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IRANIAN "EASTERNIZATION" IS STRONGER THAN TURKISH "WESTERNIZATION"
Hazem Saghieh Al-Hayat
Dar Al-Hayat, Lebanon
April 17 2006
Lying in the dark shadow of dealing with the US-Iranian issue is the
Turkish issue, and by extension, the Turkish-Kurdish issue.
If Washington and Tehran reach a settlement over Iraq, after a partial
military clash caused by Uranium enrichment, or even without this
enrichment, the issue of Turkish influence and interests in northern
Iraq will be raised. One of the geo-political constants that have
accompanied this region is the preservation of balance between the
Turkish and Iranian roles, whether extending toward Iraq or keeping
distant from it.
Currently, the probable course of this issue joins up with two other
courses, making the problem even more unstable.
With the creeping civil war in Iraq, the Kurds of the North might
survive; they have lived in a state of quasi-independence since
the secure zone was established there in 1992. The situation
was strengthened by the establishment of independent political
institutions, like a Parliament and autonomous government, as well
as the Kurds' own political parties.
If this is added to what is taking place in terms of infrastructure,
economic development and security arrangements, the "separatist"
form involves a serious amount of content.
Perhaps Washington, if there is a total collapse in Iraq and the
reshaping of the country along communal spheres of influence, will
approach Iraqi Kurdistan as the "share" that it can retain and perhaps
transform into the model that was desired for the entire country.
However, all of this is connected to Turkey, to a great extent,
to the degree that American interests and its own become one. It is
a complex matter, naturally, which complicates the second direction
that further crisis is likely to take, a direction that involves the
relationship between Ankara and its Kurds. It was interesting to see
the situation explode, with no obvious introduction, in a way not seen
since 1994. The violent clashes between Kurdish fighters and Turkish
security forces led to the killing of 20 people in south-east Turkey
as well as Istanbul itself.
In fact, Ankara, under constant pressure from the European Union,
lifted the state of emergency in Kurdish regions and began paying
compensation to Kurds for the destruction of their villages by
the Turkish Army. The government also endorsed some cultural and
linguistic rights for the Kurds. This is of course insufficient,
especially since the economic despair that hovers over the Kurds of
Turkey, the widespread unemployment, low wages and lack of investment,
makes Kurdish anger an event to be anticipated. But the defeat of this
course is another thing altogether, quantitatively and qualitatively
different. In this sense, some observers fear that the recent clashes,
sparked by the funeral of 14 members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party,
was the beginning of a wide-scale deterioration, especially since
the KWP two years ago ended a unilateral truce that had lasted for
six years.
If things goes this way, and militarization and oppression return to
the southeast, Turkey's desire to join the EU will be threatened again;
it is a desire about which doubts of its success are growing.
That said, the possibilities of "easternization" via Iran remain
stronger than the possibilities of "westernization" via Turkey. Even
if the Iraqi Shiite Coalition splits off, this possibility remains
"safer" and easier to travel.
Pure authoritarianism, which characterizes the Iranian state, makes
it a candidate for imperial expansion in a way that does not suit the
current nature of the Turkish state. Turkey has become a complicated
mixture of aspects that are authoritarian, democratic, nationalist and
Islamic, not to speak of civilian and military. In times of crisis,
the decisive entity wins out over the confused entity.
The Turkish stumbling is revealed in its points of contact with
all concerned parties, and all of the issues that concern them. It
reveals that the deadlocks practically represent impossibilities. If
relations with Europe are threatened because of the Kurds, in sympathy
with the Armenian genocide and the rest of the "human rights" agenda,
following the US policy will provoke the majority of people, which
will make the claim of democracy purely that - a claim.
Meanwhile, a just solution of the Kurdish problem will mobilize a
rainbow in Turkey consisting of the military, the nationalists, and
some Islamists; dealing with the matter through repression will weaken
any Turkish role in Iraqi Kurdistan, especially if the Kurdish-Turkoman
conflict there explodes, in parallel to the Kurdish-Arab conflict,
over Kirkuk.
The Iranian authorities appear to be united around Khamenei and
Ahmadinejad, while "opponents" like Rafsanjani and Khatami are out of
the spotlight. However, when these two are in line with the regime,
the Turkish authorities, after the fall of the one-sided Kemalism,
seem closer to coalitions that are made and broken on a daily basis
between the Islamists and the army, and the president of the Republic
and these two groups.
In this situation, it is said that what made democracy fail in Iraq
could make it fail in any part of the country, despite the good
thinking shown by the Kurds ever since their mid-1990s fighting.
However, the Kemalism of Turkey that involved modernization from
above requires some rethinking, about the ways it can be corrected
and the methods used.
If it is true that Turkey went too far in its anti-pluralistic
nationalism, especially regarding the Kurds, its militarism remains
more effective in a region that voted for Ahmadinejad as president.
These are certainly narrow options, and ones likely to provoke
despair. However, they put us face to face with certain questions:
Why, at a stone's throw away from India, with its different experience,
has no instance of modernization arisen in our region, unless it comes
at the expense of freedom. And when freedom arises, modernization
collapses, while the nation either collapses or is paralyzed. This
question will be increasingly asked in the event of a wide-scale
military confrontation between Tehran and Washington, doing away
with the Khamenei regime or weakening it until it does away with
many of the above-mentioned hypotheses, without doing away with the
question itself.
Hazem Saghieh Al-Hayat
Dar Al-Hayat, Lebanon
April 17 2006
Lying in the dark shadow of dealing with the US-Iranian issue is the
Turkish issue, and by extension, the Turkish-Kurdish issue.
If Washington and Tehran reach a settlement over Iraq, after a partial
military clash caused by Uranium enrichment, or even without this
enrichment, the issue of Turkish influence and interests in northern
Iraq will be raised. One of the geo-political constants that have
accompanied this region is the preservation of balance between the
Turkish and Iranian roles, whether extending toward Iraq or keeping
distant from it.
Currently, the probable course of this issue joins up with two other
courses, making the problem even more unstable.
With the creeping civil war in Iraq, the Kurds of the North might
survive; they have lived in a state of quasi-independence since
the secure zone was established there in 1992. The situation
was strengthened by the establishment of independent political
institutions, like a Parliament and autonomous government, as well
as the Kurds' own political parties.
If this is added to what is taking place in terms of infrastructure,
economic development and security arrangements, the "separatist"
form involves a serious amount of content.
Perhaps Washington, if there is a total collapse in Iraq and the
reshaping of the country along communal spheres of influence, will
approach Iraqi Kurdistan as the "share" that it can retain and perhaps
transform into the model that was desired for the entire country.
However, all of this is connected to Turkey, to a great extent,
to the degree that American interests and its own become one. It is
a complex matter, naturally, which complicates the second direction
that further crisis is likely to take, a direction that involves the
relationship between Ankara and its Kurds. It was interesting to see
the situation explode, with no obvious introduction, in a way not seen
since 1994. The violent clashes between Kurdish fighters and Turkish
security forces led to the killing of 20 people in south-east Turkey
as well as Istanbul itself.
In fact, Ankara, under constant pressure from the European Union,
lifted the state of emergency in Kurdish regions and began paying
compensation to Kurds for the destruction of their villages by
the Turkish Army. The government also endorsed some cultural and
linguistic rights for the Kurds. This is of course insufficient,
especially since the economic despair that hovers over the Kurds of
Turkey, the widespread unemployment, low wages and lack of investment,
makes Kurdish anger an event to be anticipated. But the defeat of this
course is another thing altogether, quantitatively and qualitatively
different. In this sense, some observers fear that the recent clashes,
sparked by the funeral of 14 members of the Kurdistan Workers' Party,
was the beginning of a wide-scale deterioration, especially since
the KWP two years ago ended a unilateral truce that had lasted for
six years.
If things goes this way, and militarization and oppression return to
the southeast, Turkey's desire to join the EU will be threatened again;
it is a desire about which doubts of its success are growing.
That said, the possibilities of "easternization" via Iran remain
stronger than the possibilities of "westernization" via Turkey. Even
if the Iraqi Shiite Coalition splits off, this possibility remains
"safer" and easier to travel.
Pure authoritarianism, which characterizes the Iranian state, makes
it a candidate for imperial expansion in a way that does not suit the
current nature of the Turkish state. Turkey has become a complicated
mixture of aspects that are authoritarian, democratic, nationalist and
Islamic, not to speak of civilian and military. In times of crisis,
the decisive entity wins out over the confused entity.
The Turkish stumbling is revealed in its points of contact with
all concerned parties, and all of the issues that concern them. It
reveals that the deadlocks practically represent impossibilities. If
relations with Europe are threatened because of the Kurds, in sympathy
with the Armenian genocide and the rest of the "human rights" agenda,
following the US policy will provoke the majority of people, which
will make the claim of democracy purely that - a claim.
Meanwhile, a just solution of the Kurdish problem will mobilize a
rainbow in Turkey consisting of the military, the nationalists, and
some Islamists; dealing with the matter through repression will weaken
any Turkish role in Iraqi Kurdistan, especially if the Kurdish-Turkoman
conflict there explodes, in parallel to the Kurdish-Arab conflict,
over Kirkuk.
The Iranian authorities appear to be united around Khamenei and
Ahmadinejad, while "opponents" like Rafsanjani and Khatami are out of
the spotlight. However, when these two are in line with the regime,
the Turkish authorities, after the fall of the one-sided Kemalism,
seem closer to coalitions that are made and broken on a daily basis
between the Islamists and the army, and the president of the Republic
and these two groups.
In this situation, it is said that what made democracy fail in Iraq
could make it fail in any part of the country, despite the good
thinking shown by the Kurds ever since their mid-1990s fighting.
However, the Kemalism of Turkey that involved modernization from
above requires some rethinking, about the ways it can be corrected
and the methods used.
If it is true that Turkey went too far in its anti-pluralistic
nationalism, especially regarding the Kurds, its militarism remains
more effective in a region that voted for Ahmadinejad as president.
These are certainly narrow options, and ones likely to provoke
despair. However, they put us face to face with certain questions:
Why, at a stone's throw away from India, with its different experience,
has no instance of modernization arisen in our region, unless it comes
at the expense of freedom. And when freedom arises, modernization
collapses, while the nation either collapses or is paralyzed. This
question will be increasingly asked in the event of a wide-scale
military confrontation between Tehran and Washington, doing away
with the Khamenei regime or weakening it until it does away with
many of the above-mentioned hypotheses, without doing away with the
question itself.