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Karabakh: In the impassable jungle of resolution

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  • Karabakh: In the impassable jungle of resolution

    Agency WPS
    DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
    August 4, 2006 Friday

    KARABAKH: IN THE IMPASSABLE JUNGLE OF RESOLUTION

    by Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, the head of the Russian Mission for
    Truce in Karabakh

    RUSSIAN, AMERICAN, AND FRENCH CHAIRMEN OF THE OSCE MINSK GROUP WILL
    DISCUSS THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT RESOLUTION; The OSCE Minsk
    Group is meeting to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution.

    Russian, American, and French chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group will
    meet in Paris on August 2-3, to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
    resolution. This is going to be the first conference of international
    mediators after the June demarche, caused by fruitlessness of the
    meetings between Presidents Robert Kocharjan of Armenia and Ilham
    Aliyev of Azerbaijan this year.

    Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group called a break this June, and urged
    the heads of the involved states (Armenia and Azerbaijan) to display
    political will for peace. Their demarche and some leaks to the media
    on what suggestions had been made generated public debates. The
    cul-de-sac situation is being grappled with at this point, but few
    stimuli for mutual concessions appear. Official reaction in the
    respective capitals proved quite traditional. President of the
    unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh Arkady Gukasjan was the
    first the other day to promote in public the necessity of long
    overdue reconciliation between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

    Yerevan began play-acting, pretending that the suggestions made by
    foreign intermediaries were acceptable as a basis for talks
    continuation. The Armenians never hesitate to show their own
    "constructive stand" whenever they are confident of Azerbaijan's
    reaction - meaning that whatever is suggested will be turned down by
    Baku. It gives the Armenians a slight advantage. In the meantime,
    many Armenians complain that the other side is not dependable enough
    when it comes down to honoring accords and grumble over what they
    call exaggerated readiness of their own leaders (virtual readiness,
    if the truth were to be told) to withdraw from the occupied districts
    around Nagorno-Karabakh.

    It is more difficult for the Azerbaijani leadership, which is
    compelled to reassure its general public that nothing has been agreed
    on actually and that the key idea of a referendum on the status of
    Nagorno-Karabakh is to be reduced to the level of an ordinary opinion
    poll. In the meantime, it was only recently that official Baku was
    bragging that only two issues of eight or ten had to be settled yet.
    This permanent lack of exactness (whether or not accords have been
    made and if they are being honored) is typical of the adolescent
    Azerbaijani diplomacy.

    Official Baku is racking its brains to try to come up with new
    demands now. Demilitarization of the conflict area, i.e. disarmament
    of Nagorno-Karabakh, is insisted on. It becomes more and more clear
    that Aliyev does not really want an agreement, that he is stalling
    for time in the hope to build up military muscle despite his regular
    threats to Yerevan to the effect that Azerbaijan's patience is
    running out. Ducking the suggestions made by the international
    community, official Baku itself procrastinates the sufferings of
    Azerbaijani fugitives from Nagorno-Karabakh (it claims that they
    number over a million!) and makes them hostages of the unsolved
    problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. Every now and then Aliyev even hints at
    the possibility of a military operation of vengeance - even though
    the international community has made its stand on this particular
    option clear. No new war will be tolerated.

    This time-out taken by the intermediaries prompted some other players
    to try their hand with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. The
    notorious International Crisis Group or ICG went to great lengths to
    show the panic it was in and all but proclaimed the need for a new
    international intermediary. France alone would not do, as far as ICG
    representatives are concerned. They want all of Europe dragged into
    the matter. Peter Semneby of the EU visited the region in unseemly
    haste. Pierre Leluche of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly grew
    active...

    This eagerness to play the arbiter for Nagorno-Karabakh proves
    existence of certain geopolitical appetites and even certain
    shallowness of the thinking processes. A great deal of states and
    prominent state officials racked their brains, collective and
    individual, afterwards trying to save face. Lack of knowledge on what
    the conflict had been about in the first place and how it had evolved
    let down the overly eager more than once. It happened so to the ICG
    or Lord Atkinson, author of the report to the Parliamentary Assembly
    of the Council of Europe who chose to rely on "a single still shot"
    of the situation in the region in 2005, when even a whole "movie"
    (figuratively of course) wouldn't have sufficed as a basis for
    serious debates.

    New American Chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group Matthew Bryza joined
    the club in the cowboy-ish manner typical of the Bush Administration.
    Bryza visited Yerevan, Stepanakert, and Baku - and left the
    impression of having been overly long-winded.

    It stands to reason to expect three chairmen to base their future
    actions on Bryza's trip to the region. Even another meeting between
    Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers may be arranged.

    The OSCE set out to have the conflict resolved peacefully. It ought
    therefore to be more consequent and persistent. First and foremost,
    it should demand a peaceful solution to the problem more firmly,
    denouncing everything that collides with its efforts - including all
    and any threats particularly when they are made by the heads of
    states.

    Undeniably nit-picking in the matter of human rights and electoral
    procedures, OSCE structures are surprisingly tolerant when
    confronting militarist and revenge-monger-ish statements from
    officials and outright blase when it comes down to the continuing
    arms race, actual skirmishes, and neglect of the existing accords by
    the involved countries. The Middle East in the meantime is an example
    of how even a restricted war results in mass and huge violations of
    human rights.

    A categorical denouncement of a new war alone will pave way to actual
    resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

    Source: Vremya Novostei, August 2, 2006, p. 5

    Translated by A. Ignatkin
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