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Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
October 7, 2005, Friday
CAUCASUS TRANSIT
SOURCE: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 37, October 5 - 10, 2005, p.
3
by Sergei Minasjan, Director of the Research Center of the Caucasus
Regional Security and Integration of the Russian-Armenian (Slav)
State University
WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN MILITARY BASES FROM GEORGIA MAY POSE THREATS TO
NATIONAL SECURITY OF ARMENIA
Withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia (as far as Moscow
and Tbilisi are concerned, its schedule checks with the May 30
accord) may pose unexpected threats to the future of the
Russian-Armenian military cooperation and even national security of
Armenia.
Russia claims to have kept its commitments (2005) concerning transfer
of objects to Georgia and withdrawal of its bases from Batumi and
Akhalkalaki. Objects of the Russian Army Group in the Caucasus were
turned over to the Georgians in accordance with the existing
regulations to preclude complaints concerning their condition.
A delegation of the Russian Foreign Ministry under Ambassador Igor
Savolsky visited Tbilisi to discuss the process of withdrawal of the
Russian military bases. Negotiations over a legally binding document
on the withdrawal took place.
According to Savolsky, two-day consultations in Tbilisi were supposed
to dwell on the problems of Russian military transit to Armenia via
Georgia. It seems to be a major obstacle. Tbilisi does not want
Russian convoys to be escorted by Russian servicemen wielding arms.
It insists on having the Russian servicemen unarmed, their own
security seen to by the armed Georgians. In this manner, what Georgia
essentially aspires to is control over Russian troops' military
communications in the region.
It is clear already that Georgia's obstinacy on the matter will make
problems for the 102nd Russian Military Base in Armenia. Once the
bases are out of Georgia, it will remain the only Russian combat
ready military object in the southern part of the Caucasus with a
clear status (discounting the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan that
monitors missile launchers from the Indian Ocean, but that is a
different matter). If therefore maintenance of the Russian military
base in Armenia becomes dependant on Georgia with its clear
pro-Washington and pro-Brussels attitude, it will raise questions of
expediency of Russia's military presence in the region. Professor
Anatoly Tsyganok, a prominent military analyst, claims that
withdrawal of military bases from Georgia compromises the
Russian-Armenian military cooperation because it will disrupt the
single antiaircraft defense system in the south (a lot of its command
posts have been in Georgia ever since the Soviet era). It will
grossly affect air control in the southern part of the Caucasus and
efficiency of the Armenian antiaircraft defense linked to the Russian
antiaircraft defense system.
There is more to it. Georgian military expert Irakly Aladashvili
points out that withdrawal of the Russian bases will make bringing
supplies to the base in Armenia much more problematic and - even
worse - jeopardize military transit into this country, an active
member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. In a
crisis (say, another round of hostilities with Azerbaijan), Armenia's
allies from the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization will find
sending its weapons and military hardware extremely difficult.
Aladashvili is concerned that Georgia "will try to prevent additional
shipments of Russian arms across its territory" to "retain
neutrality". It is clear, however, that Georgia will not be regarded
as an objectively neutral country because it will help isolate
Armenia from the rest of the world. (Armenia lacks access to the sea,
it has been blocked by Turkey and Azerbaijan for over a decade
already.)
There is another important aspect of the withdrawal that may pose a
threat to national security of Armenia. Georgian experts maintain
that even with the bases pulled out, Russia and its "sympathizers" in
the former Georgian autonomies and areas populated with ethnic
minorities will go on posing a threat to Georgia. Alexander Rusetsky,
a prominent expert of the SCIRS (Georgian Center of Security
Analysis), maintains in one of his articles that "Russia's clout with
the southern part of the Caucasus is dwindling but its presence
(military presence included) in Georgia is inevitable in the
foreseeable future. An end may be put to it only through a massacre
and complete extermination or expulsion of pro-Russian politicians
and citizenry. First and foremost from the territory of Abkhazia, the
former South Ossetian Autonomous Region, and Samtskhe-Djavakheti. We
cannot expect the process to be as subtle as it was in Adjaria in May
2004." It follows that once the Russian military bases are out of
Georgia, the Georgian authorities may bring up the matter of
termination of Russian peacekeepers' mission in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia and mount a campaign to "neutralize" Armenian "politicians
and citizenry" in Djavakheti...
Gela Bezhuashvili, Secretary of the National Security Council,
clarified his position on the first point in an interview with Novye
Izvestia on September 5. "Our dissatisfaction with how Russian
peacekeepers perform in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are
well-grounded," he said. "Peacekeeping mandate of these operations is
obsolete. Unless radical measures are taken to ameliorate the
situation, we will insist on amendment of the mandate and structure
of peacekeeping contingents." No more need be said. Tbilisi only has
to bide its time and wait for the bases to be out of Georgia.
As for the situation in Samtskhe-Djavakheti, not everything with it
is that clear. There is no saying to what extent official Tbilisi
shares the expert's views. It is clear in any case that as soon as
the 62nd Russian Military Base in Akhalkalaki is history, the
Georgian authorities may forget their loudly proclaimed determination
to handle the political and socioeconomic problems the Armenian
population of the region is facing. Should Tbilisi try a military
solution, including actions against Armenian political groups and
movements, it will become another threat to national security of
Armenia. Official Yerevan will not remain indifferent to the lot of
the Armenian population of Djavakheti.
Translated by A. Ignatkin
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
October 7, 2005, Friday
CAUCASUS TRANSIT
SOURCE: Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kurier, No 37, October 5 - 10, 2005, p.
3
by Sergei Minasjan, Director of the Research Center of the Caucasus
Regional Security and Integration of the Russian-Armenian (Slav)
State University
WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN MILITARY BASES FROM GEORGIA MAY POSE THREATS TO
NATIONAL SECURITY OF ARMENIA
Withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia (as far as Moscow
and Tbilisi are concerned, its schedule checks with the May 30
accord) may pose unexpected threats to the future of the
Russian-Armenian military cooperation and even national security of
Armenia.
Russia claims to have kept its commitments (2005) concerning transfer
of objects to Georgia and withdrawal of its bases from Batumi and
Akhalkalaki. Objects of the Russian Army Group in the Caucasus were
turned over to the Georgians in accordance with the existing
regulations to preclude complaints concerning their condition.
A delegation of the Russian Foreign Ministry under Ambassador Igor
Savolsky visited Tbilisi to discuss the process of withdrawal of the
Russian military bases. Negotiations over a legally binding document
on the withdrawal took place.
According to Savolsky, two-day consultations in Tbilisi were supposed
to dwell on the problems of Russian military transit to Armenia via
Georgia. It seems to be a major obstacle. Tbilisi does not want
Russian convoys to be escorted by Russian servicemen wielding arms.
It insists on having the Russian servicemen unarmed, their own
security seen to by the armed Georgians. In this manner, what Georgia
essentially aspires to is control over Russian troops' military
communications in the region.
It is clear already that Georgia's obstinacy on the matter will make
problems for the 102nd Russian Military Base in Armenia. Once the
bases are out of Georgia, it will remain the only Russian combat
ready military object in the southern part of the Caucasus with a
clear status (discounting the Gabala radar in Azerbaijan that
monitors missile launchers from the Indian Ocean, but that is a
different matter). If therefore maintenance of the Russian military
base in Armenia becomes dependant on Georgia with its clear
pro-Washington and pro-Brussels attitude, it will raise questions of
expediency of Russia's military presence in the region. Professor
Anatoly Tsyganok, a prominent military analyst, claims that
withdrawal of military bases from Georgia compromises the
Russian-Armenian military cooperation because it will disrupt the
single antiaircraft defense system in the south (a lot of its command
posts have been in Georgia ever since the Soviet era). It will
grossly affect air control in the southern part of the Caucasus and
efficiency of the Armenian antiaircraft defense linked to the Russian
antiaircraft defense system.
There is more to it. Georgian military expert Irakly Aladashvili
points out that withdrawal of the Russian bases will make bringing
supplies to the base in Armenia much more problematic and - even
worse - jeopardize military transit into this country, an active
member of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization. In a
crisis (say, another round of hostilities with Azerbaijan), Armenia's
allies from the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization will find
sending its weapons and military hardware extremely difficult.
Aladashvili is concerned that Georgia "will try to prevent additional
shipments of Russian arms across its territory" to "retain
neutrality". It is clear, however, that Georgia will not be regarded
as an objectively neutral country because it will help isolate
Armenia from the rest of the world. (Armenia lacks access to the sea,
it has been blocked by Turkey and Azerbaijan for over a decade
already.)
There is another important aspect of the withdrawal that may pose a
threat to national security of Armenia. Georgian experts maintain
that even with the bases pulled out, Russia and its "sympathizers" in
the former Georgian autonomies and areas populated with ethnic
minorities will go on posing a threat to Georgia. Alexander Rusetsky,
a prominent expert of the SCIRS (Georgian Center of Security
Analysis), maintains in one of his articles that "Russia's clout with
the southern part of the Caucasus is dwindling but its presence
(military presence included) in Georgia is inevitable in the
foreseeable future. An end may be put to it only through a massacre
and complete extermination or expulsion of pro-Russian politicians
and citizenry. First and foremost from the territory of Abkhazia, the
former South Ossetian Autonomous Region, and Samtskhe-Djavakheti. We
cannot expect the process to be as subtle as it was in Adjaria in May
2004." It follows that once the Russian military bases are out of
Georgia, the Georgian authorities may bring up the matter of
termination of Russian peacekeepers' mission in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia and mount a campaign to "neutralize" Armenian "politicians
and citizenry" in Djavakheti...
Gela Bezhuashvili, Secretary of the National Security Council,
clarified his position on the first point in an interview with Novye
Izvestia on September 5. "Our dissatisfaction with how Russian
peacekeepers perform in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are
well-grounded," he said. "Peacekeeping mandate of these operations is
obsolete. Unless radical measures are taken to ameliorate the
situation, we will insist on amendment of the mandate and structure
of peacekeeping contingents." No more need be said. Tbilisi only has
to bide its time and wait for the bases to be out of Georgia.
As for the situation in Samtskhe-Djavakheti, not everything with it
is that clear. There is no saying to what extent official Tbilisi
shares the expert's views. It is clear in any case that as soon as
the 62nd Russian Military Base in Akhalkalaki is history, the
Georgian authorities may forget their loudly proclaimed determination
to handle the political and socioeconomic problems the Armenian
population of the region is facing. Should Tbilisi try a military
solution, including actions against Armenian political groups and
movements, it will become another threat to national security of
Armenia. Official Yerevan will not remain indifferent to the lot of
the Armenian population of Djavakheti.
Translated by A. Ignatkin