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FRENCH COMMENTARY SEES GOVERNMENT AT ODDS WITH PUBLIC OVER TURKISH EU ENTRY
Le Figaro, France (translated)
Oct 3 2005
Text of commentary by Luc de Barochez entitled "Paris' and Istanbul's
secret love affair" by French newspaper Le Figaro website on 3 October
Never in the Fifth Republic has French diplomacy been so at odds
with public opinion. Rarely has France's foreign policy been so much
decided by a single person, the president, against the advice of his
parliamentary majority. Four months after the French people's "no"
vote in the referendum on the European constitutional treaty, Paris
has just confirmed its go-ahead to negotiations whose stated aim is
Turkey's accession to the EU. The debates that accompanied the 29 May
vote showed, however, how much concern the prospect of that country's
accession to the European club causes to a large proportion of the
French people (footnote: Only 21 per cent of French people questioned
are in favour of Turkey's accession, 70 per cent are against it,
and 9 per cent have no opinion, according to an Eurobarometre poll
conducted by the European Commission in July 2005.)
The two issues are not linked officially. Jacques Chirac stressed in
advance that they are "completely unrelated". Voters were consulted not
about Turkey but about the draft constitution. And it is conceivable
that the EU could continue to expand without acquiring the means
to move towards political union. The paradox is that this path,
which French diplomacy now seems to be taking, is that which Paris
has always claimed to reject. Successive presidents have voiced the
wish, at least since Britain's accession to the Common Market in
1973, that each enlargement be accompanied by an intensification of
European unity.
This link is threatened following the shelving of Valery Giscard
d'Estaing's draft constitution. The Treaty of Nice, unanimously deemed
inadequate, marked the last advance towards EU integration in the
year 2000, during the French presidency. That treaty was intended to
prepare for the accession of the 10 countries that joined in 2004,
as well as that of Bulgaria and Romania. The start of negotiations
with Turkey, and soon with Croatia, shows how mistaken some voters
were in thinking that they could oppose enlargement by voting "no" on
29 May. Is France in earnest in encouraging the start of negotiations
with Turkey? The closer the fateful day has drawn, the less France's
leaders have had to say about the subject. And if they have spoken,
it has been to stress that the talks would be long, complex and not
necessarily successful, and that even if they were successful the
French people could still disrupt everything by refusing to ratify
Turkey's accession by referendum. None of this is very encouraging.
"How can membership negotiations be started unless this prospect is
considered both possible and desirable?" a French diplomat involved
in the negotiations asked. Valery Giscard d'Estaing was even more
explicit last month, when he lamented France's "double talk".
Though there is a before and after 29 May in French leaders' public
statements, the basic line has not changed. Hence the impression
of embarrassment and vagueness that prevailed during the summer. On
2 August Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin said: "It seems to me
inconceivable that any negotiations process could begin with a country
that did not recognize every member of the EU." Since then Turkey has
still not recognized the Republic of Cyprus, the prime minister has
had to eat his hat, and that which was inconceivable is about to take
place. Chirac was very specific, addressing the Ambassadors' Conference
on 29 August: "Pledges have been made that France will honour."!
The policy of a single man, France's endorsement of Turkey's marriage
to Europe is also a promise kept. To Turkey, but also to Germany,
and to our other EU partners. In 1999 the Helsinki European Council
session, with the support of the French cohabitation government,
established that Turkey was "destined" to join the EU. It confirmed
that the criteria applied to that country, whatever its particular
religious, demographic or socioeconomic characteristics, would be "the
same as are applied to other candidate countries". In December 2004
the European Council session in Brussels confirmed that negotiations
would begin on 3 October 2005 if Turkey satisfied in the meantime
a number of conditions, which included neither recognition of the
Armenian genocide nor recognition of the Greek Cypriot government's
sovereignty over the whole of the island of Aphrodite.
Like a secret love affair, which cannot be revealed in public, the
relationship between Paris and Ankara remains very discreet. France
is still among Ankara's allies within the EU. On every key issue the
president has opposed demanding from Turkey more than it can give, for
the present. Jacques Chirac believes that the interest of the West,
in the broad sense - Europe's influence in the world, its relations
with Islam, and the imperative of guaranteeing the continent's energy
supplies - combine to encourage progress with Turkey. "A secular
Turkey having fully adhered to the values of the rule of law and
building a modern and competitive economy would be an asset for the
EU," one diplomat close to the Elysee [president's office] said.
Officially, nothing is being said. And Istanbul and Ankara greatly
resent the vagueness of France's policy. The Turkish elites,
traditionally pro-French, are moving away from a partner that they
now consider neither reliable nor honest. At the time of the latest
enlargement, France ruined the confidence that it enjoyed in Poland
because of an attitude that was perceived to be both hesitant and
arrogant. It could now achieve the same result in Turkey.
Le Figaro, France (translated)
Oct 3 2005
Text of commentary by Luc de Barochez entitled "Paris' and Istanbul's
secret love affair" by French newspaper Le Figaro website on 3 October
Never in the Fifth Republic has French diplomacy been so at odds
with public opinion. Rarely has France's foreign policy been so much
decided by a single person, the president, against the advice of his
parliamentary majority. Four months after the French people's "no"
vote in the referendum on the European constitutional treaty, Paris
has just confirmed its go-ahead to negotiations whose stated aim is
Turkey's accession to the EU. The debates that accompanied the 29 May
vote showed, however, how much concern the prospect of that country's
accession to the European club causes to a large proportion of the
French people (footnote: Only 21 per cent of French people questioned
are in favour of Turkey's accession, 70 per cent are against it,
and 9 per cent have no opinion, according to an Eurobarometre poll
conducted by the European Commission in July 2005.)
The two issues are not linked officially. Jacques Chirac stressed in
advance that they are "completely unrelated". Voters were consulted not
about Turkey but about the draft constitution. And it is conceivable
that the EU could continue to expand without acquiring the means
to move towards political union. The paradox is that this path,
which French diplomacy now seems to be taking, is that which Paris
has always claimed to reject. Successive presidents have voiced the
wish, at least since Britain's accession to the Common Market in
1973, that each enlargement be accompanied by an intensification of
European unity.
This link is threatened following the shelving of Valery Giscard
d'Estaing's draft constitution. The Treaty of Nice, unanimously deemed
inadequate, marked the last advance towards EU integration in the
year 2000, during the French presidency. That treaty was intended to
prepare for the accession of the 10 countries that joined in 2004,
as well as that of Bulgaria and Romania. The start of negotiations
with Turkey, and soon with Croatia, shows how mistaken some voters
were in thinking that they could oppose enlargement by voting "no" on
29 May. Is France in earnest in encouraging the start of negotiations
with Turkey? The closer the fateful day has drawn, the less France's
leaders have had to say about the subject. And if they have spoken,
it has been to stress that the talks would be long, complex and not
necessarily successful, and that even if they were successful the
French people could still disrupt everything by refusing to ratify
Turkey's accession by referendum. None of this is very encouraging.
"How can membership negotiations be started unless this prospect is
considered both possible and desirable?" a French diplomat involved
in the negotiations asked. Valery Giscard d'Estaing was even more
explicit last month, when he lamented France's "double talk".
Though there is a before and after 29 May in French leaders' public
statements, the basic line has not changed. Hence the impression
of embarrassment and vagueness that prevailed during the summer. On
2 August Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin said: "It seems to me
inconceivable that any negotiations process could begin with a country
that did not recognize every member of the EU." Since then Turkey has
still not recognized the Republic of Cyprus, the prime minister has
had to eat his hat, and that which was inconceivable is about to take
place. Chirac was very specific, addressing the Ambassadors' Conference
on 29 August: "Pledges have been made that France will honour."!
The policy of a single man, France's endorsement of Turkey's marriage
to Europe is also a promise kept. To Turkey, but also to Germany,
and to our other EU partners. In 1999 the Helsinki European Council
session, with the support of the French cohabitation government,
established that Turkey was "destined" to join the EU. It confirmed
that the criteria applied to that country, whatever its particular
religious, demographic or socioeconomic characteristics, would be "the
same as are applied to other candidate countries". In December 2004
the European Council session in Brussels confirmed that negotiations
would begin on 3 October 2005 if Turkey satisfied in the meantime
a number of conditions, which included neither recognition of the
Armenian genocide nor recognition of the Greek Cypriot government's
sovereignty over the whole of the island of Aphrodite.
Like a secret love affair, which cannot be revealed in public, the
relationship between Paris and Ankara remains very discreet. France
is still among Ankara's allies within the EU. On every key issue the
president has opposed demanding from Turkey more than it can give, for
the present. Jacques Chirac believes that the interest of the West,
in the broad sense - Europe's influence in the world, its relations
with Islam, and the imperative of guaranteeing the continent's energy
supplies - combine to encourage progress with Turkey. "A secular
Turkey having fully adhered to the values of the rule of law and
building a modern and competitive economy would be an asset for the
EU," one diplomat close to the Elysee [president's office] said.
Officially, nothing is being said. And Istanbul and Ankara greatly
resent the vagueness of France's policy. The Turkish elites,
traditionally pro-French, are moving away from a partner that they
now consider neither reliable nor honest. At the time of the latest
enlargement, France ruined the confidence that it enjoyed in Poland
because of an attitude that was perceived to be both hesitant and
arrogant. It could now achieve the same result in Turkey.