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Too soon for Turkish delight
Sep 29th 2005
The Economist Global Agenda
Formal talks are about to begin on Turkish membership of the European
Union. Within Turkey and outside it, there are questions about the
predominantly Muslim country's readiness for Europe-but also encouraging
signs
Corbis
Get article background
BARRING last-minute upsets, never to be ruled out as the diplomats
continued haggling this week, Turkey is on the brink of realising its
fondest national dream: on Monday October 3rd, formal talks will begin
on Turkish membership of a European Union at whose gate it has been
waiting for 40 years.
But as so often happens, the settlement of one question-should Turkey
step all the way into the EU's ante-room?-has quickly given rise to a
host of others. People are already asking how long rapprochement with
the EU can be sustained, in the face of opposition in Europe to
Turkey-and in Turkey to Europe.
Scepticism over the Turks surfaced again this week in the European
Parliament. The legislators, while endorsing the start of talks with the
government in Ankara, balked at ratifying Turkey's inclusion in a
customs protocol-on the grounds that the ships and aircraft of Cyprus,
an EU member, are still barred from Turkish ports. Dominique de
Villepin, the French prime minister, had earlier said that Turkey must
recognise Cyprus in order to join the EU. Nicolas Sarkozy, a popular
Gaullist who is well placed to win the French presidency in 2007,
opposes Turkish membership. So does Angela Merkel, who is favourite to
take Germany's chancellorship following its recent elections, which
ended in a hung parliament. Overall, just 35% of EU citizens support
Turkish membership, according to a recent poll by Eurobarometer.
Europeans are queasy about the idea of taking in a big Muslim member,
and of hordes of Turkish job-seekers overwhelming the EU's current
members.
But the other part of Turkey's Euro-question is even harder: how much
resistance will there be among the Turks to the changes-legal, economic,
and above all cultural-that the EU is demanding?
For Turks who want a European future, there was a dollop of hope last
weekend, when brave historians managed to hold a conference in Istanbul
to discuss the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. It was the first time
Turkish pundits were permitted to challenge publicly the official line,
holding that the mass deportation of Armenians in 1915 did not amount to
a conspiracy to kill them. As participants read out letters between the
"Young Turks" then ruling the empire, a rapt audience was left with no
doubt that hundreds of thousands of Armenians were deliberately slain.
Planned originally for May, the Armenian forum was called off then at
the behest of Cemil Cicek, the justice minister. It was nearly scuppered
anew last week, when an Istanbul court used a technicality to order its
cancellation. This time Mr Cicek offered a way out-changing the venue.
And Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, condemned the court
ruling: the first time an elected leader had so publicly rebuked
Turkey's courts. It was also the first time that Mr Erdogan had so
clearly given a lead to public opinion instead of pandering to populism.
The establishment media fell in behind him, decrying the noisy
nationalists who pelted the conference delegates with eggs.
Cynics, who recall Mr Erdogan's earlier moves to appease conservatives
by criminalising adultery, see his recent outburst of liberalism as a
last-ditch effort to clinch the October 3rd date. Be that as it may,
people close to the prime minister insist he has pinned his political
fortunes on further reforms, with or without the EU. "He can't compete
on nationalism with the ultra-nationalists, so it's in his interest to
keep on reforming," says a western diplomat.
This may explain some other recent moves by Mr Erdogan: he dared to
admit, in a speech in the Kurdish stronghold of Diyarbakir, that Turkey
had erred in its dealings with the Kurds. These frank words enraged
nationalists, including some members of his own party. In the country as
a whole, nationalism has been bubbling: it has been rising since June
2004, when the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) ended a five-year
truce.
Chauvinism has surfaced in ugly ways. There have been attempted
lynchings of Kurdish civilians outside their native south-east region. A
recent poll shows the jingoistic Nationalist Action Party, which failed
to enter parliament in the 2002 elections, would gain seats today.
As well as countering this dark mood, Mr Erdogan must cope with foes in
the army who fear that rapprochement with Europe will reduce their
power-and who see in Turkey's internal conflicts a chance to restore
that influence. But Mr Erdogan has rebuffed army demands to re-introduce
a draconian anti-terror law. Solving the Kurdish problem requires more
democracy, not repression, he insists. He may have to take further
risks-for example by endorsing, despite army opposition, a deal that
would coax 5,000 PKK fighters from their mountain strongholds, both in
northern Iraq and within Turkey.
The coming year will be a big test of Mr Erdogan's leadership. Austria,
a sceptic on Turkish entry, takes over the presidency of the EU in
January. The Austrians will doubtless promote their idea of a
"privileged partnership" between Turkey and Europe, instead of full
membership. Next year will also see the retirement of General Hilmi
Ozkok, a liberal chief of the general staff. His likely successor is the
land-forces commander, Yasar Buyukanit, a more old-fashioned type of
soldier. It is to keep such secularist hawks at bay that Mr Erdogan has
ignored some demands from his pious voters, such as boosting religious
education and easing curbs on the headscarf.
Another challenge, in his dealings both with sceptical Europeans and his
own voters, is to honour his claim to be giving Turkey its first clean
government. Charges of irregularity in the sale of shares in the state
refinery, Tupras-and also in a tender for the operation of Istanbul's
Galata port-have weakened that claim. Unless he deals with sleaze, Mr
Erdogan may lose the trust of his own citizens and his European
partners. That would be a pity, when the prime minister has risked so
much for Turkey's European future.
Sep 29th 2005
The Economist Global Agenda
Formal talks are about to begin on Turkish membership of the European
Union. Within Turkey and outside it, there are questions about the
predominantly Muslim country's readiness for Europe-but also encouraging
signs
Corbis
Get article background
BARRING last-minute upsets, never to be ruled out as the diplomats
continued haggling this week, Turkey is on the brink of realising its
fondest national dream: on Monday October 3rd, formal talks will begin
on Turkish membership of a European Union at whose gate it has been
waiting for 40 years.
But as so often happens, the settlement of one question-should Turkey
step all the way into the EU's ante-room?-has quickly given rise to a
host of others. People are already asking how long rapprochement with
the EU can be sustained, in the face of opposition in Europe to
Turkey-and in Turkey to Europe.
Scepticism over the Turks surfaced again this week in the European
Parliament. The legislators, while endorsing the start of talks with the
government in Ankara, balked at ratifying Turkey's inclusion in a
customs protocol-on the grounds that the ships and aircraft of Cyprus,
an EU member, are still barred from Turkish ports. Dominique de
Villepin, the French prime minister, had earlier said that Turkey must
recognise Cyprus in order to join the EU. Nicolas Sarkozy, a popular
Gaullist who is well placed to win the French presidency in 2007,
opposes Turkish membership. So does Angela Merkel, who is favourite to
take Germany's chancellorship following its recent elections, which
ended in a hung parliament. Overall, just 35% of EU citizens support
Turkish membership, according to a recent poll by Eurobarometer.
Europeans are queasy about the idea of taking in a big Muslim member,
and of hordes of Turkish job-seekers overwhelming the EU's current
members.
But the other part of Turkey's Euro-question is even harder: how much
resistance will there be among the Turks to the changes-legal, economic,
and above all cultural-that the EU is demanding?
For Turks who want a European future, there was a dollop of hope last
weekend, when brave historians managed to hold a conference in Istanbul
to discuss the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. It was the first time
Turkish pundits were permitted to challenge publicly the official line,
holding that the mass deportation of Armenians in 1915 did not amount to
a conspiracy to kill them. As participants read out letters between the
"Young Turks" then ruling the empire, a rapt audience was left with no
doubt that hundreds of thousands of Armenians were deliberately slain.
Planned originally for May, the Armenian forum was called off then at
the behest of Cemil Cicek, the justice minister. It was nearly scuppered
anew last week, when an Istanbul court used a technicality to order its
cancellation. This time Mr Cicek offered a way out-changing the venue.
And Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, condemned the court
ruling: the first time an elected leader had so publicly rebuked
Turkey's courts. It was also the first time that Mr Erdogan had so
clearly given a lead to public opinion instead of pandering to populism.
The establishment media fell in behind him, decrying the noisy
nationalists who pelted the conference delegates with eggs.
Cynics, who recall Mr Erdogan's earlier moves to appease conservatives
by criminalising adultery, see his recent outburst of liberalism as a
last-ditch effort to clinch the October 3rd date. Be that as it may,
people close to the prime minister insist he has pinned his political
fortunes on further reforms, with or without the EU. "He can't compete
on nationalism with the ultra-nationalists, so it's in his interest to
keep on reforming," says a western diplomat.
This may explain some other recent moves by Mr Erdogan: he dared to
admit, in a speech in the Kurdish stronghold of Diyarbakir, that Turkey
had erred in its dealings with the Kurds. These frank words enraged
nationalists, including some members of his own party. In the country as
a whole, nationalism has been bubbling: it has been rising since June
2004, when the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) ended a five-year
truce.
Chauvinism has surfaced in ugly ways. There have been attempted
lynchings of Kurdish civilians outside their native south-east region. A
recent poll shows the jingoistic Nationalist Action Party, which failed
to enter parliament in the 2002 elections, would gain seats today.
As well as countering this dark mood, Mr Erdogan must cope with foes in
the army who fear that rapprochement with Europe will reduce their
power-and who see in Turkey's internal conflicts a chance to restore
that influence. But Mr Erdogan has rebuffed army demands to re-introduce
a draconian anti-terror law. Solving the Kurdish problem requires more
democracy, not repression, he insists. He may have to take further
risks-for example by endorsing, despite army opposition, a deal that
would coax 5,000 PKK fighters from their mountain strongholds, both in
northern Iraq and within Turkey.
The coming year will be a big test of Mr Erdogan's leadership. Austria,
a sceptic on Turkish entry, takes over the presidency of the EU in
January. The Austrians will doubtless promote their idea of a
"privileged partnership" between Turkey and Europe, instead of full
membership. Next year will also see the retirement of General Hilmi
Ozkok, a liberal chief of the general staff. His likely successor is the
land-forces commander, Yasar Buyukanit, a more old-fashioned type of
soldier. It is to keep such secularist hawks at bay that Mr Erdogan has
ignored some demands from his pious voters, such as boosting religious
education and easing curbs on the headscarf.
Another challenge, in his dealings both with sceptical Europeans and his
own voters, is to honour his claim to be giving Turkey its first clean
government. Charges of irregularity in the sale of shares in the state
refinery, Tupras-and also in a tender for the operation of Istanbul's
Galata port-have weakened that claim. Unless he deals with sleaze, Mr
Erdogan may lose the trust of his own citizens and his European
partners. That would be a pity, when the prime minister has risked so
much for Turkey's European future.