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Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
Thursday April 13, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 72
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Lavrov puts brakes on Kosovo recognition
*Baku sees opportunities, risks in Aliyev's meeting with Bush
*Putin continues to lose allies in European elections
KOSOVO AND THE POST-SOVIET CONFLICTS: NO ANALOGY MEANS NO "PRECEDENT"
(part one of two)
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov and other officials
have shifted their tactics regarding the negotiations on the status of
Kosovo. The new theme of their statements and tactical approach to the
negotiations is: "No Haste." In their view, the negotiations must
prepare a settlement "acceptable to all parties" -- translation: hand
Serbia blocking rights -- even if it means delaying the final outcome.
Lavrov and his spokesman, Mikhail Kamynin, somberly intimate that
recognition of Kosovo's independence could set a "precedent" with
"dangerous consequences in Europe," i.e., encourage movements in parts
of certain countries to press for separate statehood and international
recognition (Interfax, April 10). Meanwhile, the United States is the
main promoter of Kosovo's independence, contingent on proper standards
of governance and human rights. The EU position is similar.
Moscow's new arguments seek to dissuade some European governments from
supporting recognition and, through this tactic, to complicate and
prolong the negotiations.
The shift seems due at least in part to the prospect that the Serbian
government might officially consent to independence and international
recognition of Kosovo, albeit subject to international (i.e., Western)
certification that Kosovo has achieved democratic standards. Serbian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Draskovic recently declared that Serbia
could agree to international recognition of Kosovo's independence,
including membership in all international organizations save the United
Nations (a reservation that seems destined to be abandoned in due
course). Draskovic's statement has triggered a reassessment of policy in
Moscow.
The Kremlin had initially calculated that international recognition of
Kosovo's independence could become a "model" or "precedent" enabling
Russia to call for recognition of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
or Karabakh. However, Serbian consent to international recognition of
Kosovo would make it impossible for Moscow to apply a "Kosovo model" to
the post-Soviet conflicts. In that case, the "model" would stipulate
that international recognition of a new state depends on the prior
consent of the country from which that entity secedes. Such a model
would be useless to Russia and the post-Soviet secessionist territories
because Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan would not grant such consent in
any foreseeable circumstances. Moreover, rapid progress toward resolving
the Kosovo issue with minimal Serbian resistance would deprive Russia of
opportunities to play spoiler in the negotiations
within the Kosovo Contact Group and UN Security Council. Moscow wants a
dragged-out negotiating process with opportunities for tradeoffs,
whether at Serbia's expense or the expense of Moscow's protégés in
the post-Soviet secessionist enclaves, depending on tactical
developments down the road.
Moscow is responding in three ways to the situation created by the
Draskovic statement. First, it tries to embolden hard-line nationalists
in the Serbian government to oppose Kosovo's independence in principle
and to raise insuperable obstacles in the negotiations. Second, it tries
to outflank the United States by raising the prospect of destabilization
in Europe with some West European participants in the Contact Group and
with some Central-East European governments in bilateral channels. And,
third, it cries, "No Haste," so as to frustrate the U.S. and, largely,
Western goal of achieving a resolution this year.
The authorities in Tiraspol, Transnistria; Sukhumi, Abkhazia;
Tskhinvali, South Ossetia; and Stepanakert, Karabakh (and Yerevan as
well) never based their hopes for international or at least Russian
official recognition upon a possible Kosovo "model" or "precedent." When
Russian President Vladimir Putin raised this idea earlier this year and
turned it into a staple of Russia's discourse on post-Soviet conflict
resolution, the secessionist authorities reacted with caution and
skepticism. While putting a few of their eggs in the Kosovo basket, they
are clearly loath to stake their case on Kosovo or Russian actions
related to Kosovo. They continually stress other arguments, "precedents"
or "models" in their quest for recognition (see EDM, February 2, 6, 8).
--Vladimir Socor
ALIYEV'S INVITATION TO THE WHITE HOUSE: A BLESSING OR A CURSE?
Officials in Baku are rejoicing. Three years after his election,
Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has received an official invitation
to visit the White House and meet with U.S. President George W. Bush. In
a press release issued by the White House on April 10, the invitation
was justified by the fact that "Azerbaijan is a key ally in a region of
great importance and a valued partner, making important contributions in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo." The meeting with President Bush, set for
April 28, will include discussion of a wide range of issues, including
democracy promotion and cooperation in the Caucasus, energy
diversification, and the shared U.S.-Azerbaijani commitment to working
together to advance freedom and security.
The invitation comes as a slap in the face to the Azerbaijani
opposition, which has long complained about election fraud in the
country and the lack of adequate pressure from the Western community on
the Aliyev administration. The Azerbaijani opposition has often cited
the continuing refusal to invite President Aliyev to Washington, while
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili were welcomed immediately after elections in their
countries, to show the international community's negative assessment of
the state of democracy in Azerbaijan. Now this trump card has
disappeared.
Local analysts predict that two issues will dominate the talks between
Aliyev and Bush: Iran and Azerbaijan's long-standing conflict with
Armenia over the Karabakh enclave. "There will be a set of complex
issues on the agenda, but Iran will dominate it with the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict being included into the discussion through the
prism of the Iranian question," independent political analyst Ilgar
Mammadov told Jamestown. "Everything tells us that the negotiations will
focus around the Iranian and Karabakh problems," according to an
editorial in the opposition Azadliq newspaper on April 9. Consequently,
the long-anticipated invitation from Washington might not be the
blessing that was expected by official Baku.
Political scientist Fuad Gahramanli believes "Aliyev is not interested
in participating in possible military operations against Iran and
actively tries to stay away from this process." For that reason, the
invitation to the United States at this particular moment might not
please Aliyev that much, concludes Gahramanli (Azadliq, April 7).
Mammadov also believes that Azerbaijan will try to play a careful game,
but "It is not for sure yet if Azerbaijan will stay completely outside
of the process."
Still, some other experts forecast that the Karabakh conflict will top
the discussions, as Washington is re-energizing peace talks between
Armenia and Azerbaijan and trying to save the failed talks in
Rambouillet, outside Paris, on February 11. The intensive trips by the
OSCE's Minsk group co-chairs into the region in the last few weeks have
raised speculations about the possibility of reaching an agreement on
this conflict in 2006. U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Reno L. Harnish
III, has told the local Azerbaijani media that there are good prospects
for settling the conflict in 2006. Furthermore, Azerbaijani Foreign
Minister Elmar Mammadyarov said after his trip to the Washington last
week "some new, interesting proposals regarding the solution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been offered and the Azerbaijani
government will discuss them" (Turan, April 10, also see EDM, April 12).
"The United States is interested in a quick resolution of the conflict
this year," Mammadov told Jamestown, "but whether Russia will help in
this process is still not clear." ANS-TV radio quoted Yuri Merzlyakov,
the Russian co-chair of the Minsk group, as saying that there is no
competition between the co-chairs and that President Aliyev met with
Russian President Vladimir Putin long before he is scheduled to meet
with President Bush (ANS-TV, April 13).
Much is expected from Aliyev's upcoming trip to Washington, yet most
local analysts agree that the negotiations will be tough for the
Azerbaijani president. Particularly, any possible pressures on Aliyev to
agree to the terms of the referendum that is being proposed for the
resolution of the Karabakh conflict might produce counter-productive
results domestically. The Azerbaijani opposition is carefully watching
what will happen in Washington and they will try to dampen President
Aliyev's excitement about the long-anticipated meeting with President
Bush by focusing on the failures of Azerbaijani diplomacy regarding the
Karabakh conflict. As for President Bush, he is no longer feeling the
necessity to postpone this invitation, as his re-election in 2004 has
removed the need to take domestic considerations into account regarding
such an action. Now the emphasis is on security and foreign
policy, areas in which Azerbaijan could be a key ally.
--Fariz Ismailzade
PUTIN'S FEAR OF ELECTIONS AND FEAR OF INVESTMENT
Every recent election in Europe has severed a connection with Moscow,
allowing Russia to drift further and further away from the rest of the
continent. Italy is the latest point in this trajectory since Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi's defeat this week signifies for Russian
President Vladimir Putin the loss of a key European ally and the end of
a carefully cultivated personal friendship (Vremya novostei, April 11;
Gazeta.ru, April 13). The March 26 parliamentary elections in Ukraine,
inconclusive as they are, have confirmed Kyiv's European vector and
shown the steady retreat of the pro-Russian forces in the multi-colored
political arena (Lenta.ru, April 11). Presidential elections in Belarus
on March 19 and the swift suppression of public protests against the
crudely manipulated voting left Putin, who rushed to congratulate
Alexander Lukashenka on his victory, alone against the broad
European condemnation of this authoritarian regime (Ekho Moskvy, April
11). Even the elections in the Palestinian Authority fit the pattern,
since Moscow's readiness to embrace the Hamas leadership has generated
mild disapproval in Europe and bitter acrimony in Israel (Kommersant,
April 12).
The trend could easily be traced further back: Parliamentary elections
in Poland last September were dominated by parties that hold serious
suspicions about Putin's Russia, and elections in Germany forced the
departure of Putin's closest and most privileged partner, Gerhard
Schroeder, from the Bundestag. Some electoral results that were
unfortunate for Moscow were decided by margins slimmer than the "hanging
chads" that decided Bush's victory in 2000, and both Berlusconi and
Schroeder could complain about bad luck. In other cases, Belarus being
the prime example, Moscow was clearly set to lose because of its own
political choices. Lukashenka enjoys solid enough popular support to win
a free and fair election, but the very possibility of creating a space
for uncontrollable political opposition was unacceptable, and he opted
to show the "monolithic unity" of the quasi-Soviet regime
(Ezhednevny zhurnal, April 1).
Putin is in much the same situation and shows equally deep mistrust in
election mechanisms, but he feels the need to hide his true preferences
behind many layers of "Euro-correct" rhetoric. This habitual hypocrisy
serves to make him an acceptable partner for Western leaders, but the
Russian public apparently prefers a more frank expression of political
views; a recent poll by Ekho Moskvy radio (March 20) showed that 82% of
listeners would vote for Lukashenka as the president of a hypothetical
union of Russia and Belarus, while only 18% preferred Putin. Finalizing
the text of his annual address to the parliament, Putin now may take a
clue from this rather unexpected choice and add a few explicitly
populist condemnations of his own bureaucracy (Vedomosti, April 12). He
also knows that he has no real competitor in the country so that the
officially discarded idea of a third presidential
term remains far more popular than any of his potential successors; 45%
of Russians are now ready to amend the constitution accordingly
(Kommersant, April 12).
Each setback with elections in the near and far neighborhood, however,
increases Putin's distaste regarding the proposition that his tightly
hand-managed system of power should be subjected to the test of
competitive -- even if only formally -- decision-making by the general
population. This entirely unnecessary procedure goes directly against
his self-perception as the CEO and the chairman of the board of a
corporation comprising all structures of the Russian state. This
self-perception, which in fact is not that different from how Berlusconi
had seen himself until last weekend, probably informed Putin's first
words to the "captains" of business that were gathered in the Kremlin
last month: "Dear colleagues" (Vedomosti, April 4). Russian
state/corporate culture could be quite relaxed and the discipline in the
hierarchy should not necessarily be draconian, but the idea that the top
management must be exposed to electoral choices of the "lower ranks" is
simply alien. Berlusconi's scandalous resistance to his removal from a
position of power only reinforces the conviction among Putin's entourage
that undesirable surprises must be prevented at any cost.
Elections, however, remain a source of grave risks and the possibility
of a sudden shift in the electorate's mood cannot be eliminated.
Amassing "administrative resources" and employing every available
"political technology," the Kremlin still cannot overcome the pervasive
fear of elections. While perhaps not entirely rational, this feeling is
driven by growing mistrust among Putin's courtiers and rooted in their
common knowledge that the Russians indeed have very good reasons not to
trust any of them. The only way to exorcise this fear is to spread it
not only through the business elite, which constitutes less than 1% of
the population, but also across the middle entrepreneurial class that
has grown to about 20% (Kommersant, April 12). Uncertainty about the
immediate future, which can bring any kind of semi-official offer that
cannot be refused, including the sell-off of prime assets,
is an irreducible feature of Russian business climate. Fear is the main
instrument of establishing dominance of the 1.462 million strong army of
bureaucrats, which increased by 10.9% in 2005, over the oppressed,
abused, and potentially hostile class of middle and small business
(Lenta.ru, April 12; Ezhednevny zhurnal, April 11).
This instrumentalization of the fear factor creates various distortions
in Russian economic activities, from the increase of "informal taxation"
to the speculative growth of the Moscow property market. Such respected
experts as Yevgeny Gavrilenkov and Yevgeny Yasin have argued this week
that the abnormally low level of investment affects the dynamics and the
quality of economic growth and generates huge inflationary pressure
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 11). Entrepreneurs have no confidence in
their own businesses and are reluctant to invest, so money flows into
the stock market, which expanded by some 20% since the start of the
year, or into the accelerated growth of consumer imports. Corporatist
politics invariably translate into deformed and stagnant economics.
Putin's team of managers may try to hide their fiasco by doctoring
accounts and spinning new slogans, but Berlusconi was a
grand master of these tricks -- and they helped him only so far.
--Pavel K. Baev
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of
EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to [email protected].
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.
The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)
http://www.jamestown.org
Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.
Thursday April 13, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 72
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Lavrov puts brakes on Kosovo recognition
*Baku sees opportunities, risks in Aliyev's meeting with Bush
*Putin continues to lose allies in European elections
KOSOVO AND THE POST-SOVIET CONFLICTS: NO ANALOGY MEANS NO "PRECEDENT"
(part one of two)
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov and other officials
have shifted their tactics regarding the negotiations on the status of
Kosovo. The new theme of their statements and tactical approach to the
negotiations is: "No Haste." In their view, the negotiations must
prepare a settlement "acceptable to all parties" -- translation: hand
Serbia blocking rights -- even if it means delaying the final outcome.
Lavrov and his spokesman, Mikhail Kamynin, somberly intimate that
recognition of Kosovo's independence could set a "precedent" with
"dangerous consequences in Europe," i.e., encourage movements in parts
of certain countries to press for separate statehood and international
recognition (Interfax, April 10). Meanwhile, the United States is the
main promoter of Kosovo's independence, contingent on proper standards
of governance and human rights. The EU position is similar.
Moscow's new arguments seek to dissuade some European governments from
supporting recognition and, through this tactic, to complicate and
prolong the negotiations.
The shift seems due at least in part to the prospect that the Serbian
government might officially consent to independence and international
recognition of Kosovo, albeit subject to international (i.e., Western)
certification that Kosovo has achieved democratic standards. Serbian
Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Draskovic recently declared that Serbia
could agree to international recognition of Kosovo's independence,
including membership in all international organizations save the United
Nations (a reservation that seems destined to be abandoned in due
course). Draskovic's statement has triggered a reassessment of policy in
Moscow.
The Kremlin had initially calculated that international recognition of
Kosovo's independence could become a "model" or "precedent" enabling
Russia to call for recognition of Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
or Karabakh. However, Serbian consent to international recognition of
Kosovo would make it impossible for Moscow to apply a "Kosovo model" to
the post-Soviet conflicts. In that case, the "model" would stipulate
that international recognition of a new state depends on the prior
consent of the country from which that entity secedes. Such a model
would be useless to Russia and the post-Soviet secessionist territories
because Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan would not grant such consent in
any foreseeable circumstances. Moreover, rapid progress toward resolving
the Kosovo issue with minimal Serbian resistance would deprive Russia of
opportunities to play spoiler in the negotiations
within the Kosovo Contact Group and UN Security Council. Moscow wants a
dragged-out negotiating process with opportunities for tradeoffs,
whether at Serbia's expense or the expense of Moscow's protégés in
the post-Soviet secessionist enclaves, depending on tactical
developments down the road.
Moscow is responding in three ways to the situation created by the
Draskovic statement. First, it tries to embolden hard-line nationalists
in the Serbian government to oppose Kosovo's independence in principle
and to raise insuperable obstacles in the negotiations. Second, it tries
to outflank the United States by raising the prospect of destabilization
in Europe with some West European participants in the Contact Group and
with some Central-East European governments in bilateral channels. And,
third, it cries, "No Haste," so as to frustrate the U.S. and, largely,
Western goal of achieving a resolution this year.
The authorities in Tiraspol, Transnistria; Sukhumi, Abkhazia;
Tskhinvali, South Ossetia; and Stepanakert, Karabakh (and Yerevan as
well) never based their hopes for international or at least Russian
official recognition upon a possible Kosovo "model" or "precedent." When
Russian President Vladimir Putin raised this idea earlier this year and
turned it into a staple of Russia's discourse on post-Soviet conflict
resolution, the secessionist authorities reacted with caution and
skepticism. While putting a few of their eggs in the Kosovo basket, they
are clearly loath to stake their case on Kosovo or Russian actions
related to Kosovo. They continually stress other arguments, "precedents"
or "models" in their quest for recognition (see EDM, February 2, 6, 8).
--Vladimir Socor
ALIYEV'S INVITATION TO THE WHITE HOUSE: A BLESSING OR A CURSE?
Officials in Baku are rejoicing. Three years after his election,
Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev has received an official invitation
to visit the White House and meet with U.S. President George W. Bush. In
a press release issued by the White House on April 10, the invitation
was justified by the fact that "Azerbaijan is a key ally in a region of
great importance and a valued partner, making important contributions in
Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo." The meeting with President Bush, set for
April 28, will include discussion of a wide range of issues, including
democracy promotion and cooperation in the Caucasus, energy
diversification, and the shared U.S.-Azerbaijani commitment to working
together to advance freedom and security.
The invitation comes as a slap in the face to the Azerbaijani
opposition, which has long complained about election fraud in the
country and the lack of adequate pressure from the Western community on
the Aliyev administration. The Azerbaijani opposition has often cited
the continuing refusal to invite President Aliyev to Washington, while
Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili were welcomed immediately after elections in their
countries, to show the international community's negative assessment of
the state of democracy in Azerbaijan. Now this trump card has
disappeared.
Local analysts predict that two issues will dominate the talks between
Aliyev and Bush: Iran and Azerbaijan's long-standing conflict with
Armenia over the Karabakh enclave. "There will be a set of complex
issues on the agenda, but Iran will dominate it with the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict being included into the discussion through the
prism of the Iranian question," independent political analyst Ilgar
Mammadov told Jamestown. "Everything tells us that the negotiations will
focus around the Iranian and Karabakh problems," according to an
editorial in the opposition Azadliq newspaper on April 9. Consequently,
the long-anticipated invitation from Washington might not be the
blessing that was expected by official Baku.
Political scientist Fuad Gahramanli believes "Aliyev is not interested
in participating in possible military operations against Iran and
actively tries to stay away from this process." For that reason, the
invitation to the United States at this particular moment might not
please Aliyev that much, concludes Gahramanli (Azadliq, April 7).
Mammadov also believes that Azerbaijan will try to play a careful game,
but "It is not for sure yet if Azerbaijan will stay completely outside
of the process."
Still, some other experts forecast that the Karabakh conflict will top
the discussions, as Washington is re-energizing peace talks between
Armenia and Azerbaijan and trying to save the failed talks in
Rambouillet, outside Paris, on February 11. The intensive trips by the
OSCE's Minsk group co-chairs into the region in the last few weeks have
raised speculations about the possibility of reaching an agreement on
this conflict in 2006. U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Reno L. Harnish
III, has told the local Azerbaijani media that there are good prospects
for settling the conflict in 2006. Furthermore, Azerbaijani Foreign
Minister Elmar Mammadyarov said after his trip to the Washington last
week "some new, interesting proposals regarding the solution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have been offered and the Azerbaijani
government will discuss them" (Turan, April 10, also see EDM, April 12).
"The United States is interested in a quick resolution of the conflict
this year," Mammadov told Jamestown, "but whether Russia will help in
this process is still not clear." ANS-TV radio quoted Yuri Merzlyakov,
the Russian co-chair of the Minsk group, as saying that there is no
competition between the co-chairs and that President Aliyev met with
Russian President Vladimir Putin long before he is scheduled to meet
with President Bush (ANS-TV, April 13).
Much is expected from Aliyev's upcoming trip to Washington, yet most
local analysts agree that the negotiations will be tough for the
Azerbaijani president. Particularly, any possible pressures on Aliyev to
agree to the terms of the referendum that is being proposed for the
resolution of the Karabakh conflict might produce counter-productive
results domestically. The Azerbaijani opposition is carefully watching
what will happen in Washington and they will try to dampen President
Aliyev's excitement about the long-anticipated meeting with President
Bush by focusing on the failures of Azerbaijani diplomacy regarding the
Karabakh conflict. As for President Bush, he is no longer feeling the
necessity to postpone this invitation, as his re-election in 2004 has
removed the need to take domestic considerations into account regarding
such an action. Now the emphasis is on security and foreign
policy, areas in which Azerbaijan could be a key ally.
--Fariz Ismailzade
PUTIN'S FEAR OF ELECTIONS AND FEAR OF INVESTMENT
Every recent election in Europe has severed a connection with Moscow,
allowing Russia to drift further and further away from the rest of the
continent. Italy is the latest point in this trajectory since Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi's defeat this week signifies for Russian
President Vladimir Putin the loss of a key European ally and the end of
a carefully cultivated personal friendship (Vremya novostei, April 11;
Gazeta.ru, April 13). The March 26 parliamentary elections in Ukraine,
inconclusive as they are, have confirmed Kyiv's European vector and
shown the steady retreat of the pro-Russian forces in the multi-colored
political arena (Lenta.ru, April 11). Presidential elections in Belarus
on March 19 and the swift suppression of public protests against the
crudely manipulated voting left Putin, who rushed to congratulate
Alexander Lukashenka on his victory, alone against the broad
European condemnation of this authoritarian regime (Ekho Moskvy, April
11). Even the elections in the Palestinian Authority fit the pattern,
since Moscow's readiness to embrace the Hamas leadership has generated
mild disapproval in Europe and bitter acrimony in Israel (Kommersant,
April 12).
The trend could easily be traced further back: Parliamentary elections
in Poland last September were dominated by parties that hold serious
suspicions about Putin's Russia, and elections in Germany forced the
departure of Putin's closest and most privileged partner, Gerhard
Schroeder, from the Bundestag. Some electoral results that were
unfortunate for Moscow were decided by margins slimmer than the "hanging
chads" that decided Bush's victory in 2000, and both Berlusconi and
Schroeder could complain about bad luck. In other cases, Belarus being
the prime example, Moscow was clearly set to lose because of its own
political choices. Lukashenka enjoys solid enough popular support to win
a free and fair election, but the very possibility of creating a space
for uncontrollable political opposition was unacceptable, and he opted
to show the "monolithic unity" of the quasi-Soviet regime
(Ezhednevny zhurnal, April 1).
Putin is in much the same situation and shows equally deep mistrust in
election mechanisms, but he feels the need to hide his true preferences
behind many layers of "Euro-correct" rhetoric. This habitual hypocrisy
serves to make him an acceptable partner for Western leaders, but the
Russian public apparently prefers a more frank expression of political
views; a recent poll by Ekho Moskvy radio (March 20) showed that 82% of
listeners would vote for Lukashenka as the president of a hypothetical
union of Russia and Belarus, while only 18% preferred Putin. Finalizing
the text of his annual address to the parliament, Putin now may take a
clue from this rather unexpected choice and add a few explicitly
populist condemnations of his own bureaucracy (Vedomosti, April 12). He
also knows that he has no real competitor in the country so that the
officially discarded idea of a third presidential
term remains far more popular than any of his potential successors; 45%
of Russians are now ready to amend the constitution accordingly
(Kommersant, April 12).
Each setback with elections in the near and far neighborhood, however,
increases Putin's distaste regarding the proposition that his tightly
hand-managed system of power should be subjected to the test of
competitive -- even if only formally -- decision-making by the general
population. This entirely unnecessary procedure goes directly against
his self-perception as the CEO and the chairman of the board of a
corporation comprising all structures of the Russian state. This
self-perception, which in fact is not that different from how Berlusconi
had seen himself until last weekend, probably informed Putin's first
words to the "captains" of business that were gathered in the Kremlin
last month: "Dear colleagues" (Vedomosti, April 4). Russian
state/corporate culture could be quite relaxed and the discipline in the
hierarchy should not necessarily be draconian, but the idea that the top
management must be exposed to electoral choices of the "lower ranks" is
simply alien. Berlusconi's scandalous resistance to his removal from a
position of power only reinforces the conviction among Putin's entourage
that undesirable surprises must be prevented at any cost.
Elections, however, remain a source of grave risks and the possibility
of a sudden shift in the electorate's mood cannot be eliminated.
Amassing "administrative resources" and employing every available
"political technology," the Kremlin still cannot overcome the pervasive
fear of elections. While perhaps not entirely rational, this feeling is
driven by growing mistrust among Putin's courtiers and rooted in their
common knowledge that the Russians indeed have very good reasons not to
trust any of them. The only way to exorcise this fear is to spread it
not only through the business elite, which constitutes less than 1% of
the population, but also across the middle entrepreneurial class that
has grown to about 20% (Kommersant, April 12). Uncertainty about the
immediate future, which can bring any kind of semi-official offer that
cannot be refused, including the sell-off of prime assets,
is an irreducible feature of Russian business climate. Fear is the main
instrument of establishing dominance of the 1.462 million strong army of
bureaucrats, which increased by 10.9% in 2005, over the oppressed,
abused, and potentially hostile class of middle and small business
(Lenta.ru, April 12; Ezhednevny zhurnal, April 11).
This instrumentalization of the fear factor creates various distortions
in Russian economic activities, from the increase of "informal taxation"
to the speculative growth of the Moscow property market. Such respected
experts as Yevgeny Gavrilenkov and Yevgeny Yasin have argued this week
that the abnormally low level of investment affects the dynamics and the
quality of economic growth and generates huge inflationary pressure
(Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 11). Entrepreneurs have no confidence in
their own businesses and are reluctant to invest, so money flows into
the stock market, which expanded by some 20% since the start of the
year, or into the accelerated growth of consumer imports. Corporatist
politics invariably translate into deformed and stagnant economics.
Putin's team of managers may try to hide their fiasco by doctoring
accounts and spinning new slogans, but Berlusconi was a
grand master of these tricks -- and they helped him only so far.
--Pavel K. Baev
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of
EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to [email protected].
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.
The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
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