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"THE US HAS DONE ITS BEST FOR ARMENIA": INTERVIEW OF AZERI POLITICAL EXPERT MUBARRIZ AHMEDOGLU
www.regnum.ru/english/615207.html
13:19 04/02/2006
On March 31 the world Azeris commemorated the Day of the Azeri
Genocide. In his March 26, 1998, decree Azeri President Haydar Aliyev
proclaimed March 31 as the Day of the Azerbaijani Genocide. Among
other tragic pages of Azerbaijan's history of the 20th century, decree
mentions the Karabakh conflict. REGNUM has met with influential Azeri
political expert, the director of the Center for Political Strategies
and Innovations (Baku) Mubarriz Ahmedoglu and asked him to give is
view of the present state of the Karabakh conflict,
REGNUM: The Azeri authorities have repeatedly said that the Karabakh
talks with Armenia must be stopped if Armenia starts to just "imitate"
its participation in the talks. What would be the criteria of such
"imitation"?
After Rambouillet (the meeting of Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and
Armenian President Robert Kocharyan in Rambouillet, France, Feb
10-11 2006 -- REGNUM), Armenia has strongly reduced its imitation
arsenal, it has opened all its "cards": until recently Armenia has
kept changing its position on the Karabakh problem. When summing up
the results of 2004, Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan said
that Armenia was ready to show flexibility and to agree to put off
the date of the referendum for determining Karabakh's status. In
Rambouillet Armenia said that the status issue was a priority.
But in practice, without external forces, including the OSCE Minsk
Group, Armenia has little - if any -- diplomatic potential for
imitation. In fact, it has little time. In the autumn 2006 Armenia
will enter a pre-electoral period, while Azerbaijan has already gone
through elections and will feel freer to choose imitation criteria.
REGNUM: Do you believe in the military way to solve the conflict?
Armenia is leading us to it and knows it itself. There can be several
types of military solution:
- real, serious, bloody war;
- use of military technologies;
- war for saving image.
The first scenario will impact the whole Caucasus. If the war fails
to reveal the winner - it will inevitably lead to a new war. The war
will exhaust both sides and will put them in a stalemate. But what is
more interesting is what will come next: Azerbaijan can recover its
potential, while Armenia can't. It's naïve to think that military
and other analysts have overlooked the scenario of the sides' first
spending their military resources and then starting a new war for
an easy victory. In this context, one should take seriously the use
of military technologies. I think that if Armenia has to choose -
to get Karabakh back by war or by peace -- it will choose war. This
is an obligatory condition for the existence of the Armenian national
ideology. The theory that in case of war Azerbaijan's war sector will
stand idle is nothing but an illusion. The world depends on oil and,
particularly, on the oil and the transit potential of Azerbaijan. There
is always demand for oil and it must be satisfied in any case.
REGNUM: The problem of the occupied districts and the problem of
Karabakh itself - should they be solved one after another or in one
"package"?
If the question is about Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, its
sovereignty, the inviolability of its borders and the liberation of
all its occupied lands, including Karabakh, the best scenario is a
"package." The choice between the "package" and "step-by-step" models
does not matter much here. What really matters is that "the level
and depth of Azeri-Armenians relations are directly proportional to
Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Karabakh. There is also a possibility
of just diplomatic rather than full value relations between Azerbaijan
and Armenia."
REGNUM: Throughout the conflict Armenia and Azerbaijan have carried out
state-level propaganda against each other. If Karabakh gets autonomy
within Azerbaijan, will the Azeri state machine be able to "retune
itself" to integration of the Karabakh Armenians with Azerbaijan.
It certainly will. The history of our neighborhood is not only wars,
genocides and separatism. The survey of social ties between the three
South Caucasian nations has shown a lot. Azeris had much better social
ties with Armenians than with Georgians.
REGNUM: How then could the events of 1988 be possible? Were they
a result of some old conflict hid by the Soviet authorities under
the cover of "Socialist internationalism"? Was there actually peace
between the two nations before 1988? If there was, then who and what
for broke that peace?
In the Soviet times the Armenians had centers abroad that developed an
ideology different from the Soviet one. The Soviet-time archives can
tell a lot. When the Soviet Union got weaker, the western centers set a
goal to destroy the Soviet ideology and the USSR itself. The Armenian
Diaspora became a tool in their hands in their anti-Soviet plot. The
Armenians' attempt to kindle nationalism was not a coincidence. They
started such processes in Karabakh and Javakheti (Georgia) at almost
one and the same time. But realizing that they would not be able
to hold two wars at one time, they gave prevalence to the religious
factor and chose Karabakh. This very process led to the USSR collapse.
Before 1988 the history of our peoples was favorable for
co-existence. This does not mean that the Armenians' separatism got
no response from Azerbaijan. I guess this will continue like that.
REGNUM: They in Azerbaijan are getting increasing displeased with the
work of the OSCE Minsk Group. What steps by international mediators
would get a more positive response in the country?
When Azerbaijan got the UN Security Council to consider the Karabakh
problem, the OSCE MG supported Armenia. They did their best to save
Armenia from international sanctions. There are many examples of the
mediators' partiality. Azerbaijan needs an impartial fair mediation
by the OSCE MG. Finding themselves in a fix after Rambouillet, the
MG co-chairs have begun to express displeasure with their mandate
that was formalized as long ago as 1992-1993.
Today's realities are much different from those times. The status of
mediator should be raised to arbiter. For Armenia the only acceptable
mediator is the OSCE, who makes decisions through consensus unlike
other international organizations. Except for its own self, Armenia
doesn't trust anybody - either Russia or the US or France. That's why
Armenia needs an organization voting by consensus, while organizations
voting by majority (PACE, the Council of Europe, in many cases,
the UN) are a danger for that country. Azerbaijan knows that and,
on the contrary, is interested in such organizations.
Still any international organizations, including the OSCE MG, who
have a mediator-arbiter status and comply with the international law,
may get positive response in Azerbaijan.
REGNUM: Now that the American-Iranian conflict is possible, is
Armenia's role of Iran's partner growing? Do you expect any changes
in the US' policy on the Karabakh conflict?
In the possible US-Iran war I don't see Armenia as a partner that could
worry the US. On the contrary, they in Armenia want their territory
to be used against Iran and Turkey. Armenia was happy when the US and
Turkey revealed contradictions over Iraq. They think that conflict
with Turkey will force the US to change its attitude to Armenia. Some
Armenian political experts and politicians advocate the model "small
Israel, Great Armenia," whose gist is to be a tool for the US in its
fight against the Muslim world (first of all, against Turkey and Iran).
The US has done all it could for Armenia: in 1989 US Congress passed
two resolutions on the Karabakh conflict; in 1992 they adopted
Section 907 of Freedom Supporting Act (a document prohibiting the
US governmental support of Azerbaijan because of its blockade of
Armenia and Karabakh. The Section was abolished by Senate in 2001 --
REGNUM). But the key point is that the US is the only country - except
Armenia - who provides official assistance to the "Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic." I don't expect any changes in the quality of US-Armenian
relations, but Armenia is resolved to make them tighter.
The possible war between the US and Iran might and may have an impact
on the Karabakh peace process. If Azerbaijan agreed to the use of
its territory against Iran, things would develop otherwise. But
Azerbaijan didn't and will hardly do. But still, Iran's position can
change many things.
REGNUM: Many in Azerbaijan say that the international structures must
recognize Armenia as an aggressor. Why doesn't this happen?
Double standards are wide-spread in the world powers. Even Russia,
who is suffering from double standards itself, is applying them to
Karabakh. By the way, the declaration signed by the Russian and Azeri
presidents during President Putin's last visit to Azerbaijan has
changed Russia's attitude to the Karabakh conflict. The declaration
allows saying that Russia advocates peace process in the framework
of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, sovereignty and border
inviolability in conformity with the UN resolutions and with the
mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group. I think this to be very important.
An important factor here is the relations between Islam and
Christianity. But the most important factor is the time. In the first
years of the Karabakh conflict Armenia was winning the information
war. Now Azerbaijan is seeking information prevalence, and I would
not say it is not successful.
REGNUM: If there is a possibility of an agreement on the principal
ways to solve the Karabakh conflict - who should sign it? Given the
presence of Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) armed forces in Karabakh
and around it, should NKR be a party to the negotiating process?
The Karabakh agreement must be signed by the Armenian and Azeri
presidents. There is no other way even in your case. 2/3 of the budget
of "NKR" is paid by Armenia. Of the 20,000-strong "NKR" army only 2,000
are Karabakh Armenians, while 18,000 are citizens of Armenia. Only
after stopping any military, political and economic relations with
Armenia will "NKR" be able to say that it is a subject and can exist
independently. "NKR" does not have necessary resources for holding
talks. At least, it has claims not only against Azerbaijan but also
against Armenia.
REGNUM: Let's assume Karabakh gets autonomy within Azerbaijan. Is
it then possible to create a land "corridor" to link Karabakh with
Armenia? Who will be able to ensure its security?
Of course, it is possible. Before the conflict these regions (Lachin,
Gubadli) had normal land communications with Armenia. Now it is
possible both to restore the old roads and to build new ones. The
Armenians exaggerate the problem of security. They are ready to ask
even God for security guarantees. The world community will get tired
of it one day.
--Boundary_(ID_FIuS2UNgFV93D2zzr9XYPg)--
www.regnum.ru/english/615207.html
13:19 04/02/2006
On March 31 the world Azeris commemorated the Day of the Azeri
Genocide. In his March 26, 1998, decree Azeri President Haydar Aliyev
proclaimed March 31 as the Day of the Azerbaijani Genocide. Among
other tragic pages of Azerbaijan's history of the 20th century, decree
mentions the Karabakh conflict. REGNUM has met with influential Azeri
political expert, the director of the Center for Political Strategies
and Innovations (Baku) Mubarriz Ahmedoglu and asked him to give is
view of the present state of the Karabakh conflict,
REGNUM: The Azeri authorities have repeatedly said that the Karabakh
talks with Armenia must be stopped if Armenia starts to just "imitate"
its participation in the talks. What would be the criteria of such
"imitation"?
After Rambouillet (the meeting of Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and
Armenian President Robert Kocharyan in Rambouillet, France, Feb
10-11 2006 -- REGNUM), Armenia has strongly reduced its imitation
arsenal, it has opened all its "cards": until recently Armenia has
kept changing its position on the Karabakh problem. When summing up
the results of 2004, Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanyan said
that Armenia was ready to show flexibility and to agree to put off
the date of the referendum for determining Karabakh's status. In
Rambouillet Armenia said that the status issue was a priority.
But in practice, without external forces, including the OSCE Minsk
Group, Armenia has little - if any -- diplomatic potential for
imitation. In fact, it has little time. In the autumn 2006 Armenia
will enter a pre-electoral period, while Azerbaijan has already gone
through elections and will feel freer to choose imitation criteria.
REGNUM: Do you believe in the military way to solve the conflict?
Armenia is leading us to it and knows it itself. There can be several
types of military solution:
- real, serious, bloody war;
- use of military technologies;
- war for saving image.
The first scenario will impact the whole Caucasus. If the war fails
to reveal the winner - it will inevitably lead to a new war. The war
will exhaust both sides and will put them in a stalemate. But what is
more interesting is what will come next: Azerbaijan can recover its
potential, while Armenia can't. It's naïve to think that military
and other analysts have overlooked the scenario of the sides' first
spending their military resources and then starting a new war for
an easy victory. In this context, one should take seriously the use
of military technologies. I think that if Armenia has to choose -
to get Karabakh back by war or by peace -- it will choose war. This
is an obligatory condition for the existence of the Armenian national
ideology. The theory that in case of war Azerbaijan's war sector will
stand idle is nothing but an illusion. The world depends on oil and,
particularly, on the oil and the transit potential of Azerbaijan. There
is always demand for oil and it must be satisfied in any case.
REGNUM: The problem of the occupied districts and the problem of
Karabakh itself - should they be solved one after another or in one
"package"?
If the question is about Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, its
sovereignty, the inviolability of its borders and the liberation of
all its occupied lands, including Karabakh, the best scenario is a
"package." The choice between the "package" and "step-by-step" models
does not matter much here. What really matters is that "the level
and depth of Azeri-Armenians relations are directly proportional to
Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Karabakh. There is also a possibility
of just diplomatic rather than full value relations between Azerbaijan
and Armenia."
REGNUM: Throughout the conflict Armenia and Azerbaijan have carried out
state-level propaganda against each other. If Karabakh gets autonomy
within Azerbaijan, will the Azeri state machine be able to "retune
itself" to integration of the Karabakh Armenians with Azerbaijan.
It certainly will. The history of our neighborhood is not only wars,
genocides and separatism. The survey of social ties between the three
South Caucasian nations has shown a lot. Azeris had much better social
ties with Armenians than with Georgians.
REGNUM: How then could the events of 1988 be possible? Were they
a result of some old conflict hid by the Soviet authorities under
the cover of "Socialist internationalism"? Was there actually peace
between the two nations before 1988? If there was, then who and what
for broke that peace?
In the Soviet times the Armenians had centers abroad that developed an
ideology different from the Soviet one. The Soviet-time archives can
tell a lot. When the Soviet Union got weaker, the western centers set a
goal to destroy the Soviet ideology and the USSR itself. The Armenian
Diaspora became a tool in their hands in their anti-Soviet plot. The
Armenians' attempt to kindle nationalism was not a coincidence. They
started such processes in Karabakh and Javakheti (Georgia) at almost
one and the same time. But realizing that they would not be able
to hold two wars at one time, they gave prevalence to the religious
factor and chose Karabakh. This very process led to the USSR collapse.
Before 1988 the history of our peoples was favorable for
co-existence. This does not mean that the Armenians' separatism got
no response from Azerbaijan. I guess this will continue like that.
REGNUM: They in Azerbaijan are getting increasing displeased with the
work of the OSCE Minsk Group. What steps by international mediators
would get a more positive response in the country?
When Azerbaijan got the UN Security Council to consider the Karabakh
problem, the OSCE MG supported Armenia. They did their best to save
Armenia from international sanctions. There are many examples of the
mediators' partiality. Azerbaijan needs an impartial fair mediation
by the OSCE MG. Finding themselves in a fix after Rambouillet, the
MG co-chairs have begun to express displeasure with their mandate
that was formalized as long ago as 1992-1993.
Today's realities are much different from those times. The status of
mediator should be raised to arbiter. For Armenia the only acceptable
mediator is the OSCE, who makes decisions through consensus unlike
other international organizations. Except for its own self, Armenia
doesn't trust anybody - either Russia or the US or France. That's why
Armenia needs an organization voting by consensus, while organizations
voting by majority (PACE, the Council of Europe, in many cases,
the UN) are a danger for that country. Azerbaijan knows that and,
on the contrary, is interested in such organizations.
Still any international organizations, including the OSCE MG, who
have a mediator-arbiter status and comply with the international law,
may get positive response in Azerbaijan.
REGNUM: Now that the American-Iranian conflict is possible, is
Armenia's role of Iran's partner growing? Do you expect any changes
in the US' policy on the Karabakh conflict?
In the possible US-Iran war I don't see Armenia as a partner that could
worry the US. On the contrary, they in Armenia want their territory
to be used against Iran and Turkey. Armenia was happy when the US and
Turkey revealed contradictions over Iraq. They think that conflict
with Turkey will force the US to change its attitude to Armenia. Some
Armenian political experts and politicians advocate the model "small
Israel, Great Armenia," whose gist is to be a tool for the US in its
fight against the Muslim world (first of all, against Turkey and Iran).
The US has done all it could for Armenia: in 1989 US Congress passed
two resolutions on the Karabakh conflict; in 1992 they adopted
Section 907 of Freedom Supporting Act (a document prohibiting the
US governmental support of Azerbaijan because of its blockade of
Armenia and Karabakh. The Section was abolished by Senate in 2001 --
REGNUM). But the key point is that the US is the only country - except
Armenia - who provides official assistance to the "Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic." I don't expect any changes in the quality of US-Armenian
relations, but Armenia is resolved to make them tighter.
The possible war between the US and Iran might and may have an impact
on the Karabakh peace process. If Azerbaijan agreed to the use of
its territory against Iran, things would develop otherwise. But
Azerbaijan didn't and will hardly do. But still, Iran's position can
change many things.
REGNUM: Many in Azerbaijan say that the international structures must
recognize Armenia as an aggressor. Why doesn't this happen?
Double standards are wide-spread in the world powers. Even Russia,
who is suffering from double standards itself, is applying them to
Karabakh. By the way, the declaration signed by the Russian and Azeri
presidents during President Putin's last visit to Azerbaijan has
changed Russia's attitude to the Karabakh conflict. The declaration
allows saying that Russia advocates peace process in the framework
of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, sovereignty and border
inviolability in conformity with the UN resolutions and with the
mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group. I think this to be very important.
An important factor here is the relations between Islam and
Christianity. But the most important factor is the time. In the first
years of the Karabakh conflict Armenia was winning the information
war. Now Azerbaijan is seeking information prevalence, and I would
not say it is not successful.
REGNUM: If there is a possibility of an agreement on the principal
ways to solve the Karabakh conflict - who should sign it? Given the
presence of Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) armed forces in Karabakh
and around it, should NKR be a party to the negotiating process?
The Karabakh agreement must be signed by the Armenian and Azeri
presidents. There is no other way even in your case. 2/3 of the budget
of "NKR" is paid by Armenia. Of the 20,000-strong "NKR" army only 2,000
are Karabakh Armenians, while 18,000 are citizens of Armenia. Only
after stopping any military, political and economic relations with
Armenia will "NKR" be able to say that it is a subject and can exist
independently. "NKR" does not have necessary resources for holding
talks. At least, it has claims not only against Azerbaijan but also
against Armenia.
REGNUM: Let's assume Karabakh gets autonomy within Azerbaijan. Is
it then possible to create a land "corridor" to link Karabakh with
Armenia? Who will be able to ensure its security?
Of course, it is possible. Before the conflict these regions (Lachin,
Gubadli) had normal land communications with Armenia. Now it is
possible both to restore the old roads and to build new ones. The
Armenians exaggerate the problem of security. They are ready to ask
even God for security guarantees. The world community will get tired
of it one day.
--Boundary_(ID_FIuS2UNgFV93D2zzr9XYPg)--