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Baku-Tbilisi-Cehyan pipeline begins to operate: beginning of an end for Aliyev clan?
Yerkir/arm
27 May 05
The solemn opening ceremony of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline on
May 25 was apparently the most important event in Azerbaijan this
week. However, Heydar Aliyev pipeline could become a bad surprise
for Ilham Aliyev.
The U.S.-Israeli analytical center Stratfor indicates that after
the post-Soviet regimes in Georgia and Ukraine were ousted, and
following the Kyrgyz president's removal, the Azerbaijani president
has found himself in focus in the context of the upcoming November
2005 parliamentary election in Azerbaijan.
The experts of the Center say that Aliyev the son has received
instructions from Washington on the things he has to do in order to
keep his hold on power. On April 4, U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan
Reno Harnish told Aliyev that the U.S. is expecting that Azerbaijan
should take decisive steps towards democratization, economic reforms,
peaceful settlement of the Karabakh confrontation, as well as ensuring
the security of the "East-West energy corridor."
The American diplomat also urged Aliyev to engage in a dialogue
with the opposition, and suggesting that the sides should sign an
agreement to hold free, fair and transparent parliamentary election.
But here is that the odd things began.
Aliyev told the U.S. diplomat that he is too interested in democratic
elections, surprising the Americans. First the Azerbaijani ruling
party in contrast to its leader and the opposition criticized the
U.S. proposal, calling it an interference with the country's internal
affairs.
On May 21, the authorities brutally dispersed an unsanctioned
opposition rally, thus indicating that the Azerbaijani government is
not ready to keep to its promises. There is no doubt that the West
would remind this to Aliyev when needed. But it is too early to speak
of Aliyev's failure in the upcoming election. "Azerbaijan has enormous
oil resources that ensure significant finances.
And those who are currently in power are not likely to relinquish the
profit they get," Stratfor concludes. "In its turn, the U.S. does not
want to see a chaos in Baku similar to what happened in Kyrgyzstan
following the overthrow of President Akayev. Washington wants to make
sure that the Caspian oil flows westwards, expecting to get 1 million
barrels annually spelling in $3.5 billion."
Stratfor analysts, however, mention that like it was the case with
Kyrgyzstan, the Azerbaijani opposition is too segmented, and what
is important, there is no charismatic individuals "to assume a
responsibility for a revolution."
Given this, the analysts note, the U.S. would prefer to keep Aliyev
in power until the opposition parties become more organized. As soon
as Washington is satisfied with the state of things with the oil,
it would probably begin to work toward ousting Aliyev and getting
the country out of his corrupt influence. Aliyev too realizes this;
it is better to have a few years in power than just a few months
especially when he sees Akayev sitting in Moscow.
Was Heydar Aliyev realizing in the beginning of the 90's when signing
the "deal of the century" that he was digging a political grave for
his son?
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Yerkir/arm
27 May 05
The solemn opening ceremony of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline on
May 25 was apparently the most important event in Azerbaijan this
week. However, Heydar Aliyev pipeline could become a bad surprise
for Ilham Aliyev.
The U.S.-Israeli analytical center Stratfor indicates that after
the post-Soviet regimes in Georgia and Ukraine were ousted, and
following the Kyrgyz president's removal, the Azerbaijani president
has found himself in focus in the context of the upcoming November
2005 parliamentary election in Azerbaijan.
The experts of the Center say that Aliyev the son has received
instructions from Washington on the things he has to do in order to
keep his hold on power. On April 4, U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan
Reno Harnish told Aliyev that the U.S. is expecting that Azerbaijan
should take decisive steps towards democratization, economic reforms,
peaceful settlement of the Karabakh confrontation, as well as ensuring
the security of the "East-West energy corridor."
The American diplomat also urged Aliyev to engage in a dialogue
with the opposition, and suggesting that the sides should sign an
agreement to hold free, fair and transparent parliamentary election.
But here is that the odd things began.
Aliyev told the U.S. diplomat that he is too interested in democratic
elections, surprising the Americans. First the Azerbaijani ruling
party in contrast to its leader and the opposition criticized the
U.S. proposal, calling it an interference with the country's internal
affairs.
On May 21, the authorities brutally dispersed an unsanctioned
opposition rally, thus indicating that the Azerbaijani government is
not ready to keep to its promises. There is no doubt that the West
would remind this to Aliyev when needed. But it is too early to speak
of Aliyev's failure in the upcoming election. "Azerbaijan has enormous
oil resources that ensure significant finances.
And those who are currently in power are not likely to relinquish the
profit they get," Stratfor concludes. "In its turn, the U.S. does not
want to see a chaos in Baku similar to what happened in Kyrgyzstan
following the overthrow of President Akayev. Washington wants to make
sure that the Caspian oil flows westwards, expecting to get 1 million
barrels annually spelling in $3.5 billion."
Stratfor analysts, however, mention that like it was the case with
Kyrgyzstan, the Azerbaijani opposition is too segmented, and what
is important, there is no charismatic individuals "to assume a
responsibility for a revolution."
Given this, the analysts note, the U.S. would prefer to keep Aliyev
in power until the opposition parties become more organized. As soon
as Washington is satisfied with the state of things with the oil,
it would probably begin to work toward ousting Aliyev and getting
the country out of his corrupt influence. Aliyev too realizes this;
it is better to have a few years in power than just a few months
especially when he sees Akayev sitting in Moscow.
Was Heydar Aliyev realizing in the beginning of the 90's when signing
the "deal of the century" that he was digging a political grave for
his son?
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress