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ISRAEL AND AZERBAIJAN'S FURTIVE EMBRACE
PipeLineNews.org, CA
Aug 6, 2006
by Ilya Bourtman
August 7, 2006 - Washington, DC - PipeLineNews.org via Middle East
Forum - The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed
the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Within weeks,
six predominantly Muslim countries along the southern rim of the
Soviet Union gained independence. Israel, along with Turkey, Iran,
and various Arab states, rushed to establish embassies in capitals
ranging from Ashgabat to Tashkent. While Jerusalem maintains good
working relations with these newly independent states, few could have
foreseen how Israel's relationship with Azerbaijan would blossom. The
two countries formally established relations in April 1992, one year
after Azerbaijan declared its independence. The idea that a country
93 percent Muslim would cooperate closely with Israeli intelligence,
and even provide Israeli officials a defensive platform in such a
volatile region, was hardly considered. Yet, Jerusalem and Baku have
quietly become strategic partners-sharing intelligence, developing
trade relations, and together building regional alliances. Although the
Israel-Azerbaijan partnership has had important regional implications,
uncertainty remains how far Azerbaijani elites are willing to pursue
ties.
A Convergence of Interests
While the mutual relationship has not been a priority for either
Israel or Azerbaijan, both Jerusalem and Baku have expanded their
ties in response to the realization that policy coordination best
protects Caspian security and counters Iranian expansionism. Both
Israel and Azerbaijan face challenges to their legitimacy if not
their very existence. Both share a sense of trial by fire after
winning independence only after a territorial war with neighbors.
While Israel had to face down five invading Arab armies upon its
independence and remains in a technical state of war with Syria,
Lebanon, and Iraq, Azerbaijan remains embroiled in a decade-long
military conflict with Armenia over the mountainous enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani territory occupied by an Armenian army.
Indeed, unproven rumors persist in the Arabic-language press and
pro-Saudi journals suggesting Israeli arms exports to Azerbaijan may
have even preceded formal Azerbaijani independence.
Insecurity complexes born of war and siege cause both Jerusalem and
Baku to see the region through similar prisms. Both countries grapple
with identity problems: how can Azerbaijan be "the Azeri state"
when close to 20 million Azeris-almost twice its population-live
in neighboring Iran? Indeed, Iranian Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamene'i
is an ethnic Azeri. Israel, meanwhile, grapples both to define its
relationship to the Jewish diaspora and to its own sizable Arab
minority.
The Israeli government reached out to Azerbaijan for a number
of reasons. Israeli policymakers, like their Arab and Iranian
counterparts, viewed Azerbaijan and the Caspian littoral as part
of the "Greater Middle East." Expanding its influence into an area
of the world heavily Muslim but not Arab has long been a strategic
Israeli objective. After all, prior to the revolution in 1979,
Israel had sold weapons to the Iranian army and considered the shah
a friend. Similarly, since the early 1990s, Israel has reached out
to Turkey. New allies could also lead to new economic opportunities,
greater energy security, and, it was hoped, extra U.N. votes. Israel
aimed to exploit the region's energy resources by lobbying for the
development of gas and oil pipelines that would help its allies and
circumvent its foes. Finally, Israeli officials hoped that direct
ties would facilitate the immigration of Azerbaijan's 20,000-strong
Jewish community to Israel.
The Azerbaijani government, meanwhile, found itself cooperating with
Israel both out of respect for the Jewish state and because of lack
of an alternative. In 1991, Azerbaijan was economically fragile,
politically unstable, and militarily weak. Desperate for outside
assistance, Baku turned to Israel to provide leverage against a much
stronger Iran and a militarily superior Armenia. Israel promised
to improve Azerbaijan's weak economy by developing trade ties. It
purchased Azerbaijani oil and gas and sent medical, technological,
and agricultural experts. Most importantly for Azerbaijan, Israel's
foreign ministry vowed to lend its lobby's weight in Washington
to improve Azeri-American relations, providing a counterweight to
the influential Armenian lobby. According to Azerbaijan's first
president, Abulfas Elcibey, "Israel could help Azerbaijan in [the]
Karabakh problem by convincing the Americans to stop the Armenians."
Azerbaijani diplomats recognized the need to diversify their contacts
in Washington, especially after the U.S. Congress imposed sanctions on
Azerbaijan at the behest of the Armenian lobby following the war in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani military officials also believed that
Israeli firms could better equip the ragtag Azerbaijani army, which
needed new weapons following its defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh. On several
occasions, Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan's president between 1993 and 2003,
personally requested military assistance from Israeli prime ministers.
http://www.pipelinenews.org/index.cfm? page=bourtman8706.htm
PipeLineNews.org, CA
Aug 6, 2006
by Ilya Bourtman
August 7, 2006 - Washington, DC - PipeLineNews.org via Middle East
Forum - The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 changed
the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Within weeks,
six predominantly Muslim countries along the southern rim of the
Soviet Union gained independence. Israel, along with Turkey, Iran,
and various Arab states, rushed to establish embassies in capitals
ranging from Ashgabat to Tashkent. While Jerusalem maintains good
working relations with these newly independent states, few could have
foreseen how Israel's relationship with Azerbaijan would blossom. The
two countries formally established relations in April 1992, one year
after Azerbaijan declared its independence. The idea that a country
93 percent Muslim would cooperate closely with Israeli intelligence,
and even provide Israeli officials a defensive platform in such a
volatile region, was hardly considered. Yet, Jerusalem and Baku have
quietly become strategic partners-sharing intelligence, developing
trade relations, and together building regional alliances. Although the
Israel-Azerbaijan partnership has had important regional implications,
uncertainty remains how far Azerbaijani elites are willing to pursue
ties.
A Convergence of Interests
While the mutual relationship has not been a priority for either
Israel or Azerbaijan, both Jerusalem and Baku have expanded their
ties in response to the realization that policy coordination best
protects Caspian security and counters Iranian expansionism. Both
Israel and Azerbaijan face challenges to their legitimacy if not
their very existence. Both share a sense of trial by fire after
winning independence only after a territorial war with neighbors.
While Israel had to face down five invading Arab armies upon its
independence and remains in a technical state of war with Syria,
Lebanon, and Iraq, Azerbaijan remains embroiled in a decade-long
military conflict with Armenia over the mountainous enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijani territory occupied by an Armenian army.
Indeed, unproven rumors persist in the Arabic-language press and
pro-Saudi journals suggesting Israeli arms exports to Azerbaijan may
have even preceded formal Azerbaijani independence.
Insecurity complexes born of war and siege cause both Jerusalem and
Baku to see the region through similar prisms. Both countries grapple
with identity problems: how can Azerbaijan be "the Azeri state"
when close to 20 million Azeris-almost twice its population-live
in neighboring Iran? Indeed, Iranian Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamene'i
is an ethnic Azeri. Israel, meanwhile, grapples both to define its
relationship to the Jewish diaspora and to its own sizable Arab
minority.
The Israeli government reached out to Azerbaijan for a number
of reasons. Israeli policymakers, like their Arab and Iranian
counterparts, viewed Azerbaijan and the Caspian littoral as part
of the "Greater Middle East." Expanding its influence into an area
of the world heavily Muslim but not Arab has long been a strategic
Israeli objective. After all, prior to the revolution in 1979,
Israel had sold weapons to the Iranian army and considered the shah
a friend. Similarly, since the early 1990s, Israel has reached out
to Turkey. New allies could also lead to new economic opportunities,
greater energy security, and, it was hoped, extra U.N. votes. Israel
aimed to exploit the region's energy resources by lobbying for the
development of gas and oil pipelines that would help its allies and
circumvent its foes. Finally, Israeli officials hoped that direct
ties would facilitate the immigration of Azerbaijan's 20,000-strong
Jewish community to Israel.
The Azerbaijani government, meanwhile, found itself cooperating with
Israel both out of respect for the Jewish state and because of lack
of an alternative. In 1991, Azerbaijan was economically fragile,
politically unstable, and militarily weak. Desperate for outside
assistance, Baku turned to Israel to provide leverage against a much
stronger Iran and a militarily superior Armenia. Israel promised
to improve Azerbaijan's weak economy by developing trade ties. It
purchased Azerbaijani oil and gas and sent medical, technological,
and agricultural experts. Most importantly for Azerbaijan, Israel's
foreign ministry vowed to lend its lobby's weight in Washington
to improve Azeri-American relations, providing a counterweight to
the influential Armenian lobby. According to Azerbaijan's first
president, Abulfas Elcibey, "Israel could help Azerbaijan in [the]
Karabakh problem by convincing the Americans to stop the Armenians."
Azerbaijani diplomats recognized the need to diversify their contacts
in Washington, especially after the U.S. Congress imposed sanctions on
Azerbaijan at the behest of the Armenian lobby following the war in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani military officials also believed that
Israeli firms could better equip the ragtag Azerbaijani army, which
needed new weapons following its defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh. On several
occasions, Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan's president between 1993 and 2003,
personally requested military assistance from Israeli prime ministers.
http://www.pipelinenews.org/index.cfm? page=bourtman8706.htm