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EU, TURKEY: NEW TALKS, OLD HINDRANCES
By Federico Bordonaro for ISN Security Watch
ISN, Switzerland
Sept 19 2005
With talks set for next week on Turkey's EU accession negotiations,
all major EU states appear eager to staff for time.
EU governments on 14 September failed to approve a declaration to
surmount divisions over Ankara's refusal to recognize Cyprus, a move
considered necessary by continental states to proceed to Turkey's
membership talks on 3 October. A negotiating mandate for Turkish
entry talks will be discussed once again on 21 September. In a joint
declaration, EU member states have stated that "recognition of all the
member states is a component necessary to the process of adhesion",
the French daily Le Figaro reported.
However, the Cyprus issue is not the only trouble the Turkish
government will face on its way to Brussels. The EU is split over
further enlargements and more than ever over Turkey's integration into
the union. After more than 40 years since Europe's first openings to
the prospect of membership, Turkish accession still appears to be a
long and difficult journey.
Cyprus' protests and Ankara's gaffe The current crisis, which broke
just a few weeks before membership talks begin, was originated
by two concomitant events. One is Cyprus' protest against Ankara's
unwillingness to fully recognize Cypriot national unity and sovereignty
before the talks start. Evidently, the Turkish government cannot act
in a hurry in this respect, because of the 30,000 ethnic Turks still
living in the island, whose possible departure from Cyprus must be
carefully negotiated to obtain guarantees.
EU member states like France - sceptical about Turkey's full
integration into the bloc - immediately pointed out that membership
could be given to those who did not fully recognize other member's
sovereignty. Then this week, Paris accepted a diplomatic draft that
makes it possible for the membership talks to start before Turkey
officially recognizes Cyprus. France thus accepts the talks to begin
as planned on October 3. But the issue is far from over.
September's other spiky issue was the EU members' annoyance with
Ankara's allegedly repressive policy against Orhan Pamuk, a novelist
who is being accused of insulting the Turkish national character for
telling a Swiss journal that "30,000 Kurds and one million Armenians
were killed in these lands and nobody but me dares to talk about it".
The new Turkish penal code makes it a crime to denigrate the national
identity, and Turkey's determination to force Pamuk to stand trial
is viewed by many in Western Europe as a "provocation".
Both these facts highlight underlying European tensions about the
Turkish accession to the EU. However, the impression is that some
governments in Western Europe are using such events to further
complicate the membership talks, thus gaining time and appeasing
recalcitrant and increasingly "euro-sceptic" public opinion at home.
Moreover, Europe is once again divided over the issue, augmenting
Turkey's frustration and possibly paving the way for further political
manoeuvring.
Europe's divisions and Turkey's irritation The real matter behind the
Turkish accession troubles is the EU enlargement process itself. It's
no secret that EU members are divided over the very nature of Europe's
political unification. Last year's big eastward enlargement left many
wondering what kind of union they were getting.
The real issue at hand is the viability of a 25-states federation as a
geopolitical unit - whereas sovereignty in Europe remains split between
a cumbersome supranational decision-level and a weakened national one.
In this respect, Bulgaria's and Romania's applications for EU
membership also appear to have become more complicated following the
EU Constitutional Treaty's failure and the new wave of euro-scepticism
in Western Europe.
Moreover, Ankara's integration would challenge the European cultural
identity because of its almost totally Muslim population and modify
the demographic balance in the Old Continent. By 2015, Turkey should
have surpassed Germany as the most populous EU country, which - given
the EU voting system - could have important political consequences
on the European parliament, which Paris and Berlin have perhaps
not anticipated.
Paradoxically, the traditionally more Europeanist states like France,
Germany, the Netherlands, or Italy, are disappointed with the EU
political integration process, which they had so strenuously advocated
during the 1990s. This is due to the difficulties in management the
single currency and to the "identity crisis" that has overcome the
"New Europe" - which quickly looked after its own security and
geopolitical goals by aligning with Washington and not with the
Franco-German combine on Iraq.
In addition, both the 2004 enlargement and (especially) the Turkish
membership issue are often perceived by Paris and Berlin as US and
British priorities, and that such processes are being managed according
to the Anglo-American agenda and timing.
All these elements are the driving forces behind recently conceived
proposals of an enhanced partnership between the EU and Turkey, to
be offered Ankara in place of a full membership - a proposal that
has been categorically rejected by Ankara.
In fact, as Italian ambassador Luigi V. Ferraris told to ISN-Security
Watch this week, it is now impossible to keep saying "no" to Ankara
- unless the latter did something so serious to become unacceptable
for the EU.
Turkey is a full member of NATO and is already part of the European
Council, and as such there is no solid basis upon which EU member
states could set up a coherently obstructionist position. Besides,
Ankara could easily perceive its real "fault" being its Muslim identity
- which would only fuel the fires of a "clash of civilizations"
that EU members want to avoid.
Apart from Turkey's obvious geopolitical and geostrategic importance,
as a land directly connecting the Balkan regions and the Black Sea
regions of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as well as the Syria,
Iraq, and Iran in the Middle East, some observers have highlighted
that Ankara's role in Europe could be that of epitomizing a modern
Muslim democracy to other influential Muslim states. Since it is often
repeated that one of the keys in tackling Islamist terror is to enhance
moderate Islam, such a "geo-cultural" function could be one of Turkey's
most attractive features to offer to its diffident EU partners.
On the contrary, should Turkey be eventually refused EU membership, its
ruling classes might turn towards enhanced strategic partnerships with
Syria and Iran from an anti-European perspective, thus complicating EU
efforts to make the East Mediterranean region a secure and stable area.
What is more, in recent years Turkey has worked hard to catch up with
European social and political standards, abolishing the death penalty,
accepting Kurdish as a language in schools, scrapping state security
courts, changing the penal code, and increasing civilian control over
the army.
Can London succeed?
According to Ambassador Ferraris, the current British EU Presidency
has an overtly different position from France, Germany, and the
Netherlands on Turkish membership. London is trying to smooth the
progress of Turkey's accession, but it is doubtful whether it will
have the strength to impose a decisive acceleration.
The Turkish issue was a central topic during recent French and Dutch
referendums on the EU Constitutional Treaty, and large parts of the
French public are unconvinced that welcoming Ankara into the EU is
in Paris' interests, Ferraris said.
In Germany, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) candidate Angela Merkel
has taken an anti-integrationist position during the election
campaign, but she is likely to mitigate her position should she
become chancellor, replacing Gerhard Schroder who has lobbied for
full Turkish membership in the EU.
Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD), on the contrary, keeps a
more cautious stand on the issue, also because of the large Turkish
community in Germany, whose votes are traditionally social-democrat.
However, German (but also French) decision-makers are still in need
of a clear strategy towards Turkey, whereas Italy appears, for the
moment, decidedly more aligned with London than with Paris and Berlin.
German federal elections, which took place on Sunday, proved to be a
tight race, with both Merkel and Schroder claiming victory on Monday
and the chancellor's post still up for grabs.
Stalling for time Independent of next week's talks, all major EU
states appear eager to stall for time. The Turkish membership issue
- already complicated if seen as a EU-Turkey bilateral affair -
is being made increasingly thorny by the French, German, Dutch and
other domestic political contexts.
With public opinion undecided - if not, sometimes, overtly hostile to
Ankara's accession - it is likely that both the new German government
and its French and Dutch homologues will start the negotiations knowing
that the latter will be very long, so that current governments will
hardly be the ones to resolve the matter.
In fact, according to Ambassador Ferraris, a sort of buck-passing from
present to future European administrations is not to be ruled-out,
even though sharp rhetoric against Turkish integration could be surface
when election campaigns in Western countries enter the decisive stage.
Federico Bordonaro, based in Italy, is an analyst of International
Relations and Geopolitics with the Power and Interest News Report
and Stategic-Road.com. His expertise is concentrated in the new
structure of the international system after the Cold War, the
European integration process, Security and Defense issues, and
political realism.
By Federico Bordonaro for ISN Security Watch
ISN, Switzerland
Sept 19 2005
With talks set for next week on Turkey's EU accession negotiations,
all major EU states appear eager to staff for time.
EU governments on 14 September failed to approve a declaration to
surmount divisions over Ankara's refusal to recognize Cyprus, a move
considered necessary by continental states to proceed to Turkey's
membership talks on 3 October. A negotiating mandate for Turkish
entry talks will be discussed once again on 21 September. In a joint
declaration, EU member states have stated that "recognition of all the
member states is a component necessary to the process of adhesion",
the French daily Le Figaro reported.
However, the Cyprus issue is not the only trouble the Turkish
government will face on its way to Brussels. The EU is split over
further enlargements and more than ever over Turkey's integration into
the union. After more than 40 years since Europe's first openings to
the prospect of membership, Turkish accession still appears to be a
long and difficult journey.
Cyprus' protests and Ankara's gaffe The current crisis, which broke
just a few weeks before membership talks begin, was originated
by two concomitant events. One is Cyprus' protest against Ankara's
unwillingness to fully recognize Cypriot national unity and sovereignty
before the talks start. Evidently, the Turkish government cannot act
in a hurry in this respect, because of the 30,000 ethnic Turks still
living in the island, whose possible departure from Cyprus must be
carefully negotiated to obtain guarantees.
EU member states like France - sceptical about Turkey's full
integration into the bloc - immediately pointed out that membership
could be given to those who did not fully recognize other member's
sovereignty. Then this week, Paris accepted a diplomatic draft that
makes it possible for the membership talks to start before Turkey
officially recognizes Cyprus. France thus accepts the talks to begin
as planned on October 3. But the issue is far from over.
September's other spiky issue was the EU members' annoyance with
Ankara's allegedly repressive policy against Orhan Pamuk, a novelist
who is being accused of insulting the Turkish national character for
telling a Swiss journal that "30,000 Kurds and one million Armenians
were killed in these lands and nobody but me dares to talk about it".
The new Turkish penal code makes it a crime to denigrate the national
identity, and Turkey's determination to force Pamuk to stand trial
is viewed by many in Western Europe as a "provocation".
Both these facts highlight underlying European tensions about the
Turkish accession to the EU. However, the impression is that some
governments in Western Europe are using such events to further
complicate the membership talks, thus gaining time and appeasing
recalcitrant and increasingly "euro-sceptic" public opinion at home.
Moreover, Europe is once again divided over the issue, augmenting
Turkey's frustration and possibly paving the way for further political
manoeuvring.
Europe's divisions and Turkey's irritation The real matter behind the
Turkish accession troubles is the EU enlargement process itself. It's
no secret that EU members are divided over the very nature of Europe's
political unification. Last year's big eastward enlargement left many
wondering what kind of union they were getting.
The real issue at hand is the viability of a 25-states federation as a
geopolitical unit - whereas sovereignty in Europe remains split between
a cumbersome supranational decision-level and a weakened national one.
In this respect, Bulgaria's and Romania's applications for EU
membership also appear to have become more complicated following the
EU Constitutional Treaty's failure and the new wave of euro-scepticism
in Western Europe.
Moreover, Ankara's integration would challenge the European cultural
identity because of its almost totally Muslim population and modify
the demographic balance in the Old Continent. By 2015, Turkey should
have surpassed Germany as the most populous EU country, which - given
the EU voting system - could have important political consequences
on the European parliament, which Paris and Berlin have perhaps
not anticipated.
Paradoxically, the traditionally more Europeanist states like France,
Germany, the Netherlands, or Italy, are disappointed with the EU
political integration process, which they had so strenuously advocated
during the 1990s. This is due to the difficulties in management the
single currency and to the "identity crisis" that has overcome the
"New Europe" - which quickly looked after its own security and
geopolitical goals by aligning with Washington and not with the
Franco-German combine on Iraq.
In addition, both the 2004 enlargement and (especially) the Turkish
membership issue are often perceived by Paris and Berlin as US and
British priorities, and that such processes are being managed according
to the Anglo-American agenda and timing.
All these elements are the driving forces behind recently conceived
proposals of an enhanced partnership between the EU and Turkey, to
be offered Ankara in place of a full membership - a proposal that
has been categorically rejected by Ankara.
In fact, as Italian ambassador Luigi V. Ferraris told to ISN-Security
Watch this week, it is now impossible to keep saying "no" to Ankara
- unless the latter did something so serious to become unacceptable
for the EU.
Turkey is a full member of NATO and is already part of the European
Council, and as such there is no solid basis upon which EU member
states could set up a coherently obstructionist position. Besides,
Ankara could easily perceive its real "fault" being its Muslim identity
- which would only fuel the fires of a "clash of civilizations"
that EU members want to avoid.
Apart from Turkey's obvious geopolitical and geostrategic importance,
as a land directly connecting the Balkan regions and the Black Sea
regions of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as well as the Syria,
Iraq, and Iran in the Middle East, some observers have highlighted
that Ankara's role in Europe could be that of epitomizing a modern
Muslim democracy to other influential Muslim states. Since it is often
repeated that one of the keys in tackling Islamist terror is to enhance
moderate Islam, such a "geo-cultural" function could be one of Turkey's
most attractive features to offer to its diffident EU partners.
On the contrary, should Turkey be eventually refused EU membership, its
ruling classes might turn towards enhanced strategic partnerships with
Syria and Iran from an anti-European perspective, thus complicating EU
efforts to make the East Mediterranean region a secure and stable area.
What is more, in recent years Turkey has worked hard to catch up with
European social and political standards, abolishing the death penalty,
accepting Kurdish as a language in schools, scrapping state security
courts, changing the penal code, and increasing civilian control over
the army.
Can London succeed?
According to Ambassador Ferraris, the current British EU Presidency
has an overtly different position from France, Germany, and the
Netherlands on Turkish membership. London is trying to smooth the
progress of Turkey's accession, but it is doubtful whether it will
have the strength to impose a decisive acceleration.
The Turkish issue was a central topic during recent French and Dutch
referendums on the EU Constitutional Treaty, and large parts of the
French public are unconvinced that welcoming Ankara into the EU is
in Paris' interests, Ferraris said.
In Germany, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) candidate Angela Merkel
has taken an anti-integrationist position during the election
campaign, but she is likely to mitigate her position should she
become chancellor, replacing Gerhard Schroder who has lobbied for
full Turkish membership in the EU.
Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD), on the contrary, keeps a
more cautious stand on the issue, also because of the large Turkish
community in Germany, whose votes are traditionally social-democrat.
However, German (but also French) decision-makers are still in need
of a clear strategy towards Turkey, whereas Italy appears, for the
moment, decidedly more aligned with London than with Paris and Berlin.
German federal elections, which took place on Sunday, proved to be a
tight race, with both Merkel and Schroder claiming victory on Monday
and the chancellor's post still up for grabs.
Stalling for time Independent of next week's talks, all major EU
states appear eager to stall for time. The Turkish membership issue
- already complicated if seen as a EU-Turkey bilateral affair -
is being made increasingly thorny by the French, German, Dutch and
other domestic political contexts.
With public opinion undecided - if not, sometimes, overtly hostile to
Ankara's accession - it is likely that both the new German government
and its French and Dutch homologues will start the negotiations knowing
that the latter will be very long, so that current governments will
hardly be the ones to resolve the matter.
In fact, according to Ambassador Ferraris, a sort of buck-passing from
present to future European administrations is not to be ruled-out,
even though sharp rhetoric against Turkish integration could be surface
when election campaigns in Western countries enter the decisive stage.
Federico Bordonaro, based in Italy, is an analyst of International
Relations and Geopolitics with the Power and Interest News Report
and Stategic-Road.com. His expertise is concentrated in the new
structure of the international system after the Cold War, the
European integration process, Security and Defense issues, and
political realism.