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MILITARY SOLUTION OF IRANIAN PROBLEM WILL HARM BAKU AND YEREVAN
RIA Novosti, Russia
April 26 2006
Moscow, (Alexei Makarkin for RIA Novosti) - Escalation of the
U.S. conflict with Iran directly affects the interests of its
neighbors.
A military solution may generate serious problems for Iraq, where it
took the political forces several months to agree on the distribution
of government positions. Moreover, a Shiite has again become Prime
Minister, and the Iraqi Shiites have historical ties with their
brethren in Iran. Understandably, political risks in Afghanistan
and Pakistan will markedly grow. The states of the South Caucasus,
also Iran's neighbors, will face problems too.
The media report that the United States is hoping for Azeri cooperation
- its territory could be used as a potential bridgehead for military
action against Iran (this may or may not happen, but nevertheless
is on the agenda). Ilham Aliyev may discuss this issue during his
U.S. visit this week. The agenda may include the use of Azeri air space
and airfields, and the deployment of U.S. troops on Azeri territory.
Obviously, Baku is not very enthusiastic about this prospect. To begin
with, Azerbaijan maintains close relations with Iran. They signed a
non-aggression and cooperation treaty in 2002. Last December their
representatives attended the inauguration of the gas pipeline -
under a 25 year-long bilateral agreement, Iran will supply 80.5
million cubic m of natural gas a year.
During his recent trip to Baku, Iranian Defence Minister Mostafa
Mohammad-Najjar said: "The security of Azerbaijan is the security of
Iran. Our defence capability is your defence capability." He seemed
keen to find out the Azeri position on the eve of Aliyev's visit to
the U.S. It is clear, however, that if Azerbaijan becomes an American
ally in the war against Iran, it will itself become a target for
Iranian missiles."
Moreover, Iran is the home for at least 35 million Azeris ( their
number being bigger than the population of Azerbaijan itself), many of
them with relatives in Azerbaijan. It is rumoured that the Americans
may try and use the ethnic factor - contradictions between the Azeri
diaspora and the Tehran regime (as Stalin tried to do in 1946). If so,
the U.S. will find it hard to do without Baku. But let's not forget
that Stalin did not succeed, although the Iranian central government
was much weaker than it is now. In addition, if hostilities break
out, refugees may flood Azeri territory and create serious problems
for the Baku authorities. Finally, the Islamic fundamentalists in
Azerbaijan may use military action to enhance their positions by
espousing anti-American rhetoric.
While Baku is thinking about its position in the Iranian crisis,
Armenia is worried that it may have a negative effect on the
Karabakh problem, in which the U.S. is increasingly trying to act as
a go-between. So far, the point at issue is whether Baku will grant
Karabakh the right to self-determination, and sanction a referendum,
the results of which are already clear. Only in this case will
Armenia agree to concessions, and return to Baku control over the
areas of the country (outside Karabakh), which are now occupied by
its armed formations. For the time being, Aliyev rejects the idea of
a referendum as a matter of principle - if he agrees to it, he will
weaken his position inside the country and give the opposition an
excuse to lash out at him.
Today, the Americans are emphasizing their role of an "honest broker"
at the Karabakh negotiations, and are trying to exert equal influence
on either side. But the question is if they are so interested in Azeri
territory as a bridgehead for military action against Iran, how can
they "compensate" Baku for the tremendous political risks involved?
At the very least, the U.S. could support the Azeri option of the
Karabakh settlement, which Armenia finds unacceptable. At most,
Washington may look the other way if Baku possible attempts to resolve
the issue with military force. The leader of the Armenian opposition
Stepan Demirchyan said with good reason: "The consequences of a war
in Iran will be destructive for the whole region." He added that a
war in Iran would spell disaster both for Nagorny Karabakh and Armenia.
Although unlikely, even the possibility of such a war causes concern
in Armenia and other CIS nations, which have a vested interest in
peaceful settlement of conflicts on their territory.
Thus potential U.S. military intervention in Iran may not only
result in huge casualties (part of which will be caused by Tehran's
retaliation), but also exacerbate old seats of tension, which have
been almost extinguished. In short, it could trigger a chain reaction
with unpredictable consequences.
Alexei Makarkin is Deputy General Director of the Center for Political
Technologies.
RIA Novosti, Russia
April 26 2006
Moscow, (Alexei Makarkin for RIA Novosti) - Escalation of the
U.S. conflict with Iran directly affects the interests of its
neighbors.
A military solution may generate serious problems for Iraq, where it
took the political forces several months to agree on the distribution
of government positions. Moreover, a Shiite has again become Prime
Minister, and the Iraqi Shiites have historical ties with their
brethren in Iran. Understandably, political risks in Afghanistan
and Pakistan will markedly grow. The states of the South Caucasus,
also Iran's neighbors, will face problems too.
The media report that the United States is hoping for Azeri cooperation
- its territory could be used as a potential bridgehead for military
action against Iran (this may or may not happen, but nevertheless
is on the agenda). Ilham Aliyev may discuss this issue during his
U.S. visit this week. The agenda may include the use of Azeri air space
and airfields, and the deployment of U.S. troops on Azeri territory.
Obviously, Baku is not very enthusiastic about this prospect. To begin
with, Azerbaijan maintains close relations with Iran. They signed a
non-aggression and cooperation treaty in 2002. Last December their
representatives attended the inauguration of the gas pipeline -
under a 25 year-long bilateral agreement, Iran will supply 80.5
million cubic m of natural gas a year.
During his recent trip to Baku, Iranian Defence Minister Mostafa
Mohammad-Najjar said: "The security of Azerbaijan is the security of
Iran. Our defence capability is your defence capability." He seemed
keen to find out the Azeri position on the eve of Aliyev's visit to
the U.S. It is clear, however, that if Azerbaijan becomes an American
ally in the war against Iran, it will itself become a target for
Iranian missiles."
Moreover, Iran is the home for at least 35 million Azeris ( their
number being bigger than the population of Azerbaijan itself), many of
them with relatives in Azerbaijan. It is rumoured that the Americans
may try and use the ethnic factor - contradictions between the Azeri
diaspora and the Tehran regime (as Stalin tried to do in 1946). If so,
the U.S. will find it hard to do without Baku. But let's not forget
that Stalin did not succeed, although the Iranian central government
was much weaker than it is now. In addition, if hostilities break
out, refugees may flood Azeri territory and create serious problems
for the Baku authorities. Finally, the Islamic fundamentalists in
Azerbaijan may use military action to enhance their positions by
espousing anti-American rhetoric.
While Baku is thinking about its position in the Iranian crisis,
Armenia is worried that it may have a negative effect on the
Karabakh problem, in which the U.S. is increasingly trying to act as
a go-between. So far, the point at issue is whether Baku will grant
Karabakh the right to self-determination, and sanction a referendum,
the results of which are already clear. Only in this case will
Armenia agree to concessions, and return to Baku control over the
areas of the country (outside Karabakh), which are now occupied by
its armed formations. For the time being, Aliyev rejects the idea of
a referendum as a matter of principle - if he agrees to it, he will
weaken his position inside the country and give the opposition an
excuse to lash out at him.
Today, the Americans are emphasizing their role of an "honest broker"
at the Karabakh negotiations, and are trying to exert equal influence
on either side. But the question is if they are so interested in Azeri
territory as a bridgehead for military action against Iran, how can
they "compensate" Baku for the tremendous political risks involved?
At the very least, the U.S. could support the Azeri option of the
Karabakh settlement, which Armenia finds unacceptable. At most,
Washington may look the other way if Baku possible attempts to resolve
the issue with military force. The leader of the Armenian opposition
Stepan Demirchyan said with good reason: "The consequences of a war
in Iran will be destructive for the whole region." He added that a
war in Iran would spell disaster both for Nagorny Karabakh and Armenia.
Although unlikely, even the possibility of such a war causes concern
in Armenia and other CIS nations, which have a vested interest in
peaceful settlement of conflicts on their territory.
Thus potential U.S. military intervention in Iran may not only
result in huge casualties (part of which will be caused by Tehran's
retaliation), but also exacerbate old seats of tension, which have
been almost extinguished. In short, it could trigger a chain reaction
with unpredictable consequences.
Alexei Makarkin is Deputy General Director of the Center for Political
Technologies.