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KOSOVO AND THE POST-SOVIET CONFLICTS: NO ANALOGY MEANS NO "PRECEDENT"
By Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
April 13 2006
Part one of two.
Lavrov puts brakes on Kosovo recognition Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs Sergei Lavrov and other officials have shifted their tactics
regarding the negotiations on the status of Kosovo. The new theme
of their statements and tactical approach to the negotiations is:
"No Haste." In their view, the negotiations must prepare a settlement
"acceptable to all parties" -- translation: hand Serbia blocking
rights -- even if it means delaying the final outcome. Lavrov and
his spokesman, Mikhail Kamynin, somberly intimate that recognition
of Kosovo's independence could set a "precedent" with "dangerous
consequences in Europe," i.e., encourage movements in parts of certain
countries to press for separate statehood and international recognition
(Interfax, April 10). Meanwhile, the United States is the main promoter
of Kosovo's independence, contingent on proper standards of governance
and human rights. The EU position is similar.
Moscow's new arguments seek to dissuade some European governments
from supporting recognition and, through this tactic, to complicate
and prolong the negotiations.
The shift seems due at least in part to the prospect that the Serbian
government might officially consent to independence and international
recognition of Kosovo, albeit subject to international (i.e., Western)
certification that Kosovo has achieved democratic standards.
Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Draskovic recently declared
that Serbia could agree to international recognition of Kosovo's
independence, including membership in all international organizations
save the United Nations (a reservation that seems destined to be
abandoned in due course). Draskovic's statement has triggered a
reassessment of policy in Moscow.
The Kremlin had initially calculated that international recognition
of Kosovo's independence could become a "model" or "precedent"
enabling Russia to call for recognition of Transnistria, Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, or Karabakh. However, Serbian consent to international
recognition of Kosovo would make it impossible for Moscow to apply
a "Kosovo model" to the post-Soviet conflicts. In that case, the
"model" would stipulate that international recognition of a new state
depends on the prior consent of the country from which that entity
secedes. Such a model would be useless to Russia and the post-Soviet
secessionist territories because Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan
would not grant such consent in any foreseeable circumstances.
Moreover, rapid progress toward resolving the Kosovo issue with
minimal Serbian resistance would deprive Russia of opportunities to
play spoiler in the negotiations within the Kosovo Contact Group and
UN Security Council. Moscow wants a dragged-out negotiating process
with opportunities for tradeoffs, whether at Serbia's expense or the
expense of Moscow's proteges in the post-Soviet secessionist enclaves,
depending on tactical developments down the road.
Moscow is responding in three ways to the situation created by the
Draskovic statement. First, it tries to embolden hard-line nationalists
in the Serbian government to oppose Kosovo's independence in principle
and to raise insuperable obstacles in the negotiations. Second,
it tries to outflank the United States by raising the prospect of
destabilization in Europe with some West European participants in
the Contact Group and with some Central-East European governments
in bilateral channels. And, third, it cries, "No Haste," so as to
frustrate the U.S. and, largely, Western goal of achieving a resolution
this year.
The authorities in Tiraspol, Transnistria; Sukhumi, Abkhazia;
Tskhinvali, South Ossetia; and Stepanakert, Karabakh (and Yerevan as
well) never based their hopes for international or at least Russian
official recognition upon a possible Kosovo "model" or "precedent."
When Russian President Vladimir Putin raised this idea earlier this
year and turned it into a staple of Russia's discourse on post-Soviet
conflict resolution, the secessionist authorities reacted with caution
and skepticism. While putting a few of their eggs in the Kosovo basket,
they are clearly loath to stake their case on Kosovo or Russian
actions related to Kosovo. They continually stress other arguments,
"precedents" or "models" in their quest for recognition (see EDM,
February 2, 6, 8).
By Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
April 13 2006
Part one of two.
Lavrov puts brakes on Kosovo recognition Russian Minister of Foreign
Affairs Sergei Lavrov and other officials have shifted their tactics
regarding the negotiations on the status of Kosovo. The new theme
of their statements and tactical approach to the negotiations is:
"No Haste." In their view, the negotiations must prepare a settlement
"acceptable to all parties" -- translation: hand Serbia blocking
rights -- even if it means delaying the final outcome. Lavrov and
his spokesman, Mikhail Kamynin, somberly intimate that recognition
of Kosovo's independence could set a "precedent" with "dangerous
consequences in Europe," i.e., encourage movements in parts of certain
countries to press for separate statehood and international recognition
(Interfax, April 10). Meanwhile, the United States is the main promoter
of Kosovo's independence, contingent on proper standards of governance
and human rights. The EU position is similar.
Moscow's new arguments seek to dissuade some European governments
from supporting recognition and, through this tactic, to complicate
and prolong the negotiations.
The shift seems due at least in part to the prospect that the Serbian
government might officially consent to independence and international
recognition of Kosovo, albeit subject to international (i.e., Western)
certification that Kosovo has achieved democratic standards.
Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Draskovic recently declared
that Serbia could agree to international recognition of Kosovo's
independence, including membership in all international organizations
save the United Nations (a reservation that seems destined to be
abandoned in due course). Draskovic's statement has triggered a
reassessment of policy in Moscow.
The Kremlin had initially calculated that international recognition
of Kosovo's independence could become a "model" or "precedent"
enabling Russia to call for recognition of Transnistria, Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, or Karabakh. However, Serbian consent to international
recognition of Kosovo would make it impossible for Moscow to apply
a "Kosovo model" to the post-Soviet conflicts. In that case, the
"model" would stipulate that international recognition of a new state
depends on the prior consent of the country from which that entity
secedes. Such a model would be useless to Russia and the post-Soviet
secessionist territories because Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan
would not grant such consent in any foreseeable circumstances.
Moreover, rapid progress toward resolving the Kosovo issue with
minimal Serbian resistance would deprive Russia of opportunities to
play spoiler in the negotiations within the Kosovo Contact Group and
UN Security Council. Moscow wants a dragged-out negotiating process
with opportunities for tradeoffs, whether at Serbia's expense or the
expense of Moscow's proteges in the post-Soviet secessionist enclaves,
depending on tactical developments down the road.
Moscow is responding in three ways to the situation created by the
Draskovic statement. First, it tries to embolden hard-line nationalists
in the Serbian government to oppose Kosovo's independence in principle
and to raise insuperable obstacles in the negotiations. Second,
it tries to outflank the United States by raising the prospect of
destabilization in Europe with some West European participants in
the Contact Group and with some Central-East European governments
in bilateral channels. And, third, it cries, "No Haste," so as to
frustrate the U.S. and, largely, Western goal of achieving a resolution
this year.
The authorities in Tiraspol, Transnistria; Sukhumi, Abkhazia;
Tskhinvali, South Ossetia; and Stepanakert, Karabakh (and Yerevan as
well) never based their hopes for international or at least Russian
official recognition upon a possible Kosovo "model" or "precedent."
When Russian President Vladimir Putin raised this idea earlier this
year and turned it into a staple of Russia's discourse on post-Soviet
conflict resolution, the secessionist authorities reacted with caution
and skepticism. While putting a few of their eggs in the Kosovo basket,
they are clearly loath to stake their case on Kosovo or Russian
actions related to Kosovo. They continually stress other arguments,
"precedents" or "models" in their quest for recognition (see EDM,
February 2, 6, 8).