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YURI NABIYEV: PROSPECTS OF KURDISH STATEHOOD
Yuri Nabiyev - Chief Editor of www.kurdistan.ru
www.regnum.ru/english/616672.htm l
http://www.regnum.ru/english/616672.html
14:02 04/06/2006
The first Russian to set his foot in Kurdistan in the 40s of XIX was
the professor of St. Petersburg University Wilhelm Dittel, who said
that while being Russia's immediate and quite important neighbor,
that country was still a real terra incognita. Though much time
has passed since then, this remark is still true. Kurdistan is an
unknown country; the Kurds are an unknown nation; Kurdish cause is an
unknown cause - a problem mostly known as existing and threatening
the world stability. But if in the times of Dittel and, partly, in
XX, the knowledge of the Kurds was mostly of academic nature and its
lack was no obstacle to the real policy making, today the Kurds and
the Kurdish cause are coming into the foreground in the Middle East,
and this is becoming politically intolerant.
That's why, in order to give you a clear picture of how the Kurdish
cause and the Kurdish national movement developed, I will have to
detail the key historical facts that few in Russia, unfortunately,
know. As you may know, XIX was a century of nationalism; by XX
this concept had reached the East to replace the local traditional
ideologies. Meanwhile, for the reasons I'd rather avoid dwelling
on here, the Kurds came to this point with a society that was far
from the standards of those times. They had a mostly tribal social
structure, almost no urban class or no high society. Politically,
Kurdistan was divided between the retrograde Turkish and Iranian
empires (who later proved ability to upgrade).
In presenting the Kurdish nationalism, I'd rather omit its background,
i.e. the XIX movements to create a Kurdish state, i.e. the attempts
to gain independence from Turkey by Emir Bedir Xan Bey (1840s),
and his nephew Yazdanshir (1855) or, finally, the campaign of Sheik
Obeidullah against Iran (1880), which was almost the first time the
Kurds openly spoke about creating their own state.
I'd rather start from the Young Turk Revolution, i.e. from 1908,
when the first Kurdish clubs and societies began an active campaign
for independence. But because of the archaism of the Kurdish society
they failed to form a strong political movement, like the Turks'
Unity and Progress or the Armenians' Dashnaktsoutyun - a force that,
with popular support, could consistently and consciously champion the
national interests of the Kurds. This all proved fatal for the Kurds
during the WWI, when the Turks - first Young Turks then Kemalists -
carried them away with Panislamist slogans and used them for their
own purposes.
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 was a unique chance for
the Kurds to create their own state, at least, under the protectorate
of the League of Nations, or, why not, the Entente. As you may know,
articles 62 and 65 of the Treaty of Sevres provided for Kurdistan's
independence. But they missed that chance because of the selfsame
archaism of their society.
I can't say the Kurds did not fight for independence. The ideas
of a nation' s self-determination right, officially proclaimed
and partly realized by the Entente, and the Russian revolution,
taken in Kurdistan as an attempt to create a new fair world system -
had impressed the Kurds a lot. In 1920 the Mosul villayet, i.e. the
present-day Iraqi Kurdistan, was in the flame of never-ending revolts:
Sheik Mahmud Barzanji proclaimed himself as the King of Kurdistan in
Sulaymaniya. He did it twice and once (1921) was even half-recognized
by the British government. A similar attempt was made by the leader
of the Iranian Kurds Ismail Aga Simko. But their tribal movements
were doomed to failure.
The fate of Kurdistan was to be decided in Turkey, which was home
to most Kurdish tribes. But lacking modern political consciousness,
they easily fell pray to the Kemalists, who led them under the
Islamic and anti-imperial slogans against their natural allies -
the Greeks and the Entente. A peace treaty was finally concluded in
Lausanne in 1923 to set the present-day state borders in the Middle
East. Right afterwards the Turkish nationalists threw off their masks
and fell on the Kurds with the whole weight of their renewed state
machinery. Only then did the Kurds understand what mistake they had
made. But their following rebels (1925, 1927-1930, 1937) made things
even worse for them and better for the Kemalists, who used every riot
as a pretext for a new repression, barbarian assimilation - in fact,
a genocide. The Kurds missed their chance in Lausanne -- a post-war
status quo was set that nobody wanted to break.
In the new post-war states Iraq and Syria and in the quickly modernized
Pahlevi Iran and Kemalist Turkey the Kurds went through all the pains
an ethnic minority can go through in an ultranationalist centralized
state. But they too got modernized between the wars. Their society
was quickly developing, their intelligentsia and urban class were
growing, this providing a natural basis for nationalist organizations:
Khoybun (Independence) in Turkey, Life of Kurdistan in Iran, Khiva
(Hope) in Iraq. At the time the WWII began, the Kurds were already a
well-organized and politically conscious society. But their trouble
was that the war affected them only indirectly.
The key result of the war for the Kurds was Mehabad - a short-lived
republic proclaimed over an area of Northern Iran occupied by the
Soviet Union. In Iraq Mustafa Barzani stirred the Barzan tribe to a
rebellion that finally forced Baghdad into big concessions. The Barzan
rebellion was never followed by an all Kurdish movement even though
it was much better organized than any previous tribal action: it was
backed by Khiva, offered a clear program of autonomy and even had
its political representatives abroad. But Mehabad was an upper-class
project with no popular support. That's why it was so short-lived:
the Barzan uprising was put down after the war, when Great Britain
helped Iraq.
The Mehabard Republic fell down not long after, when the Soviet troops
left Iran. The key legacy of the Mehabard Republic and the Barzan
rebellion was Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and Democratic
Party of Kurdistan (Iraq) - two driving national forces for the
Iranian and Iraq Kurds.
Until then, as we can see, the Kurdish society was too weak internally
to capitalize on a favorable international situation. But after the
war things turned around. Now the Kurds were internally ready to get
what they need: the uprising of Mustafa Barzani in Iraqki Kurdistan in
1961-1975 quickly grew into a pan-national liberation movement. But
the international situation was not favorable. There was again a
status quo, and again nobody wanted to break it.
The system of Yalta was apparently tougher than that of Versailles. The
supper powers played each their game in the Middle East, but none of
them wanted unpredictable changes that could spoil their games. The
Kurdish movement could spoil the games of both blocs: the West was
afraid of destabilization of allied Turkey and Iran, the Soviet Union -
of Arab regimes.
That's why in 1975 both sides allowed Saddam to crush the de
facto existing rebel state in Iraqi Kurdistan and then had been
cold-bloodedly watching for 15 years how the Kurds went through
genocide, mass deportation and gas attacks - a suffering that lasted
till 1990, when the breakdown of the whole post-war global system,
on the one hand, and Saddam's Kuwaiti adventure, on the other,
spoiled the Middle East game once again.
There is one interesting paradox: in XX almost all the events and
processes that benefited other nations, harmed the Kurds. This
is equally true for the triumph of the principle of national
self-determination after 1918 and the triumph of the principle of
decolonization after 1945. 1918 made the Kurds a part to a number
of national states with nationalist governments, while 1945 made
those governments uncontrolled to commit such actions in Syria and
especially Iraq that nobody would ever imagine in the mandate epoch.
The new tectonic shift of the 90s has brought about a drastically
new situation. On the one hand, the Kurds were politically ready
for changes, but, on the other, Kurdistan and the Middle East, in
general, were no longer a periphery but the epicenter of the new
world re-division. This brought on stage a force that was extremely
interested in the Kurds and, luckily for them, the only super power
on the globe. That's why now the Kurds are facing a mirror situation:
whatever is happening is good for them, and even their own mistakes --
sometimes quite big - can't make things worse.
The downfall of the Yalta system caused by the Gorbachev perestroika
implied inevitable global changes. But nothing special happened in the
Middle East and would probably not were it not for Saddam's Kuwaiti
adventure. Kuwait pushed America into action; and once it began to
act it couldn't stop halfway.
Let's briefly remember the crucial events of 1991: the defeat of
Saddam, the national revolt in Kurdistan, its suppression, the mass
flee of Kurds to Turkey and Iran and the consequent Northern Watch
operation to expel Iraqi troops from part of Kurdistan and to establish
a de facto independent Kurdish state there. Luckily for the Kurds,
there was already no Soviet threat at that time, and Turkey was no
longer a key player in the US' geo-political games; Iran was no longer
the US' friend and Syria was outside its concerns at all. And so,
the US could well afford supporting the Iraqi Kurds, at least, within
the boundaries set by its still important alliance with Turkey. But
the Turks blundered themselves, when in Mar 2003 they refused to
provide their territory for the US attack on Iraq. This, naturally,
freed the Americans from a number of commitments to Turkey. The
shares of Turkey dropped in price, while those of the Kurds, on the
contrary, rose. Ever since, the US - sometimes even demonstratively -
has ignored Turkey's interests in Iraqi Kurdistan.
So, as a result of the events of 1991-2003 we have a de facto
half-independent and de jure legal Kurdish state, which, in fact, is
the US' strongest geo-political base in the region. Like it or not,
but the last point is a fact.
Indisputably, the US' interest in Kurdish statehood in Iraq makes Iraqi
Kurdistan an almost invulnerable real political and economic force
for friends, enemies and any partners in general. So, the national
core is already existent, and what will happen with it depends on
both national Kurdish and regional politics. Given the national rise
in Kurdistan and the political downfall and the growing US pressure
in Syria and Iran, the Kurds are facing quite good prospects.
This is the general outline of the present political situation around
Kurdistan. But to see it more clearly, we should remember that
Kurdistan is by no means an isolated independent system, but just
a sub-system of the Middle East and, more widely, of the world. So,
we should understand what an impact the general regional and global
processes are having on Kurdistan.
We should not forget that the social-political systems formed in the
Middle East in XX were, in fact, traditional societies transformed into
industrial ones. All the processes in the region -- from the Young
Turk Revolution and the Iranian Revolution of 1905 till our days -
have, in fact, been attempts to modernize and industrialize traditional
society - attempts of "catch-up development" - and, on the other hand,
protective reaction of traditionalism to modernization. The state
authority is as always the driving force - the demiurge that reforms
old and weak society. The ideology of this authority is Progressive
Nationalism; while Socialism was the society's reaction to the
difficulties of modernization against the old system. But having won,
Socialism has turned into bitter Etatism itself.
By the mid 1970 the process of industrialization and modernization
reached its climax to later go into crisis. The first sign of the
crisis was emerging Islamism. Islamism is an ideology of crisis; it is
absolutely negative and has nothing positive in it even compared with
Socialism. It can't reform society. The only positive thing Khomeini
did was liberalizing the private economy sector choked by the Shah
Socialism. But this has nothing to do with Islamism as such. Hence,
we can say that the present-day Islamic Republic of Iran is not a new
stage of development of the Iranian society and state, but the old,
industrial Shah Iran in crisis and agony.
Now we are living in a period of "post-industrial society,"
"post-modernist society," "society of high technologies." Globalization
is quickly developing: national states are losing their
self-sufficiency, sovereignty is losing its clear definition. Against
this background, the Socialist and Nationalist Etatism looks just
a museum anachronism. Today, there is no alternative to western
democratic society, as 100 years ago there was no alternative
to European government forms. True, Islamism is trying to be an
alternative, but, as we have already said, it can't be one as it has
no positive content.
These changes gave new life to the Kurdish cause, which had been
dead since 1975. It was almost impracticable in the former system of
national sovereignties. The Kurds' own sovereignty would do bad to
many and good to nobody.
Their real autonomy was also impossible because of the abovementioned
Etatism and Centralism of the eastern states, who would not tolerate
any self-government. But having no institutions that could protect
their interests, the Kurds could not get elementary equality from
their nationalist military-bureaucratic rulers.
The first sign of global changes for the Kurds was the events of
1991. The Kurds had noticed nothing like that before: for example,
while expressing deep concern for the human rights situation in the
USSR and the fate of each Soviet dissident, the US strangely "passed
by" the annihilation of 200,000 Kurds in Iraq and even the gas attack
Halabji, which, unlike Anfal, resounded all over the world due to
Iran's active propaganda. The Kuwaiti crisis was also a traditional
collective repression against an aggressor-state encroaching on
a sovereignty. As soon as Kuwait's sovereignty was restored, the
military campaign was stopped to leave the Iraqi rebels face to face
with dictatorship.
As a result, two millions Kurds rushed to the Turkish border. In the
previous years the Turks (like any other sovereign country) would
have closed the border and, if need be, used machine-guns. But not
then: not that Ankara thought it impossible, it just feared possible
international reaction. Meanwhile, the Western countries had to do
something, at least, to prevent the transit of Kurdish refugees via
Turkey to Europe. It was exactly then that the term " humanitarian
intervention" first appeared.
It was then that it was finally and formally proclaimed that human
rights violations cannot be an internal affair of a state or a matter
of national sovereignty. A Northern Watch operation was launched,
and Turkey was forced to do exactly what it had always feared more
than death - to create Kurdistan.
Since then we have seen more or less successful attempts of
humanitarian intervention in Somalia and former Yugoslavia; and
finally, a new Gulf War. We see that in just a decade after the first
Gulf War, the true and key reason for Bush Senior to attack Iraq. --
i.e. the threat it posed to the sovereignty of other states - turned
into an open cover for Bush Junior - a traditional, formally legal
pretext nobody believed.
Saddam's imaginary heroic love of freedom was not the true reason
either: Saddam was a pragmatic and, no doubt, America would get from
him whatever it might want. The true reason for the war 2003 was
the understanding that the Saddam regime could no longer be endured
in the modern world system. The fall of the Saddam regime was the
beginning of the end for the ruling regimes in Syria and Iran, and
neither the Syrian Baasists nor the Iranian Islamists will stay in
power for long - they are historically doomed. But the tragic problem
here is that the Damascus and Tehran regimes (as earlier the regime
in Baghdad) are too closely tied with their national statehoods and
their fall would bring ruin and chaos in Syria and Iran. Still, there
is no alternative to the Syrian and Iranian statehoods. The question
is what forms they will take. But whatever it might be - peaceful
democratization or terrible devastation, the Kurds will be at profit.
Finally, Turkey. It too can't stay away from the global
processes. Luckily, the Turkish social-political system is more
flexible and, mostly importantly, is strongly bound up with the West
and oriented towards Europe. This forces Turkey to comply with the
Western criteria: to give up the ideas of Kemalism and to gradually
liberalize its Kurdish policy. They do it not as quickly as the Kurds
would want them to - for they are strongly opposed by many influential
Turkish forces, who believe that this will ruin Kemalist Turkey as
a unitary national state.
They may have reason, but this process is inevitable, and the only
thing they can do is just to delay it - just a bit. Hence, the general
vector of the political developments in the region is good for the
Kurds. Turkey's accession into the EU is certainly good for them: in
some ten years the biggest part of Kurdistan may become Europe and the
Kurds -- Europeans. The whole process of globalization is good for the
Kurds. Just a generation before most Kurds knew nothing outside their
own village and could well ask foreign journalists what powers agas
(landlords) and sheiks have over their peasants, say, in France.
Now they have five satellite channels in Kurdish; internet, linking
them with their compatriots worldwide; mobile phones, allowing wide
communication all over Kurdistan and the Diaspora. Today we can speak
about general Kurdish information and political space, existing beyond
state borders, while the developing Diaspora is actively integrating
Kurdish elites into the Western society.
Nobody can put a ban on the Kurdish language any longer - can't do
it even technically. We can say that virtually and informationally
the Kurds are already forming a united national society, which their
relevant "sovereign" states can in no way control. Whatever happens
in any part of Kurdistan today gets known by all Kurds in a moment to
get their reaction the next moment. One example is the Mar 12 2004
events in Kamishli (Syria), when millions of Kurds rallied all over
Kurdistan in support of their compatriots.
And finally, we can't disregard the factor of demography. Kurdistan is
a kind of "demographic bomb" for the whole Middle East. The birth rate
among the " title" nationalities of the countries sharing Kurdistan
is steadily declining, while among the Kurds it is still high. As
a result, the share of Kurds in the countries' ethnic balance is
steadily growing. Some 15 years ago Urmia in Iran was a half-Kurdish,
half-Azeri town. Now it is almost totally Kurdish.
An anecdote says that Istanbul is the biggest Kurdish city in the
world: it is a home to millions of Kurds and a man speaking only
Kurdish can easily live there without any interpreter. Strongly
worried about this is the National Security Council of Turkey, who
has met several times this year to consider this impending disaster
for the Turkish nationalists.
Certainly, the key proof that the Kurds are inevitably heading for own
statehood is the existence and growth of Iraqi Kurdistan. The very fact
that national state institutions are efficiently functioning there is a
great stimulus for the Kurds in the neighboring states. In Iran, Syria
and Turkey the Kurds are actively consolidating and are showing high
political activity. Following the example of their Iraqi compatriots,
they are also beginning to push the idea of federalization.
Iraqi Kurdistan is actively building its state institutions. It has
an almost fully-fledged national army (Peshmarga) - the key defender
of the Kurdish statehood in Iraq. If anybody tries to take away the
Kurds' achievements in Iraq, he will face not just guerrillas but a
strong army - and not only them, but also millions of Kurds in Iraq
and elsewhere in the world.
Vital for the general Kurdish cause is economy. That's why today
the economically efficient Iraqi Kurdistan is actively helping the
neighboring Kurds by commodity turnover and jobs. Some 20,000 workers
from Turkey (naturally, mostly Kurds) are presently employed in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Kurdish specialists from Syria, Iran, Europe and Northern
America are coming back to work in Iraqi Kurdistan. There are all
prerequisites for an economic boom in the region - unless some big
instability shocks the whole Middle East.
Iraqi Kurdistan has laid the foundations of the national education. Its
universities are a real alma mater for Kurdish youths from all over
Kurdistan.
The local authorities actively encourage inflow of students from the
neighboring countries. The Kurdish culture and literature are on the
rise. Iraqi Kurdistan is a venue of numerous conferences and symposiums
for Kurdish scientists and artists from all over the world. The key
task now is to create a standard united Kurdish language as a stimulus
for quicker unification of the Kurdish nation. In his Mar 27 interview
to Khabat Kurdish President Masud Barzani said that this is the most
urgent issue. We can say that Iraqi Kurdistan has become a center of
culture and national consciousness for Kurds from all over the world.
Strongly represented in the Iraqi central authorities - with many
in top positions - the Kurds are acquiring experience in the world
politics. The new Iraqi constitution allows them to legitimate their
status in the world and to develop relations with many countries and
regions. This all will promote their problems on the international
arena.
Meanwhile, the prospects of the Kurds strongly depend on the US policy
in the region and on their relations with the US. The Kurds are facing
a whole number of questions that their sad experience is urging them
to answer. It would be a big illusion for them to believe that the
US has exactly the same interests as they have. In fact, the US has
its own strategic interests in the region, it is heavily pressured
by the Arab countries and its NATO ally Turkey over many problems and
in the problem of Kurds in Iraq, in particular. The situation in the
Middle East is very dynamic.
This region is a knot of world problems: the Arab-Israeli conflict,
the Iranian nuclear program, terrorism. One can hardly say how things
will develop and how the US will behave if it has to haggle with the
local countries. Won't the Kurds be again a small change in their big
political game? They may well be. But this will lead to a large-scale
destabilization - something this region hardly needs. The Kurdish
leaders perfectly understand what is going on.
In a late Mar interview to Khabat the Kurdish president said that the
US is clearly for the territorial integrity of Iraq - but democratic
and federal Iraq. Despite 100% popular will to proclaim independent
Iraqi Kurdistan, the political leaders of the Kurds are lingering to
do it -- also because they fear the US' disapproval. If the US faces
a bad scenario -- like a large-scale civil war in Iraq -- Kurdistan
may become the most reliable base for the US army.
Such presence in Kurdistan would be good for the Kurds as it would give
them a sure guarantee of security and long-term positive consequences.
Here the Kurds are healthily pragmatic - their stay within Iraq
is safe and economically good for them for the time being. By
proclaiming independence now the Kurds would give a free hand to
their neighbors, who would certainly start their economic blockade,
while Turkey and Iran might even launch a military campaign against
the new state. That's why for the time being the Kurds are trying to
strengthen their positions in Iraq - to develop central authorities
and economy, to form state institutions. Their priority is to reinforce
their Peshmarga.
For the US the Kurds are the best ally in its concept to democratize
the Middle East, and this regards not only Iraq, but also Iran,
Syria and Turkey.
So, today the US and the Kurds are building their relations on mutual
benefit and, given the situation in Iran and Syria and the Kurds'
importance in Iraq, the US is strongly interested in the Kurds just
as the Kurds are in the US - for they are using their relations with
the US for solving their own national tasks. In any case, things will
stay like that till late 2007 - for as long as the Bush Republican
administration is in power. The Kurds know that, and no coincidence
they insist on solving the problem of Kirkuk by the end of 2007.
These days the Kurdish cause is as acutely pressing as never
before. There are many proofs of this. One proof is the news reports
of just one day Apr 1 2006:
The US administration is preparing President Bush's meeting with
representatives of the Kurdish political parties of Syria
A national revolt is underway in Turkey. The officials of the EU,
which Turkey is so much eager to join, make numerous calls for that
country to solve the Kurdish problem
Two satellite TV programs launched for Iranian Kurds
One thing is clear that if the US gets into conflict with Syria or
Iran, the local millions of Kurds will not support the local regimes,
at least, and, at most, in case of a large-scale destabilization
following a US military campaign against Iran or Syria, they may
revolt and join Iraqi Kurdistan.
To understand the West's policy you should know that the territory of
Big Kurdistan is really abundant in hydrocarbon and is a key transit
area for its transportation. The last reports say that Southern
Kurdistan alone has 45 bln barrels of oil and 100 trl c m of gas -
quite impressive figures. Also huge are Kurdistan's water resources.
In conclusion, I can say that the world is quickly changing today:
a new global order is taking shape, and the Kurds are facing one more
historic chance to make true the dream of many generations of their
ancestors to have their own state. Whether they can do it depends
on the world politics, on the policies of the great powers, on the
processes in the countries sharing Kurdistan and, most importantly,
on the unity of the Kurds themselves. One thing is clear - in analyzing
the current developments in the Middle East and, especially, in making
decisions in the region, the concerned countries can no longer neglect
the Kurdish factor.
Yuri Nabiyev - Chief Editor of www.kurdistan.ru
www.regnum.ru/english/616672.htm l
http://www.regnum.ru/english/616672.html
14:02 04/06/2006
The first Russian to set his foot in Kurdistan in the 40s of XIX was
the professor of St. Petersburg University Wilhelm Dittel, who said
that while being Russia's immediate and quite important neighbor,
that country was still a real terra incognita. Though much time
has passed since then, this remark is still true. Kurdistan is an
unknown country; the Kurds are an unknown nation; Kurdish cause is an
unknown cause - a problem mostly known as existing and threatening
the world stability. But if in the times of Dittel and, partly, in
XX, the knowledge of the Kurds was mostly of academic nature and its
lack was no obstacle to the real policy making, today the Kurds and
the Kurdish cause are coming into the foreground in the Middle East,
and this is becoming politically intolerant.
That's why, in order to give you a clear picture of how the Kurdish
cause and the Kurdish national movement developed, I will have to
detail the key historical facts that few in Russia, unfortunately,
know. As you may know, XIX was a century of nationalism; by XX
this concept had reached the East to replace the local traditional
ideologies. Meanwhile, for the reasons I'd rather avoid dwelling
on here, the Kurds came to this point with a society that was far
from the standards of those times. They had a mostly tribal social
structure, almost no urban class or no high society. Politically,
Kurdistan was divided between the retrograde Turkish and Iranian
empires (who later proved ability to upgrade).
In presenting the Kurdish nationalism, I'd rather omit its background,
i.e. the XIX movements to create a Kurdish state, i.e. the attempts
to gain independence from Turkey by Emir Bedir Xan Bey (1840s),
and his nephew Yazdanshir (1855) or, finally, the campaign of Sheik
Obeidullah against Iran (1880), which was almost the first time the
Kurds openly spoke about creating their own state.
I'd rather start from the Young Turk Revolution, i.e. from 1908,
when the first Kurdish clubs and societies began an active campaign
for independence. But because of the archaism of the Kurdish society
they failed to form a strong political movement, like the Turks'
Unity and Progress or the Armenians' Dashnaktsoutyun - a force that,
with popular support, could consistently and consciously champion the
national interests of the Kurds. This all proved fatal for the Kurds
during the WWI, when the Turks - first Young Turks then Kemalists -
carried them away with Panislamist slogans and used them for their
own purposes.
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 was a unique chance for
the Kurds to create their own state, at least, under the protectorate
of the League of Nations, or, why not, the Entente. As you may know,
articles 62 and 65 of the Treaty of Sevres provided for Kurdistan's
independence. But they missed that chance because of the selfsame
archaism of their society.
I can't say the Kurds did not fight for independence. The ideas
of a nation' s self-determination right, officially proclaimed
and partly realized by the Entente, and the Russian revolution,
taken in Kurdistan as an attempt to create a new fair world system -
had impressed the Kurds a lot. In 1920 the Mosul villayet, i.e. the
present-day Iraqi Kurdistan, was in the flame of never-ending revolts:
Sheik Mahmud Barzanji proclaimed himself as the King of Kurdistan in
Sulaymaniya. He did it twice and once (1921) was even half-recognized
by the British government. A similar attempt was made by the leader
of the Iranian Kurds Ismail Aga Simko. But their tribal movements
were doomed to failure.
The fate of Kurdistan was to be decided in Turkey, which was home
to most Kurdish tribes. But lacking modern political consciousness,
they easily fell pray to the Kemalists, who led them under the
Islamic and anti-imperial slogans against their natural allies -
the Greeks and the Entente. A peace treaty was finally concluded in
Lausanne in 1923 to set the present-day state borders in the Middle
East. Right afterwards the Turkish nationalists threw off their masks
and fell on the Kurds with the whole weight of their renewed state
machinery. Only then did the Kurds understand what mistake they had
made. But their following rebels (1925, 1927-1930, 1937) made things
even worse for them and better for the Kemalists, who used every riot
as a pretext for a new repression, barbarian assimilation - in fact,
a genocide. The Kurds missed their chance in Lausanne -- a post-war
status quo was set that nobody wanted to break.
In the new post-war states Iraq and Syria and in the quickly modernized
Pahlevi Iran and Kemalist Turkey the Kurds went through all the pains
an ethnic minority can go through in an ultranationalist centralized
state. But they too got modernized between the wars. Their society
was quickly developing, their intelligentsia and urban class were
growing, this providing a natural basis for nationalist organizations:
Khoybun (Independence) in Turkey, Life of Kurdistan in Iran, Khiva
(Hope) in Iraq. At the time the WWII began, the Kurds were already a
well-organized and politically conscious society. But their trouble
was that the war affected them only indirectly.
The key result of the war for the Kurds was Mehabad - a short-lived
republic proclaimed over an area of Northern Iran occupied by the
Soviet Union. In Iraq Mustafa Barzani stirred the Barzan tribe to a
rebellion that finally forced Baghdad into big concessions. The Barzan
rebellion was never followed by an all Kurdish movement even though
it was much better organized than any previous tribal action: it was
backed by Khiva, offered a clear program of autonomy and even had
its political representatives abroad. But Mehabad was an upper-class
project with no popular support. That's why it was so short-lived:
the Barzan uprising was put down after the war, when Great Britain
helped Iraq.
The Mehabard Republic fell down not long after, when the Soviet troops
left Iran. The key legacy of the Mehabard Republic and the Barzan
rebellion was Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan and Democratic
Party of Kurdistan (Iraq) - two driving national forces for the
Iranian and Iraq Kurds.
Until then, as we can see, the Kurdish society was too weak internally
to capitalize on a favorable international situation. But after the
war things turned around. Now the Kurds were internally ready to get
what they need: the uprising of Mustafa Barzani in Iraqki Kurdistan in
1961-1975 quickly grew into a pan-national liberation movement. But
the international situation was not favorable. There was again a
status quo, and again nobody wanted to break it.
The system of Yalta was apparently tougher than that of Versailles. The
supper powers played each their game in the Middle East, but none of
them wanted unpredictable changes that could spoil their games. The
Kurdish movement could spoil the games of both blocs: the West was
afraid of destabilization of allied Turkey and Iran, the Soviet Union -
of Arab regimes.
That's why in 1975 both sides allowed Saddam to crush the de
facto existing rebel state in Iraqi Kurdistan and then had been
cold-bloodedly watching for 15 years how the Kurds went through
genocide, mass deportation and gas attacks - a suffering that lasted
till 1990, when the breakdown of the whole post-war global system,
on the one hand, and Saddam's Kuwaiti adventure, on the other,
spoiled the Middle East game once again.
There is one interesting paradox: in XX almost all the events and
processes that benefited other nations, harmed the Kurds. This
is equally true for the triumph of the principle of national
self-determination after 1918 and the triumph of the principle of
decolonization after 1945. 1918 made the Kurds a part to a number
of national states with nationalist governments, while 1945 made
those governments uncontrolled to commit such actions in Syria and
especially Iraq that nobody would ever imagine in the mandate epoch.
The new tectonic shift of the 90s has brought about a drastically
new situation. On the one hand, the Kurds were politically ready
for changes, but, on the other, Kurdistan and the Middle East, in
general, were no longer a periphery but the epicenter of the new
world re-division. This brought on stage a force that was extremely
interested in the Kurds and, luckily for them, the only super power
on the globe. That's why now the Kurds are facing a mirror situation:
whatever is happening is good for them, and even their own mistakes --
sometimes quite big - can't make things worse.
The downfall of the Yalta system caused by the Gorbachev perestroika
implied inevitable global changes. But nothing special happened in the
Middle East and would probably not were it not for Saddam's Kuwaiti
adventure. Kuwait pushed America into action; and once it began to
act it couldn't stop halfway.
Let's briefly remember the crucial events of 1991: the defeat of
Saddam, the national revolt in Kurdistan, its suppression, the mass
flee of Kurds to Turkey and Iran and the consequent Northern Watch
operation to expel Iraqi troops from part of Kurdistan and to establish
a de facto independent Kurdish state there. Luckily for the Kurds,
there was already no Soviet threat at that time, and Turkey was no
longer a key player in the US' geo-political games; Iran was no longer
the US' friend and Syria was outside its concerns at all. And so,
the US could well afford supporting the Iraqi Kurds, at least, within
the boundaries set by its still important alliance with Turkey. But
the Turks blundered themselves, when in Mar 2003 they refused to
provide their territory for the US attack on Iraq. This, naturally,
freed the Americans from a number of commitments to Turkey. The
shares of Turkey dropped in price, while those of the Kurds, on the
contrary, rose. Ever since, the US - sometimes even demonstratively -
has ignored Turkey's interests in Iraqi Kurdistan.
So, as a result of the events of 1991-2003 we have a de facto
half-independent and de jure legal Kurdish state, which, in fact, is
the US' strongest geo-political base in the region. Like it or not,
but the last point is a fact.
Indisputably, the US' interest in Kurdish statehood in Iraq makes Iraqi
Kurdistan an almost invulnerable real political and economic force
for friends, enemies and any partners in general. So, the national
core is already existent, and what will happen with it depends on
both national Kurdish and regional politics. Given the national rise
in Kurdistan and the political downfall and the growing US pressure
in Syria and Iran, the Kurds are facing quite good prospects.
This is the general outline of the present political situation around
Kurdistan. But to see it more clearly, we should remember that
Kurdistan is by no means an isolated independent system, but just
a sub-system of the Middle East and, more widely, of the world. So,
we should understand what an impact the general regional and global
processes are having on Kurdistan.
We should not forget that the social-political systems formed in the
Middle East in XX were, in fact, traditional societies transformed into
industrial ones. All the processes in the region -- from the Young
Turk Revolution and the Iranian Revolution of 1905 till our days -
have, in fact, been attempts to modernize and industrialize traditional
society - attempts of "catch-up development" - and, on the other hand,
protective reaction of traditionalism to modernization. The state
authority is as always the driving force - the demiurge that reforms
old and weak society. The ideology of this authority is Progressive
Nationalism; while Socialism was the society's reaction to the
difficulties of modernization against the old system. But having won,
Socialism has turned into bitter Etatism itself.
By the mid 1970 the process of industrialization and modernization
reached its climax to later go into crisis. The first sign of the
crisis was emerging Islamism. Islamism is an ideology of crisis; it is
absolutely negative and has nothing positive in it even compared with
Socialism. It can't reform society. The only positive thing Khomeini
did was liberalizing the private economy sector choked by the Shah
Socialism. But this has nothing to do with Islamism as such. Hence,
we can say that the present-day Islamic Republic of Iran is not a new
stage of development of the Iranian society and state, but the old,
industrial Shah Iran in crisis and agony.
Now we are living in a period of "post-industrial society,"
"post-modernist society," "society of high technologies." Globalization
is quickly developing: national states are losing their
self-sufficiency, sovereignty is losing its clear definition. Against
this background, the Socialist and Nationalist Etatism looks just
a museum anachronism. Today, there is no alternative to western
democratic society, as 100 years ago there was no alternative
to European government forms. True, Islamism is trying to be an
alternative, but, as we have already said, it can't be one as it has
no positive content.
These changes gave new life to the Kurdish cause, which had been
dead since 1975. It was almost impracticable in the former system of
national sovereignties. The Kurds' own sovereignty would do bad to
many and good to nobody.
Their real autonomy was also impossible because of the abovementioned
Etatism and Centralism of the eastern states, who would not tolerate
any self-government. But having no institutions that could protect
their interests, the Kurds could not get elementary equality from
their nationalist military-bureaucratic rulers.
The first sign of global changes for the Kurds was the events of
1991. The Kurds had noticed nothing like that before: for example,
while expressing deep concern for the human rights situation in the
USSR and the fate of each Soviet dissident, the US strangely "passed
by" the annihilation of 200,000 Kurds in Iraq and even the gas attack
Halabji, which, unlike Anfal, resounded all over the world due to
Iran's active propaganda. The Kuwaiti crisis was also a traditional
collective repression against an aggressor-state encroaching on
a sovereignty. As soon as Kuwait's sovereignty was restored, the
military campaign was stopped to leave the Iraqi rebels face to face
with dictatorship.
As a result, two millions Kurds rushed to the Turkish border. In the
previous years the Turks (like any other sovereign country) would
have closed the border and, if need be, used machine-guns. But not
then: not that Ankara thought it impossible, it just feared possible
international reaction. Meanwhile, the Western countries had to do
something, at least, to prevent the transit of Kurdish refugees via
Turkey to Europe. It was exactly then that the term " humanitarian
intervention" first appeared.
It was then that it was finally and formally proclaimed that human
rights violations cannot be an internal affair of a state or a matter
of national sovereignty. A Northern Watch operation was launched,
and Turkey was forced to do exactly what it had always feared more
than death - to create Kurdistan.
Since then we have seen more or less successful attempts of
humanitarian intervention in Somalia and former Yugoslavia; and
finally, a new Gulf War. We see that in just a decade after the first
Gulf War, the true and key reason for Bush Senior to attack Iraq. --
i.e. the threat it posed to the sovereignty of other states - turned
into an open cover for Bush Junior - a traditional, formally legal
pretext nobody believed.
Saddam's imaginary heroic love of freedom was not the true reason
either: Saddam was a pragmatic and, no doubt, America would get from
him whatever it might want. The true reason for the war 2003 was
the understanding that the Saddam regime could no longer be endured
in the modern world system. The fall of the Saddam regime was the
beginning of the end for the ruling regimes in Syria and Iran, and
neither the Syrian Baasists nor the Iranian Islamists will stay in
power for long - they are historically doomed. But the tragic problem
here is that the Damascus and Tehran regimes (as earlier the regime
in Baghdad) are too closely tied with their national statehoods and
their fall would bring ruin and chaos in Syria and Iran. Still, there
is no alternative to the Syrian and Iranian statehoods. The question
is what forms they will take. But whatever it might be - peaceful
democratization or terrible devastation, the Kurds will be at profit.
Finally, Turkey. It too can't stay away from the global
processes. Luckily, the Turkish social-political system is more
flexible and, mostly importantly, is strongly bound up with the West
and oriented towards Europe. This forces Turkey to comply with the
Western criteria: to give up the ideas of Kemalism and to gradually
liberalize its Kurdish policy. They do it not as quickly as the Kurds
would want them to - for they are strongly opposed by many influential
Turkish forces, who believe that this will ruin Kemalist Turkey as
a unitary national state.
They may have reason, but this process is inevitable, and the only
thing they can do is just to delay it - just a bit. Hence, the general
vector of the political developments in the region is good for the
Kurds. Turkey's accession into the EU is certainly good for them: in
some ten years the biggest part of Kurdistan may become Europe and the
Kurds -- Europeans. The whole process of globalization is good for the
Kurds. Just a generation before most Kurds knew nothing outside their
own village and could well ask foreign journalists what powers agas
(landlords) and sheiks have over their peasants, say, in France.
Now they have five satellite channels in Kurdish; internet, linking
them with their compatriots worldwide; mobile phones, allowing wide
communication all over Kurdistan and the Diaspora. Today we can speak
about general Kurdish information and political space, existing beyond
state borders, while the developing Diaspora is actively integrating
Kurdish elites into the Western society.
Nobody can put a ban on the Kurdish language any longer - can't do
it even technically. We can say that virtually and informationally
the Kurds are already forming a united national society, which their
relevant "sovereign" states can in no way control. Whatever happens
in any part of Kurdistan today gets known by all Kurds in a moment to
get their reaction the next moment. One example is the Mar 12 2004
events in Kamishli (Syria), when millions of Kurds rallied all over
Kurdistan in support of their compatriots.
And finally, we can't disregard the factor of demography. Kurdistan is
a kind of "demographic bomb" for the whole Middle East. The birth rate
among the " title" nationalities of the countries sharing Kurdistan
is steadily declining, while among the Kurds it is still high. As
a result, the share of Kurds in the countries' ethnic balance is
steadily growing. Some 15 years ago Urmia in Iran was a half-Kurdish,
half-Azeri town. Now it is almost totally Kurdish.
An anecdote says that Istanbul is the biggest Kurdish city in the
world: it is a home to millions of Kurds and a man speaking only
Kurdish can easily live there without any interpreter. Strongly
worried about this is the National Security Council of Turkey, who
has met several times this year to consider this impending disaster
for the Turkish nationalists.
Certainly, the key proof that the Kurds are inevitably heading for own
statehood is the existence and growth of Iraqi Kurdistan. The very fact
that national state institutions are efficiently functioning there is a
great stimulus for the Kurds in the neighboring states. In Iran, Syria
and Turkey the Kurds are actively consolidating and are showing high
political activity. Following the example of their Iraqi compatriots,
they are also beginning to push the idea of federalization.
Iraqi Kurdistan is actively building its state institutions. It has
an almost fully-fledged national army (Peshmarga) - the key defender
of the Kurdish statehood in Iraq. If anybody tries to take away the
Kurds' achievements in Iraq, he will face not just guerrillas but a
strong army - and not only them, but also millions of Kurds in Iraq
and elsewhere in the world.
Vital for the general Kurdish cause is economy. That's why today
the economically efficient Iraqi Kurdistan is actively helping the
neighboring Kurds by commodity turnover and jobs. Some 20,000 workers
from Turkey (naturally, mostly Kurds) are presently employed in Iraqi
Kurdistan. Kurdish specialists from Syria, Iran, Europe and Northern
America are coming back to work in Iraqi Kurdistan. There are all
prerequisites for an economic boom in the region - unless some big
instability shocks the whole Middle East.
Iraqi Kurdistan has laid the foundations of the national education. Its
universities are a real alma mater for Kurdish youths from all over
Kurdistan.
The local authorities actively encourage inflow of students from the
neighboring countries. The Kurdish culture and literature are on the
rise. Iraqi Kurdistan is a venue of numerous conferences and symposiums
for Kurdish scientists and artists from all over the world. The key
task now is to create a standard united Kurdish language as a stimulus
for quicker unification of the Kurdish nation. In his Mar 27 interview
to Khabat Kurdish President Masud Barzani said that this is the most
urgent issue. We can say that Iraqi Kurdistan has become a center of
culture and national consciousness for Kurds from all over the world.
Strongly represented in the Iraqi central authorities - with many
in top positions - the Kurds are acquiring experience in the world
politics. The new Iraqi constitution allows them to legitimate their
status in the world and to develop relations with many countries and
regions. This all will promote their problems on the international
arena.
Meanwhile, the prospects of the Kurds strongly depend on the US policy
in the region and on their relations with the US. The Kurds are facing
a whole number of questions that their sad experience is urging them
to answer. It would be a big illusion for them to believe that the
US has exactly the same interests as they have. In fact, the US has
its own strategic interests in the region, it is heavily pressured
by the Arab countries and its NATO ally Turkey over many problems and
in the problem of Kurds in Iraq, in particular. The situation in the
Middle East is very dynamic.
This region is a knot of world problems: the Arab-Israeli conflict,
the Iranian nuclear program, terrorism. One can hardly say how things
will develop and how the US will behave if it has to haggle with the
local countries. Won't the Kurds be again a small change in their big
political game? They may well be. But this will lead to a large-scale
destabilization - something this region hardly needs. The Kurdish
leaders perfectly understand what is going on.
In a late Mar interview to Khabat the Kurdish president said that the
US is clearly for the territorial integrity of Iraq - but democratic
and federal Iraq. Despite 100% popular will to proclaim independent
Iraqi Kurdistan, the political leaders of the Kurds are lingering to
do it -- also because they fear the US' disapproval. If the US faces
a bad scenario -- like a large-scale civil war in Iraq -- Kurdistan
may become the most reliable base for the US army.
Such presence in Kurdistan would be good for the Kurds as it would give
them a sure guarantee of security and long-term positive consequences.
Here the Kurds are healthily pragmatic - their stay within Iraq
is safe and economically good for them for the time being. By
proclaiming independence now the Kurds would give a free hand to
their neighbors, who would certainly start their economic blockade,
while Turkey and Iran might even launch a military campaign against
the new state. That's why for the time being the Kurds are trying to
strengthen their positions in Iraq - to develop central authorities
and economy, to form state institutions. Their priority is to reinforce
their Peshmarga.
For the US the Kurds are the best ally in its concept to democratize
the Middle East, and this regards not only Iraq, but also Iran,
Syria and Turkey.
So, today the US and the Kurds are building their relations on mutual
benefit and, given the situation in Iran and Syria and the Kurds'
importance in Iraq, the US is strongly interested in the Kurds just
as the Kurds are in the US - for they are using their relations with
the US for solving their own national tasks. In any case, things will
stay like that till late 2007 - for as long as the Bush Republican
administration is in power. The Kurds know that, and no coincidence
they insist on solving the problem of Kirkuk by the end of 2007.
These days the Kurdish cause is as acutely pressing as never
before. There are many proofs of this. One proof is the news reports
of just one day Apr 1 2006:
The US administration is preparing President Bush's meeting with
representatives of the Kurdish political parties of Syria
A national revolt is underway in Turkey. The officials of the EU,
which Turkey is so much eager to join, make numerous calls for that
country to solve the Kurdish problem
Two satellite TV programs launched for Iranian Kurds
One thing is clear that if the US gets into conflict with Syria or
Iran, the local millions of Kurds will not support the local regimes,
at least, and, at most, in case of a large-scale destabilization
following a US military campaign against Iran or Syria, they may
revolt and join Iraqi Kurdistan.
To understand the West's policy you should know that the territory of
Big Kurdistan is really abundant in hydrocarbon and is a key transit
area for its transportation. The last reports say that Southern
Kurdistan alone has 45 bln barrels of oil and 100 trl c m of gas -
quite impressive figures. Also huge are Kurdistan's water resources.
In conclusion, I can say that the world is quickly changing today:
a new global order is taking shape, and the Kurds are facing one more
historic chance to make true the dream of many generations of their
ancestors to have their own state. Whether they can do it depends
on the world politics, on the policies of the great powers, on the
processes in the countries sharing Kurdistan and, most importantly,
on the unity of the Kurds themselves. One thing is clear - in analyzing
the current developments in the Middle East and, especially, in making
decisions in the region, the concerned countries can no longer neglect
the Kurdish factor.