Caucasian powers Russia and Armenia (Azerbaijan and Georgia acceded
to it later) became an attempt to develop an integration strategy in
the sphere of security.
But the treaty failed to become an effective instrument of the
Caucasian geopolitics. The leaders of Georgia more than once spoke of
its declarative nature. Azerbaijan believes that the problem of
Nagorny Karabakh was provoked by the Armenian aggression and hence
views the CST as ineffective for ensuring its territorial integrity
and security.
Peacekeeping operations, which Russia undertook in the 1990s, became
more effective instruments of the Russian influence in the South
Caucasus. Russian peacekeepers have been maintaining peace in the
zone of the Georgia-Ossetia conflict since July 1992 and in the zone
of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, since July 1994. In autumn 1993,
the units of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus helped
stop the civil war in Georgia between the supporters of Eduard
Shevardnadze and the deposed president Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
The Russian peacekeeping operations in the region proved to be much
more effective than comparable actions of the U.S. and its allies in
Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo.
The Russian military facilities in Georgia were mostly located in
problem regions, which complicated, to a degree, Russia-Georgian
relations. The bases were deployed in Batumi (Adzharia), Akhalkalaki
(Dzhavakheti), Vaziani and Gudauta (Abkhazia; the provisional capital
of the self-proclaimed republic in 1992-1993).
Georgia viewed the Russian military presence as the bridgehead for
the Kremlin's neo-imperial policy. In 1997, Georgia adopted the law
on the protection of the border, under which Russian border guards
were obliged to hand over their functions to their Georgian
colleagues. The Russian "border" presence in Georgia was discontinued
in 1999.
At the Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (November 1999), Russia and Georgia agreed on
the withdrawal of Russian bases. These Istanbul agreements were
formalized as the official supplement to the Treaty on the
Conventional Forces in Europe.
The current aggravation of Russia-Georgia relations is connected with
the bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. The importance of the Batumi
base for Russia's policy is close to zero, but an accelerated
withdrawal of the Akhalkalaki base will create quite a few problems.
The base is located in the Samtskhe-Dzhavakheti region populated by
Armenians, who view the Russian presence as a guarantee of personal
and ethnic security.
The Russian diplomatic inaction with regard to the Akhalkalaki base
is shocking. The Russian presence there is not a military but a
political question. If we leave Akhalkalaki, we will lose the trust
of the Armenian population of the Transcaucasus.
This issue can and should be presented not as a Russia-Georgia
conflict but as a problem of Georgia-Armenia relations. We could
apply the methods of Mikhail Saakashvili and elevate the problem to
the international level, involving influential Armenian lobbyists in
Europe and the U.S. and the Yerevan authorities. Regrettably, the
same policy was pursued with regard to the two bases and so
withdrawal from Akhalkalaki is inevitable.
But the issue of Russian military bases has one more crucial aspect.
The withdrawal of Russian troops from the South Caucasus would not
encourage an intensive post-conflict settlement in the zones of
ethnic conflicts there. The Georgia-Abkhazia, Georgia-Ossetia and
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflicts can be mothballed but will not be
settled until the leaders of the independent Caucasian states offer
their people a new political agenda and new forms and methods of
national development.
Worse still, withdrawal from Akhalkalaki is fraught with
Georgia-Armenia contradictions. The potential refusal to send Russian
peacekeepers to the zones of Georgia's conflicts with Abkhazia and
Ossetia can provoke a new round of ethnic tensions. In a word,
demanding a speedy liquidation of the Russian military presence
without filling the gap with a substantiated security policy does not
promise a tranquil future to the Greater Caucasus.
Sergei Markedonov, candidate of history, is head of the department of
ethnic relations at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
May 26 2005
RUSSIA NEEDS A STABLE CAUCASUS
16:08
MOSCOW (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - The Russian military
presence in Georgia has become the key issue of the Caucasian Big
Game in the last few months.
Discussions of the timeframe and speed of their withdrawal from
Georgia overshadowed the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
But the Russian presence (including military) in the South Caucasus
is not an element of its "imperial resurgence." Ensuring stability in
the former Soviet republics of the Transcaucasus is a fundamental
condition of Russia's peaceful domestic development and the
preservation of its integrity.
Russia is a Caucasian state because ten of its Federation members are
located in the North Caucasus. Another three (Volgograd and Astrakhan
regions and the Republic of Kalmykia) are part of its South Federal
District and have become involved in the Caucasian socio-economic,
political and cultural projects in the last decade. The territory of
Russia's North Caucasus is bigger than the independent states of the
South Caucasus.
Nearly all ethnic-political conflicts in South Russia are closely
connected with conflicts in the former Soviet republics of the
Transcaucasus and vice versa (the Georgia-Ossetia and the
Ossetia-Ingush conflicts, the Georgia-Abkhazia confrontation, the
Chechen problem, the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and the difficult
relations between the "indigenous" population of the Kuban and
Stavropol territories and migrant Armenians).
Besides, the Russian North Caucasus and the states of the South
Caucasus have a common problem of "divided nations" (Lezghinians,
Ossetians and Avars) and persecuted nations (Meskhetian Turks).
Hence, security in the Russian Caucasus cannot be ensured without
restoring stability in the neighboring Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia took
over the burden of geopolitical leadership in the former Soviet area.
The Collective Security Treaty of May 15, 1992, signed by the
Caucasian powers Russia and Armenia (Azerbaijan and Georgia acceded
to it later) became an attempt to develop an integration strategy in
the sphere of security.
But the treaty failed to become an effective instrument of the
Caucasian geopolitics. The leaders of Georgia more than once spoke of
its declarative nature. Azerbaijan believes that the problem of
Nagorny Karabakh was provoked by the Armenian aggression and hence
views the CST as ineffective for ensuring its territorial integrity
and security.
Peacekeeping operations, which Russia undertook in the 1990s, became
more effective instruments of the Russian influence in the South
Caucasus. Russian peacekeepers have been maintaining peace in the
zone of the Georgia-Ossetia conflict since July 1992 and in the zone
of the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, since July 1994. In autumn 1993,
the units of the Group of Russian Forces in the Transcaucasus helped
stop the civil war in Georgia between the supporters of Eduard
Shevardnadze and the deposed president Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
The Russian peacekeeping operations in the region proved to be much
more effective than comparable actions of the U.S. and its allies in
Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo.
The Russian military facilities in Georgia were mostly located in
problem regions, which complicated, to a degree, Russia-Georgian
relations. The bases were deployed in Batumi (Adzharia), Akhalkalaki
(Dzhavakheti), Vaziani and Gudauta (Abkhazia; the provisional capital
of the self-proclaimed republic in 1992-1993).
Georgia viewed the Russian military presence as the bridgehead for
the Kremlin's neo-imperial policy. In 1997, Georgia adopted the law
on the protection of the border, under which Russian border guards
were obliged to hand over their functions to their Georgian
colleagues. The Russian "border" presence in Georgia was discontinued
in 1999.
At the Istanbul summit of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (November 1999), Russia and Georgia agreed on
the withdrawal of Russian bases. These Istanbul agreements were
formalized as the official supplement to the Treaty on the
Conventional Forces in Europe.
The current aggravation of Russia-Georgia relations is connected with
the bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki. The importance of the Batumi
base for Russia's policy is close to zero, but an accelerated
withdrawal of the Akhalkalaki base will create quite a few problems.
The base is located in the Samtskhe-Dzhavakheti region populated by
Armenians, who view the Russian presence as a guarantee of personal
and ethnic security.
The Russian diplomatic inaction with regard to the Akhalkalaki base
is shocking. The Russian presence there is not a military but a
political question. If we leave Akhalkalaki, we will lose the trust
of the Armenian population of the Transcaucasus.
This issue can and should be presented not as a Russia-Georgia
conflict but as a problem of Georgia-Armenia relations. We could
apply the methods of Mikhail Saakashvili and elevate the problem to
the international level, involving influential Armenian lobbyists in
Europe and the U.S. and the Yerevan authorities. Regrettably, the
same policy was pursued with regard to the two bases and so
withdrawal from Akhalkalaki is inevitable.
But the issue of Russian military bases has one more crucial aspect.
The withdrawal of Russian troops from the South Caucasus would not
encourage an intensive post-conflict settlement in the zones of
ethnic conflicts there. The Georgia-Abkhazia, Georgia-Ossetia and
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflicts can be mothballed but will not be
settled until the leaders of the independent Caucasian states offer
their people a new political agenda and new forms and methods of
national development.
Worse still, withdrawal from Akhalkalaki is fraught with
Georgia-Armenia contradictions. The potential refusal to send Russian
peacekeepers to the zones of Georgia's conflicts with Abkhazia and
Ossetia can provoke a new round of ethnic tensions. In a word,
demanding a speedy liquidation of the Russian military presence
without filling the gap with a substantiated security policy does not
promise a tranquil future to the Greater Caucasus.
Sergei Markedonov, candidate of history, is head of the department of
ethnic relations at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.