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The New Anatolian, Turkey
May 27 2005
Don't Say Amen for a Prayer Never to Come True!
Seyfi Tashan
Ever since the European Commission's decision to start accession
talks with Turkey, conservative European politicians have talked
about a special relationship model despite it being promptly and
categorically rejected by Turkey. Before committing themselves to
such a policy line these politicians should have considered the
meaning of such a proposal insofar as Turkey's relations with the
European Union are concerned, and whether the scheme they have in
mind could be implemented. From what's been suggested by an unnamed
French think tank director to a Turkish think tank director, we
understand that the plan aims to make Turkey a full partner in the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and oblige it to
establish better frontier controls that would lead to "easing" visa
restrictions. In addition, under the plan, Turkey would not be forced
to implement EU standards, the EU would put no pressure on Turkey to
find solutions the problems of Cyprus and the Aegean, the Armenian
question would not be raised, and Kurdish rights would no longer be
considered a criteria.
The EU doesn't have this kind of relationship with any other
non-member country. The new model that the EU has created is the New
Neighborhood Policy, covering association agreements and action plans
aiming at a closer relationship with the EU to create a "circle of
friends" and prevent the emergence of new dividing lines. This model
excludes Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and other Balkan countries which
are set to eventually become EU members. The EU has already agreed
with seven countries -- namely Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the
Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Ukraine -- on action plans. By
the end of the year, the EU hopes to agree on action plans for
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, and Lebanon as well. All the
action plans cover broad areas such as political and economic reform,
cooperation in the fields of justice, freedom, and security,
infrastructure networks, and people-to-people contacts.
The EU's relationship model with Turkey has been, since 1963, a
partnership based on eventual accession, and a great distance has
already been covered in this direction to the point that we've
reached the final phase of the association, the Customs Union, and as
soon as we've completed all the reforms required the start of
accession negotiations, these will begin this October. Although the
negotiations are open ended their duration will depend on progress
made in the talks, the implementation of an agreed harmonization
process, and approval of the accession treaty by EU institutions and
member states according to their own legal procedures. No one claims
that the negotiation and approval phases will be easy or are a
foregone conclusion. However, the least one would expect is decency
and an objective approach by both sides in working on the already
agreed modalities and the final objective.
Some of the suggestions of the French think tank director may be
termed as the obligations that Turkey has to fulfill as part of its
accession process. It's Turkey's duty to properly control its
frontiers, a task that this country needs to do, and to prevent
Turkey from being a conduit for illegal migration. Secondly, Turkey's
full participation in the ESDP can only be fully realized when Turkey
becomes a full member, as the ESDP is exclusively an EU institution
and it's difficult to predict how many EU members would be willing to
change its current structure.
As regards the so-called political concession for not insisting on a
solution to the problems of Cyprus and the Aegean, those who believe
that preservation of the status quo in Cyprus is in Turkey's interest
are mistaken. By becoming a member of the EU before solving the
problem, the Greek Cypriots have acquired a major advantage for
themselves. Their calculation seems to be that by obtaining Turkish
passports most of Turks of the island would in fact become full
citizens of the Greek-dominated "Republic of Cyprus." For a while
they would reap the benefits of such a citizenship but, at some
point, they would then be expected to fulfill the obligations of
citizenship, such as military service and payment of taxes. The
property question will continue to be a real headache for Turkey as
the European Court of Human Rights (EHCR) may come up with more
Loizidou-type rulings. In other words, delaying a solution to the
Cyprus question is not in the interests of Turkey, as the proposal
would suggest. A similar situation exists in the Aegean: The Greek
Parliament has approved the extension of Greek territorial waters to
12 miles and the bill is in the hands of the Greek president, who can
make it law by adding his signature to it whenever he likes. Turkey's
threat of casus belli keeps him from signing the law. If, as
proposed, Turkey becomes a full member of the ESDP, could it then
resort to casus belli against a co-member if it were to extend its
territorial waters to 12 miles?
Who would force the Greek Cypriots and the Greeks to give up their
veto rights on issues relating to Turkey? I recall, at a meeting in
1979 when Greece was preparing to become a member of the EU, both the
Greeks and the European Community (the precursor to the EU) were
making promises to help Turkey to develop its relations with the EC.
At that meeting, late Ambassador Muharrem Nuri Birgi made the the
following prophetic remark: "Every marriage starts with a wave of
fidelity but soon after the marriage no one can prevent gilting."
Indeed, immediately after Greece became a member of the EU it vetoed
every document that had the word "Turkey" in it.
As regards adopting EU standards one could say that Turkey has to
adopt and apply all of these standards if it wants to be a civilized,
modern country even if it doesn't become a member of the EU in the
end.
Being the director of a think tank myself, I can say that it's our
job and privilege to propose ideas and solutions to problems, but
they are only considered by decision makers if they are practicable
and in their interests. As depriving Turkey of the prospect and
process of full membership is neither practicable nor in the
interests of Turkey or the EU, my recommendation would be for us to
be realistic and join efforts to solve problems such as Cyprus and
the Aegean and carry out all the reforms and harmonization work
needed to facilitate the task of accession without dilly-dallying on
other paradigms.
May 27 2005
Don't Say Amen for a Prayer Never to Come True!
Seyfi Tashan
Ever since the European Commission's decision to start accession
talks with Turkey, conservative European politicians have talked
about a special relationship model despite it being promptly and
categorically rejected by Turkey. Before committing themselves to
such a policy line these politicians should have considered the
meaning of such a proposal insofar as Turkey's relations with the
European Union are concerned, and whether the scheme they have in
mind could be implemented. From what's been suggested by an unnamed
French think tank director to a Turkish think tank director, we
understand that the plan aims to make Turkey a full partner in the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and oblige it to
establish better frontier controls that would lead to "easing" visa
restrictions. In addition, under the plan, Turkey would not be forced
to implement EU standards, the EU would put no pressure on Turkey to
find solutions the problems of Cyprus and the Aegean, the Armenian
question would not be raised, and Kurdish rights would no longer be
considered a criteria.
The EU doesn't have this kind of relationship with any other
non-member country. The new model that the EU has created is the New
Neighborhood Policy, covering association agreements and action plans
aiming at a closer relationship with the EU to create a "circle of
friends" and prevent the emergence of new dividing lines. This model
excludes Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and other Balkan countries which
are set to eventually become EU members. The EU has already agreed
with seven countries -- namely Israel, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, the
Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Ukraine -- on action plans. By
the end of the year, the EU hopes to agree on action plans for
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, and Lebanon as well. All the
action plans cover broad areas such as political and economic reform,
cooperation in the fields of justice, freedom, and security,
infrastructure networks, and people-to-people contacts.
The EU's relationship model with Turkey has been, since 1963, a
partnership based on eventual accession, and a great distance has
already been covered in this direction to the point that we've
reached the final phase of the association, the Customs Union, and as
soon as we've completed all the reforms required the start of
accession negotiations, these will begin this October. Although the
negotiations are open ended their duration will depend on progress
made in the talks, the implementation of an agreed harmonization
process, and approval of the accession treaty by EU institutions and
member states according to their own legal procedures. No one claims
that the negotiation and approval phases will be easy or are a
foregone conclusion. However, the least one would expect is decency
and an objective approach by both sides in working on the already
agreed modalities and the final objective.
Some of the suggestions of the French think tank director may be
termed as the obligations that Turkey has to fulfill as part of its
accession process. It's Turkey's duty to properly control its
frontiers, a task that this country needs to do, and to prevent
Turkey from being a conduit for illegal migration. Secondly, Turkey's
full participation in the ESDP can only be fully realized when Turkey
becomes a full member, as the ESDP is exclusively an EU institution
and it's difficult to predict how many EU members would be willing to
change its current structure.
As regards the so-called political concession for not insisting on a
solution to the problems of Cyprus and the Aegean, those who believe
that preservation of the status quo in Cyprus is in Turkey's interest
are mistaken. By becoming a member of the EU before solving the
problem, the Greek Cypriots have acquired a major advantage for
themselves. Their calculation seems to be that by obtaining Turkish
passports most of Turks of the island would in fact become full
citizens of the Greek-dominated "Republic of Cyprus." For a while
they would reap the benefits of such a citizenship but, at some
point, they would then be expected to fulfill the obligations of
citizenship, such as military service and payment of taxes. The
property question will continue to be a real headache for Turkey as
the European Court of Human Rights (EHCR) may come up with more
Loizidou-type rulings. In other words, delaying a solution to the
Cyprus question is not in the interests of Turkey, as the proposal
would suggest. A similar situation exists in the Aegean: The Greek
Parliament has approved the extension of Greek territorial waters to
12 miles and the bill is in the hands of the Greek president, who can
make it law by adding his signature to it whenever he likes. Turkey's
threat of casus belli keeps him from signing the law. If, as
proposed, Turkey becomes a full member of the ESDP, could it then
resort to casus belli against a co-member if it were to extend its
territorial waters to 12 miles?
Who would force the Greek Cypriots and the Greeks to give up their
veto rights on issues relating to Turkey? I recall, at a meeting in
1979 when Greece was preparing to become a member of the EU, both the
Greeks and the European Community (the precursor to the EU) were
making promises to help Turkey to develop its relations with the EC.
At that meeting, late Ambassador Muharrem Nuri Birgi made the the
following prophetic remark: "Every marriage starts with a wave of
fidelity but soon after the marriage no one can prevent gilting."
Indeed, immediately after Greece became a member of the EU it vetoed
every document that had the word "Turkey" in it.
As regards adopting EU standards one could say that Turkey has to
adopt and apply all of these standards if it wants to be a civilized,
modern country even if it doesn't become a member of the EU in the
end.
Being the director of a think tank myself, I can say that it's our
job and privilege to propose ideas and solutions to problems, but
they are only considered by decision makers if they are practicable
and in their interests. As depriving Turkey of the prospect and
process of full membership is neither practicable nor in the
interests of Turkey or the EU, my recommendation would be for us to
be realistic and join efforts to solve problems such as Cyprus and
the Aegean and carry out all the reforms and harmonization work
needed to facilitate the task of accession without dilly-dallying on
other paradigms.