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Eurasia Daily Monitor - 04/25/2006

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  • Eurasia Daily Monitor - 04/25/2006

    Eurasia Daily Monitor -- The Jamestown Foundation
    Tuesday, April 25, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 80

    IN THIS ISSUE:
    *Belarus prepares for grim Chernobyl anniversary
    *Ukraine's MFA steps into regional leadership's role at CIS conference
    *Bakiyev seeks Russian advice on foreign policy

    POLITICAL CONFRONTATION DETRACTS FROM ACUTE CHERNOBYL PROBLEMS IN
    BELARUS

    As the 20th anniversary of Chernobyl approaches in Belarus, and the
    opposition forces plan a final protest march on April 26 in the
    aftermath of the presidential elections, there is no sign that the
    country has come close to overcoming the profound health, social, and
    environmental problems caused by the 1986 nuclear accident.

    The issue has been clouded by two factors. First, there is the
    politicization of the Chernobyl event as a symbol of the confrontation
    between the president and the opposition, particularly the united
    democratic forces behind candidate Alexander Milinkevich. Second, there
    has been a rather unseemly international dispute as to the health
    effects of Chernobyl, and particularly the long-term mortality rates
    from radiation-induced cancers.

    President Alexander Lukashenka marked the last two anniversaries with
    visits to the Chernobyl zone, which were marked with intensive TV
    publicity and the overall message that if the area was dangerous, then
    the president of the country would not be visiting there. Though parts
    of the zone -- especially Homel region -- have been depopulated,
    students and migrants are being used to cultivate land that remains
    contaminated with radio-nuclides, particularly Cesium-137 and
    Strontium-90. Lukashenka has detained several scientists whose findings
    contradict the official position that the accident in Belarus has been
    largely overcome, and using the forces of the government without outside
    assistance.

    The government of Belarus did not agree with some of the findings of the
    Chernobyl Forum Report, issued in September 2005. That report, the most
    comprehensive to date, demonstrated the enormous health and
    psychological impact of the accident in Belarus. About 90% of the
    republic was irradiated with short-lived radio-nuclides, deposited by
    the "radiation cloud" that was formed after the two steam explosions at
    the fourth reactor unit of the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the early
    morning of April 26, 1986. The reaction of the republican authorities
    was delayed by the lack of information about what had happened from both
    the Soviet authorities in Moscow and the Ukrainian party leadership in
    Kyiv.

    The radioactive iodine (Iodine-131 with a half-life of eight days) was
    to take a serious toll and has resulted in some 4,000 cases of thyroid
    cancer to date, almost a quarter of them in young children, and in most
    instances contracted after 1989. Long-term effects are equally serious.
    Over the 17-year period 1986-2003, surgery had been carried out on
    almost 2,000 young adults and children, and 19 have died as a result of
    the progression of the tumors. About 23% of Belarus was contaminated
    with Cesium and Strontium, and about 2% of the territory affected with
    Plutonium radio-nuclides (half-life 24,000 years). Many of the affected
    regions did not take any preventive action until 1989, when it was
    revealed officially that they formed part of the contaminated zone.
    Belarus lost a quarter of its valuable forests.

    Today about 1.5 million residents of Belarus are provided with medical
    assistance as a result of the 1986 disaster. Among those Belarusians who
    took part in the cleanup operations -- they are referred to today as
    "liquidators," a term reminiscent of the Stalin era -- there were
    registered more than 2,800 first-time cases of cancer, and in 73% of
    these incidences it occurred among those working in the zone in 1986-88.
    Over 300,000 children continue to reside in the most affected regions of
    Homel and Mahileu. They suffer from a rise in frequency of sicknesses of
    all types, but particularly respiratory diseases, digestive problems,
    and childhood diabetes. Among the age group 10-14, for example, newly
    formed cancers in the Chernobyl zones exceed those in the "clean" region
    of Vitsebsk by 1.5 times, and the incidence of endocrinal pathology is
    double the average in clean areas.

    This disturbing picture has been partly concealed by an international
    dispute over the "true" health effects of Chernobyl, and the number of
    long-term mortalities. Two reports are now extant: the Chernobyl Forum
    Report (CFR) and the Greenpeace Report. The latter raises the number of
    long-term victims to over 90,000, and reports some 34,000 deaths to date
    among liquidators. However, the dispute is largely contrived. It derives
    from the unfortunate and misleading press releases issued by
    representatives of the Chernobyl Forum, which do not reflect accurately
    the contents of the CFR. The issue of 4,000 long-term deaths is even
    belied by the CFR itself, which includes a table indicating some 9,000
    long-term deaths.

    Even that figure pertains only to a small fraction of the lands
    contaminated by Chernobyl, namely the republics of Russia, Ukraine, and
    Belarus. Neither report really disputes that the Chernobyl-linked cancer
    deaths will be in the tens of thousands. The Belarusian government,
    which is listed as one of the authors of the CFR, would have been
    content with the misleading press release (less than 60 current
    casualties and under 4,000 long-term), but not with the figures within
    or in the heated Greenpeace Report, comprised mainly from the research
    of Ukrainian scientists.

    For the 1.5 million individuals still requiring medical attention from
    the disaster, such arguments are largely irrelevant. Most of then have
    lived off contaminated land for the past 20 years, their benefits now
    reduced, and their concerns dismissed as "psychological stress" and
    "dependency." The impact of Chernobyl has not dissipated after two
    decades.

    --David Marples



    CIS SPLIT AT MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE

    The meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the Commonwealth of
    Independent States member countries, held on April 21 in Moscow, exposed
    a profound split in the organization. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and
    Azerbaijan formed a common front on issues of shared concern, opposing
    Russian policies directed against their interests. The four countries
    are members of the GUAM group, though they did not act in that capacity
    at the conference.

    The Ukrainian delegation, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Borys
    Tarasyuk, led this group of independent-minded countries in the debate
    on most economic and political issues of concern to them. Russia, with
    the support of loyalist or neutralist countries whose interests are not
    involved in those issues, rejected the four countries' initiatives with
    a high-handedness that can only exacerbate the differences at upcoming
    high-level CIS meetings.

    Georgia and Moldova submitted separately prepared statements about
    Russia's ban on imports of their wines and other agricultural products
    on the Russian market. Describing the ban as politically motivated,
    abusive, and unwarranted, the statements underscored the "massive
    economic damage" inflicted on the two countries. Georgia and Moldova
    regard the ban as an "unfriendly action" by the Russian government, are
    asking the Russian government for explanations, and are challenging the
    Russian agencies involved -- mainly the Consumer Protection Inspectorate
    -- to show cause for this action. The Ukrainian delegation lodged its
    own complaint about recent Russian restrictions on the import of a wide
    range of Ukrainian agricultural products on the Russian market.

    Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov handled those
    grievances at the concluding press briefing with a dismissive reference
    to "some kind of declarations" made during the conference. He warned by
    Georgia and Moldova against "politicizing" the issue, as this "will not
    facilitate a solution." Russia takes the position that the issue should
    be discussed at the level of technical agencies. Thus, Moscow seeks to
    evade political responsibility for a measure undoubtedly ordered by high
    political authorities. Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine intend to raise the
    issue again at the upcoming CIS meetings of prime ministers (May 25) and
    of the heads of state shortly thereafter.

    The Russian side also blocked Ukraine's proposal to discuss the creation
    of a CIS Free Trade Zone at the conference. The proposal, nominally
    endorsed by Russia as well, is almost a decade old and no member country
    seriously expects Russia to actually implement it. In Ukraine, however,
    the proposal has become topical again in connection with the
    Russia-planned Single Economic Space (Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan, with
    Ukraine invited to become a member). Some groups in Ukraine (not only
    within the Party of Regions) want the country to join the Single
    Economic Space in one form or another -- a move that would compromise
    Ukraine's European aspirations. On the other hand, Ukrainian proponents
    of integration with the European Union cite the proposal for a CIS Free
    Trade Zone as potentially advantageous to Ukraine as well as compatible
    with the country's progress toward the EU. However, Ukrainian
    attempts to discuss the free-trade proposal with Moscow shatter against
    the resistance of Russian protectionist interests. Thus, the Moscow
    conference strengthened the view that the CIS is, at best, useless to
    member countries generally and, at worst, actually detrimental to their
    interests.

    A proposal to discuss the "frozen conflicts" at the conference was also
    blocked by the Russian side. Ukraine took the lead in submitting this
    proposal with the support of Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The
    obstruction by Moscow and its allies will strengthen the case for
    internationalization of the existing "peacekeeping" and negotiating
    frameworks on Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, as well as
    underscoring the value of American efforts to settle the Karabakh
    conflict.

    Ukraine asked the conference to prepare a proposal for the upcoming CIS
    summit to express its attitude to the 1930-33 famine and genocide in
    Ukraine (the Holodomor). However, the Russian side orchestrated a
    procedural move that eliminated the proposal from the agenda. Belarus,
    Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan voted with Russia against the
    proposal. Armenia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan abstained. Moldova,
    Georgia, and Azerbaijan voted with Ukraine.

    According to Lavrov at the concluding briefing, discussion of the
    Holodomor would have "politicized" a historical issue. Lavrov argued --
    as Russian Ambassador Viktor Chernomyrdin also did in Kyiv -- that
    Russians and other Soviet citizens suffered equally in Soviet times and
    it would therefore be inappropriate to single out any people in this
    regard.

    This argument is heard regularly from Moscow about the Baltic states as
    well: "It was a common pain in the Soviet Union." Such an argument
    constitutes the ultimate expression of a social culture of collectivism.
    It also overlooks, first, the fact that Moscow organized the famine and
    deportations in Ukraine, the Baltic states and elsewhere; and, second,
    that the Kremlin today is actively discouraging the attempts to come to
    terms with Soviet Russia's own totalitarian recent history. While
    refusing to assess the actions of the Soviet regime, Russia at the same
    time claims prerogatives as the legal successor of the USSR.

    The Moscow conference was to have discussed a CIS Executive Committee
    report on implementing decisions on CIS reform, adopted by the heads of
    state at the August 2005 summit in Astana. A corresponding Russian
    proposal envisaged setting up a high-level group on "measures to enhance
    the effectiveness of the CIS." Neither initiative was mentioned after
    the conference. In his conclusions, Tarasyuk was scathing about the CIS:
    "not a normal international organization," "unresponsive to situations
    that are most sensitive to member states," "useless," and "has no
    future."

    (Interfax, Itar-Tass, Moldpres, Imedi TV, April 21, 22)

    --Vladimir Socor



    BISHKEK WELCOMES EXPANDED RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN KYRGYZSTAN

    Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev met with Russian President Vladimir
    Putin during his first state visit to Moscow on April 24-25. The meeting
    began with Bakiyev stating that Kyrgyzstan today needs economic
    assistance, which Russia is able to provide. Putin welcomed the idea of
    intensifying bilateral cooperation in the energy sector and food
    industry with special attention to the development of small and medium
    businesses. However, Putin's announcement that Russia will increase its
    military contingent at the Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan with the
    Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) became the focus of the
    discussion.

    Bakiyev approved Putin's plans, acknowledging, "The Russian base in Kant
    contributes to the provision of stability and security not only in
    Kyrgyzstan, but in the entire Central Asian region" (Itar-Tass, April
    24). Bakiyev's support for intensifying security ties with Russia
    followed his abrupt request to the U.S. Embassy to increase the rent
    paid for the U.S. "Gansi" military base at Bishkek's Manas airport (see
    EDM, April 20). This is the second time since the March 24, 2005, Tulip
    Revolution that Bakiyev has publicly pressured Washington over the
    status of the U.S. military presence. In July 2005, U.S. Secretary of
    Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Bishkek to discuss issues of bilateral
    security cooperation following Bakiyev's demand to establish deadlines
    for the duration of the U.S. military presence. However, ten months
    after Rumsfeld's visit, the agreement on the status of the
    military base remains without any significant changes.

    Putin announced that Russia and Kyrgyzstan will conduct joint
    anti-terrorist training in 2006, focusing on efforts to eradicate
    transnational crime and the illegal drug trade. Previously Russia
    initiated several regional large-scale military training exercises
    within the CSTO, which scored high approval ratings among local security
    experts. However, these drills were also often criticized for carrying
    strong political symbolism, yet few practical applications (see EDM, May
    24, 2005).

    In summer 2005 Bakiyev proposed placing the Kyrgyz hydro-energy sector
    under the management of the Russian government-controlled Unified Energy
    Systems enterprise. The president's proposal was regarded as highly
    corrupt, according to representatives of the Kyrgyz energy sector,
    because the government sidestepped an open auction to consider other
    options for the sector's development.

    Before visiting Moscow, Bakiyev was careful about making any definite
    statements about the possibility of Kyrgyzstan's joining the World
    Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. Although there
    is a certain pressure from the international community on the Kyrgyz
    government to join the HIPC, many Kyrgyz experts believe this move would
    make the country dependent upon Western funds (Gazeta.kg, April 24). In
    particular, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Paris Club
    creditors would be able to increase their influence regarding the
    country's economic and financial regulations. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan
    would be unable to advance issues concerning its foreign policy, such as
    the U.S. military base.

    The possibility of Kyrgyzstan joining the HIPC program has prompted wide
    discussion in the local media. Some claim that it is an issue of
    national dignity, as enrolling in the debt-relief program would mean
    joining the ranks of the poorest states in Africa and Latin America.
    Kyrgyzstan's external debt is currently about billion.

    Days before Bakiyev's visit to Moscow, the president's former political
    allies again criticized his government for corrupt politics. Minister of
    Industry, Trade, and Tourism Almazbek Atambayev resigned to express his
    fundamental disagreement with the actions resulting from the president's
    political alliance with Prime Minister Felix Kulov. He accused the
    president of engaging in clan politics and failing to curb criminal
    figures' infiltration of state institutions. Atambayev had been
    considered to be one of Kulov's few supporters, but he has now moved
    into the opposition. Former prosecutor-general Azimbek Beknazarov told
    Azattyk radio that the Bakiyev-Kulov partnership should be destroyed due
    to its dysfunctional nature (Akipress, April 22). Beknazarov commented
    that Bakiyev and Kulov are pursuing personal goals in politics and,
    "They both are very similar in their strive for power."

    Meanwhile, the Kyrgyz public, as well as the government, are preparing
    for the peace demonstrations in Bishkek on April 29 (see EDM, April 11).
    The Ministry of the Interior will deploy special security forces to
    prevent any acts of civil disobedience. The Kyrgyz Coalition for
    Democracy and Civil Society is the lead organizer of the demonstration,
    but several parliamentarians and numerous other civic organizations have
    expressed an interest in participating. Melis Eshimkanov, Beknazarov,
    and a number of other parliamentarians will mobilize their own
    constituents at the demonstration.

    Bakiyev's recent visit to Russia is his fourth since the Tulip
    Revolution in Kyrgyzstan last year. The president's visit to Moscow
    confirmed the Kyrgyz government's pro-Russian views. However, the
    president's pro-Moscow tilt creates problems for Bishkek. The
    international community has condemned his attitude toward the status of
    the U.S. military base. The president also delayed stating his opinion
    regarding Kyrgyzstan's joining the HIPC until after his consultations in
    Moscow.

    --Erica Marat

    The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
    edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
    the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
    Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of
    EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in error, please
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    Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
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