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Washington File, DC
April 7 2006
State's Fried Outlines U.S. Policy for "Murrow" Journalists
Says promotion of democracy to be enduring legacy of Bush
administration
The United States will continue to support democratic movements in
the Middle East as well as in former Soviet states as a means of
countering Islamist extremism `and the terrorism derived from that
extremism,' said Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried April 4.
Fried spoke during a roundtable discussion with participants from the
Edward R. Murrow Program for Journalists, a new State Department
initiative that brings foreign reporters to the United States to
learn about American journalistic practices. (See related article.)
The Bush administration looks at democracy as a `practical solution'
to problems such as instability and poor economic development, as
well as a long-term answer to the terrorist threat posed by `radical,
anti-democratic, Islamist ideology,' said Fried, who heads the Bureau
of European and Eurasian Affairs.
`We do believe that democracy is applicable in the Middle East, just
as it has been applicable in Asia, South America, Eastern Europe, and
South Asia,' he said. `We intend to support democratic movements in
that world, as well as in Central Asia and the post-communist
hemisphere.'
The emphasis on democracy as a long-term solution to extremism and
terrorism `is apt to be an enduring legacy of the Bush
administration,' Fried said.
During the roundtable discussion, Fried answered questions about a
wide range of issues, including democracy in Russia, the future
status of Kosovo, the Annan plan for Cyprus, Turkey's bid to join the
European Union, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh, energy security in Russia and Central Asia,
democratic progress in Georgia and U.S.-European relations.
The State Department welcomed 129 journalists from around the world
for the inaugural Edward R. Murrow Program for Journalists April
1-21. It is a component of the department's International Visitor
Leadership Program. (See announcement.)
Murrow, a leading broadcast journalist from 1935 to 1960, headed the
United States Information Agency from 1961 to 1963.
Following is the full transcript of the roundtable discussion:
(begin transcript)
Daniel Fried
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
Roundtable Discussion with Murrow Journalist International Visitor
Program
U.S. State Department
Washington, DC
2:30 p.m. April 4, 2006
Ambassador Fried: Well, given that this is, I'm told, Russian and
Turkish speaking, [greeting in Russian]. [Laughter]. You're very
welcome here in the Department of State, and I'd like to talk a
little bit about U.S. foreign policy in the second Bush term, and
then stop fairly quickly and answer your questions, if that's all
right, if that's a good way to proceed.
The Bush foreign policy has really evolved from the September 11th
terrorist attack as an initial event and gone through several phases.
In the initial aftermath of September 11th, we faced a national
emergency. We were attacked essentially by the Taliban and al-Qaida
from Afghanistan, and we took action there.
Iraq you know about and that has been discussed, and I don't want to
spend the whole time talking about Iraq, but we felt that one of the
lessons of September 11th was that you could not wait for dangers to
gather and do nothing. And that containment of someone like Saddam
Hussein might not be a viable strategy, especially since containment
wasn't working.
But as time went on, you will notice if you study President Bush's
speeches carefully that in his foreign policy speeches and in the
National Security Strategy documents of the United States he
gradually emphasized issues other than the strict military and
intelligence side of counterterrorism and started speaking about
longer term issues of building democracies and reform and stability
through reform. We stopped defining al-Qaida as an enemy in a narrow
sense of being a terrorist organization and started speaking more
about radical, anti-democratic, Islamist ideology as a longer term
problem for which the answer was not principally a military or
intelligence answer, but was an answer rooted in reform, support for
democracy, support for states, for nations seeking to deepen their
own democracies.
This emphasis on democracy as a long-term answer to the problems of
Islamist extremism and the terrorism derived from that extremism is
apt to be an enduring legacy of the Bush administration - more than
what is usually considered to be the Bush administration's foreign
policy legacy, things like preemption. Preemptive military action: I
think that is going to be less important, and the emphasis on
democracy is more important.
Now, because there are a great many Turkish speakers here, it may
have occurred to you listening to me that Turkey's experience of
building a secular democracy within a society which is mostly Muslim,
and then in recent years deepening that democracy may be very
relevant. Indeed, we find that experience to be relevant because
Turkey is at once a country with a Muslim population and a democracy,
and a secular nation state.
Those achievements are very relevant to the kind of problems we face
now, which is dealing with a radical Islamist ideology which denies
in principle the relevance of democracy and denies that democracy can
take root in a society which has Muslim traditions.
We reject the notion of a clash of civilizations, and we reject the
notion that any one religion is intrinsically more disposed to
democracy than any other religion.
Similarly, we believe that democratic reforms, the rule of law, and a
kind of openness toward the world is a better answer to the problems
left behind by the Soviet Union than nationalism or authoritarianism.
There is a debate in Russia today whether democracy - well, there
isn't even much of a debate. Many Russians believe that democracy
equals chaos and that democracy as it was practiced in Russia in the
'90s demonstrates that democracy is not terribly relevant to the
problems of post-communism.
In our view this is mistaken, and the problem of reform in Russia in
the '90s was not that it was too democratic, but that it was not
consistent enough.
I see there is a journalist from Poland here. In the beginning of
the 1990s Poles didn't know whether they would succeed. The economy
in Poland was in complete ruin. The country was very poor. The
infrastructure was wretched. The demographics were bad. Not as bad
as they are in Russia today, but actually pretty bad. And the Poles'
answer to that was not to turn away from reform and embrace
authoritarianism, but to push ahead with reform, and they did so in
the early '90s with great concentration, and the results later speak
for themselves of massive economic growth, rising standard of living,
and gradual stability on a much higher level of national existence,
actually.
So the Bush administration looks at democracy not as is sometimes
assumed in Europe as a kind of Messianic ideology that bears no
relationship to reality, but as a rather practical solution to
problems and a practical solution which has been successful in the
past 17 years, since 1989, in cases where it has been applied
consistently.
Now one of the challenges we Americans face is that for 60 years we
did not really regard democracy as relevant to the broader Middle
East or countries which were Muslim. During the 1970s we talked
about democracies and human rights as the answer to communism, but we
seemed very happy to deal with authoritarian regimes in Egypt and
conservative, absolutist monarchies in Saudi Arabia.
The results in the Middle East were not terribly satisfactory, and
what we have done in this administration is to do away with this red
line around the broader Middle East which said within this red line
democracy and the normal rules don't apply. They do apply.
The problem with this kind of an approach is that although democracy,
I am convinced, will be the fate for the broader Middle East in the
long run; in the short run life is not life the way the Soviet Union
used to describe it - a triumphant march to a better future. It's
pretty complicated stuff.
But we do believe that democracy is applicable in the Middle East,
just as it has been applicable in Asia, South America, Eastern
Europe, and South Asia.
We intend to support democratic movements in that world, as well as
in Central Asia and the post-communist hemisphere.
Now those are very broad outlines of American foreign policy in the
second Bush term. Tomorrow I'm giving testimony in the Senate about
the problem and the causes of Islamist extremism, mostly in Western
Europe. This is a long-term challenge for us. Many of the Islamist
radicals and the intellectual climate they live in remind me as
someone who lived in the Soviet Union, remind me of 21st Century
versions of Raskolnikov, an uprooted semi-intellectual with great
ideas who falls into rather dangerous radical nihilism.
This is a challenge we have to face, and we have to face this
together working with the governments of the countries you represent
and with civil societies in your countries.
Let me stop here. You come from a great many countries. Your
questions are apt to be different. I will do my best to answer them,
but I wanted to give you an overall framework of what our thinking is
like.
So with that, I'm at your disposal.
Question: My name is Anna Novicka.... My name is Anna Novicka. I
am from [the] Latvian newspaper Telegraf and I would like to find out
about your opinion as the development in the relations in the
triangle the United States, Russia and Europe is concerned if we take
into account that the opinions of the United States and Russia are
becoming more and more different. I mean the relationship with
Syria, Ukraine, Belarus. Is there any future for relations in this
triangle?
Ambassador Fried: Everybody got the question?
We want to work with Russia on a common agenda, and we want to work
with Russia wherever possible. There are, objectively speaking, or
there should be, objectively speaking, as used to be said in the old
Soviet Union, no barriers to our cooperation because we are not each
other's principal problem. In practice, that cooperation has been
more difficult than we Americans had hoped.
You mentioned Belarus. Is there anybody here from Belarus?
I don't know why Russia has supported the recent elections in
Belarus. No country in Europe believed these elections were free and
fair. As far as I can tell no democracy anywhere in the world
thought these elections were free and fair. I do not understand why
Russia would find it in its interest to support the Lukashenko
regime.
I think Russia is still trying to find its place in the world after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and I think back to the period,
there was a period in history when Russia was the most advanced
relative to Western Europe, the most successful, the most
economically, culturally, scientifically dynamic, which was, of
course, the generation before 1914 when Russia also thought of itself
as a European country.
I think that the periods when Russia sought to be isolated from the
world and separate and part of its own sitting in a kind of isolation
were periods that did not bring Russia great results. Now this is not
a US government view, this is only my view as someone who lived in
Russia. But I hope that Russia will return to a path of convergence
with and integration with the Euro-Atlantic community because Russia
has a great deal to offer.
I also don't think much of the theory of some Russians that the
United States is out to encircle Russia. Encircling Russia is not
our objective. We have other problems in the world. Russia is not a
problem for us.
We were interested - you're from Latvia, right? We were interested
in seeing Latvia become a member of NATO and a member of the European
Union not because we wanted to surround Russia, but because we wanted
to complete a Europe whole, free and at peace.
A Latvia, a Poland, a Romania that are secure, prospering democracies
are not threats to Russia. A Germany in NATO and the European Union,
a Germany which is a democracy, is hardly a threat to Russia. There
is no threat to Russia from the West. I believe there ought to be the
basis for strategic cooperation between Russia and the United States.
It's proving more frustrating now than we had hoped.
Question: My name is Kirill Krabu. I've got a question about
Europe. As you know, Europe is growing up now and gets more and more
powerful. Our currency rates now are higher than the dollar. For
example, the Euro is higher than the dollar now.
How do you think about that, if this growth will continue? Is it a
reason for the USA to be maybe afraid of Europe and to begin some
polarization between Europe and USA? Because Europe is somewhere
also now called as United States of Europe. So is it a reason to
become polarized?
Ambassador Fried: No. We welcome a strong Europe. A strong Europe
is good for the United States. The difficulties of the 20th Century
- two world wars, the Cold War, Nazism, fascism, communism, were all
products of a breakup, a kind of calamitous collapse of Europe in
1914.
Now why on earth would the United States, after having had to go to
war twice in the 20th century to save Europe and fight the Cold War
to defend democracy in Europe, be alarmed by the prospect of a
secure, stable, prospering and democratic Europe today? It would be
ridiculous. We want there to be a strong Europe.
There is not one serious person in Washington who worries about a
U.S.-European rivalry. Commercially, yes. Okay, Boeing and Airbus
will always fight. Of course they will. Well, so what? Ford and GM
also fight. Let them. All right?
The strategic fact is the United States and Europe need to work
together because the threats we face are common threats, and they
mostly originate outside of Europe, both in the broader Middle East
and the problems along what I call Europe's frontiers of freedom -
the Balkans, South Caucasus. These are where the problems are. But
the United States and Europe are together a center of democracy and
prosperity in the world, and the alliance there is very close and apt
to be closer.
When I think of all the problems, the last of my worries is a
U.S.-European rivalry. Besides, the worst days of 2003, 2004, the
debate about the Iraq war - that is behind us now, thank God.
Question: I am from Kosovo, Taner, the Balkans and anything about
the Balkans. As you know the Kosovo problem and the challenge has
not been solved yet and at the same time in Serbia there are sort of
problems. So, the stability of the Balkans... and what is the
American policy towards these two issues, especially the Kosovo
status?
Ambassador Fried: The United States has been involved deeply in the
Balkans since the breakup of the old Yugoslavia. Kosovo's status is
the last open question, just as Serbia's future direction is the
biggest problem.
We support the efforts of Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president, to
negotiate arrangements for Kosovo's final status this year. I don't
know what those arrangements will be, but I do know what they will
not be. We will not go back to the situation before 1999. We will
not partition Kosovo. We will not redraw borders. That is no
secession, no greater this or greater that. And whatever solution
there is in Kosovo has to respect the rights of Kosovo's minorities
-- ethnic Serb, ethnic Turkish.
NATO didn't fight a war in Kosovo to support anyone's nationalist
agenda. The Serb population of Kosovo needs to be protected, it
needs to be respected, it needs to have a home in Kosovo. Not
because Belgrade insists, but because this is a matter of principle
to us.
Then the whole region needs to move to Europe. You cannot have the
Balkans outside of Europe as a breeding ground of poverty, theft,
smuggling, and occasionally wars. And I believe that Serbia ought to
be in Europe. This isn't just about Kosovo, it's about the whole
region. And Macedonia should be in Europe.
What I can't say is exactly what Kosovo's final status will be, but
that's not up to the United States, that's a negotiated process.
Question: I am from North Cyprus. This is Basaran. Of course there
is a... we have a Cyprus issue. In the Cyprus issue there has been a
referendum as you know. The Turkish side said yes, and the Greek
side said no, and because of that we could not reach to any peace.
The Greek side of course established themselves as the member of
European Union. So, there has been some commitments to diplomatic
channels and economic commitments. Unfortunately, these commitments
by United States have not been established. The... there was a
meeting between our president and Condoleezza Rice but any committed
promises were not established. So, if you can elaborate on this?
Ambassador Fried: I am very familiar with the Cyprus issue. We
believe in one Cyprus. We support reunification of the island as a
bizonal, bicommunal federation. We do not believe in separatism or
cessation. We are very pleased that the Turkish Cypriot community
also supports reunification.
I myself have met with Mr. Talat. We do not recognize him as
president; we do not recognize the government, but we do understand
that he is a leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, and we
appreciate the fact that he supports a negotiated settlement to
reunify the island. We encourage that. It's the right policy. We
look forward to the day when a reunited Cyprus with a secure Turkish
community is in the European Union as a whole island.
Now we understand that bizonal, bicommunal federation also means that
there have to be certain arrangements. We supported the Annan plan,
as you know. It didn't pass. I regret that. But we have to find a
way to make progress. We do want to make progress on the basis that
I stated. And we do want to encourage the Turkish Cypriot community,
but without recognizing a separate state and without creeping
recognition of a separate state because we do believe in unification.
Again, this is what the Turkish Cypriot leadership says it believes,
and I accept this. I believe their position is sincere.
So we look forward to working with the government of Cyprus, with the
Turkish Cypriot community, with the United Nations, with Turkey, with
Greece to advance a settlement which will help everyone.
Question: I come from Brussels, speaking English.
About the Cyprus issue, this year everyone is expecting a crisis for
Turkey about the Greek Cypriots and opening the port issue. Turkey
clearly declared that they won't open their ports unless there is a
settlement in Cyprus. It will be a big crisis with, big or small I
don't know, but definitely a crisis for Turkey in the EU
relationship.
Also there is a ground shifting for the settlement from UN to EU, and
it seems that U.S. doesn't respond at all. Since Mr. Annan has a
very limited time and I don't think that personally he will again try
something else because of every limitation. Do you have any concrete
steps in the short term for Cyprus? Not recognition of course, but
to try for anything.
Ambassador Fried: You make a very good point, which is that this
issue, and I'm putting it in my words not yours, but that this issue
will not get better by itself. In fact, we have been thinking about
how important it is that we do whatever we can to help promote a
settlement.
I frankly appreciate the Turkish government's support for a
settlement. I don't think that Talat could have done what he did
without Turkey's backing. This is a significant change. It means
that Turkey also supports a bizonal, bicommunal federation.
So we have to look at what we can do to support a settlement. Now
you're right, we have always supported Turkey's accession to the
European Union on the basis that Turkey ought to be treated like
every other candidate. Turkey meets the criteria, it should join.
If it doesn't, it shouldn't. But no special rules.
This is a tough position for Turkey, I understand it. We want to
make progress, and we were thinking about how to approach the Cyprus
issue so as to avoid this kind of a problem. The Turkish government
deserves credit for having supported a settlement. This is not
trivial. This is a big deal. It means that Greece, Turkey, the
Turkish Cypriot community, and the government of Cyprus all support a
bizonal, bicommunal federation. They just argue about the ways to
get there. I understand this. This is not easy. But we should not
let this drift.
So that's the premise of your question, and I frankly agree with you,
and we're thinking about this very actively right now.
Question: I am from Azerbaijan, from the TV Company INS. From the
year 2005 until today everybody who's connected to the settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, they've been talking that this conflict
has to be solved in the year 2006. If it's not solved now then it
will last for many years. But now we see that the talks are
deadlocked and the non-constructive position of the Armenian
president is indicative. How do you think, is it possible that this
conflict is settled within one or two years? And please take into
consideration that both parties have always claimed that they
wouldn't seize any territory? How do you see it?
Ambassador Fried: Happily the situation is not as stuck as it
appeared immediately after Rambouillet. At Rambouillet Presidents
Kocharian and Aliyev met. They failed to come to agreement on terms
to settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and many people
thought, oh my God, it's over, there will be war, terrible things
will happen.
Shortly after that I went out to Baku and Yerevan with Ambassador
Steve Mann, who is the American negotiator as part of the Minsk group
process of negotiating a settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh. And we had
a series of useful, I think productive, discussions with the
government of Azerbaijan, the government of Armenia, and we have had
discussions here with Foreign Minister Oskanian of Armenia and Deputy
Foreign Minister Azimov of Azerbaijan. Both governments appear
serious about making progress. Both governments gave us something to
work with. So we're no longer quite stuck. We don't have a solution
yet, but we are confident enough that we're proceeding with
discussions with both governments, working with the Minsk group
co-chairs.
It's important that both countries understand that they both cannot
have their maximum objectives at the same time. Both countries can't
achieve that. And, in fact, neither country will achieve its maximum
objectives. Similarly, no country can receive anything. Both
countries have interests that must be taken into account.
It's going to take courage and political leadership to get out of a
war cycle and start contemplating the much more hopeful future if
there is peace.
You're from Azerbaijan, right? Your country's going to have a lot of
money coming in from oil and gas, but only if there is peace. If
there is war, there is no more money. All right? Just look at the
map. You know what I'm talking about. You're well set up for peace.
Of course, the oil and gas money won't do you any good unless it's
well spent, but that's a different issue. So we're determined to
move ahead.
Question: This is Liudmila Barba from Moldova. About the Kosovo
status, many official people from Moscow, including President Putin,
have indicated that in case Kosovo is recognized then Russia would be
able to recognize the separatist regions in post-Soviet territory.
Do you take into consideration this factor when you are thinking
about the status of Kosovo?
The second question is about the widening of the European Union.
After World War II, the United States supported the present European
Union. Will the United States keep supporting the enlargement of the
European Union to include Ukraine and Moldova?
Ambassador Fried: First, we do not regard Kosovo as a precedent for
resolution of any other conflict. Not Transnistria, not Abkhazia,
not South Ossetia, not Chechnya, or North Ossetia, or Ingushetia. It
is not a precedent. Full stop.
We do not support separatism. We do not support separatist agendas.
Why is Kosovo different? Because Milosevic fought a war with NATO,
for one thing, and he lost. Secondly, the United Nations has had
administration over Kosovo for seven years. Third, the UN Security
Council has repeatedly affirmed Kosovo's status as under UN
administration, its final status to be worked out.
So our position is very clear and should not be misunderstood.
The second question about the enlargement of the European Union.
We've always favored it. We think it has been a fabulous success. It
has been a fabulous success. We believe that enlargement should
continue, although we recognize first that there is a debate in
Western Europe about EU enlargement that we have to respect. And
second, the countries have to be ready. It is not a gift, it is not
a charity program. Your Polish and Latvian colleagues here can tell
you that it was very hard to get into the European Union. They had
to do a lot, but it was worth it.
As for Ukraine, Ukrainians have to decide themselves. Anybody from
Ukraine here? Yes. All right. Ukrainians have to decide for
themselves what they want. Then they have to do the work.
Question: Thank you very much. Naziya Bissenova from Kazakshtan.
Mr. Fried, actually I have several questions but to be fair I will
ask only one question.
Presently, Russia is using its energy card when playing on the
international arena and this question refers to the Central Asian
countries and Kazakhstan.
Due to the position of the Russian monopoly Gazprom in the pipelines,
they are in charge of everything. Europe and the United States are
concerned about the situation that still the question of energy
security hasn't been solved. How do you think, how soon will the
alternative corridors be found?
Ambassador Fried: Well, that is one of the questions of the hour.
The Russians have put energy security on the agenda of the G8. We
believe that energy security comes from transparency and an open
investment regime. It does not come from a closed regime or
politicization or corruption.
Russia is going to make a lot of money off of energy under any
scenario. That's not the issue. The issue is whether gas and oil
will be developed according to commercial or strategic principles.
We believe in commercial principles. We believe that an open
investment regime will be better actually in the end for Russia.
Certainly your country and Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have a lot at
stake here. So, in a way, does Ukraine.
We think that a closed system is not good, either for your country or
for Georgia or for Ukraine or for Western Europe, and, frankly, I
don't think it's good for Russia.
An open system will force governments - an open system will raise
energy prices to world levels, which is not a bad thing, but you
can't have energy prices at world levels for some countries and not
for others. And it's very odd that your country sells its base for
$40 a thousand cubic meters and that same gas is resold for $240 a
thousand cubic meters. I see you know exactly what I'm talking about.
The system needs to be open, and then Russia is going to make
billions of dollars anyway, but it will do so under conditions which
also benefit other countries.
Question: I have very short question, and I can hear from you very
short answer. I am from Georgia, Ekaterine Kadagishvili. Everyone
knows about the Rose revolution. More than two years have gone after
this event. I am just interested if U.S. government sees any ...
some... steps before, steps forward to democratic principles in this
country or are some aspects where U.S. government maybe is
disappointed.
Ambassador Fried: I do see progress. But, of course, in the end of
2004 Georgia was, well, the end of 2003, I guess. That's when we
have to date it from, from the Rose Revolution. Georgia was in pretty
bad shape, so I see progress from a pretty low base. There has been
progress. This progress needs to be sustained for a long time.
Civil society has to be strengthened, the economy has to develop, the
state has to become functional, but not authoritarian. Georgia
cannot afford military adventurism. I don't care how frustrating it
is to have North/South Ossetia and Abkhazia in their current
situation. There is no military answer. But I think there is
progress.
You can tell me more, but I've been to Georgia three times in the
past year, and each time it's a little better. The government's a
little more organized, Tbilisi looks a little better, a few more
roads have been developed.
Question: Is this enough?
Ambassador Fried: No, it's not enough. Of course it's not enough.
But look, I'm not a Georgia expert but I know something - I'm old,
right? So I've seen post-communist, I remember post-communist
development in Eastern Europe in 1989. After two years in Poland,
the country I know the best, it was still a mess, but there was some
progress. Was it enough? No. But they made more progress, they
didn't stop.
Question: All other countries it seems like make more progress.
Ambassador Fried: No, actually Georgia's done - Look, Georgia made
no progress basically for 10 years after independence. It stopped a
civil war, that's true, but that's all it did. Georgia has a lot
more to do but it's done something.
Question: I'm Armine Amiryan, I'm from Armenia from Armenian TV. In
terms of democracy and human rights protection, which countries
within our region are more favorable conditions?
Ambassador Fried: Don't ask me to rank order countries. [Laughter].
Look, a lot of Armenians were disappointed that the constitutional
referendum last fall was not as free and fair as it should have been.
We have recently concluded with Armenia an agreement to provide $250
million worth of assistance under the Millennium Challenge Account,
but we have told Armenia very clearly that it has to deepen its
democratic reforms as a condition of this program.
I think a settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh is critical for Armenia
because the country needs to get beyond a mentality of encirclement
in the war. The same could be said for Azerbaijan.
Democracy takes leadership from the top, it also takes leadership
from civil society. And it is only - I don't know about the rest of
the world from experience, but I know that in post-communist
societies the only successful countries emerging from communism have
been countries which have implemented free market and democratic
reforms and done so on a sustained basis over time.
Other models have been tried - from nationalism and fascism in
Serbia, to a "go slow" approach in Romania. Is anybody here from
Romania? You remember President Iliescu's first term of office? Not
exactly a great success. But when he came back the second time after
Constantinescu, things advanced and got better. No matter what your
politics I think everybody agrees it was better in the late '90s.
That's my point.
I really do have to go. Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs,
U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
April 7 2006
State's Fried Outlines U.S. Policy for "Murrow" Journalists
Says promotion of democracy to be enduring legacy of Bush
administration
The United States will continue to support democratic movements in
the Middle East as well as in former Soviet states as a means of
countering Islamist extremism `and the terrorism derived from that
extremism,' said Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried April 4.
Fried spoke during a roundtable discussion with participants from the
Edward R. Murrow Program for Journalists, a new State Department
initiative that brings foreign reporters to the United States to
learn about American journalistic practices. (See related article.)
The Bush administration looks at democracy as a `practical solution'
to problems such as instability and poor economic development, as
well as a long-term answer to the terrorist threat posed by `radical,
anti-democratic, Islamist ideology,' said Fried, who heads the Bureau
of European and Eurasian Affairs.
`We do believe that democracy is applicable in the Middle East, just
as it has been applicable in Asia, South America, Eastern Europe, and
South Asia,' he said. `We intend to support democratic movements in
that world, as well as in Central Asia and the post-communist
hemisphere.'
The emphasis on democracy as a long-term solution to extremism and
terrorism `is apt to be an enduring legacy of the Bush
administration,' Fried said.
During the roundtable discussion, Fried answered questions about a
wide range of issues, including democracy in Russia, the future
status of Kosovo, the Annan plan for Cyprus, Turkey's bid to join the
European Union, the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh, energy security in Russia and Central Asia,
democratic progress in Georgia and U.S.-European relations.
The State Department welcomed 129 journalists from around the world
for the inaugural Edward R. Murrow Program for Journalists April
1-21. It is a component of the department's International Visitor
Leadership Program. (See announcement.)
Murrow, a leading broadcast journalist from 1935 to 1960, headed the
United States Information Agency from 1961 to 1963.
Following is the full transcript of the roundtable discussion:
(begin transcript)
Daniel Fried
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
Roundtable Discussion with Murrow Journalist International Visitor
Program
U.S. State Department
Washington, DC
2:30 p.m. April 4, 2006
Ambassador Fried: Well, given that this is, I'm told, Russian and
Turkish speaking, [greeting in Russian]. [Laughter]. You're very
welcome here in the Department of State, and I'd like to talk a
little bit about U.S. foreign policy in the second Bush term, and
then stop fairly quickly and answer your questions, if that's all
right, if that's a good way to proceed.
The Bush foreign policy has really evolved from the September 11th
terrorist attack as an initial event and gone through several phases.
In the initial aftermath of September 11th, we faced a national
emergency. We were attacked essentially by the Taliban and al-Qaida
from Afghanistan, and we took action there.
Iraq you know about and that has been discussed, and I don't want to
spend the whole time talking about Iraq, but we felt that one of the
lessons of September 11th was that you could not wait for dangers to
gather and do nothing. And that containment of someone like Saddam
Hussein might not be a viable strategy, especially since containment
wasn't working.
But as time went on, you will notice if you study President Bush's
speeches carefully that in his foreign policy speeches and in the
National Security Strategy documents of the United States he
gradually emphasized issues other than the strict military and
intelligence side of counterterrorism and started speaking about
longer term issues of building democracies and reform and stability
through reform. We stopped defining al-Qaida as an enemy in a narrow
sense of being a terrorist organization and started speaking more
about radical, anti-democratic, Islamist ideology as a longer term
problem for which the answer was not principally a military or
intelligence answer, but was an answer rooted in reform, support for
democracy, support for states, for nations seeking to deepen their
own democracies.
This emphasis on democracy as a long-term answer to the problems of
Islamist extremism and the terrorism derived from that extremism is
apt to be an enduring legacy of the Bush administration - more than
what is usually considered to be the Bush administration's foreign
policy legacy, things like preemption. Preemptive military action: I
think that is going to be less important, and the emphasis on
democracy is more important.
Now, because there are a great many Turkish speakers here, it may
have occurred to you listening to me that Turkey's experience of
building a secular democracy within a society which is mostly Muslim,
and then in recent years deepening that democracy may be very
relevant. Indeed, we find that experience to be relevant because
Turkey is at once a country with a Muslim population and a democracy,
and a secular nation state.
Those achievements are very relevant to the kind of problems we face
now, which is dealing with a radical Islamist ideology which denies
in principle the relevance of democracy and denies that democracy can
take root in a society which has Muslim traditions.
We reject the notion of a clash of civilizations, and we reject the
notion that any one religion is intrinsically more disposed to
democracy than any other religion.
Similarly, we believe that democratic reforms, the rule of law, and a
kind of openness toward the world is a better answer to the problems
left behind by the Soviet Union than nationalism or authoritarianism.
There is a debate in Russia today whether democracy - well, there
isn't even much of a debate. Many Russians believe that democracy
equals chaos and that democracy as it was practiced in Russia in the
'90s demonstrates that democracy is not terribly relevant to the
problems of post-communism.
In our view this is mistaken, and the problem of reform in Russia in
the '90s was not that it was too democratic, but that it was not
consistent enough.
I see there is a journalist from Poland here. In the beginning of
the 1990s Poles didn't know whether they would succeed. The economy
in Poland was in complete ruin. The country was very poor. The
infrastructure was wretched. The demographics were bad. Not as bad
as they are in Russia today, but actually pretty bad. And the Poles'
answer to that was not to turn away from reform and embrace
authoritarianism, but to push ahead with reform, and they did so in
the early '90s with great concentration, and the results later speak
for themselves of massive economic growth, rising standard of living,
and gradual stability on a much higher level of national existence,
actually.
So the Bush administration looks at democracy not as is sometimes
assumed in Europe as a kind of Messianic ideology that bears no
relationship to reality, but as a rather practical solution to
problems and a practical solution which has been successful in the
past 17 years, since 1989, in cases where it has been applied
consistently.
Now one of the challenges we Americans face is that for 60 years we
did not really regard democracy as relevant to the broader Middle
East or countries which were Muslim. During the 1970s we talked
about democracies and human rights as the answer to communism, but we
seemed very happy to deal with authoritarian regimes in Egypt and
conservative, absolutist monarchies in Saudi Arabia.
The results in the Middle East were not terribly satisfactory, and
what we have done in this administration is to do away with this red
line around the broader Middle East which said within this red line
democracy and the normal rules don't apply. They do apply.
The problem with this kind of an approach is that although democracy,
I am convinced, will be the fate for the broader Middle East in the
long run; in the short run life is not life the way the Soviet Union
used to describe it - a triumphant march to a better future. It's
pretty complicated stuff.
But we do believe that democracy is applicable in the Middle East,
just as it has been applicable in Asia, South America, Eastern
Europe, and South Asia.
We intend to support democratic movements in that world, as well as
in Central Asia and the post-communist hemisphere.
Now those are very broad outlines of American foreign policy in the
second Bush term. Tomorrow I'm giving testimony in the Senate about
the problem and the causes of Islamist extremism, mostly in Western
Europe. This is a long-term challenge for us. Many of the Islamist
radicals and the intellectual climate they live in remind me as
someone who lived in the Soviet Union, remind me of 21st Century
versions of Raskolnikov, an uprooted semi-intellectual with great
ideas who falls into rather dangerous radical nihilism.
This is a challenge we have to face, and we have to face this
together working with the governments of the countries you represent
and with civil societies in your countries.
Let me stop here. You come from a great many countries. Your
questions are apt to be different. I will do my best to answer them,
but I wanted to give you an overall framework of what our thinking is
like.
So with that, I'm at your disposal.
Question: My name is Anna Novicka.... My name is Anna Novicka. I
am from [the] Latvian newspaper Telegraf and I would like to find out
about your opinion as the development in the relations in the
triangle the United States, Russia and Europe is concerned if we take
into account that the opinions of the United States and Russia are
becoming more and more different. I mean the relationship with
Syria, Ukraine, Belarus. Is there any future for relations in this
triangle?
Ambassador Fried: Everybody got the question?
We want to work with Russia on a common agenda, and we want to work
with Russia wherever possible. There are, objectively speaking, or
there should be, objectively speaking, as used to be said in the old
Soviet Union, no barriers to our cooperation because we are not each
other's principal problem. In practice, that cooperation has been
more difficult than we Americans had hoped.
You mentioned Belarus. Is there anybody here from Belarus?
I don't know why Russia has supported the recent elections in
Belarus. No country in Europe believed these elections were free and
fair. As far as I can tell no democracy anywhere in the world
thought these elections were free and fair. I do not understand why
Russia would find it in its interest to support the Lukashenko
regime.
I think Russia is still trying to find its place in the world after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and I think back to the period,
there was a period in history when Russia was the most advanced
relative to Western Europe, the most successful, the most
economically, culturally, scientifically dynamic, which was, of
course, the generation before 1914 when Russia also thought of itself
as a European country.
I think that the periods when Russia sought to be isolated from the
world and separate and part of its own sitting in a kind of isolation
were periods that did not bring Russia great results. Now this is not
a US government view, this is only my view as someone who lived in
Russia. But I hope that Russia will return to a path of convergence
with and integration with the Euro-Atlantic community because Russia
has a great deal to offer.
I also don't think much of the theory of some Russians that the
United States is out to encircle Russia. Encircling Russia is not
our objective. We have other problems in the world. Russia is not a
problem for us.
We were interested - you're from Latvia, right? We were interested
in seeing Latvia become a member of NATO and a member of the European
Union not because we wanted to surround Russia, but because we wanted
to complete a Europe whole, free and at peace.
A Latvia, a Poland, a Romania that are secure, prospering democracies
are not threats to Russia. A Germany in NATO and the European Union,
a Germany which is a democracy, is hardly a threat to Russia. There
is no threat to Russia from the West. I believe there ought to be the
basis for strategic cooperation between Russia and the United States.
It's proving more frustrating now than we had hoped.
Question: My name is Kirill Krabu. I've got a question about
Europe. As you know, Europe is growing up now and gets more and more
powerful. Our currency rates now are higher than the dollar. For
example, the Euro is higher than the dollar now.
How do you think about that, if this growth will continue? Is it a
reason for the USA to be maybe afraid of Europe and to begin some
polarization between Europe and USA? Because Europe is somewhere
also now called as United States of Europe. So is it a reason to
become polarized?
Ambassador Fried: No. We welcome a strong Europe. A strong Europe
is good for the United States. The difficulties of the 20th Century
- two world wars, the Cold War, Nazism, fascism, communism, were all
products of a breakup, a kind of calamitous collapse of Europe in
1914.
Now why on earth would the United States, after having had to go to
war twice in the 20th century to save Europe and fight the Cold War
to defend democracy in Europe, be alarmed by the prospect of a
secure, stable, prospering and democratic Europe today? It would be
ridiculous. We want there to be a strong Europe.
There is not one serious person in Washington who worries about a
U.S.-European rivalry. Commercially, yes. Okay, Boeing and Airbus
will always fight. Of course they will. Well, so what? Ford and GM
also fight. Let them. All right?
The strategic fact is the United States and Europe need to work
together because the threats we face are common threats, and they
mostly originate outside of Europe, both in the broader Middle East
and the problems along what I call Europe's frontiers of freedom -
the Balkans, South Caucasus. These are where the problems are. But
the United States and Europe are together a center of democracy and
prosperity in the world, and the alliance there is very close and apt
to be closer.
When I think of all the problems, the last of my worries is a
U.S.-European rivalry. Besides, the worst days of 2003, 2004, the
debate about the Iraq war - that is behind us now, thank God.
Question: I am from Kosovo, Taner, the Balkans and anything about
the Balkans. As you know the Kosovo problem and the challenge has
not been solved yet and at the same time in Serbia there are sort of
problems. So, the stability of the Balkans... and what is the
American policy towards these two issues, especially the Kosovo
status?
Ambassador Fried: The United States has been involved deeply in the
Balkans since the breakup of the old Yugoslavia. Kosovo's status is
the last open question, just as Serbia's future direction is the
biggest problem.
We support the efforts of Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president, to
negotiate arrangements for Kosovo's final status this year. I don't
know what those arrangements will be, but I do know what they will
not be. We will not go back to the situation before 1999. We will
not partition Kosovo. We will not redraw borders. That is no
secession, no greater this or greater that. And whatever solution
there is in Kosovo has to respect the rights of Kosovo's minorities
-- ethnic Serb, ethnic Turkish.
NATO didn't fight a war in Kosovo to support anyone's nationalist
agenda. The Serb population of Kosovo needs to be protected, it
needs to be respected, it needs to have a home in Kosovo. Not
because Belgrade insists, but because this is a matter of principle
to us.
Then the whole region needs to move to Europe. You cannot have the
Balkans outside of Europe as a breeding ground of poverty, theft,
smuggling, and occasionally wars. And I believe that Serbia ought to
be in Europe. This isn't just about Kosovo, it's about the whole
region. And Macedonia should be in Europe.
What I can't say is exactly what Kosovo's final status will be, but
that's not up to the United States, that's a negotiated process.
Question: I am from North Cyprus. This is Basaran. Of course there
is a... we have a Cyprus issue. In the Cyprus issue there has been a
referendum as you know. The Turkish side said yes, and the Greek
side said no, and because of that we could not reach to any peace.
The Greek side of course established themselves as the member of
European Union. So, there has been some commitments to diplomatic
channels and economic commitments. Unfortunately, these commitments
by United States have not been established. The... there was a
meeting between our president and Condoleezza Rice but any committed
promises were not established. So, if you can elaborate on this?
Ambassador Fried: I am very familiar with the Cyprus issue. We
believe in one Cyprus. We support reunification of the island as a
bizonal, bicommunal federation. We do not believe in separatism or
cessation. We are very pleased that the Turkish Cypriot community
also supports reunification.
I myself have met with Mr. Talat. We do not recognize him as
president; we do not recognize the government, but we do understand
that he is a leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, and we
appreciate the fact that he supports a negotiated settlement to
reunify the island. We encourage that. It's the right policy. We
look forward to the day when a reunited Cyprus with a secure Turkish
community is in the European Union as a whole island.
Now we understand that bizonal, bicommunal federation also means that
there have to be certain arrangements. We supported the Annan plan,
as you know. It didn't pass. I regret that. But we have to find a
way to make progress. We do want to make progress on the basis that
I stated. And we do want to encourage the Turkish Cypriot community,
but without recognizing a separate state and without creeping
recognition of a separate state because we do believe in unification.
Again, this is what the Turkish Cypriot leadership says it believes,
and I accept this. I believe their position is sincere.
So we look forward to working with the government of Cyprus, with the
Turkish Cypriot community, with the United Nations, with Turkey, with
Greece to advance a settlement which will help everyone.
Question: I come from Brussels, speaking English.
About the Cyprus issue, this year everyone is expecting a crisis for
Turkey about the Greek Cypriots and opening the port issue. Turkey
clearly declared that they won't open their ports unless there is a
settlement in Cyprus. It will be a big crisis with, big or small I
don't know, but definitely a crisis for Turkey in the EU
relationship.
Also there is a ground shifting for the settlement from UN to EU, and
it seems that U.S. doesn't respond at all. Since Mr. Annan has a
very limited time and I don't think that personally he will again try
something else because of every limitation. Do you have any concrete
steps in the short term for Cyprus? Not recognition of course, but
to try for anything.
Ambassador Fried: You make a very good point, which is that this
issue, and I'm putting it in my words not yours, but that this issue
will not get better by itself. In fact, we have been thinking about
how important it is that we do whatever we can to help promote a
settlement.
I frankly appreciate the Turkish government's support for a
settlement. I don't think that Talat could have done what he did
without Turkey's backing. This is a significant change. It means
that Turkey also supports a bizonal, bicommunal federation.
So we have to look at what we can do to support a settlement. Now
you're right, we have always supported Turkey's accession to the
European Union on the basis that Turkey ought to be treated like
every other candidate. Turkey meets the criteria, it should join.
If it doesn't, it shouldn't. But no special rules.
This is a tough position for Turkey, I understand it. We want to
make progress, and we were thinking about how to approach the Cyprus
issue so as to avoid this kind of a problem. The Turkish government
deserves credit for having supported a settlement. This is not
trivial. This is a big deal. It means that Greece, Turkey, the
Turkish Cypriot community, and the government of Cyprus all support a
bizonal, bicommunal federation. They just argue about the ways to
get there. I understand this. This is not easy. But we should not
let this drift.
So that's the premise of your question, and I frankly agree with you,
and we're thinking about this very actively right now.
Question: I am from Azerbaijan, from the TV Company INS. From the
year 2005 until today everybody who's connected to the settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, they've been talking that this conflict
has to be solved in the year 2006. If it's not solved now then it
will last for many years. But now we see that the talks are
deadlocked and the non-constructive position of the Armenian
president is indicative. How do you think, is it possible that this
conflict is settled within one or two years? And please take into
consideration that both parties have always claimed that they
wouldn't seize any territory? How do you see it?
Ambassador Fried: Happily the situation is not as stuck as it
appeared immediately after Rambouillet. At Rambouillet Presidents
Kocharian and Aliyev met. They failed to come to agreement on terms
to settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and many people
thought, oh my God, it's over, there will be war, terrible things
will happen.
Shortly after that I went out to Baku and Yerevan with Ambassador
Steve Mann, who is the American negotiator as part of the Minsk group
process of negotiating a settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh. And we had
a series of useful, I think productive, discussions with the
government of Azerbaijan, the government of Armenia, and we have had
discussions here with Foreign Minister Oskanian of Armenia and Deputy
Foreign Minister Azimov of Azerbaijan. Both governments appear
serious about making progress. Both governments gave us something to
work with. So we're no longer quite stuck. We don't have a solution
yet, but we are confident enough that we're proceeding with
discussions with both governments, working with the Minsk group
co-chairs.
It's important that both countries understand that they both cannot
have their maximum objectives at the same time. Both countries can't
achieve that. And, in fact, neither country will achieve its maximum
objectives. Similarly, no country can receive anything. Both
countries have interests that must be taken into account.
It's going to take courage and political leadership to get out of a
war cycle and start contemplating the much more hopeful future if
there is peace.
You're from Azerbaijan, right? Your country's going to have a lot of
money coming in from oil and gas, but only if there is peace. If
there is war, there is no more money. All right? Just look at the
map. You know what I'm talking about. You're well set up for peace.
Of course, the oil and gas money won't do you any good unless it's
well spent, but that's a different issue. So we're determined to
move ahead.
Question: This is Liudmila Barba from Moldova. About the Kosovo
status, many official people from Moscow, including President Putin,
have indicated that in case Kosovo is recognized then Russia would be
able to recognize the separatist regions in post-Soviet territory.
Do you take into consideration this factor when you are thinking
about the status of Kosovo?
The second question is about the widening of the European Union.
After World War II, the United States supported the present European
Union. Will the United States keep supporting the enlargement of the
European Union to include Ukraine and Moldova?
Ambassador Fried: First, we do not regard Kosovo as a precedent for
resolution of any other conflict. Not Transnistria, not Abkhazia,
not South Ossetia, not Chechnya, or North Ossetia, or Ingushetia. It
is not a precedent. Full stop.
We do not support separatism. We do not support separatist agendas.
Why is Kosovo different? Because Milosevic fought a war with NATO,
for one thing, and he lost. Secondly, the United Nations has had
administration over Kosovo for seven years. Third, the UN Security
Council has repeatedly affirmed Kosovo's status as under UN
administration, its final status to be worked out.
So our position is very clear and should not be misunderstood.
The second question about the enlargement of the European Union.
We've always favored it. We think it has been a fabulous success. It
has been a fabulous success. We believe that enlargement should
continue, although we recognize first that there is a debate in
Western Europe about EU enlargement that we have to respect. And
second, the countries have to be ready. It is not a gift, it is not
a charity program. Your Polish and Latvian colleagues here can tell
you that it was very hard to get into the European Union. They had
to do a lot, but it was worth it.
As for Ukraine, Ukrainians have to decide themselves. Anybody from
Ukraine here? Yes. All right. Ukrainians have to decide for
themselves what they want. Then they have to do the work.
Question: Thank you very much. Naziya Bissenova from Kazakshtan.
Mr. Fried, actually I have several questions but to be fair I will
ask only one question.
Presently, Russia is using its energy card when playing on the
international arena and this question refers to the Central Asian
countries and Kazakhstan.
Due to the position of the Russian monopoly Gazprom in the pipelines,
they are in charge of everything. Europe and the United States are
concerned about the situation that still the question of energy
security hasn't been solved. How do you think, how soon will the
alternative corridors be found?
Ambassador Fried: Well, that is one of the questions of the hour.
The Russians have put energy security on the agenda of the G8. We
believe that energy security comes from transparency and an open
investment regime. It does not come from a closed regime or
politicization or corruption.
Russia is going to make a lot of money off of energy under any
scenario. That's not the issue. The issue is whether gas and oil
will be developed according to commercial or strategic principles.
We believe in commercial principles. We believe that an open
investment regime will be better actually in the end for Russia.
Certainly your country and Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have a lot at
stake here. So, in a way, does Ukraine.
We think that a closed system is not good, either for your country or
for Georgia or for Ukraine or for Western Europe, and, frankly, I
don't think it's good for Russia.
An open system will force governments - an open system will raise
energy prices to world levels, which is not a bad thing, but you
can't have energy prices at world levels for some countries and not
for others. And it's very odd that your country sells its base for
$40 a thousand cubic meters and that same gas is resold for $240 a
thousand cubic meters. I see you know exactly what I'm talking about.
The system needs to be open, and then Russia is going to make
billions of dollars anyway, but it will do so under conditions which
also benefit other countries.
Question: I have very short question, and I can hear from you very
short answer. I am from Georgia, Ekaterine Kadagishvili. Everyone
knows about the Rose revolution. More than two years have gone after
this event. I am just interested if U.S. government sees any ...
some... steps before, steps forward to democratic principles in this
country or are some aspects where U.S. government maybe is
disappointed.
Ambassador Fried: I do see progress. But, of course, in the end of
2004 Georgia was, well, the end of 2003, I guess. That's when we
have to date it from, from the Rose Revolution. Georgia was in pretty
bad shape, so I see progress from a pretty low base. There has been
progress. This progress needs to be sustained for a long time.
Civil society has to be strengthened, the economy has to develop, the
state has to become functional, but not authoritarian. Georgia
cannot afford military adventurism. I don't care how frustrating it
is to have North/South Ossetia and Abkhazia in their current
situation. There is no military answer. But I think there is
progress.
You can tell me more, but I've been to Georgia three times in the
past year, and each time it's a little better. The government's a
little more organized, Tbilisi looks a little better, a few more
roads have been developed.
Question: Is this enough?
Ambassador Fried: No, it's not enough. Of course it's not enough.
But look, I'm not a Georgia expert but I know something - I'm old,
right? So I've seen post-communist, I remember post-communist
development in Eastern Europe in 1989. After two years in Poland,
the country I know the best, it was still a mess, but there was some
progress. Was it enough? No. But they made more progress, they
didn't stop.
Question: All other countries it seems like make more progress.
Ambassador Fried: No, actually Georgia's done - Look, Georgia made
no progress basically for 10 years after independence. It stopped a
civil war, that's true, but that's all it did. Georgia has a lot
more to do but it's done something.
Question: I'm Armine Amiryan, I'm from Armenia from Armenian TV. In
terms of democracy and human rights protection, which countries
within our region are more favorable conditions?
Ambassador Fried: Don't ask me to rank order countries. [Laughter].
Look, a lot of Armenians were disappointed that the constitutional
referendum last fall was not as free and fair as it should have been.
We have recently concluded with Armenia an agreement to provide $250
million worth of assistance under the Millennium Challenge Account,
but we have told Armenia very clearly that it has to deepen its
democratic reforms as a condition of this program.
I think a settlement of Nagorno-Karabakh is critical for Armenia
because the country needs to get beyond a mentality of encirclement
in the war. The same could be said for Azerbaijan.
Democracy takes leadership from the top, it also takes leadership
from civil society. And it is only - I don't know about the rest of
the world from experience, but I know that in post-communist
societies the only successful countries emerging from communism have
been countries which have implemented free market and democratic
reforms and done so on a sustained basis over time.
Other models have been tried - from nationalism and fascism in
Serbia, to a "go slow" approach in Romania. Is anybody here from
Romania? You remember President Iliescu's first term of office? Not
exactly a great success. But when he came back the second time after
Constantinescu, things advanced and got better. No matter what your
politics I think everybody agrees it was better in the late '90s.
That's my point.
I really do have to go. Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Bureau of International Information Programs,
U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress