Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 4, 2006 Friday
KARABAKH: IN THE IMPASSABLE JUNGLE OF RESOLUTION
by Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, the head of the Russian Mission for
Truce in Karabakh
RUSSIAN, AMERICAN, AND FRENCH CHAIRMEN OF THE OSCE MINSK GROUP WILL
DISCUSS THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT RESOLUTION; The OSCE Minsk
Group is meeting to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution.
Russian, American, and French chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group will
meet in Paris on August 2-3, to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
resolution. This is going to be the first conference of international
mediators after the June demarche, caused by fruitlessness of the
meetings between Presidents Robert Kocharjan of Armenia and Ilham
Aliyev of Azerbaijan this year.
Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group called a break this June, and urged
the heads of the involved states (Armenia and Azerbaijan) to display
political will for peace. Their demarche and some leaks to the media
on what suggestions had been made generated public debates. The
cul-de-sac situation is being grappled with at this point, but few
stimuli for mutual concessions appear. Official reaction in the
respective capitals proved quite traditional. President of the
unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh Arkady Gukasjan was the
first the other day to promote in public the necessity of long
overdue reconciliation between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
Yerevan began play-acting, pretending that the suggestions made by
foreign intermediaries were acceptable as a basis for talks
continuation. The Armenians never hesitate to show their own
"constructive stand" whenever they are confident of Azerbaijan's
reaction - meaning that whatever is suggested will be turned down by
Baku. It gives the Armenians a slight advantage. In the meantime,
many Armenians complain that the other side is not dependable enough
when it comes down to honoring accords and grumble over what they
call exaggerated readiness of their own leaders (virtual readiness,
if the truth were to be told) to withdraw from the occupied districts
around Nagorno-Karabakh.
It is more difficult for the Azerbaijani leadership, which is
compelled to reassure its general public that nothing has been agreed
on actually and that the key idea of a referendum on the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh is to be reduced to the level of an ordinary opinion
poll. In the meantime, it was only recently that official Baku was
bragging that only two issues of eight or ten had to be settled yet.
This permanent lack of exactness (whether or not accords have been
made and if they are being honored) is typical of the adolescent
Azerbaijani diplomacy.
Official Baku is racking its brains to try to come up with new
demands now. Demilitarization of the conflict area, i.e. disarmament
of Nagorno-Karabakh, is insisted on. It becomes more and more clear
that Aliyev does not really want an agreement, that he is stalling
for time in the hope to build up military muscle despite his regular
threats to Yerevan to the effect that Azerbaijan's patience is
running out. Ducking the suggestions made by the international
community, official Baku itself procrastinates the sufferings of
Azerbaijani fugitives from Nagorno-Karabakh (it claims that they
number over a million!) and makes them hostages of the unsolved
problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. Every now and then Aliyev even hints at
the possibility of a military operation of vengeance - even though
the international community has made its stand on this particular
option clear. No new war will be tolerated.
This time-out taken by the intermediaries prompted some other players
to try their hand with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. The
notorious International Crisis Group or ICG went to great lengths to
show the panic it was in and all but proclaimed the need for a new
international intermediary. France alone would not do, as far as ICG
representatives are concerned. They want all of Europe dragged into
the matter. Peter Semneby of the EU visited the region in unseemly
haste. Pierre Leluche of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly grew
active...
This eagerness to play the arbiter for Nagorno-Karabakh proves
existence of certain geopolitical appetites and even certain
shallowness of the thinking processes. A great deal of states and
prominent state officials racked their brains, collective and
individual, afterwards trying to save face. Lack of knowledge on what
the conflict had been about in the first place and how it had evolved
let down the overly eager more than once. It happened so to the ICG
or Lord Atkinson, author of the report to the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe who chose to rely on "a single still shot"
of the situation in the region in 2005, when even a whole "movie"
(figuratively of course) wouldn't have sufficed as a basis for
serious debates.
New American Chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group Matthew Bryza joined
the club in the cowboy-ish manner typical of the Bush Administration.
Bryza visited Yerevan, Stepanakert, and Baku - and left the
impression of having been overly long-winded.
It stands to reason to expect three chairmen to base their future
actions on Bryza's trip to the region. Even another meeting between
Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers may be arranged.
The OSCE set out to have the conflict resolved peacefully. It ought
therefore to be more consequent and persistent. First and foremost,
it should demand a peaceful solution to the problem more firmly,
denouncing everything that collides with its efforts - including all
and any threats particularly when they are made by the heads of
states.
Undeniably nit-picking in the matter of human rights and electoral
procedures, OSCE structures are surprisingly tolerant when
confronting militarist and revenge-monger-ish statements from
officials and outright blase when it comes down to the continuing
arms race, actual skirmishes, and neglect of the existing accords by
the involved countries. The Middle East in the meantime is an example
of how even a restricted war results in mass and huge violations of
human rights.
A categorical denouncement of a new war alone will pave way to actual
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Source: Vremya Novostei, August 2, 2006, p. 5
Translated by A. Ignatkin
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
August 4, 2006 Friday
KARABAKH: IN THE IMPASSABLE JUNGLE OF RESOLUTION
by Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, the head of the Russian Mission for
Truce in Karabakh
RUSSIAN, AMERICAN, AND FRENCH CHAIRMEN OF THE OSCE MINSK GROUP WILL
DISCUSS THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT RESOLUTION; The OSCE Minsk
Group is meeting to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution.
Russian, American, and French chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group will
meet in Paris on August 2-3, to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
resolution. This is going to be the first conference of international
mediators after the June demarche, caused by fruitlessness of the
meetings between Presidents Robert Kocharjan of Armenia and Ilham
Aliyev of Azerbaijan this year.
Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group called a break this June, and urged
the heads of the involved states (Armenia and Azerbaijan) to display
political will for peace. Their demarche and some leaks to the media
on what suggestions had been made generated public debates. The
cul-de-sac situation is being grappled with at this point, but few
stimuli for mutual concessions appear. Official reaction in the
respective capitals proved quite traditional. President of the
unrecognized Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh Arkady Gukasjan was the
first the other day to promote in public the necessity of long
overdue reconciliation between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
Yerevan began play-acting, pretending that the suggestions made by
foreign intermediaries were acceptable as a basis for talks
continuation. The Armenians never hesitate to show their own
"constructive stand" whenever they are confident of Azerbaijan's
reaction - meaning that whatever is suggested will be turned down by
Baku. It gives the Armenians a slight advantage. In the meantime,
many Armenians complain that the other side is not dependable enough
when it comes down to honoring accords and grumble over what they
call exaggerated readiness of their own leaders (virtual readiness,
if the truth were to be told) to withdraw from the occupied districts
around Nagorno-Karabakh.
It is more difficult for the Azerbaijani leadership, which is
compelled to reassure its general public that nothing has been agreed
on actually and that the key idea of a referendum on the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh is to be reduced to the level of an ordinary opinion
poll. In the meantime, it was only recently that official Baku was
bragging that only two issues of eight or ten had to be settled yet.
This permanent lack of exactness (whether or not accords have been
made and if they are being honored) is typical of the adolescent
Azerbaijani diplomacy.
Official Baku is racking its brains to try to come up with new
demands now. Demilitarization of the conflict area, i.e. disarmament
of Nagorno-Karabakh, is insisted on. It becomes more and more clear
that Aliyev does not really want an agreement, that he is stalling
for time in the hope to build up military muscle despite his regular
threats to Yerevan to the effect that Azerbaijan's patience is
running out. Ducking the suggestions made by the international
community, official Baku itself procrastinates the sufferings of
Azerbaijani fugitives from Nagorno-Karabakh (it claims that they
number over a million!) and makes them hostages of the unsolved
problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. Every now and then Aliyev even hints at
the possibility of a military operation of vengeance - even though
the international community has made its stand on this particular
option clear. No new war will be tolerated.
This time-out taken by the intermediaries prompted some other players
to try their hand with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. The
notorious International Crisis Group or ICG went to great lengths to
show the panic it was in and all but proclaimed the need for a new
international intermediary. France alone would not do, as far as ICG
representatives are concerned. They want all of Europe dragged into
the matter. Peter Semneby of the EU visited the region in unseemly
haste. Pierre Leluche of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly grew
active...
This eagerness to play the arbiter for Nagorno-Karabakh proves
existence of certain geopolitical appetites and even certain
shallowness of the thinking processes. A great deal of states and
prominent state officials racked their brains, collective and
individual, afterwards trying to save face. Lack of knowledge on what
the conflict had been about in the first place and how it had evolved
let down the overly eager more than once. It happened so to the ICG
or Lord Atkinson, author of the report to the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe who chose to rely on "a single still shot"
of the situation in the region in 2005, when even a whole "movie"
(figuratively of course) wouldn't have sufficed as a basis for
serious debates.
New American Chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group Matthew Bryza joined
the club in the cowboy-ish manner typical of the Bush Administration.
Bryza visited Yerevan, Stepanakert, and Baku - and left the
impression of having been overly long-winded.
It stands to reason to expect three chairmen to base their future
actions on Bryza's trip to the region. Even another meeting between
Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers may be arranged.
The OSCE set out to have the conflict resolved peacefully. It ought
therefore to be more consequent and persistent. First and foremost,
it should demand a peaceful solution to the problem more firmly,
denouncing everything that collides with its efforts - including all
and any threats particularly when they are made by the heads of
states.
Undeniably nit-picking in the matter of human rights and electoral
procedures, OSCE structures are surprisingly tolerant when
confronting militarist and revenge-monger-ish statements from
officials and outright blase when it comes down to the continuing
arms race, actual skirmishes, and neglect of the existing accords by
the involved countries. The Middle East in the meantime is an example
of how even a restricted war results in mass and huge violations of
human rights.
A categorical denouncement of a new war alone will pave way to actual
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Source: Vremya Novostei, August 2, 2006, p. 5
Translated by A. Ignatkin