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Iran's Azeris or the Azeris' Iran
By Cem Oguz
New Anatolian, Turkey
April 20 2006
[email protected] April 2006
A couple of years ago a close friend of mine, after coming back from
a long journey by car across northern Iran (or "Southern Azerbaijan,"
as it is referred to in nationalist Azeri literature), was telling me
how Iranian Azeris were undergoing a cultural revival. There was a
real boom in nationalist publications and a growing interest in both
Azerbaijan and Turkey among Iranian Azeris. A considerable part of
Azeris he spoke to said that they only watched Turkish TV channels.
The most popular songs playing on the streets of Tabriz were those of
Turkish singers.
This cultural revival (or transformation) has seemingly attracted
increasing interest from the U.S. administration that was recently
reported to be willing to foment ethnic-inspired unrest in Iran. It
is for this reason that the book by Brenda Shaffer, whom I happened
to meet in the second half of the 1990s when she was doing her Ph.D.,
has captivated the attention of many influential figures in
Washington. In the book, entitled "Borders and Brethren: Iran and the
Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity," Shaffer, currently Harvard
University's Caspian Studies director, challenges the popular
assumption that a broad Iranian national identity supersedes ethnic
identities and discusses the cultural reawakening among Iranian
Azeris.
The revival of nationalist sentiment among ethnic groups in Iran,
first and foremost among Azeris, is indeed a fact. But the question
henceforth should be what this phenomenon might lead to. Could it be
a catalyst for a regime change, as asserted by some circles in the
U.S.? To find a reliable answer to this question we need to elaborate
on the fundamental features of the Azeri community in Iran.
Until Ahmed Shah, who was replaced in 1925 by Reza Khan (Pahlavi),
Iran was mainly ruled by the Turkmen/Azeri Qajar dynasty. Historical
legacy thus had an important impact on the mentality of today's
Iranian Azeris. Their feeling of affiliation with Iran and the
Iranian state is undisputable. One would not be surprised to even see
the most nationalist Iranian Azeris denounce aspirations of
separation, since, in their words, "Iran is theirs." Given this
backdrop, Iranian Azeris, the total number of which is estimated to
be anywhere between 16 to 30 million, according to different sources,
are well-integrated into Iranian society. Presently some highly
influential figures in the establishment are of Azeri descent; even
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose native town is Ardebil, a mostly
Azeri-populated place in the western part of the province of Western
Azerbaijan in Iran, is rumored to come from an Azeri family. Azeris
also constitute a considerable part of people in Tehran.
An important factor that influences bi-communal relations, on the
other hand, is economics. Some among Persian nationalists question
why the oil-rich south should feed the relatively poorer northern
regions which are mostly populated by Iranian Azeris. Due to such a
line of thinking, Persian nationalism has gradually come to contain a
considerable level of anti-Azeri feeling. The Azeris, in turn, don't
seem to be willing to renounce the wealth coming from the south's oil
reserves.
The influence of nationalist leaders among Iranian Azeris is very
limited as well. This, in fact, should be well understood by the U.S.
authorities. A couple of years ago, Movement of National Revival of
Southern Azerbaijan head Mahmudali Chehregani, a prominent and
respected academic imprisoned for three years in the past for his
outspoken opposition to the regime, was invited to Washington. With
the help of Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican advocate of regime
change in Iran, he held various meetings with U.S. officials. The
main claim asserted by Chehregani was that his movement could spur
millions of its followers into protesting on the streets. However,
such public demonstrations never materialized.
No one can deny that Tabriz, the so-called capital of Southern
Azerbaijan, is at present the center of the most active student
democracy movement outside Tehran. Nevertheless the aspirations of
Iranian Azeris are more for cultural autonomy. In fact, their
ultimate goal is not at all different from the rest of the country:
More reforms and more rights.
In such an atmosphere, to assume that Iranian Azeris are ready to
rise up against the mullah-led regime in Tehran is not only
unreliable but also risky. Nonetheless, there are clear signs that
some circles in Washington are very eager to play the Azeri card up
to the last moment. It is in this regard, for instance, that three
years after his election Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has only
just now received an official invitation to visit Washington. His
meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush is set for April 28. The
two main issues to be discussed between both leaders, analysts argue,
will be the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Iran. There is no doubt
that Aliyev's stance on the Iranian question will exercise a
considerable level of influence on the U.S.' position over the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute as well as the future of
Azerbaijani territory still under Armenian occupation.
We will soon see how Washington's attempts at influencing their
allies' strategic calculations, as put in the U.S.' new National
Security Strategy just recently, works.
By Cem Oguz
New Anatolian, Turkey
April 20 2006
[email protected] April 2006
A couple of years ago a close friend of mine, after coming back from
a long journey by car across northern Iran (or "Southern Azerbaijan,"
as it is referred to in nationalist Azeri literature), was telling me
how Iranian Azeris were undergoing a cultural revival. There was a
real boom in nationalist publications and a growing interest in both
Azerbaijan and Turkey among Iranian Azeris. A considerable part of
Azeris he spoke to said that they only watched Turkish TV channels.
The most popular songs playing on the streets of Tabriz were those of
Turkish singers.
This cultural revival (or transformation) has seemingly attracted
increasing interest from the U.S. administration that was recently
reported to be willing to foment ethnic-inspired unrest in Iran. It
is for this reason that the book by Brenda Shaffer, whom I happened
to meet in the second half of the 1990s when she was doing her Ph.D.,
has captivated the attention of many influential figures in
Washington. In the book, entitled "Borders and Brethren: Iran and the
Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity," Shaffer, currently Harvard
University's Caspian Studies director, challenges the popular
assumption that a broad Iranian national identity supersedes ethnic
identities and discusses the cultural reawakening among Iranian
Azeris.
The revival of nationalist sentiment among ethnic groups in Iran,
first and foremost among Azeris, is indeed a fact. But the question
henceforth should be what this phenomenon might lead to. Could it be
a catalyst for a regime change, as asserted by some circles in the
U.S.? To find a reliable answer to this question we need to elaborate
on the fundamental features of the Azeri community in Iran.
Until Ahmed Shah, who was replaced in 1925 by Reza Khan (Pahlavi),
Iran was mainly ruled by the Turkmen/Azeri Qajar dynasty. Historical
legacy thus had an important impact on the mentality of today's
Iranian Azeris. Their feeling of affiliation with Iran and the
Iranian state is undisputable. One would not be surprised to even see
the most nationalist Iranian Azeris denounce aspirations of
separation, since, in their words, "Iran is theirs." Given this
backdrop, Iranian Azeris, the total number of which is estimated to
be anywhere between 16 to 30 million, according to different sources,
are well-integrated into Iranian society. Presently some highly
influential figures in the establishment are of Azeri descent; even
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose native town is Ardebil, a mostly
Azeri-populated place in the western part of the province of Western
Azerbaijan in Iran, is rumored to come from an Azeri family. Azeris
also constitute a considerable part of people in Tehran.
An important factor that influences bi-communal relations, on the
other hand, is economics. Some among Persian nationalists question
why the oil-rich south should feed the relatively poorer northern
regions which are mostly populated by Iranian Azeris. Due to such a
line of thinking, Persian nationalism has gradually come to contain a
considerable level of anti-Azeri feeling. The Azeris, in turn, don't
seem to be willing to renounce the wealth coming from the south's oil
reserves.
The influence of nationalist leaders among Iranian Azeris is very
limited as well. This, in fact, should be well understood by the U.S.
authorities. A couple of years ago, Movement of National Revival of
Southern Azerbaijan head Mahmudali Chehregani, a prominent and
respected academic imprisoned for three years in the past for his
outspoken opposition to the regime, was invited to Washington. With
the help of Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican advocate of regime
change in Iran, he held various meetings with U.S. officials. The
main claim asserted by Chehregani was that his movement could spur
millions of its followers into protesting on the streets. However,
such public demonstrations never materialized.
No one can deny that Tabriz, the so-called capital of Southern
Azerbaijan, is at present the center of the most active student
democracy movement outside Tehran. Nevertheless the aspirations of
Iranian Azeris are more for cultural autonomy. In fact, their
ultimate goal is not at all different from the rest of the country:
More reforms and more rights.
In such an atmosphere, to assume that Iranian Azeris are ready to
rise up against the mullah-led regime in Tehran is not only
unreliable but also risky. Nonetheless, there are clear signs that
some circles in Washington are very eager to play the Azeri card up
to the last moment. It is in this regard, for instance, that three
years after his election Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has only
just now received an official invitation to visit Washington. His
meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush is set for April 28. The
two main issues to be discussed between both leaders, analysts argue,
will be the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Iran. There is no doubt
that Aliyev's stance on the Iranian question will exercise a
considerable level of influence on the U.S.' position over the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute as well as the future of
Azerbaijani territory still under Armenian occupation.
We will soon see how Washington's attempts at influencing their
allies' strategic calculations, as put in the U.S.' new National
Security Strategy just recently, works.