TAKING IT OUT ON TURKEY
by Josie Appleton
Spiked, UK
Oct 4 2005
The tortured debate about the Turks joining the EU is a product of
crises in the West more than the East.
Turkey appears to be causing drama in the European Union (EU). First
there was talk of crisis, when EU nations couldn't agree on the issue
of Turkish membership. Austria led the opposition, backed up by blocs
within countries such as France and Germany. Now that accession talks
are agreed, rhetoric abounds about this being a 'truly historic day
for Europe'.
This isn't about Turkey, though. Instead, it's about EU elites
jostling for position. Elites shaken over the recent 'no' votes
on the EU Constitution are now trying to take a stand on Turkish
accession. Some hope that Turkish membership will pave the way to
a confident, multicultural Europe; others think that keeping Turkey
out will keep Europe secure. But Turkey is neither the cause of nor
solution to the EU's problems - and the membership debate can only
expose the EU elites' isolation and vacuity.
The UK, which currently holds the EU presidency, is the staunchest
supporter of Turkish entry. By letting in a Muslim nation, the Brits
argue, the EU will prove its cosmopolitan credentials. Part of this
is about invigorating Europe internally; sociologists Ulrich Beck and
Anthony Giddens recently argued that accession is part of a project
for a vibrant, post-national Europe, based on diversity (1). European
politicians also hope to win the favour of Muslim communities both
abroad and at home, an argument that gets US backing. The Turkish
prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently claimed that membership
'would help to build a bridge between Christian and Muslim countries',
while rejection would reveal the EU as a 'Christian club' (2).
Austria and co, meanwhile, counter Turkey in an attempt to win favour
with their own populations. One opponent warned of the danger of
letting in 'a poor, culturally alien nation'. Former French president
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who spearheaded the effort to rewrite the
Constitution, has taken this tack in an attempt to save his reputation,
arguing that 'there is an obvious contradiction between the pursuit
of Europe's political integration and Turkish entry into European
institutions' (3).
Both sides are on a hiding to nothing. It will take more than a bit of
'diverse' Eastern spice to enliven stodgy EU politics. Similarly, it is
delusional to think that radical Islamists will call off their battles
just because Erdogan has a seat in Brussels, any more than they will
be won over by Bush and Blair reading the Koran. Meanwhile, posturing
against Turkey isn't going to solve the problems of Giscard and others
- that is a see-through attempt to cover up their own failures.
This debate reveals the isolation of EU leaders from their publics.
On the one hand, both Turkish and European people are told to just
accept that accession is inevitable. Erdogan counsels that 'in today's
Turkey, there is no possibility left other than change.
Turkey will no longer yield to political deadlocks to those who are
ideological exploiters of emotion' (4). Similarly, US deputy assistant
secretary of state, Matthew J Bryza, argued that 'our friends in the
EU completely understand how important it is to continue that process
of Turkey's anchoring in Europe. It would be a shame if that process
didn't complete itself. But I think it will' (5).
'The process' is really a business for Brussels lawyers. Turkey has
been busily passing the kinds of laws that will help it jump through
EU hoops - giving Kurds more autonomy, abolishing capital punishment,
and cleaning up archaic legislation such as the rape law. These changes
aren't bad things in themselves; the problem is the automatic way in
which they were brought through. 'We returned the abnormal heartbeat
of this country to normal', said the prime minister.
The crowd-playing opponents of accession are no better
Supporters present accession as a continuation of Turkey's past,
especially the dramatic Westernising reforms brought through by Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s. But while Ataturk's (often heavyhanded)
reforms were driven by revolutionary zeal, today's Turkish elite is
copying out the EU lawbook. Modernisation now is about bowing down in
acceptance, not seizing the reins of national destiny. Hence the EU's
insistence that Turkey recognise the Armenian genocide. The Turks are
asked to prove their membership of the Western club by flagellating
themselves - joining UK prime minister Tony Blair in apologising for
the potato famine, and former US president Bill Clinton in apologising
for slavery.
EU publics are viewed with similar contempt. Opposition to Brussels'
plans is seen as the result of a chauvinistic yearning for security.
Beck and Giddens say that suspicion of the EU is driven by 'social
and economic anxieties' and an 'emotional return to the apparent safe
haven of the nation'; they warn that there is no option but to adapt
to globalisation and adopt their cosmopolitan attitudes.
Given this, it's no surprise that both EU and Turkish publics have
started going cool on the idea of Turkish membership. Turkish support
has gone down from three quarters to two thirds over the past year, and
60,000 people gathered in Ankara on Sunday to voice their opposition
to the process. Speaking to the rally, party leader Devlet Bahceli
argued that Turkey was facing 'an environment of enmity from outside
and an environment of treason from within' (6).
The crowd-playing opponents of accession are no better, though. This is
a desperate attempt to connect with a distant public, appealing to what
elites see as the masses' knee-jerk racism. Their attempt at populism
could win them attention, but is unlikely to provide a secure support.
The debate about Turkish membership may be leading to a fracas in the
EU, but Turkey itself isn't the cause of the problem. The discussion
may look east, but its roots lie in the west.
by Josie Appleton
Spiked, UK
Oct 4 2005
The tortured debate about the Turks joining the EU is a product of
crises in the West more than the East.
Turkey appears to be causing drama in the European Union (EU). First
there was talk of crisis, when EU nations couldn't agree on the issue
of Turkish membership. Austria led the opposition, backed up by blocs
within countries such as France and Germany. Now that accession talks
are agreed, rhetoric abounds about this being a 'truly historic day
for Europe'.
This isn't about Turkey, though. Instead, it's about EU elites
jostling for position. Elites shaken over the recent 'no' votes
on the EU Constitution are now trying to take a stand on Turkish
accession. Some hope that Turkish membership will pave the way to
a confident, multicultural Europe; others think that keeping Turkey
out will keep Europe secure. But Turkey is neither the cause of nor
solution to the EU's problems - and the membership debate can only
expose the EU elites' isolation and vacuity.
The UK, which currently holds the EU presidency, is the staunchest
supporter of Turkish entry. By letting in a Muslim nation, the Brits
argue, the EU will prove its cosmopolitan credentials. Part of this
is about invigorating Europe internally; sociologists Ulrich Beck and
Anthony Giddens recently argued that accession is part of a project
for a vibrant, post-national Europe, based on diversity (1). European
politicians also hope to win the favour of Muslim communities both
abroad and at home, an argument that gets US backing. The Turkish
prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently claimed that membership
'would help to build a bridge between Christian and Muslim countries',
while rejection would reveal the EU as a 'Christian club' (2).
Austria and co, meanwhile, counter Turkey in an attempt to win favour
with their own populations. One opponent warned of the danger of
letting in 'a poor, culturally alien nation'. Former French president
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who spearheaded the effort to rewrite the
Constitution, has taken this tack in an attempt to save his reputation,
arguing that 'there is an obvious contradiction between the pursuit
of Europe's political integration and Turkish entry into European
institutions' (3).
Both sides are on a hiding to nothing. It will take more than a bit of
'diverse' Eastern spice to enliven stodgy EU politics. Similarly, it is
delusional to think that radical Islamists will call off their battles
just because Erdogan has a seat in Brussels, any more than they will
be won over by Bush and Blair reading the Koran. Meanwhile, posturing
against Turkey isn't going to solve the problems of Giscard and others
- that is a see-through attempt to cover up their own failures.
This debate reveals the isolation of EU leaders from their publics.
On the one hand, both Turkish and European people are told to just
accept that accession is inevitable. Erdogan counsels that 'in today's
Turkey, there is no possibility left other than change.
Turkey will no longer yield to political deadlocks to those who are
ideological exploiters of emotion' (4). Similarly, US deputy assistant
secretary of state, Matthew J Bryza, argued that 'our friends in the
EU completely understand how important it is to continue that process
of Turkey's anchoring in Europe. It would be a shame if that process
didn't complete itself. But I think it will' (5).
'The process' is really a business for Brussels lawyers. Turkey has
been busily passing the kinds of laws that will help it jump through
EU hoops - giving Kurds more autonomy, abolishing capital punishment,
and cleaning up archaic legislation such as the rape law. These changes
aren't bad things in themselves; the problem is the automatic way in
which they were brought through. 'We returned the abnormal heartbeat
of this country to normal', said the prime minister.
The crowd-playing opponents of accession are no better
Supporters present accession as a continuation of Turkey's past,
especially the dramatic Westernising reforms brought through by Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s. But while Ataturk's (often heavyhanded)
reforms were driven by revolutionary zeal, today's Turkish elite is
copying out the EU lawbook. Modernisation now is about bowing down in
acceptance, not seizing the reins of national destiny. Hence the EU's
insistence that Turkey recognise the Armenian genocide. The Turks are
asked to prove their membership of the Western club by flagellating
themselves - joining UK prime minister Tony Blair in apologising for
the potato famine, and former US president Bill Clinton in apologising
for slavery.
EU publics are viewed with similar contempt. Opposition to Brussels'
plans is seen as the result of a chauvinistic yearning for security.
Beck and Giddens say that suspicion of the EU is driven by 'social
and economic anxieties' and an 'emotional return to the apparent safe
haven of the nation'; they warn that there is no option but to adapt
to globalisation and adopt their cosmopolitan attitudes.
Given this, it's no surprise that both EU and Turkish publics have
started going cool on the idea of Turkish membership. Turkish support
has gone down from three quarters to two thirds over the past year, and
60,000 people gathered in Ankara on Sunday to voice their opposition
to the process. Speaking to the rally, party leader Devlet Bahceli
argued that Turkey was facing 'an environment of enmity from outside
and an environment of treason from within' (6).
The crowd-playing opponents of accession are no better, though. This is
a desperate attempt to connect with a distant public, appealing to what
elites see as the masses' knee-jerk racism. Their attempt at populism
could win them attention, but is unlikely to provide a secure support.
The debate about Turkish membership may be leading to a fracas in the
EU, but Turkey itself isn't the cause of the problem. The discussion
may look east, but its roots lie in the west.