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  • Turkey in Europe

    http://www.greekworks.com/content/index.php/weblog /extended/turkey_in_europe/

    Tuesday, April 26, 2005

    Our Opinion

    "Turkey in Europe"

    By The Editors

    As we draw closer to October 3, the start-date for the `final' course
    of negotiations for Turkey's accession to the European Union, the
    debate on Turkish membership is intensifying - which, if nothing else,
    betrays an odd sort of Western European panic (arguably more racist
    than not), given that these negotiations, as everyone knows (most
    obviously, the Turks themselves), will last anywhere from one to two
    decades (give or take a couple of years). Hardly a day goes by without
    some pontification on `Muslim' Turkey's attempt to join the
    predominantly `Christian' EU - as if the Union had an official
    (super)state religion, or its constitutional model was closer to that
    of Charlemagne (or Süleyman the Magnificent) than to those of Kant
    and the Framers of the US constitution. For every practical argument
    in support of Turkish membership, there seems to be an ideological
    argument against it. Every confirmation of concrete progress made by
    Turkey to meet EU standards and demands - which, lately, has almost
    invariably dictated fundamental Turkish constitutional reform - is
    countered by criticism that Ankara is failing to fulfill all of the
    so-called Copenhagen criteria (set by the EU in the Danish capital in
    1993 for all future candidate countries). It seems that Turkey's
    critics either do not understand how utterly radical the effort to put
    the country on a permanent path to democratic government and, above
    all, the rule of law is, or they, in fact - and we believe this to be
    much closer to the truth - want to see Turkey fail, if only to
    validate their own prejudices about the `incompatibility' between
    Turkish society and European `civilization.'

    Meanwhile, back in Turkey itself, the country is slowly and painfully
    - if not nearly as thoroughly or honestly as needed - facing up to a
    series of profound historical issues. Last Sunday marked the ninetieth
    anniversary of the Armenian massacres of 1915 - an event that was
    officially celebrated in a number of European capitals. These
    massacres, which, until recently, were ritualistically (and
    incredibly) denied by the Turkish state, have now, as The Economist
    reported earlier this month, become the subject of an `unprecedented
    debate...in intellectual and political circles and the mainstream
    Turkish press.' On the other hand, just 10 days ago (April 17),
    Turkey's state archives released `research' declaring that 523,000
    Turks were killed by Armenians between 1910 and 1922 (thus obviously
    placing the issue of the mass murder of Armenians within the context
    of Ottoman civil war rather than genocide). In a similar manner,
    recent reports on modest improvements in the government's treatment of
    Turkey's large Kurdish minority have been followed by news of
    intensifying activity by the Turkish army against Kurds. Finally,
    perennial assurances by Turkey's government on the importance it puts
    on a strong and close relationship with Greece are just as
    persistently belied by the unabating violations of Greek territorial
    waters and airspace by the Turkish armed forces.

    Anyone who considers all these manifest contradictions to be strategic
    machinations, or the typically cynical ploys of a shamelessly cynical
    government, is actually misjudging the real conflict within Turkish
    society over these fundamental moral and social issues - as well as
    related ones, many of them directly linked to the generally awful fate
    of minorities in Turkey in the twentieth century. A central reason
    that so many Turkish right-wing nationalists and Islamic
    fundamentalists are opposed to their country's accession to the EU
    (or, as they call it, to `Turkey's humiliation' by Europe) is
    precisely because they understand its consequences: Turkey will never
    enter Europe until Europe is allowed to enter Turkey. It is hardly
    ironic - it is indeed utterly predictable and congruent - that
    Europe's extreme right and its religious fundamentalists are in utter
    accord with Turkey's extreme right and its religious fundamentalists
    in opposing Turkish entry into the EU: they all understand the dangers
    of such a democratic and liberating expansion to their respective
    visions of Europe and the world.

    Yet, the Euro-punditocracy and various Europols ceaselessly exploit
    Turkey's contemporary contradictions to test Europeans' perceptions of
    the country and their attitude toward its membership in the EU. But
    why? These are the unsurprising `contradictions' of any nation
    wobbling from arbitrary rule to self-government, and they are easily
    explicable since they reflect historical and social oppositions, and
    political antagonisms, that are amenable to analysis and rational
    debate. greekworks.com has repeatedly supported Turkey's accession to
    the European Union, and we continue to do so. The truth is that every
    passing month reinforces our considered judgment that Turkey is the
    natural extent of European society (and, lest we forget, history), and
    that Turkey itself will prove that in the end in the only way
    possible: by unalterably committing itself to all those covenants and
    democratic self-restrictions that bind a state to protect the civil
    and human rights of its citizens, who are, by that fact, free(d) to
    participate actively in every aspect of civic and public life.

    Indeed, the problem is that nobody takes Turkey seriously enough to
    engage with it openly, without subterfuge. The issue, in other words,
    as we see it, is not whether one is `for' Turkey, but the kind of
    Turkey that one is for. We believe in a democratic, self-critical,
    transparent, conciliatory, secular, and, above all, just
    Turkey. greekworks.com will soon be publishing The Mechanism of
    Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the
    Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul by the eminent
    historian, Speros Vryonis, Jr., to commemorate the fiftieth
    anniversary of the Septemvriana, the government-organized and -abetted
    pogrom that decimated the then-thriving Greek community of Istanbul
    and marked the beginning of the end of Istanbul's Greeks. When we
    undertook the publication of this book, we had already editorialized
    in support of Turkish entry into the EU. Many people will undoubtedly
    see this as the height (or depths) of incoherence. We have always
    thought otherwise, and we've never believed that there is any
    contradiction between reconstituting the historical truth and using
    that truth to help a nation reconcile itself not only with its
    victims, but with its own history. To put things as simply as we can,
    while Turkey's road to EU membership undoubtedly goes through
    Copenhagen, it also goes through Van and Smyrna and Diyarbekir and all
    those villages, hamlets, towns, and cities, famous or obscure, where
    corpses were left to rot in the sun, churches were turned into
    stables, and speaking one's mother tongue was prima facie `evidence'
    of high treason.

    In the event, there are Turks - many, many Turks - who believe as we
    do. greekworks.com knows from first-hand experience that Turkish
    scholars, writers, and journalists are fighting a relentless battle to
    recover their nation's history, and to restore it to their fellow
    citizens, regardless of the judgments to be drawn from it (two of
    these scholars, among the most engaged, have already embraced
    Prof. Vryonis's book, even before its appearance). In the end, this is
    why we support Turkey's entry into the EU. Some of the issues that
    Turkey will have to address on its way to (re)joining Europe are so
    deeply embedded in the modern Turkish state's mythology that it will
    be impossible to deal with them without provoking almost pathological
    reactions. Yet, the very fact that the Armenian genocide as such is
    being debated today in Turkey is both remarkable and highly
    important. The same is true for Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish
    minority. If one is unfamiliar with the decades-long repression of
    Kurdish identity - which essentially goes back to the very foundation
    of the Turkish republic and is, therefore, identified with the
    national testament of Atatürk himself - one cannot begin to
    understand why even the most modest compromise with the Kurds on
    minority rights constitutes a previously unthinkable `concession.'

    Time is also running out on the military's defining presence in modern
    Turkish political life, and the sooner, the better - for Turkey's
    citizens, above all. The violation of Greek territorial waters and
    airspace has for many years constituted a given of Turkey's military
    `presence.' It is an idiot's gambit. Which is why no Greek prime
    minister has ever been intimidated by it, and why we think that it has
    now degenerated into a pathetic (and patent) case of genital
    exhibitionism. The continuation of this policy is hardly proof that
    the military continues to play a significant role in Turkey's
    political landscape today. It is, quite the opposite, an unambiguous
    sign that the military is desperate to `assert' itself wherever it can
    (and regardless of how stupidly it does so) because it knows that its
    days are numbered as an entire nation's judge, jury, and executioner.

    Monumental changes are occurring almost daily in Turkey, mostly
    because of the European Union, but massive societal change breeds
    contradiction - at least until the change has been institutionalized,
    and `naturalized,' and integrated into the everyday reality of a
    people. In a few days, the French will vote on the so-called European
    constitution. There is a very good chance that they will reject it,
    opposed as so many of them are (and, in our opinion, rightly so) to
    the currently proposed version. The French, of course, are not the
    only ones in the EU who have serious reservations about the Union's
    current form and function, and thus seem, lately, to be of two,
    contradictory, minds about where it is headed. Such contradictions,
    however, are an inherent dynamic of what has truly become a European
    community, and they are a necessary part of constructing the Union's
    framework and future architecture. For the last half century,
    contradiction - or, more accurately, creative destruction - has seemed
    to be the motivating force behind Europe's ever-steady union (and
    unity). In the same way, the EU should recognize and accept the
    extraordinary and very difficult historical process that today
    inevitably characterizes Turkey's efforts to merge its contradictions
    with those of Europe.
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