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Yerevan Press Club of Armenia presents `MediaDialogue" Web Site as a
Regional Information Hub project.
As a part of the project www.mediadialogue.org web site is maintained,
featuring the most interesting publications from the press of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey on issues of mutual concern. The latest
updates on the site are weekly delivered to the subscribers.
************************************************** *************************
================================================== =========================
CONFLICTS
================================================== =========================
"THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS MILITARY OPTIONS
OF PROBLEM SETTLEMENT",
---------------------------------------------------------------- ------------
Source: "Zerkalo" newspaper (Azerbaijan) [October 03, 2005]
Author: K. Guluzade
Elmar Mamedov stated in his exclusive interview to `Zerkalo'
- Mr. Mamedov, it is a year and a half that you have held this
position. What innovation do you think Elmar Mamedov has introduced in
Azerbaijani diplomacy?
- I don't think it is the right way to pose the question, moreover,
you should not ask me about it. The main aim of Foreign Minister's
activity in any state is defending and promoting sovereign interests
of the country on the international arena, to be more precise -
improvement of efficient mechanism of such protection and ensuring its
unimpeded functioning. To this effect, besides everyday activity on
administering the diplomatic agency, a number of steps are taken in
the sphere of personnel and technical support of our ministry
including personnel recruitment on competitive basis first time in the
history of our MFA.
- At what stage are the negotiations on the settlement of
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict? What are the chances of `Prague
proceedings'?
- "The Prague proceedings" and negotiations on settlement overall
should not be considered as a sequence of separate meetings and
discussions. The point is about interrelated and organically
developing process. I think that the best option would be defining the
current stage as a start-up period for another round of
negotiations. The goals of the `Prague proceedings' are stage-by-stage
settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani Mountainous Karabagh conflict,
removing all the consequences of military aggression against our
country, provided its territorial integrity is restored, the relations
between Azerbaijan and Armenia are normalized, the climate of friendly
relations, cooperation and partnership in the South Caucasus is set.
- What terms did the Azerbaijani government define for the peaceful
negotiations? A dozen of years for peaceful process are still to come
or there is a deadline for active intervention of the military?
- The Minister of Foreign Affairs should not discuss military options
of problem settlement even if the problem is as crucial and delayed as
the Armenian aggression. The authorities of our country will take all
effort for effective peaceful negotiations. At the same time, it is
too early to speak about concrete terms. The recent meetings of the
heads of the two states in Kazan and those of Foreign Ministers in
Moscow give us ground for envisioning constructive development of the
process.
- The diplomats of the two countries recently declared about common
ground in the disputes over certain elements. What elements are these?
Which ones are accorded and which are most unacceptable for the
parties?
- We repeatedly spoke about 8-10 elements of settlement being closely
related and discussed simultaneously. I don't think it is constructive
to speak about accordance or preservation of the discrepancies on the
given elements, moreover, I think it may have a negative impact on the
process of negotiations. Consequently, I do not see any point in
discussing each of the components separately, since it is the
accordance of the whole set that matters.
- Azerbaijan suggests to the Armenian side supreme autonomy for
Mountainous Karabagh within Azerbaijan. However, it is a very general
point. Could you clarify the frames of this autonomy? What is the
proposal for delineating the functions between Mountainous Karabagh
and Baku?
- The notion of `supreme autonomy status' includes self-regulation of
the region within sovereign state in full compliance with the
international experience. We could discuss it in more detail after a
progress at negotiations.
- Now about the issue of a referendum in Mountainous Karabagh. We have
to expect constitutional amendments? The current Constitution excludes
holding a referendum in a separate region of the country.
- I have repeatedly stated and will do it over again: it is not any
amendments in the supreme law of Azerbaijani Republic that is
meant. During the negotiations, we essentially proceed from the
necessity of restoring territorial integrity of our country on the
basis of current Constitution of Azerbaijan.
- What about the statistics of Azerbaijani side on the cease-fire
regime? Who is the regular violator? Why are Kasprshik's monitoring
groups a failure?
- I do not think discussing the issue of statistics for violating the
cease-fire regime would have a constructive impact on the
negotiations. The situation is not simple and it leads to periodic
canceling of monitoring. Had the situation been simple, we would
probably have reached agreement on the decision ensuring conflict
settlement.
- OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairman Yuri Merzliakov states that there is a
likelihood for transferring half of the Group powers to the Council of
Europe. The Minsk Group does not manage the mediation mission? What
the attitude of Baku?
- The Azerbaijani side often confirmed its adherence to the
constructive format with the involvement of Minsk Group
mechanism. Calling on the Co-chairmen to activate their mediation
efforts, at the same time we don't think that MG `does not manage' its
mission. Considering the repeatedly stated position of Azerbaijan on
the expediency of consistent steps for expanding the participation of
options for settlement, we think that the Council of Europe may have
its constructive contribution to this process.
- The attempts for discussing the Karabagh issue in other
organizations lead to the resistance of the Armenian side - UN
discussions are an example. Why should we `tease the geese' if the
resolutions of UN stay on paper for over 10 years?
- The discussion of all the spectrum of the issues in
Armenian-Azerbaijani Mountainous Karabagh conflict is not just the
concern of OSCE Minsk Group but also international community as a
whole. We think it necessary that UN, as a leading global
organization, constantly focus on the situation in the occupied
territories and take steps on boosting the process of peaceful
settlement in accordance with the situation on these territories. As
for UN resolutions on paper, herein you have raised a very important
and sensitive problem. The issues of efficient activity of the United
Nations Organization, institutionalization of the mechanism, allowing
to exercise control over implementation of the adopted resolutions,
are one of the main objectives of UN reforms. These plans are fully
supported by Azerbaijan.
- Passing on to another plane. Why President Ilham Aliev did not go to
US either on working or official visit? The opponents of the
authorities claim that it is the `legacy' of 2003 elections, after
which our President is not invited to US, pending the results of
parliamentary elections.
- As you know, President of Azerbaijan visits foreign countries on
permanent and intensive basis. The visit to US is not an aim in itself
and I don't see any reasons for concerns over the fact that President
Aliev has not yet visited United States.
The element of democratization in US foreign policy is in organic
correlation with the element of geo-strategy. As regards the first
aspect, the contacts between the two countries have a constructive
character and are in perfect accordance. Speaking about the relations
with the second component, it should be stated that Azerbaijan builds
its relations with all the foreign states primarily on the basis of
its national interests. Finally coming to the recent presidential
elections in our country, I want to emphasize that no one has ever
questioned the general result expressing the will of Azerbaijani
people neither in US or any other country, be it on state or
non-government level, including many meetings in Washington and even
the criticism of certain aspects of organizing the elections and
post-election processes. In conclusion, I may state that discussion of
the terms for President's visit to US is still underway, and the sides
are working at this issue on bilateral level.
- How `impeding' is the internal political situation in Azerbaijan for
conducting foreign policy? The issues of political prisoners, freedom
of expression and freedom of assembly are quite sensitive.
- I think you seem to be shifting the focus of interconnection between
interior and foreign policy of the country. In this respect, I see the
main goals of diplomacy on the one hand in objective presentation of
the country's ongoing processes of democratization abroad and
consistent and timely introduction of the position by international
community to our country on the other. In my opinion, Azerbaijani MFA
is quite successful in this activity.
As for the internal political processes being out of my competence so
far, I would like to note that they are underway, moreover they are
gathering momentum, as the recent events in the country show. Thus,
there are regular consultations between the representatives of the
governing and oppositional parties. For over three months, a
multilateral working group on solving the problems of the so-called
political prisoners has developed its activity, the representatives of
international organizations regularly visit Azerbaijan, providing
their recommendations, etc.
Speaking on behalf of national leader of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliev,
democracy is not an apple to be bought in a store. Building democracy
is a complex gradual process, in which all political forces of the
country, its social layers and groups are involved. It includes not
only the steps towards democratization but also the measures for
setting economic, political, social conditions for its progress,
efforts for formation of a relevant mentality, etc.
- Azerbaijan is accused of `unbalanced foreign policy' that excludes
any concrete allies. Do you think we undermine our Western reputation
by signing documents with Iran?
- What you qualify as accusations is one of the main advantages of our
country's foreign policy. Its balance allows Azerbaijan not only to
preserve constructive friendly relations with the states of our
complex region but also to conduct independent and sovereign policy on
international arena in its full sense. I think that orientation for
democratic and civil values of the Western society you qualify as
`pro-Western orientation' is in full accordance with the document
signed during the visit of Azerbaijani Defense Minister to Iran. The
document aims at further development of friendly relations of
Azerbaijan with our Southern neighbor.
- How probable is deployment of military groups of the third countries
on our territory? My question is not about the peacekeepers in the
zone of Karabagh conflict but about the military bases of US. Many
Western publications state that the military bases will appear here in
exchange for the guarantee of internal political stability.
- The high-ranking officials both of our country and US repeatedly
gave a response to this question. On my part, I also gave many
comments on this issue. The United States reconsiders the concept of
deploying their armed forces on global scale in the conditions of the
bipolar model of peace being non-functional in the face of new
challenges and threats emerging. It is one of the integral components
of American view on the system of global security. An equally
important component of this view is also regional security. US has its
contribution to this system as well, including the expansion of
national opportunities of the Caspian states as regards control over
their borders. It is in this aspect that we should consider US
decision about financing for the equipment of two radar stations on
the territory of Azerbaijan that will be the property of our country
under its full control. I will repeat that the plans about stationing
of American military bases in Azerbaijan are not c! onsidered by the
two countries.
- Recently, the attacks of the Russian armed forces against the
Azerbaijani residents increased. Russian Charge d'Affaires in
Azerbaijan, Budyrkin states, `if you don't like it here then why are
you coming?' Is it the indicator for the level of Azerbaijani-Russian
relations?
- In my point, a vivid indicator of cooperation between Azerbaijan and
Russia is intensification of bilateral relations in economic,
political, cultural and other spheres. Each state has a sovereign
right for determining conditions about the residence of foreigners on
its territory and for conducting actions of control over compliance
with these regulations. In this concrete case, we mean a legal
activity held without compliance with the regulations. In such cases,
Azerbaijan, as usual, will defend the rights of its citizens and will
conduct bilateral activity with respect to the foreign states where
our citizens reside. It will also ensure security of these persons and
compliance with international legal norms and provisions of bilateral
documents without any bias towards them. It is one of the priorities
of our foreign policy.
================================================== =========================
REGION
================================================== =========================
TURKEY ACCEPTS THE EU CONDITIONS
--------------------------------------- -------------------------------------
Source: "Azg" newspaper (Armenia) [October 04, 2005]
Author: Hakob Chakrian
On starting negotiations for accession
The decision for starting membership talks on October 3 was adopted on
December 17, 2004 at EU summit. On the eve of the summit, December 16,
it was still not clear if the summit will adopt this decision. The
history gets repeated also before the start of negotiations. On
October 2 in Luxemburg, the Foreign Ministers of EU member states
failed to reach a consensus on the final draft of the negotiation
package, so their extraordinary session was held the next day until
late evening.
Before referring to the result of the extraordinary meeting of EU
Foreign Ministers, we will note that Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah
Gull had notified in advance the Foreign Minister of Great Britain
Jack Straw that he would not arrive in Luxemburg until he saw the
final version of the negotiation package. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan qualified imposing any new proposal on Turkey in relation to
the start of membership negotiations process as unacceptable. On
October 1, upon opening the session of Turkish Grand National
Assembly, President of the country Ahmed Necdet Sezer and Chairman of
the Mejlis supported this position in their speeches regarding
Turkey's full compliance with the commitments taken.
On October 2 declaring its support for negotiations about Turkey's
membership, the administration of International Monetary Fund also
joined this view. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common
Foreign and Security Policy expressed hope that the meeting of EU
Foreign Ministers will have positive results. He reminded, `The
previous resolutions on Turkey were also adopted at the last moment'.
On the same day, when EU Foreign Ministers in Luxemburg discussed the
issue of starting negotiations with Turkey at their extraordinary
meeting, two rallies under the slogan `No to European Union' were held
in Istanbul and Ankara. Over a thousand people participated in
Istanbul rally. Ankara rally, organized by `Grey Wolves' political
organization - Nationalist Movement Party, brought together about 100
thousand participants. Addressing his allies, Chairman of the party,
Devlet Bahceli thinks October 3 is `not a start of negotiations with
EU but an end of surrender'. He raises the question in his speech,
`Will Turkey be a part of Europe at the expense of renouncing the
Cyprus Turks and accepting the lies of Armenian?' He also appeals to
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, `Your Excellency, Mr. Prime Minister, your
statements plunged our country into darkness. Don't give them a chance
for putting new claims and demanding new concessions. Accept the fact
that as a result of your surrender to EU, based on your friendly
feelings, our country is paying a big price. Don't commit new sins,
withdraw from negotiations'.
At the same time, Armenians were also on a rally in Luxemburg
protesting Turkey's accession to EU until its recognition of Armenian
Genocide.
Turkey did not withdraw from negotiations but on October 3 morning
Gull again applied to Straw and refused all the proposals stipulated
by the final package. Foreign Minister of Great Britain notified the
participants of Luxemburg meeting about the rejection, which was
followed by a telephone conversation of Prime Minister Erdogan with US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who promised her mediation.
It is hard to define the impact of the mediation by the Secretary of
State. However, it is evident that Austria made a concession under the
pressure of the mentioned participants and used in the final draft of
the negotiation package instead of `special membership' the statement
that `the general aim of EU member states at the negotiations is
Turkey's full membership'. At the same time, in case the Republic of
Cyprus accession to NATO, Turkey will have veto power. In other words,
if Austria conceded to EU countries, these countries made concessions
to Turkey.
In this period, the official ceremony for the start of the
negotiations on Turkey's EU membership, scheduled for 20:00, was
cancelled till 23:30 local time. Recent data show that the final draft
of the package was sent to Ankara, discussed first at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, then at the session of the Council of Ministers.
Abdullah Gull was going to visit Luxemburg to participate at the
official ceremony of starting EU-Turkey negotiations.
LIGHT FINALLY, BUT TROUBLES AHEAD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: "Turkish Daily News" newspaper (Turkey) [October 04, 2005]
Author: Yusuf Kanli
Turkey's European vocation entered a new phase on Monday with the
painful start of the accession talks, which Turks hope will carry them
to membership in the European club of democracies in 10 to 15 years,
while opponents of this large Muslim state in the European Union are
unwilling to give it anything more than `privileged membership' status
or the place of a guest at the family dining table.
Two days of arm-twisting by Jack Straw, foreign secretary of EU term
president Britain, succeeded in scoring a last-minute deal among the
25 EU nations and candidate Turkey.
The EU ministers, who still haven't agreed on a budget for their club
for the 2007-2013 period, would have suffered an even greater
credibility crisis had they failed to reach a consensus on the
document that serves as a roadmap for Turkish accession talks.
Indeed, according to our information from both Sunday and Monday,
Straw repeatedly cautioned his counterparts that failing to start EU
entry talks with Turkey would be "catastrophic," saying the bloc is on
the edge of a precipice.
Now, while on the one hand Austria was forced to step back from its
hard-line position against Turkey's talks and agreed to drop its
demand that `privileged partnership' be included among the possible
results of the process should the negotiations fail to end in
accession or should the EU's absorption capacity not allow Turkish
integration, it on the other hand has managed to include a reference
to Article 49 of the Rome Treaty -- the founding document of the EU --
that defines how accession talks are held.
Though it appears that a reference to the relevant article on
accession in the founding charter should not lead to complaints on the
part of the Turks that their accession talks were watered down, since
the reference was made in the sentence stressing that the `shared
objective' of the talks was accession and as Article 49 underlines
that aspiring countries will negotiate accession with the club on the
terms and conditions agreed by the EU, with this reference the
importance of the negotiating framework document was diluted. Now the
EU ministers can introduce a new condition for the Turkish talks at
any time and in any fashion they would like.
While problems related to Austrian insistence on `privileged
partnership' was the dominant problem on Sunday, on Monday Vienna
found a problem-maker partner -- the Greek Cypriot side, which not
only demanded to see the talks' opening statement of Turkish Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul but at the same time wanted consolidation of the
stipulation in Paragraph 5 of the negotiating framework document to
the effect that `In the period up to accession, Turkey will be
required to progressively align its policies towards third countries
and its positions within international organizations (including in
relation to the membership by all EU Member States of those
organizations) with the policies and positions adopted by the Union
and its member states.' The aim was clear: to get rid of a possible
Turkish veto should the Greek Cypriots apply for NATO.
Eventually, Turkey was convinced that the EU presidency would bring a
clarification that `EU is EU, NATO is NATO, and neither can decide on
issues within the competence of the other.' That is, Turkey is
relieved that the Greek Cypriots would not be allowed into NATO, at
least not without a peace settlement on Cyprus.
After two days of tension, the talks finally kicked off and Turkey has
acquired the status of `accession negotiating country.' Still, both
the Austrian objection document to the wording of the document as well
as the row with the Greek Cypriots over the fifth paragraph of the
negotiating framework were eradicated after intense lobbying by
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the request of Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
That is, we have light finally, but the future path is full of mines.
================================================== =========================
NEIGHBOURS
================================================== =========================
TURKISH GEORGIANS ARE RESENTFUL WITH SAHAKASHVILI
------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------
Source: `Georgian Times' newspaper (Georgia) [September 29, 2005]
Author:
The guest of `Georgian Times' current issue is Givi Korchava, a third
year student of American studies department at International Black Sea
University. For two weeks, he stayed with the Georgians (Lazs,
Meskhs), residing in Turkey.
- Late June, I stayed in Turkey with local Georgians. I went there
with a young Laz, my guest. I showed him the ancient capital Mtskheta,
Svetitskhoveli temple with the bas-relief showing the cut-off arm of
its legendary architect, Constantine Arsakidze. It is to his honor and
the great Constantine Gamsakhurdia, depicting these events in `The
Hand of the Great Master', that I started to call my guest Uta. Now he
demands that his relatives and friends stop calling him by his
previous Turkish name Orhan and use the name Uta. I mention this for
you to understand the sensitive attitude of ethnic Georgians to their
historic homeland. At the same time, I want to emphasize that the
majority of them do not have a good knowledge of Georgia and its
history. Actually, the only self-identification for them is the
language containing too many Turkic elements, and this penetration is
still underway. I think that our mission is giving the Lazs concrete
knowledge of this sphere.
- Do they understand Megrel dialect that is close to Laz?
- Overall, they do. However, I already mentioned that their language
has too many Turkic elements. Laz and Megrel languages are certainly
similar, as the articulation base shows. These common features are
also visible in the appearance of these ethnic groups. Ethnic
Georgians of Turkey more frequently voice their preference for
autonomy, ask to open their schools, where the teachers will use the
native language, also the television. It is not the case that the
Turkish government ignores their problems. Officially, the Lazs have
television - `Geleshini', however 99 percent of its broadcasts are in
Turkish (?!) and only in the region of Riza city. I also want to
mention that the works of Lazs writers are lately published in the
native language. Thus, they have a growing interest in Georgian. For
instance, during the funeral of a famous Laz singer Kazim Koyundju in
Khopa, another reputable Laz figure Otar Imedashvili started the
farewell in the Georgian language and then pass! ed on to Turkish,
since the representatives of Turkish authorities and ordinary Turkish
citizens also came to bid farewell to the deceased singer.
- Still, why the Turkish authorities are reluctant to resolve the
issue of Lazs autonomy?
- We can't really tell the Turkish authorities somehow infringe on
their rights or national dignity. However, there is a fear or mistrust
or even some complex, which are groundless. The Georgians will never
harm the Turks in any way.
- Apparently, you are right when speaking about the mistrust or fear
in place. Probably, it also explains why our record breaker from
`Guinness Book' Henry Kupreshvili was not allowed to swim through
Bosphorus in `Laz style' (with tied arms and legs). Unfortunately such
examples are quite common. What about their attitude towards dual
Turkish-Georgian citizenship for the ethnic Georgians?
- They were excited over it but the Turkish government was very
restrained and even anxious thus raising mistrust of Lazs and
Meskhs. To cope with this mistrust, the Georgian government should
work for the Turkish authorities to get convinced of their sincere
friendship.
- What is the attitude of Turkish Georgians towards new authorities of
Georgia?
- In Istanbul, Bursa, where I met my countrymen, they were not very
satisfied with the new authorities of historic homeland. In
particular, they were resentful by the neglect of President
Sahakashvili who never congratulated them for their many important
holidays, even if they are Muslim. They say `yes' we are Muslims but
it does not mean our citadels, mentioned in various historic works,
records, cease to be Georgian. By the way, when our President was in
Azerbaijan, he did not visit Saingilo (the region densely populated by
the Georgians). At the same time when Azerbaijani leaders are in
Georgia, they always visit the districts with Azerbaijani residents.
************************************************** *************************
You can subscribe or unsubscribe to this newsletter either at
www.mediadialogue.org or by sending a message to the Editor:
[email protected].
For comments or questions please contact the Editor: [email protected].
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Regional Information Hub project.
As a part of the project www.mediadialogue.org web site is maintained,
featuring the most interesting publications from the press of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey on issues of mutual concern. The latest
updates on the site are weekly delivered to the subscribers.
************************************************** *************************
================================================== =========================
CONFLICTS
================================================== =========================
"THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHOULD NOT DISCUSS MILITARY OPTIONS
OF PROBLEM SETTLEMENT",
---------------------------------------------------------------- ------------
Source: "Zerkalo" newspaper (Azerbaijan) [October 03, 2005]
Author: K. Guluzade
Elmar Mamedov stated in his exclusive interview to `Zerkalo'
- Mr. Mamedov, it is a year and a half that you have held this
position. What innovation do you think Elmar Mamedov has introduced in
Azerbaijani diplomacy?
- I don't think it is the right way to pose the question, moreover,
you should not ask me about it. The main aim of Foreign Minister's
activity in any state is defending and promoting sovereign interests
of the country on the international arena, to be more precise -
improvement of efficient mechanism of such protection and ensuring its
unimpeded functioning. To this effect, besides everyday activity on
administering the diplomatic agency, a number of steps are taken in
the sphere of personnel and technical support of our ministry
including personnel recruitment on competitive basis first time in the
history of our MFA.
- At what stage are the negotiations on the settlement of
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict? What are the chances of `Prague
proceedings'?
- "The Prague proceedings" and negotiations on settlement overall
should not be considered as a sequence of separate meetings and
discussions. The point is about interrelated and organically
developing process. I think that the best option would be defining the
current stage as a start-up period for another round of
negotiations. The goals of the `Prague proceedings' are stage-by-stage
settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani Mountainous Karabagh conflict,
removing all the consequences of military aggression against our
country, provided its territorial integrity is restored, the relations
between Azerbaijan and Armenia are normalized, the climate of friendly
relations, cooperation and partnership in the South Caucasus is set.
- What terms did the Azerbaijani government define for the peaceful
negotiations? A dozen of years for peaceful process are still to come
or there is a deadline for active intervention of the military?
- The Minister of Foreign Affairs should not discuss military options
of problem settlement even if the problem is as crucial and delayed as
the Armenian aggression. The authorities of our country will take all
effort for effective peaceful negotiations. At the same time, it is
too early to speak about concrete terms. The recent meetings of the
heads of the two states in Kazan and those of Foreign Ministers in
Moscow give us ground for envisioning constructive development of the
process.
- The diplomats of the two countries recently declared about common
ground in the disputes over certain elements. What elements are these?
Which ones are accorded and which are most unacceptable for the
parties?
- We repeatedly spoke about 8-10 elements of settlement being closely
related and discussed simultaneously. I don't think it is constructive
to speak about accordance or preservation of the discrepancies on the
given elements, moreover, I think it may have a negative impact on the
process of negotiations. Consequently, I do not see any point in
discussing each of the components separately, since it is the
accordance of the whole set that matters.
- Azerbaijan suggests to the Armenian side supreme autonomy for
Mountainous Karabagh within Azerbaijan. However, it is a very general
point. Could you clarify the frames of this autonomy? What is the
proposal for delineating the functions between Mountainous Karabagh
and Baku?
- The notion of `supreme autonomy status' includes self-regulation of
the region within sovereign state in full compliance with the
international experience. We could discuss it in more detail after a
progress at negotiations.
- Now about the issue of a referendum in Mountainous Karabagh. We have
to expect constitutional amendments? The current Constitution excludes
holding a referendum in a separate region of the country.
- I have repeatedly stated and will do it over again: it is not any
amendments in the supreme law of Azerbaijani Republic that is
meant. During the negotiations, we essentially proceed from the
necessity of restoring territorial integrity of our country on the
basis of current Constitution of Azerbaijan.
- What about the statistics of Azerbaijani side on the cease-fire
regime? Who is the regular violator? Why are Kasprshik's monitoring
groups a failure?
- I do not think discussing the issue of statistics for violating the
cease-fire regime would have a constructive impact on the
negotiations. The situation is not simple and it leads to periodic
canceling of monitoring. Had the situation been simple, we would
probably have reached agreement on the decision ensuring conflict
settlement.
- OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairman Yuri Merzliakov states that there is a
likelihood for transferring half of the Group powers to the Council of
Europe. The Minsk Group does not manage the mediation mission? What
the attitude of Baku?
- The Azerbaijani side often confirmed its adherence to the
constructive format with the involvement of Minsk Group
mechanism. Calling on the Co-chairmen to activate their mediation
efforts, at the same time we don't think that MG `does not manage' its
mission. Considering the repeatedly stated position of Azerbaijan on
the expediency of consistent steps for expanding the participation of
options for settlement, we think that the Council of Europe may have
its constructive contribution to this process.
- The attempts for discussing the Karabagh issue in other
organizations lead to the resistance of the Armenian side - UN
discussions are an example. Why should we `tease the geese' if the
resolutions of UN stay on paper for over 10 years?
- The discussion of all the spectrum of the issues in
Armenian-Azerbaijani Mountainous Karabagh conflict is not just the
concern of OSCE Minsk Group but also international community as a
whole. We think it necessary that UN, as a leading global
organization, constantly focus on the situation in the occupied
territories and take steps on boosting the process of peaceful
settlement in accordance with the situation on these territories. As
for UN resolutions on paper, herein you have raised a very important
and sensitive problem. The issues of efficient activity of the United
Nations Organization, institutionalization of the mechanism, allowing
to exercise control over implementation of the adopted resolutions,
are one of the main objectives of UN reforms. These plans are fully
supported by Azerbaijan.
- Passing on to another plane. Why President Ilham Aliev did not go to
US either on working or official visit? The opponents of the
authorities claim that it is the `legacy' of 2003 elections, after
which our President is not invited to US, pending the results of
parliamentary elections.
- As you know, President of Azerbaijan visits foreign countries on
permanent and intensive basis. The visit to US is not an aim in itself
and I don't see any reasons for concerns over the fact that President
Aliev has not yet visited United States.
The element of democratization in US foreign policy is in organic
correlation with the element of geo-strategy. As regards the first
aspect, the contacts between the two countries have a constructive
character and are in perfect accordance. Speaking about the relations
with the second component, it should be stated that Azerbaijan builds
its relations with all the foreign states primarily on the basis of
its national interests. Finally coming to the recent presidential
elections in our country, I want to emphasize that no one has ever
questioned the general result expressing the will of Azerbaijani
people neither in US or any other country, be it on state or
non-government level, including many meetings in Washington and even
the criticism of certain aspects of organizing the elections and
post-election processes. In conclusion, I may state that discussion of
the terms for President's visit to US is still underway, and the sides
are working at this issue on bilateral level.
- How `impeding' is the internal political situation in Azerbaijan for
conducting foreign policy? The issues of political prisoners, freedom
of expression and freedom of assembly are quite sensitive.
- I think you seem to be shifting the focus of interconnection between
interior and foreign policy of the country. In this respect, I see the
main goals of diplomacy on the one hand in objective presentation of
the country's ongoing processes of democratization abroad and
consistent and timely introduction of the position by international
community to our country on the other. In my opinion, Azerbaijani MFA
is quite successful in this activity.
As for the internal political processes being out of my competence so
far, I would like to note that they are underway, moreover they are
gathering momentum, as the recent events in the country show. Thus,
there are regular consultations between the representatives of the
governing and oppositional parties. For over three months, a
multilateral working group on solving the problems of the so-called
political prisoners has developed its activity, the representatives of
international organizations regularly visit Azerbaijan, providing
their recommendations, etc.
Speaking on behalf of national leader of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliev,
democracy is not an apple to be bought in a store. Building democracy
is a complex gradual process, in which all political forces of the
country, its social layers and groups are involved. It includes not
only the steps towards democratization but also the measures for
setting economic, political, social conditions for its progress,
efforts for formation of a relevant mentality, etc.
- Azerbaijan is accused of `unbalanced foreign policy' that excludes
any concrete allies. Do you think we undermine our Western reputation
by signing documents with Iran?
- What you qualify as accusations is one of the main advantages of our
country's foreign policy. Its balance allows Azerbaijan not only to
preserve constructive friendly relations with the states of our
complex region but also to conduct independent and sovereign policy on
international arena in its full sense. I think that orientation for
democratic and civil values of the Western society you qualify as
`pro-Western orientation' is in full accordance with the document
signed during the visit of Azerbaijani Defense Minister to Iran. The
document aims at further development of friendly relations of
Azerbaijan with our Southern neighbor.
- How probable is deployment of military groups of the third countries
on our territory? My question is not about the peacekeepers in the
zone of Karabagh conflict but about the military bases of US. Many
Western publications state that the military bases will appear here in
exchange for the guarantee of internal political stability.
- The high-ranking officials both of our country and US repeatedly
gave a response to this question. On my part, I also gave many
comments on this issue. The United States reconsiders the concept of
deploying their armed forces on global scale in the conditions of the
bipolar model of peace being non-functional in the face of new
challenges and threats emerging. It is one of the integral components
of American view on the system of global security. An equally
important component of this view is also regional security. US has its
contribution to this system as well, including the expansion of
national opportunities of the Caspian states as regards control over
their borders. It is in this aspect that we should consider US
decision about financing for the equipment of two radar stations on
the territory of Azerbaijan that will be the property of our country
under its full control. I will repeat that the plans about stationing
of American military bases in Azerbaijan are not c! onsidered by the
two countries.
- Recently, the attacks of the Russian armed forces against the
Azerbaijani residents increased. Russian Charge d'Affaires in
Azerbaijan, Budyrkin states, `if you don't like it here then why are
you coming?' Is it the indicator for the level of Azerbaijani-Russian
relations?
- In my point, a vivid indicator of cooperation between Azerbaijan and
Russia is intensification of bilateral relations in economic,
political, cultural and other spheres. Each state has a sovereign
right for determining conditions about the residence of foreigners on
its territory and for conducting actions of control over compliance
with these regulations. In this concrete case, we mean a legal
activity held without compliance with the regulations. In such cases,
Azerbaijan, as usual, will defend the rights of its citizens and will
conduct bilateral activity with respect to the foreign states where
our citizens reside. It will also ensure security of these persons and
compliance with international legal norms and provisions of bilateral
documents without any bias towards them. It is one of the priorities
of our foreign policy.
================================================== =========================
REGION
================================================== =========================
TURKEY ACCEPTS THE EU CONDITIONS
--------------------------------------- -------------------------------------
Source: "Azg" newspaper (Armenia) [October 04, 2005]
Author: Hakob Chakrian
On starting negotiations for accession
The decision for starting membership talks on October 3 was adopted on
December 17, 2004 at EU summit. On the eve of the summit, December 16,
it was still not clear if the summit will adopt this decision. The
history gets repeated also before the start of negotiations. On
October 2 in Luxemburg, the Foreign Ministers of EU member states
failed to reach a consensus on the final draft of the negotiation
package, so their extraordinary session was held the next day until
late evening.
Before referring to the result of the extraordinary meeting of EU
Foreign Ministers, we will note that Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah
Gull had notified in advance the Foreign Minister of Great Britain
Jack Straw that he would not arrive in Luxemburg until he saw the
final version of the negotiation package. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan qualified imposing any new proposal on Turkey in relation to
the start of membership negotiations process as unacceptable. On
October 1, upon opening the session of Turkish Grand National
Assembly, President of the country Ahmed Necdet Sezer and Chairman of
the Mejlis supported this position in their speeches regarding
Turkey's full compliance with the commitments taken.
On October 2 declaring its support for negotiations about Turkey's
membership, the administration of International Monetary Fund also
joined this view. Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common
Foreign and Security Policy expressed hope that the meeting of EU
Foreign Ministers will have positive results. He reminded, `The
previous resolutions on Turkey were also adopted at the last moment'.
On the same day, when EU Foreign Ministers in Luxemburg discussed the
issue of starting negotiations with Turkey at their extraordinary
meeting, two rallies under the slogan `No to European Union' were held
in Istanbul and Ankara. Over a thousand people participated in
Istanbul rally. Ankara rally, organized by `Grey Wolves' political
organization - Nationalist Movement Party, brought together about 100
thousand participants. Addressing his allies, Chairman of the party,
Devlet Bahceli thinks October 3 is `not a start of negotiations with
EU but an end of surrender'. He raises the question in his speech,
`Will Turkey be a part of Europe at the expense of renouncing the
Cyprus Turks and accepting the lies of Armenian?' He also appeals to
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, `Your Excellency, Mr. Prime Minister, your
statements plunged our country into darkness. Don't give them a chance
for putting new claims and demanding new concessions. Accept the fact
that as a result of your surrender to EU, based on your friendly
feelings, our country is paying a big price. Don't commit new sins,
withdraw from negotiations'.
At the same time, Armenians were also on a rally in Luxemburg
protesting Turkey's accession to EU until its recognition of Armenian
Genocide.
Turkey did not withdraw from negotiations but on October 3 morning
Gull again applied to Straw and refused all the proposals stipulated
by the final package. Foreign Minister of Great Britain notified the
participants of Luxemburg meeting about the rejection, which was
followed by a telephone conversation of Prime Minister Erdogan with US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who promised her mediation.
It is hard to define the impact of the mediation by the Secretary of
State. However, it is evident that Austria made a concession under the
pressure of the mentioned participants and used in the final draft of
the negotiation package instead of `special membership' the statement
that `the general aim of EU member states at the negotiations is
Turkey's full membership'. At the same time, in case the Republic of
Cyprus accession to NATO, Turkey will have veto power. In other words,
if Austria conceded to EU countries, these countries made concessions
to Turkey.
In this period, the official ceremony for the start of the
negotiations on Turkey's EU membership, scheduled for 20:00, was
cancelled till 23:30 local time. Recent data show that the final draft
of the package was sent to Ankara, discussed first at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, then at the session of the Council of Ministers.
Abdullah Gull was going to visit Luxemburg to participate at the
official ceremony of starting EU-Turkey negotiations.
LIGHT FINALLY, BUT TROUBLES AHEAD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: "Turkish Daily News" newspaper (Turkey) [October 04, 2005]
Author: Yusuf Kanli
Turkey's European vocation entered a new phase on Monday with the
painful start of the accession talks, which Turks hope will carry them
to membership in the European club of democracies in 10 to 15 years,
while opponents of this large Muslim state in the European Union are
unwilling to give it anything more than `privileged membership' status
or the place of a guest at the family dining table.
Two days of arm-twisting by Jack Straw, foreign secretary of EU term
president Britain, succeeded in scoring a last-minute deal among the
25 EU nations and candidate Turkey.
The EU ministers, who still haven't agreed on a budget for their club
for the 2007-2013 period, would have suffered an even greater
credibility crisis had they failed to reach a consensus on the
document that serves as a roadmap for Turkish accession talks.
Indeed, according to our information from both Sunday and Monday,
Straw repeatedly cautioned his counterparts that failing to start EU
entry talks with Turkey would be "catastrophic," saying the bloc is on
the edge of a precipice.
Now, while on the one hand Austria was forced to step back from its
hard-line position against Turkey's talks and agreed to drop its
demand that `privileged partnership' be included among the possible
results of the process should the negotiations fail to end in
accession or should the EU's absorption capacity not allow Turkish
integration, it on the other hand has managed to include a reference
to Article 49 of the Rome Treaty -- the founding document of the EU --
that defines how accession talks are held.
Though it appears that a reference to the relevant article on
accession in the founding charter should not lead to complaints on the
part of the Turks that their accession talks were watered down, since
the reference was made in the sentence stressing that the `shared
objective' of the talks was accession and as Article 49 underlines
that aspiring countries will negotiate accession with the club on the
terms and conditions agreed by the EU, with this reference the
importance of the negotiating framework document was diluted. Now the
EU ministers can introduce a new condition for the Turkish talks at
any time and in any fashion they would like.
While problems related to Austrian insistence on `privileged
partnership' was the dominant problem on Sunday, on Monday Vienna
found a problem-maker partner -- the Greek Cypriot side, which not
only demanded to see the talks' opening statement of Turkish Foreign
Minister Abdullah Gul but at the same time wanted consolidation of the
stipulation in Paragraph 5 of the negotiating framework document to
the effect that `In the period up to accession, Turkey will be
required to progressively align its policies towards third countries
and its positions within international organizations (including in
relation to the membership by all EU Member States of those
organizations) with the policies and positions adopted by the Union
and its member states.' The aim was clear: to get rid of a possible
Turkish veto should the Greek Cypriots apply for NATO.
Eventually, Turkey was convinced that the EU presidency would bring a
clarification that `EU is EU, NATO is NATO, and neither can decide on
issues within the competence of the other.' That is, Turkey is
relieved that the Greek Cypriots would not be allowed into NATO, at
least not without a peace settlement on Cyprus.
After two days of tension, the talks finally kicked off and Turkey has
acquired the status of `accession negotiating country.' Still, both
the Austrian objection document to the wording of the document as well
as the row with the Greek Cypriots over the fifth paragraph of the
negotiating framework were eradicated after intense lobbying by
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the request of Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
That is, we have light finally, but the future path is full of mines.
================================================== =========================
NEIGHBOURS
================================================== =========================
TURKISH GEORGIANS ARE RESENTFUL WITH SAHAKASHVILI
------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------
Source: `Georgian Times' newspaper (Georgia) [September 29, 2005]
Author:
The guest of `Georgian Times' current issue is Givi Korchava, a third
year student of American studies department at International Black Sea
University. For two weeks, he stayed with the Georgians (Lazs,
Meskhs), residing in Turkey.
- Late June, I stayed in Turkey with local Georgians. I went there
with a young Laz, my guest. I showed him the ancient capital Mtskheta,
Svetitskhoveli temple with the bas-relief showing the cut-off arm of
its legendary architect, Constantine Arsakidze. It is to his honor and
the great Constantine Gamsakhurdia, depicting these events in `The
Hand of the Great Master', that I started to call my guest Uta. Now he
demands that his relatives and friends stop calling him by his
previous Turkish name Orhan and use the name Uta. I mention this for
you to understand the sensitive attitude of ethnic Georgians to their
historic homeland. At the same time, I want to emphasize that the
majority of them do not have a good knowledge of Georgia and its
history. Actually, the only self-identification for them is the
language containing too many Turkic elements, and this penetration is
still underway. I think that our mission is giving the Lazs concrete
knowledge of this sphere.
- Do they understand Megrel dialect that is close to Laz?
- Overall, they do. However, I already mentioned that their language
has too many Turkic elements. Laz and Megrel languages are certainly
similar, as the articulation base shows. These common features are
also visible in the appearance of these ethnic groups. Ethnic
Georgians of Turkey more frequently voice their preference for
autonomy, ask to open their schools, where the teachers will use the
native language, also the television. It is not the case that the
Turkish government ignores their problems. Officially, the Lazs have
television - `Geleshini', however 99 percent of its broadcasts are in
Turkish (?!) and only in the region of Riza city. I also want to
mention that the works of Lazs writers are lately published in the
native language. Thus, they have a growing interest in Georgian. For
instance, during the funeral of a famous Laz singer Kazim Koyundju in
Khopa, another reputable Laz figure Otar Imedashvili started the
farewell in the Georgian language and then pass! ed on to Turkish,
since the representatives of Turkish authorities and ordinary Turkish
citizens also came to bid farewell to the deceased singer.
- Still, why the Turkish authorities are reluctant to resolve the
issue of Lazs autonomy?
- We can't really tell the Turkish authorities somehow infringe on
their rights or national dignity. However, there is a fear or mistrust
or even some complex, which are groundless. The Georgians will never
harm the Turks in any way.
- Apparently, you are right when speaking about the mistrust or fear
in place. Probably, it also explains why our record breaker from
`Guinness Book' Henry Kupreshvili was not allowed to swim through
Bosphorus in `Laz style' (with tied arms and legs). Unfortunately such
examples are quite common. What about their attitude towards dual
Turkish-Georgian citizenship for the ethnic Georgians?
- They were excited over it but the Turkish government was very
restrained and even anxious thus raising mistrust of Lazs and
Meskhs. To cope with this mistrust, the Georgian government should
work for the Turkish authorities to get convinced of their sincere
friendship.
- What is the attitude of Turkish Georgians towards new authorities of
Georgia?
- In Istanbul, Bursa, where I met my countrymen, they were not very
satisfied with the new authorities of historic homeland. In
particular, they were resentful by the neglect of President
Sahakashvili who never congratulated them for their many important
holidays, even if they are Muslim. They say `yes' we are Muslims but
it does not mean our citadels, mentioned in various historic works,
records, cease to be Georgian. By the way, when our President was in
Azerbaijan, he did not visit Saingilo (the region densely populated by
the Georgians). At the same time when Azerbaijani leaders are in
Georgia, they always visit the districts with Azerbaijani residents.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress