Baku's militaristic fantasies seem to have no end
Yerkir.am
July 28, 2006
By Gayane MOVSESSIAN
OSCE Minsk Group American Co-Chair Mathew Bryza's planned visit to
the region raises different expectations among the conflict sides.
Yerevan, according to Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian, expects
that Washington will succeed in convincing Baku to return to the
negotiations table to continue discussion of the document developed
and recently publicized by the mediators.
Baku on the other hand expects that Bryza will bring new proposals. The
Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov stated that if Baku sees in
Bryza's proposals any possibility for progress in the negotiations
it will agree to hold a meeting of Azeri and Armenian Foreign
Ministers. However, the American Co-Chair cannot bring any radically
new proposals since it would take much time to come up with such
proposals and to discuss them with the other two Co-Chairs.
Besides, the Co-Chairs have indicated in one of their statements that
they have exhausted their imagination and are expecting new ideas
and decisions from the Armenian and Azeri presidents. The American
Co-Chair's visit aims at understanding in what direction the mediators
should move further. Mr. Bryza will brief his colleagues on the results
of the visit during their meeting in Paris in the beginning of August.
It should be noted that Bryza will visit not only Yerevan and Baku
but also Stepanakert. Even though this visit cannot be expected to
cause any changes in the Co-Chairs' approach to the conflict, it is
possible that Mr. Bryza will see on the ground that no arrangement in
the framework of the Armenian-Azeri dialog can be made and implemented
without active participation of Karabakh.
Mr. Bryza's meeting with another overlooked side of the
conflict, the Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, can also be
interesting. "International Rights of Refugees", a civil society
network organization, has appealed to the American Ambassador in
Armenia John Evans with a request to organize such a meeting.
The network includes eight organizations that represent the interests
of refugees from the former Azerbaijani SSR and Nakhijevan. If this
meeting is held Mr. Bryza will receive much information to think
about and to recharge his Minsk Group colleagues' imagination. The
prospect for Nagorno Karabagh Republic 's participation in the resumes
negotiation process as well as the prospect of long-term settlement
of the conflict will depend on how the international mediators will
use such information.
It is obvious that Baku will be against such a turn in the developments
around conflict settlement. Baku is usually against any initiative
aimed at the settlement of the conflict. Lower-ranked officials and
experts from Azerbaijan openly say things that official representatives
of Baku do not always state, "The present plan for peaceful settlement
(referring to the document containing the main principles - editor)
is not in Azerbaijan's interests...
First of all, taking into consideration that Azerbaijan will not
have full control over Lachin and Kelbajar as well as the presence
of Armenian troops in the conflict zone, Azerbaijan partially loses
its territorial integrity. Secondly, there are no guarantees that
if a referendum is held in 15 or 20 years the Armenian community
in Nagorno Karabagh that would significantly improve its economic
situation through international assistance and Azerbaijan's oil
money will not demand independence again. Thirdly, if this plan is
implemented Azerbaijan will lose one of its main leverages - the
possibility of military settlement of the conflict."
Baku is still expecting that it will have a new opportunity to
resort to aggression against Nagorno Karabagh and Armenia. "There
was a time when the small Armenia was allowed to do everything... In
the new international order Azerbaijan can always have a chance of
settling the conflict through another war," member of Azerbaijan's
Soros Foundation Board Ilhar Mamedov stated.
Azerbaijan is afraid that if no results are achieved through
negotiations the international community will be in a position to
force a peaceful settlement upon the parties.
This is why Azerbaijan is trying to win some time. For the sake of
winning some time Azeri experts even advise the government to engage
in negotiations with Nagorno Karabagh. "In terms of strategic issues,
Azerbaijan will show to the international community its willingness
to reach an agreement, its readiness for compromises.
This will somewhat isolate Armenia from the negotiation process
and will show to the community in Nagorno Karabagh the benefits of
economic cooperation with Azerbaijan. Besides, engagement of the
Armenian community in Karabagh into the negotiations process will
mean additional rounds of discussions which will take some time. This
in its turn would mean postponement of a forced peace agreement, a
'South Caucasus Dayton'," they write.
The Azeri experts explore the possibility of members of the Azeri
parliament visiting Nagorno Karabagh. "It is noteworthy that the
Azeri parliamentarians want to go to Karabagh not through Armenia
but directly crossing the frontline.
The parliamentarians to participate in this visit might include
Nizami Bahmanov (the head of the Azeri community in Karabagh),
the deputy elected to the Mili Mejlis from Khankendi (Stepanakert)
precinct, members of the Azeri delegation to the PACE, journalists
and others. Such a delegation would not allow the Armenians to claim
that Azerbaijan recognizes the so-called "Nagorno Karabagh Republic"
since the parliamentarians are not representing the executive power.
The Armenians would hardly reject such a proposal since it would be
rejection of negotiations and would indicate unwillingness for mutual
compromises. It would result in a very negative response from the
international community and will be an advantage Azerbaijan could
use in further negotiations. In this way Azerbaijan would have more
arguments to convince the international community that Armenians are
not ready for mutual compromises".
In the best case scenario, the visit is planned as another act of
propaganda. Even worse, if our "peace-loving" neighbors are trying
to provoke a break of the ceasefire which we believe is much closer
to the reality. It is not difficult for them to start shooting and
then blame Karabaghi population for everything.
Their imagination, as opposed to that of the mediators, does not seem
to be exhausted at all. The Minsk Group Co-Chairs had better try to
revive their imagination instead of merely calling on the leaders
of the conflicting sides to prepare their peoples for peace and not
for war. They should better think about how to calm down the Azeris'
militaristic fantasies.
Director of the International Crisis Group's European Program Nicolas
White and ICG Caucasus Project Coordinator Sabina Freiser made a
statement on this, "Russia, Europe and USA should make a statement
on unacceptability of war...
Some representatives of Azerbaijan hope that geopolitical interests
would make the international community allow a military campaign to
regain the territories lost in 1994. Russia, Europe and USA should be
absolutely clear on this issue if the mediators' last statement fails
to send this message. They should indicate that resort to military
action would eliminate prospects for any assistance in economic and
political spheres. If the international community does not succeed in
bringing peace to the South Caucasus it should make a clear statement
on unacceptability of another war."
Yerkir.am
July 28, 2006
By Gayane MOVSESSIAN
OSCE Minsk Group American Co-Chair Mathew Bryza's planned visit to
the region raises different expectations among the conflict sides.
Yerevan, according to Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian, expects
that Washington will succeed in convincing Baku to return to the
negotiations table to continue discussion of the document developed
and recently publicized by the mediators.
Baku on the other hand expects that Bryza will bring new proposals. The
Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mamedyarov stated that if Baku sees in
Bryza's proposals any possibility for progress in the negotiations
it will agree to hold a meeting of Azeri and Armenian Foreign
Ministers. However, the American Co-Chair cannot bring any radically
new proposals since it would take much time to come up with such
proposals and to discuss them with the other two Co-Chairs.
Besides, the Co-Chairs have indicated in one of their statements that
they have exhausted their imagination and are expecting new ideas
and decisions from the Armenian and Azeri presidents. The American
Co-Chair's visit aims at understanding in what direction the mediators
should move further. Mr. Bryza will brief his colleagues on the results
of the visit during their meeting in Paris in the beginning of August.
It should be noted that Bryza will visit not only Yerevan and Baku
but also Stepanakert. Even though this visit cannot be expected to
cause any changes in the Co-Chairs' approach to the conflict, it is
possible that Mr. Bryza will see on the ground that no arrangement in
the framework of the Armenian-Azeri dialog can be made and implemented
without active participation of Karabakh.
Mr. Bryza's meeting with another overlooked side of the
conflict, the Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, can also be
interesting. "International Rights of Refugees", a civil society
network organization, has appealed to the American Ambassador in
Armenia John Evans with a request to organize such a meeting.
The network includes eight organizations that represent the interests
of refugees from the former Azerbaijani SSR and Nakhijevan. If this
meeting is held Mr. Bryza will receive much information to think
about and to recharge his Minsk Group colleagues' imagination. The
prospect for Nagorno Karabagh Republic 's participation in the resumes
negotiation process as well as the prospect of long-term settlement
of the conflict will depend on how the international mediators will
use such information.
It is obvious that Baku will be against such a turn in the developments
around conflict settlement. Baku is usually against any initiative
aimed at the settlement of the conflict. Lower-ranked officials and
experts from Azerbaijan openly say things that official representatives
of Baku do not always state, "The present plan for peaceful settlement
(referring to the document containing the main principles - editor)
is not in Azerbaijan's interests...
First of all, taking into consideration that Azerbaijan will not
have full control over Lachin and Kelbajar as well as the presence
of Armenian troops in the conflict zone, Azerbaijan partially loses
its territorial integrity. Secondly, there are no guarantees that
if a referendum is held in 15 or 20 years the Armenian community
in Nagorno Karabagh that would significantly improve its economic
situation through international assistance and Azerbaijan's oil
money will not demand independence again. Thirdly, if this plan is
implemented Azerbaijan will lose one of its main leverages - the
possibility of military settlement of the conflict."
Baku is still expecting that it will have a new opportunity to
resort to aggression against Nagorno Karabagh and Armenia. "There
was a time when the small Armenia was allowed to do everything... In
the new international order Azerbaijan can always have a chance of
settling the conflict through another war," member of Azerbaijan's
Soros Foundation Board Ilhar Mamedov stated.
Azerbaijan is afraid that if no results are achieved through
negotiations the international community will be in a position to
force a peaceful settlement upon the parties.
This is why Azerbaijan is trying to win some time. For the sake of
winning some time Azeri experts even advise the government to engage
in negotiations with Nagorno Karabagh. "In terms of strategic issues,
Azerbaijan will show to the international community its willingness
to reach an agreement, its readiness for compromises.
This will somewhat isolate Armenia from the negotiation process
and will show to the community in Nagorno Karabagh the benefits of
economic cooperation with Azerbaijan. Besides, engagement of the
Armenian community in Karabagh into the negotiations process will
mean additional rounds of discussions which will take some time. This
in its turn would mean postponement of a forced peace agreement, a
'South Caucasus Dayton'," they write.
The Azeri experts explore the possibility of members of the Azeri
parliament visiting Nagorno Karabagh. "It is noteworthy that the
Azeri parliamentarians want to go to Karabagh not through Armenia
but directly crossing the frontline.
The parliamentarians to participate in this visit might include
Nizami Bahmanov (the head of the Azeri community in Karabagh),
the deputy elected to the Mili Mejlis from Khankendi (Stepanakert)
precinct, members of the Azeri delegation to the PACE, journalists
and others. Such a delegation would not allow the Armenians to claim
that Azerbaijan recognizes the so-called "Nagorno Karabagh Republic"
since the parliamentarians are not representing the executive power.
The Armenians would hardly reject such a proposal since it would be
rejection of negotiations and would indicate unwillingness for mutual
compromises. It would result in a very negative response from the
international community and will be an advantage Azerbaijan could
use in further negotiations. In this way Azerbaijan would have more
arguments to convince the international community that Armenians are
not ready for mutual compromises".
In the best case scenario, the visit is planned as another act of
propaganda. Even worse, if our "peace-loving" neighbors are trying
to provoke a break of the ceasefire which we believe is much closer
to the reality. It is not difficult for them to start shooting and
then blame Karabaghi population for everything.
Their imagination, as opposed to that of the mediators, does not seem
to be exhausted at all. The Minsk Group Co-Chairs had better try to
revive their imagination instead of merely calling on the leaders
of the conflicting sides to prepare their peoples for peace and not
for war. They should better think about how to calm down the Azeris'
militaristic fantasies.
Director of the International Crisis Group's European Program Nicolas
White and ICG Caucasus Project Coordinator Sabina Freiser made a
statement on this, "Russia, Europe and USA should make a statement
on unacceptability of war...
Some representatives of Azerbaijan hope that geopolitical interests
would make the international community allow a military campaign to
regain the territories lost in 1994. Russia, Europe and USA should be
absolutely clear on this issue if the mediators' last statement fails
to send this message. They should indicate that resort to military
action would eliminate prospects for any assistance in economic and
political spheres. If the international community does not succeed in
bringing peace to the South Caucasus it should make a clear statement
on unacceptability of another war."