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  • ANKARA: Georgia: Important State for the Stability in the Caucasus

    Journal of Turkish Weekly
    Sept 14 2005

    Georgia: An Important State for the Stability in the Caucasus

    by Kamer KASIM


    After the collapse of the Soviet Union , became an independent state,
    however, since its independence faced severe internal crisis and
    security problems, which were the great obstacle for the
    implementation of reforms and the success of the state-building
    process. Having border with , , and and access to the Black Sea make
    important transit routes to the Europe and Central Asia . Internal
    conflicts and lack of stability prevented to utilize its location in
    the Caucasus and delayed the possible regional cooperation, which
    would be beneficial for all the countries in the region. Given the
    fact that has lack of natural resources and weak economic structure,
    it is very difficult for to exploit its geographical location without
    support from the regional powers and the . In fact, is the one of the
    biggest beneficiary of the aid in the world. has received
    approximately $ 800 million aid from the . , the , and the are also
    important donors for . To analyze the roots of 's continuing problems
    and its difficulty to solve them despite the financial and political
    support from the outside world; we need to look at 's frozen
    conflicts and Russian role in the region.

    After the collapse of the Soviet Union , the has emerged with 60
    percent of the population and 76 percent of the territory of the
    former Soviet Union and followed the policy of domination in the
    former Soviet territories. The Soviet Union was a multinational
    empire and its foreign policy agenda was designed accordingly. The
    foreign policy of the had to be different than the Soviet Union .
    Internal discussing about the direction of the Russian foreign policy
    produced the two main groups: Atlanticists and Eurasianists.
    Atlanticists considered as a Western nation and according to them
    cooperation with the Western states would help to absorb Western
    values, including democracy and human rights. Atlanticists believed
    that must avoid assuming a leading role in the Commonwealth of
    Independent States (CIS). 's active role in the CIS would slow down
    's integration with Western economic institutions.[1] Until the end
    of 1992 Atlanticist view was dominant in Russian foreign policy and
    they aimed to liberate the from the burdens of the empire and to make
    a part of community of democratic states. In that period, 's
    administration was concerned with transforming of the Russian economy
    into a genuine market and to integrate with the Western system. As a
    result, showed a lack of interest in its relations with the new
    Caucasian and Central Asian republics.[2] Eurasianists criticized
    Atlanticist view and they emphasized 's distinctive identity from the
    West. The Eurasianist approach affected 's foreign policy after 1992,
    and produced the policy of `Near Abroad' (blizhneezarubezhe)
    promoting 's relations with the CIS. Eurasianists believed that the
    security of and its `Near Abroad' was inseparable and should not
    ignore the Caucasus and Central Asia .[3] As an indication of the
    change in Russian foreign policy, the `foreign policy concept' was
    introduced in 1993, which emphasized actual and potential conflicts
    of interests with the West and envisaged a more active role for in
    security and economic affairs in the `Near Abroad'.[4] After that
    used every tool to restore its dominance in the Caucasus and small
    states in the region were severely affected by that policy. was one
    of the worst affected states with the Russian policy in the region.
    was rejected became a part of the CIS and Russian military presence
    in the country. showed its ability to use internal dispute in
    regional states in order to exert its influence and to keep its
    military presence in newly independent states. was an easy target for
    the Russian foreign policy, since has diverse minority groups and
    fragile political and economic structures. As a result faced internal
    turmoil and conflict with Abkhazia and Ossetia . Abkhazia was an
    autonomous republic within and the conflict, erupted between
    Georgians and Abkhazians.

    The Russian forces played a role in supplying arms, training and
    assisting Abkhazian units in direct combat.[5] The main reason for
    the Russian support of Abkhazia was to put pressure on to enter the
    CIS and allow Russian troops to be deployed on the Turkish-Georgian
    border. Abkhazia's strategic position along the Black Sea coast was
    probably another reason for the Russian support of Abkhazia.[6] In
    fact, the conflict forced to enter the CIS.[7] got four military
    bases in . The Russian bases were in the most sensitive areas. One
    was in Abkhazia and was believed to be a support point for the
    Abkhazian separatists. Another was in the southwestern region of
    Adjara, which was also in rebel hands. A third one was at
    Akhalkalaki; the heart of a region populated mainly by Armenians. The
    fourth one was on the outskirts of Tbilisi where there is also an air
    base.[8]

    On April 4, 1994, the `Declaration on Measures for a Political
    Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict' was signed, even
    though the resumption of armed conflict remained a future
    possibility. According to this document, Abkhazia would have its own
    constitution, parliament and government and appropriate state
    symbols, such as an anthem, emblem and flag, and would maintain its
    own internal sovereignty.[9] Georgian officials complained about the
    agreement and Deputy Prime Minister, Nadareishvili, said that
    `agreements signed between and Abkhazia had no legal basis and were
    harmful for '.[10]

    also faced Ossetia problem just after the independence. Some south
    Ossetians wanted to unite with North Ossetia and become part of .
    Having used Abkhazians and Ossetians, had the chance to meddle .
    After Ossetians' declaration of sovereignty, Georgian Parliament
    abolished Ossetia 's autonomous status. 100,000 people became refugee
    as a result of the fighting in Ossetia . In 1992 a
    Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force was created in South
    Ossetia .[11] Crisis gave a chance to intervene the internal affair
    of . It might be argued that unification of south and north Ossetia
    was not 's interest. Therefore benefited from the crisis, but it did
    not also want Ossetians to reach their final objective.

    Dispute between and continued about the Russian military bases in .
    In 1995, the treaty was signed between and about permission to the
    Russian military bases in . The Treaty was in effect for 25 years,
    and automatically extent five years at a time if the parties did not
    agree otherwise. However, the treaty was not ratified. In 1999,
    Georgian Foreign Minister Menegarashvili stated that the reason for
    the non-ratification of the 1995 treaty was that it was in fact
    breaching the limits of the original Conventional Forces in Europe
    (CFE) treaty. In March 2005 the Georgian parliament passed a
    resolution ordering to withdraw from no later than 2006 and allowing
    to exercise its right to take measures against the bases before May
    2005.[12] According to the recent deal the withdrawal of the Russian
    military bases from will be completed within 2008.

    The developments after the 11th of September 2001 terrorist attacks
    have a great impact in the Caucasus . The military presence in the
    region increased the influence and in this aspect, together with ,
    became an important state to fight against terrorism. The stability
    in became more important for the . First, provides air link for the
    troops to Central Asia and important check point in the Caucasus .
    Second after 11 September and the War in in 2003 made crucial to the
    realization of the East-West energy corridor and particularly the
    transportation of Caspian oil to the world markets.
    Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline became partly operational on 25th of
    May 2005. Therefore, the will not want any destabilization of , which
    might prevent the flow of oil from the pipeline. Despite the fact
    that was benefited from the international environment after the 11
    September 2001, also used this environment for its benefit, which to
    some extent put in a difficult situation. imposed more assertive
    policy towards the Chechen conflict and blamed to provide shelter for
    terrorists in Pankisi Valley . argued that Pankisi Valley became the
    area as a training ground and arms smuggling route for the Chechen
    rebels. The area also became home for approximately 7.000 Chechen
    refugees and full control of the region is beyond the 's capacity.
    aimed to established anti-terror centers in . However, considered
    this suggestion as a Russian strategy to re-label its military bases
    in as anti-Terror centers.

    faced also tension in Javakheti province and its capital Ahalkelek,
    where was home for Ahiska Turks and currently Armenian minority lives
    there. The return of the Ahiska Turks to was discussed in the Council
    of Europe within the framework of Georgian membership to the Council
    of Europe. Ahiska Turks' return to has not been realized yet. The
    province is adjacent to and on the important transit route between
    and . Separatist tendencies of the Armenian minority of the province
    might destabilize and even the potential danger exists for the
    creation of second `Karabakh'. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
    Armenians in Javakheti aided to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and
    Nagorno-Karabakh problem is stimulated Armenian nationalism.[13]
    After 11th September 2001 increased importance of in the region and
    the military presence in reduced the risk of possible conflict in
    Javakheti province.

    After the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Cayhan pipeline Georgia
    became a key state for Turkey, Azerbaijan and the US. Georgia's
    relations with Turkey improved on the political and economic front.
    The project to construct railway link between Turkish city Kars to
    Georgian city Ahalkelek would be important for improve the
    transportation in the region. However, Armenia objected the
    Kars-Ahalkelek railway link. Armenia argued that proposed railway
    line would contribute the isolation of Armenia. The construction of
    the Kars-Ahalkelek railway line and the rehabilitation of the
    existing Tbilisi-Ahalkelek line need approximately $ 400 million.

    Georgia's significance will grow in the region and the US and
    Turkey's assistance will continue in the future. Political stability
    in the Caucasus will be very difficult to achieve in the near future.
    The increase of political and economic stability in Caucasus
    countries will contribute the regional stability. After the `velvet
    revolution', the positive atmosphere emerged for the stability of
    Georgia and stability will create the suitable atmosphere for the
    solution of Georgia's `Frozen Disputes'.



    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    [1] Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy Of
    Russia Changing Systems and Enduring Interests, (London and New York:
    M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 112-113.

    [2] For example, Foreign Minister Kozyrev first visited Central Asia
    in April 1992, by which time US Secretary of State James Baker had
    already been there three times on official visits. See, Graham E.
    Fuller, `Russia and Central Asia...' pp. 125-127.

    [3] Roy Allison, Millitary Forces in the Soviet Successor States,
    Adelphi Paper, 280, (London: The International Institute for
    Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 46. See also A. Kortunov, `Russia, the
    `Near Abroad', and the West', G. Lapidus (ed.), The New Russia:
    Troubled Transformation, (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 157-160

    [4] Neil Malcolm, `The New Russian...', p. 31. See also Oleg Kovalev,
    Foreign Policy Belief Systems of Post Soviet Russian Elites,
    unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University Of Delaware, Summer 1996, pp.
    158-222.

    [5]Although, generally, Russia rejected the involvement of the
    Russian troops in the conflict, Russian warplanes bombed Georgian
    positions at the Gumsta front. It was argued by Russia that they were
    provoked by the Georgian artillery shelling of the Russian military
    laboratory in Eshera. Ibid, p. 74 Elizabeth Fuller, RFE/RL, 1 October
    1993

    [6] Ali Fuat Borovali, `The Caucasus within a Historical-Strategic
    Matrix: Russia, Iran And Turkey', Dis Politika (Foreign Policy), Vol.
    18, 1994, p. 33.

    [7] Viacheslav A. Chirikba, `Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict and its
    Aftermath', Mehmet Tutuncu (ed.), Caucasus: War and Peace, (The
    Netherlands: SOTA Haarlem, 1998), p. 75.

    [8] Stephen Kinzer, `Defiant Satellite Nation Finds Russia's Orbit
    Inescapable', Sunday, 3 May 1998.

    [9] Chirikba, `Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict...', p. 79

    [10] Interfax, 16 September 1996. After the series of talks, both
    sides reached another agreement at the end of October 1998. Abkhazian
    Newsletter, 5 December 1998.

    [11] Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations, (London and New
    Jersey: Zed books, 1994), pp. 105-107.

    [12] See Johanna Popjanevski, `Russian Trop Withdrawal In Light of
    International Law', Georgian Foundation for Strategic and
    International Studies

    [13] Hasan Kanbolat ve Nazmi Gül, `The Geopolitics and Quest for
    Autonomy of the Armenians of Javakheti (Georgia) and Krasnodar
    (Russia) in the Caucasus', Armenian Studies (Ermeni Araþtýrmalarý),
    Issue 2, June-July-August 2001, ss. 186-210. For the
    Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, See Kamer Kasým, `The Nagorno-Karabakh
    Conflict, Caspian Oil and Regional Powers', Bülent Gökay (ed.), The
    Politics of Caspian Oil, London: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 185-198. Kamer
    Kasým, `The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict From Its Inception To The Peace
    Process', Armenian Studies, Issue 2, June-July-August, 2001, pp.
    170-185. Kamer Kasým, `The Transportation of Caspian Oil and Regional
    Stability', Journal of Southern Europe and The Balkans, Volume: 4,
    Number 1, May 2002, pp. 36-45.

    Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kamer KASIM: Abant Izzet Baysal University,
    Department of International Relations and Member of ISRO Science
    Committee.
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