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Armenian daily details scenario of possible war with Azerbaijan
Aykakan Zhamanak, Yerevan
20 Apr 06
Text of Arman Karapetyan's report by Armenian newspaper Aykakan
Zhamanak on 20 April headlined "Kocharyan may save the situation"
An attentive perusal of [Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan] Oskanyan's
interview with our newspaper shows that the foreign minister has
confirmed the option we put forward a month ago that Azerbaijan,
Armenia and the USA have made an arrangement before the Rambouillet
meeting [Karabakh talks in Paris in February] to settle the Karabakh
conflict by means of an "arranged war".
The first fact pointing to this is Oskanyan's idea that "today it is
not just up to Azerbaijan to decide to go to war". Thus, the foreign
minister admits that without the consent of the West Azerbaijan will
not dare to start a war. Oskanyan's next idea is that if Armenia
recognizes the NKR's [Nagornyy Karabakh republic] independence in
case of the resumption of hostilities, this will become the beginning
of the international recognition of Karabakh's independence. Oskanyan
would not have said that if Western missionaries had not said so.
Thus, we can draw the following conclusion: Azerbaijan, Armenia and
the USA agreed on starting a war before the Rambouillet talks. This
arrangement seems advantageous for all of the negotiating parties
from the point of view of their own interests. [Azerbaijani
President] Ilham Aliyev believes that by means of war he will get
back the liberated-occupied territories [as given] and become a
national hero. [Armenian President] Robert Kocharyan believes that he
cannot give back the liberated-occupied territories to Azerbaijan
peacefully because in that case he will be accused of betraying the
nation. But if Azerbaijanis take back these territories by means of
war, he will have an opportunity to accuse others of betrayal.
Returning these territories to Azerbaijan is important because in
that case the USA promises to recognize Karabakh's independence,
which will justify the war and mellow the impression from losing the
liberated territories. For its part, the USA would gain from the war
because it will get an opportunity to deploy peacekeeping forces in
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict zone, which it needs in the context
of the Iranian problem settlement.
Today the existence of a scenario like this may be considered to be a
proven fact. But how advantageous is this option for Armenia? Let us
start with the idea that the war will kill people. If we are going to
return the Azerbaijani territories by killing several thousands of
young men, why cannot we do that without victims by means of a
stage-by-stage solution as an expression of good will? If war is a
reason for us to invite US peacekeeping forces to the region, why
cannot we invite them as the guarantor of an Armenian-Azerbaijani
peace treaty?
But Robert Kocharyan and [Armenian Defence Minister] Serzh Sarkisyan
cannot take this kind of step as they are very much likely to have
been warned by Iran and Russia about possible unpredictable
consequences. Certainly, this is a very serious threat, but it may be
neutralized if the Azerbaijani army starts suddenly the occupation of
the liberated territories, and Russia and Iran will be unable to stop
the process. In that case an SOS of the Americans sent out to
Kocharyan will be logical, and the loss of the liberated territories
will be explained by the unpredictability of the war. On the
contrary, in that case Kocharyan may blame Russia and Iran of
inability to stop the Azerbaijani army. But if Russia and Iran join
the war, Turkey will also do so.
The unpredictability of the war prompts us that this
Azerbaijani-Armenian-US plan contradicts Armenia's interests because
nobody can guarantee that the Azerbaijani army will stop where it has
arranged with Robert Kocharyan. If the war starts, that will be the
last war permitted to Azerbaijan and its final opportunity to resolve
the Megri [area in Armenia separating Azerbaijan from its exclave
Naxcivan] problem. In that case, Turkey will not lose its chance.
Coming close to Zangilan [southwest Azerbaijan], they will persuade
Americans in this matter. We are sure, having [US ambassador to
Armenia] John Evans's example, it is not difficult to persuade
American diplomats to take any unprincipled step. Turks may do so in
order to demonstrate to the USA that the separation of Megri from
Armenia means the separation of Russia from Iran, which at present
the USA needs much.
Thus, the Armenian authorities must be thinking that they have been
fooling the USA till today. However, the USA might have done so
expecting to get something more important in exchange. Kocharyan has
been forgiven for electoral fraud in 1998, 2003 and 2005 and after it
all given 235m dollars [allocated to Armenia by the US Millennium
Challenge Corporation] not because of his beautiful eyes. This is the
price of something specific. The above-mentioned scenario is that
specific thing.
But Armenian people do not want Karabakh's independence at the cost
of Megri. Of course, Kocharyan did not agree to the Megri option and
will hardly agree. But at a crucial moment nobody will ask him. Thus,
we have no chance in this game, and the incumbent authorities of
Armenia should quit the game as soon as possible even at the cost of
losing power.
Aykakan Zhamanak, Yerevan
20 Apr 06
Text of Arman Karapetyan's report by Armenian newspaper Aykakan
Zhamanak on 20 April headlined "Kocharyan may save the situation"
An attentive perusal of [Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan] Oskanyan's
interview with our newspaper shows that the foreign minister has
confirmed the option we put forward a month ago that Azerbaijan,
Armenia and the USA have made an arrangement before the Rambouillet
meeting [Karabakh talks in Paris in February] to settle the Karabakh
conflict by means of an "arranged war".
The first fact pointing to this is Oskanyan's idea that "today it is
not just up to Azerbaijan to decide to go to war". Thus, the foreign
minister admits that without the consent of the West Azerbaijan will
not dare to start a war. Oskanyan's next idea is that if Armenia
recognizes the NKR's [Nagornyy Karabakh republic] independence in
case of the resumption of hostilities, this will become the beginning
of the international recognition of Karabakh's independence. Oskanyan
would not have said that if Western missionaries had not said so.
Thus, we can draw the following conclusion: Azerbaijan, Armenia and
the USA agreed on starting a war before the Rambouillet talks. This
arrangement seems advantageous for all of the negotiating parties
from the point of view of their own interests. [Azerbaijani
President] Ilham Aliyev believes that by means of war he will get
back the liberated-occupied territories [as given] and become a
national hero. [Armenian President] Robert Kocharyan believes that he
cannot give back the liberated-occupied territories to Azerbaijan
peacefully because in that case he will be accused of betraying the
nation. But if Azerbaijanis take back these territories by means of
war, he will have an opportunity to accuse others of betrayal.
Returning these territories to Azerbaijan is important because in
that case the USA promises to recognize Karabakh's independence,
which will justify the war and mellow the impression from losing the
liberated territories. For its part, the USA would gain from the war
because it will get an opportunity to deploy peacekeeping forces in
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict zone, which it needs in the context
of the Iranian problem settlement.
Today the existence of a scenario like this may be considered to be a
proven fact. But how advantageous is this option for Armenia? Let us
start with the idea that the war will kill people. If we are going to
return the Azerbaijani territories by killing several thousands of
young men, why cannot we do that without victims by means of a
stage-by-stage solution as an expression of good will? If war is a
reason for us to invite US peacekeeping forces to the region, why
cannot we invite them as the guarantor of an Armenian-Azerbaijani
peace treaty?
But Robert Kocharyan and [Armenian Defence Minister] Serzh Sarkisyan
cannot take this kind of step as they are very much likely to have
been warned by Iran and Russia about possible unpredictable
consequences. Certainly, this is a very serious threat, but it may be
neutralized if the Azerbaijani army starts suddenly the occupation of
the liberated territories, and Russia and Iran will be unable to stop
the process. In that case an SOS of the Americans sent out to
Kocharyan will be logical, and the loss of the liberated territories
will be explained by the unpredictability of the war. On the
contrary, in that case Kocharyan may blame Russia and Iran of
inability to stop the Azerbaijani army. But if Russia and Iran join
the war, Turkey will also do so.
The unpredictability of the war prompts us that this
Azerbaijani-Armenian-US plan contradicts Armenia's interests because
nobody can guarantee that the Azerbaijani army will stop where it has
arranged with Robert Kocharyan. If the war starts, that will be the
last war permitted to Azerbaijan and its final opportunity to resolve
the Megri [area in Armenia separating Azerbaijan from its exclave
Naxcivan] problem. In that case, Turkey will not lose its chance.
Coming close to Zangilan [southwest Azerbaijan], they will persuade
Americans in this matter. We are sure, having [US ambassador to
Armenia] John Evans's example, it is not difficult to persuade
American diplomats to take any unprincipled step. Turks may do so in
order to demonstrate to the USA that the separation of Megri from
Armenia means the separation of Russia from Iran, which at present
the USA needs much.
Thus, the Armenian authorities must be thinking that they have been
fooling the USA till today. However, the USA might have done so
expecting to get something more important in exchange. Kocharyan has
been forgiven for electoral fraud in 1998, 2003 and 2005 and after it
all given 235m dollars [allocated to Armenia by the US Millennium
Challenge Corporation] not because of his beautiful eyes. This is the
price of something specific. The above-mentioned scenario is that
specific thing.
But Armenian people do not want Karabakh's independence at the cost
of Megri. Of course, Kocharyan did not agree to the Megri option and
will hardly agree. But at a crucial moment nobody will ask him. Thus,
we have no chance in this game, and the incumbent authorities of
Armenia should quit the game as soon as possible even at the cost of
losing power.