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EYE OF THE STORM: READING PUTIN'S MIND
By Amir Taheri
Jerusalem Post
April 16 2006
Talkbacks for this article: 16
President George W. Bush has described his Russian counterpart Vladimir
Putin as "a strategic ally" and "a friend we can trust." But as the
diplomatic maneuvers to pressure Iran continue, can Washington count
on Moscow?
Of all the powers involved in the current showdown with the Islamic
Republic, only Russia is in a position to tip the balance between a
peaceful resolution and war.
To start with, Russia, which is building an Iranian power plant
near Bushehr, could slow down, or even suspend the project pending
a diplomatic resolution of the crisis.
Russia has another card to play in the shape of its proposal to set
up a special uranium enrichment project for Iran to cover the needs
of the Bushehr plant during its entire life-span of 37 years. (At
present there is an agreement for Russia to provide the plant with
fuel for the first 10 years.) To make it easier for the Teheran
leadership to save face, the Russian proposal could be modified to
have part of the enrichment process done in Iranian facilities and
with the participation of Iranian technicians.
All that, however, may lead nowhere because President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad may actually want a military conflict with the US as the
opening shot in his promised "clash of civilizations."
Ahmadinejad seems convinced that the US, plagued by bitter internal
dissensions, does not have the stomach for a fight with the Islamic
Republic and its radical allies. Thus he may want a clash over the
nuclear issue, which, thanks to the Goebbelsian presentation of it,
is seen by many Iranians as a matter of nationalistic pride.
The Russian position at the Security Council is crucial because China,
which also has a veto, would not be prepared to isolate itself by
siding with Iran if Russia sided with the United States. If Russia
vetoes, so will China. If Russia does not veto, the most China might
do is abstain.
THE BUSH administration knows all that. This is why it is beginning
to build up pressure on Russia ahead of the next G-8 summit, scheduled
to be hosted by Putin in July.
The American calculation is that Putin, having won the presidency
of the G-8 for the first time, is unlikely to start his tenure by
splitting the group to please the mullahs.
Nevertheless, it will not be easy for Putin to make an unambiguous
choice between Teheran and Washington. Russia needs the Islamic
Republic as part of Moscow's effort to curtail US influence in Central
Asia, the Caspian Basin and the Middle East.
As regional allies, Teheran and Moscow have already succeeded
in curtailing American influence in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. In Tajikistan, Teheran - which sided with the US
against Russia a decade ago - is now switching back to Moscow. In
Trans-Caucasia, Teheran and Moscow have sided with Armenia against
Azerbaijan and Georgia, both of which are in the American camp.
In Afghanistan, Teheran and Moscow have been working closely for more
than a decade and are currently engaged in developing a joint strategy
in anticipation of an American withdrawal once Bush leaves office.
Moscow also needs Teheran to prevent the US from imposing its proposed
model for the exploitation of the Caspian Sea. The US, backed by
Britain, proposes a division of the Caspian among its littoral states
so each can conclude separate contracts with foreign nations. Of
the five littoral states of the Caspian only two, Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, are favorable to the US proposed model.
Russia and Iran are against. They propose that the Caspian be treated
as a single unit in which all activity, including exploitation of
energy resources and navigation, require the consent of all littoral
states. (The fifth littoral state, Turkmenistan, has tried not to
take sides but is closer to Iran and Russia.)
Having lost all of its Arab clients of the Soviet era, Moscow also
needs Teheran as a bridgehead to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf
and the Indian Ocean. The current analysis in Moscow is that once Bush
is gone, Iran will emerge as the dominant power in Iraq and will need
Russia as a strategic partner in developing such major oil fields as
Majnun, which sits astride the Irano-Iraqi frontier.
It is also in conjunction with the Islamic Republic that Russia
envisages making a comeback in such places as Syria and Lebanon,
where Iranian influence is already well-established.
THE US is not the only strategic rival that Russia has identified.
Also looming on the horizon is China, which many Moscow analysts see
as a potential threat to Russian interests in Asia and the Middle East.
In that context a Sino-Iranian axis could isolate Russia in Western
Asia and the Middle East and even shut it out of chunks of Central
Asia.
Another reason why Moscow needs the Islamic Republic is related to
the so-called Islamic time-bomb that is ticking in the heart of the
Russian federation. With birthrates among ethnic Russians in free
fall, the federation's Muslims, now a fifth of the population, are
slated to double by the middle of the century.
The Islamic Republic, although a Shi'ite power, could nevertheless
play a role in discouraging secessionist tendencies among Russia's
Muslims. Conversely, a hostile Iran could use its immense experience
in exporting terrorism to make life difficult for Russia.
Add to all that the fact that Iran is the biggest market for Russian
arms, including aircraft and submarines. The loss of the Iranian orders
could force entire lines of Russian weapons industries to close down.
The two neighbors have also signed trade contracts worth $80 billion
over the next decade. And Russia hopes to build most of the seven
nuclear power plants the Islamic Republic wants to set up in the next
10 years. The fact that more than 30,000 Russian technicians work in
Iran adds an important human dimension to the relationship.
Big power games, oil, Islam, trade, arms and terrorism are some of
the factors that make it hard for Putin to side with the Bush in the
coming confrontation with the Islamic Republic.
But there is another, perhaps more important, factor: Putin can never
be sure that when the crunch comes, Washington will not strike a deal
with Teheran, leaving Moscow in the lurch.
The writer, an Iranian author and journalist, is editor of the
Paris-based Politique Internationale.
By Amir Taheri
Jerusalem Post
April 16 2006
Talkbacks for this article: 16
President George W. Bush has described his Russian counterpart Vladimir
Putin as "a strategic ally" and "a friend we can trust." But as the
diplomatic maneuvers to pressure Iran continue, can Washington count
on Moscow?
Of all the powers involved in the current showdown with the Islamic
Republic, only Russia is in a position to tip the balance between a
peaceful resolution and war.
To start with, Russia, which is building an Iranian power plant
near Bushehr, could slow down, or even suspend the project pending
a diplomatic resolution of the crisis.
Russia has another card to play in the shape of its proposal to set
up a special uranium enrichment project for Iran to cover the needs
of the Bushehr plant during its entire life-span of 37 years. (At
present there is an agreement for Russia to provide the plant with
fuel for the first 10 years.) To make it easier for the Teheran
leadership to save face, the Russian proposal could be modified to
have part of the enrichment process done in Iranian facilities and
with the participation of Iranian technicians.
All that, however, may lead nowhere because President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad may actually want a military conflict with the US as the
opening shot in his promised "clash of civilizations."
Ahmadinejad seems convinced that the US, plagued by bitter internal
dissensions, does not have the stomach for a fight with the Islamic
Republic and its radical allies. Thus he may want a clash over the
nuclear issue, which, thanks to the Goebbelsian presentation of it,
is seen by many Iranians as a matter of nationalistic pride.
The Russian position at the Security Council is crucial because China,
which also has a veto, would not be prepared to isolate itself by
siding with Iran if Russia sided with the United States. If Russia
vetoes, so will China. If Russia does not veto, the most China might
do is abstain.
THE BUSH administration knows all that. This is why it is beginning
to build up pressure on Russia ahead of the next G-8 summit, scheduled
to be hosted by Putin in July.
The American calculation is that Putin, having won the presidency
of the G-8 for the first time, is unlikely to start his tenure by
splitting the group to please the mullahs.
Nevertheless, it will not be easy for Putin to make an unambiguous
choice between Teheran and Washington. Russia needs the Islamic
Republic as part of Moscow's effort to curtail US influence in Central
Asia, the Caspian Basin and the Middle East.
As regional allies, Teheran and Moscow have already succeeded
in curtailing American influence in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. In Tajikistan, Teheran - which sided with the US
against Russia a decade ago - is now switching back to Moscow. In
Trans-Caucasia, Teheran and Moscow have sided with Armenia against
Azerbaijan and Georgia, both of which are in the American camp.
In Afghanistan, Teheran and Moscow have been working closely for more
than a decade and are currently engaged in developing a joint strategy
in anticipation of an American withdrawal once Bush leaves office.
Moscow also needs Teheran to prevent the US from imposing its proposed
model for the exploitation of the Caspian Sea. The US, backed by
Britain, proposes a division of the Caspian among its littoral states
so each can conclude separate contracts with foreign nations. Of
the five littoral states of the Caspian only two, Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan, are favorable to the US proposed model.
Russia and Iran are against. They propose that the Caspian be treated
as a single unit in which all activity, including exploitation of
energy resources and navigation, require the consent of all littoral
states. (The fifth littoral state, Turkmenistan, has tried not to
take sides but is closer to Iran and Russia.)
Having lost all of its Arab clients of the Soviet era, Moscow also
needs Teheran as a bridgehead to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf
and the Indian Ocean. The current analysis in Moscow is that once Bush
is gone, Iran will emerge as the dominant power in Iraq and will need
Russia as a strategic partner in developing such major oil fields as
Majnun, which sits astride the Irano-Iraqi frontier.
It is also in conjunction with the Islamic Republic that Russia
envisages making a comeback in such places as Syria and Lebanon,
where Iranian influence is already well-established.
THE US is not the only strategic rival that Russia has identified.
Also looming on the horizon is China, which many Moscow analysts see
as a potential threat to Russian interests in Asia and the Middle East.
In that context a Sino-Iranian axis could isolate Russia in Western
Asia and the Middle East and even shut it out of chunks of Central
Asia.
Another reason why Moscow needs the Islamic Republic is related to
the so-called Islamic time-bomb that is ticking in the heart of the
Russian federation. With birthrates among ethnic Russians in free
fall, the federation's Muslims, now a fifth of the population, are
slated to double by the middle of the century.
The Islamic Republic, although a Shi'ite power, could nevertheless
play a role in discouraging secessionist tendencies among Russia's
Muslims. Conversely, a hostile Iran could use its immense experience
in exporting terrorism to make life difficult for Russia.
Add to all that the fact that Iran is the biggest market for Russian
arms, including aircraft and submarines. The loss of the Iranian orders
could force entire lines of Russian weapons industries to close down.
The two neighbors have also signed trade contracts worth $80 billion
over the next decade. And Russia hopes to build most of the seven
nuclear power plants the Islamic Republic wants to set up in the next
10 years. The fact that more than 30,000 Russian technicians work in
Iran adds an important human dimension to the relationship.
Big power games, oil, Islam, trade, arms and terrorism are some of
the factors that make it hard for Putin to side with the Bush in the
coming confrontation with the Islamic Republic.
But there is another, perhaps more important, factor: Putin can never
be sure that when the crunch comes, Washington will not strike a deal
with Teheran, leaving Moscow in the lurch.
The writer, an Iranian author and journalist, is editor of the
Paris-based Politique Internationale.