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Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
Thursday April 20, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 77
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Moscow protests Jamestown seminar on North Caucasus
*Bakiyev, Putin to discuss U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan
*Russian ban turns from Georgian wine to mineral water
RUSSIAN REACTION TO JAMESTOWN CONFERENCE REVEALS KREMLIN FEAR OF FREE
SPEECH ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
On April 18 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented William
Burns, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, a note of protest in connection
with a Jamestown Foundation-sponsored seminar that took place in
Washington on Friday, April 14, "Sadullaev's Caucasian Front: Prospects
for the Next Nalchik."
As the Foreign Ministry noted, "in the course of the seminar the
participants called for new terror acts on the territory of Russia." The
U.S. Ambassador was reminded, "The conduct of such activities on the
territory of the U.S. is incompatible with the international obligations
of the United States in the sphere of struggle against terrorism," in
particular with UN Security Council Resolution 1624, "Threats to
International Peace and Security," which the United States played a
major role in developing. "The fact that Washington DC tolerates Chechen
gunmen and separatists is incompatible with the spirit of partnership
that would be necessary for anti-terrorist coordination of the two
countries and it is also harmful for bilateral relations," according to
the note (gazeta.ru, April 18).
The public discussion organized by Jamestown took place at the
conference facilities of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
in Washington, DC. Five people made presentations, including Glen E.
Howard, president of the Jamestown Foundation; Ivan Sventsistski, an
independent Russian journalist and coordinator of the Yalta Initiative
for Peace in Chechnya; Dr. Andrew McGregor, director of Aberfoyle
International Security in Toronto; Kelly McEvers, an American journalist
who was arrested in Dagestan and deported from Russia at the beginning
of April (see Chechnya Weekly, April 6); and Mairbek Vatchagaev, a
Chechen historian who now lives in France and was previously a spokesman
for Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen rebel leader killed last year. All the
participants spoke about the deteriorating situation in the North
Caucasus, the rising frustration among the local population, and the
possibility of a rebel attack in any part of that region.
Two officials from the Russian Embassy to the United States attended the
event as observers. They were accompanied by journalists from the
Kremlin-controlled ORT television network. ORT broadcast a story about
the event on the popular 9 pm news program that night. The panelists
were surprised to learn from the ORT story that they had planned new
terrorist acts in Russia during their discussion in Washington.
"The statements that are made in the USA imply that new, large-scale
acts of terrorism in Russia are necessary," according to the ORT
headline. "As a matter of fact, the presented subject of the event is
‘Perspectives of the New Nalchik.' These perspectives were treated
with sympathy" (ORT, April 14).
The note of protest from the Russian Foreign Ministry likely had been
prepared in advance so that Russian authorities were ready to condemn
the discussion irrespective of its content. The ORT report about the
conference was needed to provide grounds for a protest to the American
ambassador. ORT and the Russian authorities likely had coordinated their
actions.
Clearly, the Kremlin was enraged just by the title of the discussion:
"Sadullaev's Caucasian Front." Unlike in the United States, where the
government encourages public research on terrorism issues and open
analysis of al-Qaeda statements and publications on websites belonging
to Islamic radicals, in Russia such topics are the exclusive prerogative
of the authorities.
The Kremlin is not interested in providing either Russian society or the
international community with detailed information about the Caucasian
insurgency. Instead, officials in Russia use vague terms like
"international terrorism" or "dark forces" to describe the source of
instability in the south of the country. Sometimes some "unknown Arabs"
are mentioned, but never actual insurgency leaders such as Abdul-Khalim
Sadullaev. Nor does official Moscow recognize the existence of the
Caucasian front, preferring to speak about "the criminal underground in
the North Caucasus."
The Russian authorities do not want to focus on Sadullaev, as his
presence proves that the insurgency across the North Caucasus is
directed from Chechnya by Chechen separatists, not by terrorists from
Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan, as official propaganda claims. The
authorities were even angrier about the fact that Vachagaev called
Sadullaev the "Chechen president," trying to present the rebel leader as
a legitimate figure in the eyes of the Americans. Since Abdul-Khalim
Sadullaev succeeded Maskhadov after the latter's death last year, the
Kremlin has used a number of devices to hide his name from the West,
fearing that one day Western governments will start to persuade Moscow
to initiate a dialogue with him. Previously they had called on Russia to
negotiate with Maskhadov.
Russian authorities are also afraid of any accurate, thorough analyses
of the situation in the North Caucasus. As it increasingly loses control
over the region, Moscow has tried to make it off-limits to foreigners by
deporting journalists and humanitarian-aid workers. Public discussions
like the Jamestown forum on April 14 are considered as threatening to
the Kremlin as independent, inquisitive journalists who try to enter the
volatile region.
There is one more reason for the Russian authorities' pained reaction to
the Jamestown event. The Kremlin is watching closely the emerging
dispute between two influential groups in the U.S. government. One,
headed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, stands for a pragmatic
approach in U.S. policy towards Russia. The other group, led by
Vice-President Dick Cheney, believes that Washington should be tougher
in criticizing the policies of Russian President Vladimir Putin. It is
no accident that the ORT report specifically tried to link Cheney with
the Jamestown Foundation (ORT, April 14).
Many high-ranking Russian officials subscribe to a variety of conspiracy
theories, and Putin's entourage suspects that "anti-Russian forces"
headed by Cheney are behind the Jamestown conference on the North
Caucasus. The Russian leadership, which has established a "managed
democracy" under which nothing can be done without permission from the
authorities, simply cannot believe that a public discussion on a burning
political issue could be solely the initiative of an independent,
non-partisan organization.
--Andrei Smirnov
MOMENT OF TRUTH IN KYRGYZSTAN FOR U.S. POLICY
American strategic and democratic interests in Kyrgyzstan are
increasingly coming under pressure, one year after the purported
democratic "Tulip Revolution" in that country. Russian influence and
that of local organized crime groups are growing while U.S. influence is
steadily eroding. At the overt level, Moscow relies on President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Minister of Foreign Affairs Alikbek Jekshenkulov
to pursue its interests in Kyrgyzstan. Bakiyev, a pro-Kremlin though
weak president, in turn appears to rely on a modus vivendi with
representatives of organized crime in hopes of navigating the chaos that
has engulfed the country since the 2005 "revolution."
The sequence of events in the run-up to Bakiyev's April 24-25 visit to
the Kremlin is dramatizing those trends and had impelled the United
States for the first time to speak out publicly in Bishkek about the
country's direction.
On April 18, Jekshenkulov warned in a Russian media interview that
Kyrgyzstan is asking for a "hundredfold increase" in the rent paid by
the United States for using the Manas air base located near Bishkek. The
issue has been under discussion since autumn 2005 when Bakiyev raised it
at Moscow's instigation (see EDM, September 22, 2005). The Pentagon-paid
rent has been shared since 2002 among the Manas airport company, the
Kyrgyz Defense Ministry, and local authorities for the rented land plot.
At present, a Kyrgyz working group is preparing "economic
justifications" for the hundredfold-increase demand (Interfax, April
18).
At a joint news conference with Jekshenkulov that same day, Russian
Ambassador Yevgeny Shmagin advised unnamed foreign ambassadors --
apparently meaning primarily the U.S. ambassador -- "not to teach our
Kyrgyz friends politics and economics. They [these Kyrgyz friends] have
their heads on their shoulders and are capable to take the right
decisions." The conference previewed Bakiyev's upcoming visit to Russia
(Akipress, April 18).
Also on April 18, a Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs communiqué
criticized U.S. Ambassador Marie Jovanovich for "interfering in internal
affairs," exercising "pressures on the Kyrgyz leadership," and "going
beyond the scope of diplomatic relations" in her statements. The Kyrgyz
MFA communiqué asked Jovanovich to refrain from making public
statements on the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and
"other issues" and to observe the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations. Ostensibly, the MFA communiqué took issue with her public
advice to the Kyrgyz government to join HIPC, a debt-relief program of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. (Kyrgyzstan's external
indebtedness is estimated at approximately billion.) (Interfax,
Itar-Tass, April 18).
In fact, the broadside was responding to Jovanovich's April 17 media
interview, in which she described some aspects of the situation in
Kyrgyzstan with a realism that had been missing from official Washington
evaluations: "Journalists are scared. Members of Parliament are openly
stating that they are scared. Threats against the Central Electoral
Commission are worrisome. Even the police are frightened. Investors and
donors are raising questions about the direction in which Kyrgyzstan is
moving. … The judiciary must be free from corruption. We keep
saying that the state must take decisive measures against organized
crime" (Akipress, Interfax, April 17).
Triggering the interview was the apparent assassination attempt in broad
daylight in Bishkek on April 12 that severely injured Edil Baisalov,
leader of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (Institute for
War and Peace Reporting [London], April 14, also see EDM, April 14). The
Coalition is an influential pro-American, non-governmental organization
that combines a democracy agenda with moral support for the U.S.
military presence in Kyrgyzstan. The previous day, Baisalov had given an
unsparingly realistic presentation of the situation in the country to
the visiting Richard Boucher, newly appointed U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State for South and Central Asian Affairs.
On behalf of his and other NGOs, Baisalov told Boucher, "Unfortunately,
the situation has seriously worsened after the revolution. Our hopes
have not been realized." The state is unable to take measures against
rampant organized crime, Baisalov pointed out. He went on to criticize
Bakiyev for reneging on the promises he had made to the Kyrgyz people,
and also to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her visit
last fall, that he would transfer some of ex-president Askar Akayev's
presidential powers to the government and parliament, so as to establish
a constitutional division of power. Thus, "His promises have proven
empty words. We told Mr. Boucher that the president has deceived us
all," Baisalov announced (Kyrgyz radio, Kabar, April 11).
Jovanovich's assessment in her interview, while couched in proper
diplomatic language, parallel the substance of Baisalov's assessment.
Since the March 2005 regime change in Kyrgyzstan, the United States has
preferred to refrain from commenting on the unanticipated consequences
of what it initially portrayed as a triumph of democracy. With the
situation continually deteriorating, and Russia regaining strategic
influence over the country, a reassessment of U.S. policy seems timely.
--Vladimir Socor
RUSSIA CONTINUES TO PRESS GEORGIAN WINE INDUSTRY
After banning imports of Georgian wine and some other food products last
month (see EDM, March 28), Russian authorities now say the ban might
extend to Georgia's famous "Borjomi" mineral water. Following an order
from Gennady Onishchenko, Russian chief sanitary inspector, about 1
billion liters of Georgian and Moldovan wine have been confiscated from
retail and wholesale depots throughout Russia.
There are rumors that the deportation of multiple illegal Georgian labor
migrants will be Moscow's next "surprise," and this move, according to
pundits, might trigger large-scale social disturbances in Georgia
(Akhali Taoba, April 17).
On April 19, the Russian State Duma overwhelmingly voted for a
resolution supporting the ban on the import of Georgian and Moldovan
alcoholic beverages. Although the resolution cites health issues, the
pronounced anti-Georgian rhetoric accompanying the resolution
highlighted the political implications behind this development.
Georgian officials and observers consider the Russian move to be one
more politically motivated attempt to punish the Western-leaning
government of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. However, other
analysts argue that the ban on Georgian wine is part of a clandestine
business war, and some Russian companies that own wineries in Latin
America are trying to saturate the Russian market with their products
and push out foreign competitors.
President Saakashvili has declared that saving the Georgian wine
industry must become a top priority. "We all must become publicity
agents for Georgian wine," he said (TV-Rustavi-2, Civil Georgia, April
15).
The "wine war" has increased existing Georgian-Russian political
friction. Some top Georgian officials have threatened to take Georgia
out of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Georgian Foreign Minister
Gela Bezhuashvili pointedly declined to participate in the April 21
meeting of the CIS Ministers' Council in Moscow (Kavkaz Press, April
17).
With no Georgian wine flowing into the Russian market, other CIS members
seized the opportunity. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan
reportedly hastened to fill the temporary supply gap -- about 12% of the
Russian market -- by offering their own wine products to Russian
consumers (Akhali Taoba, April 15).
At a meeting with parliamentarians from the ruling National Movement
party on April 17, Saakashvili reiterated his belief that Russia's
import ban is a political move. He reaffirmed his readiness for a
"constructive dialogue" with Russia to settle the wine row and reminded
members of the government to promote Georgian wine abroad.
The wine war with Russia will not be settled soon, predicted Kakha
Bendukidze, Georgian State Minister for Reform Issues. "They want us to
pay a political price, which we will not pay" (TV-Imedi, TV-Rustavi-2,
Civil Georgia, April 17). Contrary to the gloomy forecasts by some
Georgian economic analysts, Bendukidze said that Russia's ban would have
minimal effect on Georgia's economy and "even in a worst-case scenario
the growth rate will decrease by approximately 0.3%." He said that
thanks to high levels of wine consumption in Georgia, producer prices
for grapes were unlikely to fall. He acknowledged that local vintners
might see their profits drop, but dismissed fears of an impending
"catastrophe." He said that the wine dispute might actually benefit
Georgia somewhat, "Because the stronger companies will survive and the
wine industry will become much healthier" (Georgian Public TV,
April 16).
The Georgian government has already granted wine producers a three-month
tax holiday. Despite the optimistic statements from Bendukidze and
Saakashvili, who claims that the "wine war" with Russia marks "a new
stage for Georgia's political and economic strengthening" (TV-Rustavi-2,
April 17), some Georgian officials and analysts -- not to mention
vintners -- are concerned about the immediate troubles that the dispute
could create for the Georgian wine industry, agriculture in general,
banking, and the entire national economy. Georgia exports 70% of its
agricultural products, 80% of its wine, and 60% of all Borjomi sales to
Russia. Some sources say that about 30% of Georgia's GNP comes from
exports of wine and other beverages to Russia. In 2005 Georgia exported
60 million bottles of wine; 40 million of these went to Russia. In 2005
Georgian wine exports to Russia were valued at
million, up from million in 2004 and million in 2003, according to the
Georgian Department of Statistics.
Some Georgian pundits argue that the Russian restrictions, if continued,
will harm Georgian banks, which finance export-import operations and
issue credits for the companies in this sector. Taking into account that
the Georgian financial sector is very small; downgrading the credit
portfolio of many Georgian banking institutions might result in a
banking crisis, according to their forecast. Some analysts argue that in
the near future Russia might allow some Georgian winemaking companies
with 100% Russian capital to resume wine exports to Russia.
Niko Lekishvili, chair of the Georgian Parliamentary Economic Committee,
said that the ban would bankrupt most Georgian wine companies, because
they owe millions in loans and back taxes. "We will lose approximately 0
million annually if the ban continues," he said (The Messenger, April
3). The ban will also hurt the many peasants involved with wine
production and grape harvesting.
Meanwhile, Georgian media and analysts are guessing about Saakashvili's
surprise decision on April 12 to assign Defense Minister Irakli
Okruashvili to find new markets for Georgian wine. Most of them link
this move with an anticipated reshuffle in the government (Resonansi,
April 17). Okruashvili demonstrated a remarkable familiarity with wine
issues when commenting on his new task. He said that many Georgian
winemaking firms are weak in marketing and management and several
semi-legal wineries in Georgia should be closed immediately (TV-Imedi,
TV-Rustavi-2, April 12).
Despite the government's calls to focus on new markets, Georgian
vintners consider restoring the Russian market to be their top priority
(Civil Georgia, April 19).
--Zaal Anjaparidze
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
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EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in error, please
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http://www.jamestown.org
Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Thursday April 20, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 77
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Moscow protests Jamestown seminar on North Caucasus
*Bakiyev, Putin to discuss U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan
*Russian ban turns from Georgian wine to mineral water
RUSSIAN REACTION TO JAMESTOWN CONFERENCE REVEALS KREMLIN FEAR OF FREE
SPEECH ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
On April 18 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented William
Burns, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, a note of protest in connection
with a Jamestown Foundation-sponsored seminar that took place in
Washington on Friday, April 14, "Sadullaev's Caucasian Front: Prospects
for the Next Nalchik."
As the Foreign Ministry noted, "in the course of the seminar the
participants called for new terror acts on the territory of Russia." The
U.S. Ambassador was reminded, "The conduct of such activities on the
territory of the U.S. is incompatible with the international obligations
of the United States in the sphere of struggle against terrorism," in
particular with UN Security Council Resolution 1624, "Threats to
International Peace and Security," which the United States played a
major role in developing. "The fact that Washington DC tolerates Chechen
gunmen and separatists is incompatible with the spirit of partnership
that would be necessary for anti-terrorist coordination of the two
countries and it is also harmful for bilateral relations," according to
the note (gazeta.ru, April 18).
The public discussion organized by Jamestown took place at the
conference facilities of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
in Washington, DC. Five people made presentations, including Glen E.
Howard, president of the Jamestown Foundation; Ivan Sventsistski, an
independent Russian journalist and coordinator of the Yalta Initiative
for Peace in Chechnya; Dr. Andrew McGregor, director of Aberfoyle
International Security in Toronto; Kelly McEvers, an American journalist
who was arrested in Dagestan and deported from Russia at the beginning
of April (see Chechnya Weekly, April 6); and Mairbek Vatchagaev, a
Chechen historian who now lives in France and was previously a spokesman
for Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen rebel leader killed last year. All the
participants spoke about the deteriorating situation in the North
Caucasus, the rising frustration among the local population, and the
possibility of a rebel attack in any part of that region.
Two officials from the Russian Embassy to the United States attended the
event as observers. They were accompanied by journalists from the
Kremlin-controlled ORT television network. ORT broadcast a story about
the event on the popular 9 pm news program that night. The panelists
were surprised to learn from the ORT story that they had planned new
terrorist acts in Russia during their discussion in Washington.
"The statements that are made in the USA imply that new, large-scale
acts of terrorism in Russia are necessary," according to the ORT
headline. "As a matter of fact, the presented subject of the event is
‘Perspectives of the New Nalchik.' These perspectives were treated
with sympathy" (ORT, April 14).
The note of protest from the Russian Foreign Ministry likely had been
prepared in advance so that Russian authorities were ready to condemn
the discussion irrespective of its content. The ORT report about the
conference was needed to provide grounds for a protest to the American
ambassador. ORT and the Russian authorities likely had coordinated their
actions.
Clearly, the Kremlin was enraged just by the title of the discussion:
"Sadullaev's Caucasian Front." Unlike in the United States, where the
government encourages public research on terrorism issues and open
analysis of al-Qaeda statements and publications on websites belonging
to Islamic radicals, in Russia such topics are the exclusive prerogative
of the authorities.
The Kremlin is not interested in providing either Russian society or the
international community with detailed information about the Caucasian
insurgency. Instead, officials in Russia use vague terms like
"international terrorism" or "dark forces" to describe the source of
instability in the south of the country. Sometimes some "unknown Arabs"
are mentioned, but never actual insurgency leaders such as Abdul-Khalim
Sadullaev. Nor does official Moscow recognize the existence of the
Caucasian front, preferring to speak about "the criminal underground in
the North Caucasus."
The Russian authorities do not want to focus on Sadullaev, as his
presence proves that the insurgency across the North Caucasus is
directed from Chechnya by Chechen separatists, not by terrorists from
Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan, as official propaganda claims. The
authorities were even angrier about the fact that Vachagaev called
Sadullaev the "Chechen president," trying to present the rebel leader as
a legitimate figure in the eyes of the Americans. Since Abdul-Khalim
Sadullaev succeeded Maskhadov after the latter's death last year, the
Kremlin has used a number of devices to hide his name from the West,
fearing that one day Western governments will start to persuade Moscow
to initiate a dialogue with him. Previously they had called on Russia to
negotiate with Maskhadov.
Russian authorities are also afraid of any accurate, thorough analyses
of the situation in the North Caucasus. As it increasingly loses control
over the region, Moscow has tried to make it off-limits to foreigners by
deporting journalists and humanitarian-aid workers. Public discussions
like the Jamestown forum on April 14 are considered as threatening to
the Kremlin as independent, inquisitive journalists who try to enter the
volatile region.
There is one more reason for the Russian authorities' pained reaction to
the Jamestown event. The Kremlin is watching closely the emerging
dispute between two influential groups in the U.S. government. One,
headed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, stands for a pragmatic
approach in U.S. policy towards Russia. The other group, led by
Vice-President Dick Cheney, believes that Washington should be tougher
in criticizing the policies of Russian President Vladimir Putin. It is
no accident that the ORT report specifically tried to link Cheney with
the Jamestown Foundation (ORT, April 14).
Many high-ranking Russian officials subscribe to a variety of conspiracy
theories, and Putin's entourage suspects that "anti-Russian forces"
headed by Cheney are behind the Jamestown conference on the North
Caucasus. The Russian leadership, which has established a "managed
democracy" under which nothing can be done without permission from the
authorities, simply cannot believe that a public discussion on a burning
political issue could be solely the initiative of an independent,
non-partisan organization.
--Andrei Smirnov
MOMENT OF TRUTH IN KYRGYZSTAN FOR U.S. POLICY
American strategic and democratic interests in Kyrgyzstan are
increasingly coming under pressure, one year after the purported
democratic "Tulip Revolution" in that country. Russian influence and
that of local organized crime groups are growing while U.S. influence is
steadily eroding. At the overt level, Moscow relies on President
Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Minister of Foreign Affairs Alikbek Jekshenkulov
to pursue its interests in Kyrgyzstan. Bakiyev, a pro-Kremlin though
weak president, in turn appears to rely on a modus vivendi with
representatives of organized crime in hopes of navigating the chaos that
has engulfed the country since the 2005 "revolution."
The sequence of events in the run-up to Bakiyev's April 24-25 visit to
the Kremlin is dramatizing those trends and had impelled the United
States for the first time to speak out publicly in Bishkek about the
country's direction.
On April 18, Jekshenkulov warned in a Russian media interview that
Kyrgyzstan is asking for a "hundredfold increase" in the rent paid by
the United States for using the Manas air base located near Bishkek. The
issue has been under discussion since autumn 2005 when Bakiyev raised it
at Moscow's instigation (see EDM, September 22, 2005). The Pentagon-paid
rent has been shared since 2002 among the Manas airport company, the
Kyrgyz Defense Ministry, and local authorities for the rented land plot.
At present, a Kyrgyz working group is preparing "economic
justifications" for the hundredfold-increase demand (Interfax, April
18).
At a joint news conference with Jekshenkulov that same day, Russian
Ambassador Yevgeny Shmagin advised unnamed foreign ambassadors --
apparently meaning primarily the U.S. ambassador -- "not to teach our
Kyrgyz friends politics and economics. They [these Kyrgyz friends] have
their heads on their shoulders and are capable to take the right
decisions." The conference previewed Bakiyev's upcoming visit to Russia
(Akipress, April 18).
Also on April 18, a Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs communiqué
criticized U.S. Ambassador Marie Jovanovich for "interfering in internal
affairs," exercising "pressures on the Kyrgyz leadership," and "going
beyond the scope of diplomatic relations" in her statements. The Kyrgyz
MFA communiqué asked Jovanovich to refrain from making public
statements on the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and
"other issues" and to observe the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations. Ostensibly, the MFA communiqué took issue with her public
advice to the Kyrgyz government to join HIPC, a debt-relief program of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. (Kyrgyzstan's external
indebtedness is estimated at approximately billion.) (Interfax,
Itar-Tass, April 18).
In fact, the broadside was responding to Jovanovich's April 17 media
interview, in which she described some aspects of the situation in
Kyrgyzstan with a realism that had been missing from official Washington
evaluations: "Journalists are scared. Members of Parliament are openly
stating that they are scared. Threats against the Central Electoral
Commission are worrisome. Even the police are frightened. Investors and
donors are raising questions about the direction in which Kyrgyzstan is
moving. … The judiciary must be free from corruption. We keep
saying that the state must take decisive measures against organized
crime" (Akipress, Interfax, April 17).
Triggering the interview was the apparent assassination attempt in broad
daylight in Bishkek on April 12 that severely injured Edil Baisalov,
leader of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society (Institute for
War and Peace Reporting [London], April 14, also see EDM, April 14). The
Coalition is an influential pro-American, non-governmental organization
that combines a democracy agenda with moral support for the U.S.
military presence in Kyrgyzstan. The previous day, Baisalov had given an
unsparingly realistic presentation of the situation in the country to
the visiting Richard Boucher, newly appointed U.S. Assistant Secretary
of State for South and Central Asian Affairs.
On behalf of his and other NGOs, Baisalov told Boucher, "Unfortunately,
the situation has seriously worsened after the revolution. Our hopes
have not been realized." The state is unable to take measures against
rampant organized crime, Baisalov pointed out. He went on to criticize
Bakiyev for reneging on the promises he had made to the Kyrgyz people,
and also to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during her visit
last fall, that he would transfer some of ex-president Askar Akayev's
presidential powers to the government and parliament, so as to establish
a constitutional division of power. Thus, "His promises have proven
empty words. We told Mr. Boucher that the president has deceived us
all," Baisalov announced (Kyrgyz radio, Kabar, April 11).
Jovanovich's assessment in her interview, while couched in proper
diplomatic language, parallel the substance of Baisalov's assessment.
Since the March 2005 regime change in Kyrgyzstan, the United States has
preferred to refrain from commenting on the unanticipated consequences
of what it initially portrayed as a triumph of democracy. With the
situation continually deteriorating, and Russia regaining strategic
influence over the country, a reassessment of U.S. policy seems timely.
--Vladimir Socor
RUSSIA CONTINUES TO PRESS GEORGIAN WINE INDUSTRY
After banning imports of Georgian wine and some other food products last
month (see EDM, March 28), Russian authorities now say the ban might
extend to Georgia's famous "Borjomi" mineral water. Following an order
from Gennady Onishchenko, Russian chief sanitary inspector, about 1
billion liters of Georgian and Moldovan wine have been confiscated from
retail and wholesale depots throughout Russia.
There are rumors that the deportation of multiple illegal Georgian labor
migrants will be Moscow's next "surprise," and this move, according to
pundits, might trigger large-scale social disturbances in Georgia
(Akhali Taoba, April 17).
On April 19, the Russian State Duma overwhelmingly voted for a
resolution supporting the ban on the import of Georgian and Moldovan
alcoholic beverages. Although the resolution cites health issues, the
pronounced anti-Georgian rhetoric accompanying the resolution
highlighted the political implications behind this development.
Georgian officials and observers consider the Russian move to be one
more politically motivated attempt to punish the Western-leaning
government of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. However, other
analysts argue that the ban on Georgian wine is part of a clandestine
business war, and some Russian companies that own wineries in Latin
America are trying to saturate the Russian market with their products
and push out foreign competitors.
President Saakashvili has declared that saving the Georgian wine
industry must become a top priority. "We all must become publicity
agents for Georgian wine," he said (TV-Rustavi-2, Civil Georgia, April
15).
The "wine war" has increased existing Georgian-Russian political
friction. Some top Georgian officials have threatened to take Georgia
out of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Georgian Foreign Minister
Gela Bezhuashvili pointedly declined to participate in the April 21
meeting of the CIS Ministers' Council in Moscow (Kavkaz Press, April
17).
With no Georgian wine flowing into the Russian market, other CIS members
seized the opportunity. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan
reportedly hastened to fill the temporary supply gap -- about 12% of the
Russian market -- by offering their own wine products to Russian
consumers (Akhali Taoba, April 15).
At a meeting with parliamentarians from the ruling National Movement
party on April 17, Saakashvili reiterated his belief that Russia's
import ban is a political move. He reaffirmed his readiness for a
"constructive dialogue" with Russia to settle the wine row and reminded
members of the government to promote Georgian wine abroad.
The wine war with Russia will not be settled soon, predicted Kakha
Bendukidze, Georgian State Minister for Reform Issues. "They want us to
pay a political price, which we will not pay" (TV-Imedi, TV-Rustavi-2,
Civil Georgia, April 17). Contrary to the gloomy forecasts by some
Georgian economic analysts, Bendukidze said that Russia's ban would have
minimal effect on Georgia's economy and "even in a worst-case scenario
the growth rate will decrease by approximately 0.3%." He said that
thanks to high levels of wine consumption in Georgia, producer prices
for grapes were unlikely to fall. He acknowledged that local vintners
might see their profits drop, but dismissed fears of an impending
"catastrophe." He said that the wine dispute might actually benefit
Georgia somewhat, "Because the stronger companies will survive and the
wine industry will become much healthier" (Georgian Public TV,
April 16).
The Georgian government has already granted wine producers a three-month
tax holiday. Despite the optimistic statements from Bendukidze and
Saakashvili, who claims that the "wine war" with Russia marks "a new
stage for Georgia's political and economic strengthening" (TV-Rustavi-2,
April 17), some Georgian officials and analysts -- not to mention
vintners -- are concerned about the immediate troubles that the dispute
could create for the Georgian wine industry, agriculture in general,
banking, and the entire national economy. Georgia exports 70% of its
agricultural products, 80% of its wine, and 60% of all Borjomi sales to
Russia. Some sources say that about 30% of Georgia's GNP comes from
exports of wine and other beverages to Russia. In 2005 Georgia exported
60 million bottles of wine; 40 million of these went to Russia. In 2005
Georgian wine exports to Russia were valued at
million, up from million in 2004 and million in 2003, according to the
Georgian Department of Statistics.
Some Georgian pundits argue that the Russian restrictions, if continued,
will harm Georgian banks, which finance export-import operations and
issue credits for the companies in this sector. Taking into account that
the Georgian financial sector is very small; downgrading the credit
portfolio of many Georgian banking institutions might result in a
banking crisis, according to their forecast. Some analysts argue that in
the near future Russia might allow some Georgian winemaking companies
with 100% Russian capital to resume wine exports to Russia.
Niko Lekishvili, chair of the Georgian Parliamentary Economic Committee,
said that the ban would bankrupt most Georgian wine companies, because
they owe millions in loans and back taxes. "We will lose approximately 0
million annually if the ban continues," he said (The Messenger, April
3). The ban will also hurt the many peasants involved with wine
production and grape harvesting.
Meanwhile, Georgian media and analysts are guessing about Saakashvili's
surprise decision on April 12 to assign Defense Minister Irakli
Okruashvili to find new markets for Georgian wine. Most of them link
this move with an anticipated reshuffle in the government (Resonansi,
April 17). Okruashvili demonstrated a remarkable familiarity with wine
issues when commenting on his new task. He said that many Georgian
winemaking firms are weak in marketing and management and several
semi-legal wineries in Georgia should be closed immediately (TV-Imedi,
TV-Rustavi-2, April 12).
Despite the government's calls to focus on new markets, Georgian
vintners consider restoring the Russian market to be their top priority
(Civil Georgia, April 19).
--Zaal Anjaparidze
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress