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OSCE BOMBSHELL REVEALS KARABAKH POSITION
Monday, 07 August 2006
By Karl Rahder in Baku for ISN Security Watch ISN, Switzerland
The OSCE Minsk Group's announcement on the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh
enclave is close to Armenia's position and spells bad news for
Azerbaijan
In the latest in a series of diplomatic bombshells to hit the South
Caucasus, Matthew Bryza, the new US co-chairman of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Minsk Group, announced last
week that he had bad news for Azerbaijan. In an interview remarkable
for its candor, Bryza told Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
on 26 July that as part of its overall framework for ending the
12-year stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Minsk Group was urging
a referendum for Karabakh's population to determine the enclave's
future status.
Why this seemingly reasonable proposal is so contentious lies
at the heart of the aftermath of the bloody 1992-1994 conflict
that dismembered Azerbaijan and gave the Armenian population of
Nagorno-Karabakh something very close to sovereignty.
Bryza's comments to RFE/RL came amid the tumult following the
Minsk Group's previous announcements on 22 June and 3 July that were
interpreted both here and in Yerevan as an expression of exasperation
by the co-chair states (Russia, the US and France) and as a signal
by some analysts that the Minsk Group would no longer take an active
role in the negotiations.
The two announcements represented the first time the Minsk Group -
the primary international body tasked with mediating the peace talks
between Azerbaijan and Armenia - had publicly outlined its approach
to a permanent peace. It was a major departure from the secretive
talks that have been held since the end of the war in 1994.
In its 3 July statement, the Minsk Group outlined the "core principles"
of what it considered to be a basis "for the two sides to draft
a far-reaching settlement agreement." The announcement laid heavy
emphasis on action from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian
President Robert Kocharian. It stressed that the Minsk Group believed
"it is now time for the two presidents to take the initiative for
achieving a breakthrough."
It also chided them for "lacking" the "political will" for a
settlement.
The key premise includes the "redeployment" of Armenian troops from
territories bordering Nagorno-Karabakh, "with special modalities" for
the two territories that the Armenian side has shown no willingness
to cede: Lachin and Kelbajar.
By "redeployment" it is generally understood that the OSCE means
"withdrawal." The Armenians were willing to give back five of the
seven districts surrounding Nagorno Karabakh, as long as they received
major concessions, as ISN Security Watch reported in February.
Other components include demilitarization of the territories, the
establishment of an international peacekeeping force, the return of
Azeri refugees who were forced out of Nagorno-Karabakh during the
war, and "a referendum [...] at a date and in a manner to be decided
through further negotiations" to determine Nagorno-Karabakh's final
legal status.
Defining a referendum
What was most remarkable about the 3 July statement was the word
choice in its reference to a future referendum. Any plebiscite should
"take place in a non-coercive environment," it said, in which citizens
would have "ample opportunity to consider their positions after a
vigorous debate in the public arena."
For the past year, the Azerbaijani government has been unambiguous
in its view that any referendum to decide Nagorno-Karabakh's final
status would involve a vote in which the entire country participated -
something mandated by Azerbaijan's constitution.
The outcome of such a nationwide vote is clear. It is inconceivable
that Azerbaijan's citizens would, in the wake of a painful and bloody
war that ended with their country's defeat, endorse the separation
of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Minsk Group's statement on 3 July seemed to indicate that a
referendum should take place not in Azerbaijan as a whole, but only in
Nagorno-Karabakh - a position clearly supported by the Armenian side.
In his interview with RFE/RL on 26 July, Bryza appeared to confirm that
the OSCE had largely accepted the Armenian approach to a referendum
when he said the ultimate status of the enclave should be determined
by the "people of Karabakh."
And despite the seemingly even-handed appeals to the two presidents in
the announcements, Bryza told RFE/RL after his 29 July trip to Yerevan
that Armenian President Kocharian had displayed a "constructive,
candid attitude."
Bryza added that Kocharian accepted the OSCE's outline of a possible
settlement, which may mean that the Minsk Group sees Azerbaijan as
the main impediment to a resolution.
In an interview with ISN Security Watch, Baku political analyst Leila
Aliyeva agreed that the Minsk Group had decided on a Karabakh-only
referendum, while speculating that the co-chair states were attempting
to pressure President Aliyev.
Aliyeva stressed that an up-or-down vote on independence that takes
place only in Karabakh was "a trap" for Azerbaijan, "as it would be
for any other state" in its circumstances.
Like a handful of other Azeri analysts, Aliyeva is not against a
referendum on principle. Such a vote might give citizens a range
of choices short of full sovereignty for Nagorno-Karabakh: "Even if
legally it was possible, the questions regarding different degrees
of autonomy within the Azerbaijani state would make more sense than
questions about secession."
For its part, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry does not accept the
interpretation that the OSCE has adopted the Armenian view. Spokesman
Tahir Taghi-Zadeh found the 3 July Minsk Group statement perplexing:
"The co-chairs are trying to stimulate the process while being as
vague as possible. A statement like this is designed to make both
sides see what they want to see."
Even the recent comments by Bryza leave room for more than one
interpretation, said Taghi-Zadeh: "The population of Karabakh has the
right to decide, which can only be utilized through participating
in a national referendum. Their participation, in fact, is a must,
if we want to make it a legitimate and lasting solution."
The Karabakh-only view, if true, has major implications for Azerbaijan,
which must now make some very difficult choices.
Preparing for peace or war?
Since the failed Rambouillet summit between the two presidents in
February, the two sides have, at least in public, displayed little
flexibility, with the war option being discussed with increasing
frequency in the Azerbaijani capital, Baku.
President Aliyev said in February that the talks were at a "dead
end," and more recently, that further negotiations in the current
framework were "hopeless" - a verdict that Minsk Group co-chairman
Bryza described as "not helpful."
The Minsk Group's appeal for the two presidents to "prepare their
publics for peace and not for war" is being given little emphasis in
Baku, where the options seem to be dwindling.
Azerbaijan's military is rated by many Western analysts as both weak
and in a state of structural torpor due to years of neglect by the late
president Heydar Aliyev. One of the few distinctive differences between
father and son is the money now being lavished on the military sector.
Military expenditures in Azerbaijan for 2006 were slated to rise to
some US$600 million, but President Aliyev said publicly on 31 July
that the actual figure would rise to US$700 million, an announcement
that came a day before the arrival of the OSCE's Bryza.
Even the lesser figure represented a doubling of the 2005 defense
budget. Aliyev says he wants Azerbaijan's military spending to
equal the total government budget for Armenia. (According to the CIA
World Factbook, Armenia's 2005 government expenditures were US$930.7
million.)
Having a large military - or at least a large defense expenditure
program - may serve not so much as a platform for a future war, but
rather as a bargaining chip. This strategy would be consistent with
Baku's approach thus far, promising a number of rewards for Yerevan
if Nagorno-Karabakh is returned to Azerbaijani control.
Analyst Leila Aliyeva believes that the burgeoning military
establishment will be used as an implied threat or a deterrent.
"Most of the politicians here think that not the actual war itself,
but rather the mere existence of a strong army, might be a deterring
factor."
When combined with the government's economic carrot-and-stick approach
to negotiations, the modernized military might begin to look like
a very real threat, although an Armenian Foreign Ministry source
told ISN Security Watch in February, "We defeated Azerbaijan in war
twice. Do they really want to try again?"
Some analysts fear that the Minsk Group has withdrawn from the peace
process. International Crisis Group analyst Sabine Freizer reportedly
told the website Armenia Now that the region was "entering a dire
stage" with the Minsk Group acknowledging "the pointlessness of
continuing their activities." The situation is bleak, according to
Freizer: "Now there is no peace process, even negotiations."
Despite such interpretations, Minsk Group co-chairman Bryza has just
completed his tour of the region, with stops in Yerevan, Baku and
Nagorno-Karabakh, activities that sound inconsistent with no longer
being involved as a mediator.
Taghi-Zadeh, however, said the Minsk Group had "no intention of
disbanding.
"I mean, first they make this announcement, and then say almost
immediately that Matthew Bryza is coming to Yerevan and Baku? That
doesn't look like they are quitting the process," he said in a
statement.
But the involvement of other actors is not being discouraged by
the Azerbaijani government, which now may welcome other mediators
with perhaps more sympathetic views - but Taghi-Zadeh denied that
Azerbaijan would seek to replace the Minsk Group.
He said that NATO and the EU had expressed interest in serving as
mediators, but said that was "due to the region's growing strategic
importance. We are not trying to replace the Minsk Group, but we'd
like to see efforts by others as well."
The US embassy in Baku declined a request by ISN Security Watch for
an interview with Bryza.
Karl Rahder has taught US foreign policy and international history
at colleges and universities in the US and Azerbaijan. In 2004, he
was a Visiting Faculty Fellow in Azerbaijan with the Civic Education
Project, an academic program funded by the Soros Foundations and the
US Department of State. He is currently based in Baku.
Monday, 07 August 2006
By Karl Rahder in Baku for ISN Security Watch ISN, Switzerland
The OSCE Minsk Group's announcement on the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh
enclave is close to Armenia's position and spells bad news for
Azerbaijan
In the latest in a series of diplomatic bombshells to hit the South
Caucasus, Matthew Bryza, the new US co-chairman of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Minsk Group, announced last
week that he had bad news for Azerbaijan. In an interview remarkable
for its candor, Bryza told Radio Free Europe - Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)
on 26 July that as part of its overall framework for ending the
12-year stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Minsk Group was urging
a referendum for Karabakh's population to determine the enclave's
future status.
Why this seemingly reasonable proposal is so contentious lies
at the heart of the aftermath of the bloody 1992-1994 conflict
that dismembered Azerbaijan and gave the Armenian population of
Nagorno-Karabakh something very close to sovereignty.
Bryza's comments to RFE/RL came amid the tumult following the
Minsk Group's previous announcements on 22 June and 3 July that were
interpreted both here and in Yerevan as an expression of exasperation
by the co-chair states (Russia, the US and France) and as a signal
by some analysts that the Minsk Group would no longer take an active
role in the negotiations.
The two announcements represented the first time the Minsk Group -
the primary international body tasked with mediating the peace talks
between Azerbaijan and Armenia - had publicly outlined its approach
to a permanent peace. It was a major departure from the secretive
talks that have been held since the end of the war in 1994.
In its 3 July statement, the Minsk Group outlined the "core principles"
of what it considered to be a basis "for the two sides to draft
a far-reaching settlement agreement." The announcement laid heavy
emphasis on action from Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian
President Robert Kocharian. It stressed that the Minsk Group believed
"it is now time for the two presidents to take the initiative for
achieving a breakthrough."
It also chided them for "lacking" the "political will" for a
settlement.
The key premise includes the "redeployment" of Armenian troops from
territories bordering Nagorno-Karabakh, "with special modalities" for
the two territories that the Armenian side has shown no willingness
to cede: Lachin and Kelbajar.
By "redeployment" it is generally understood that the OSCE means
"withdrawal." The Armenians were willing to give back five of the
seven districts surrounding Nagorno Karabakh, as long as they received
major concessions, as ISN Security Watch reported in February.
Other components include demilitarization of the territories, the
establishment of an international peacekeeping force, the return of
Azeri refugees who were forced out of Nagorno-Karabakh during the
war, and "a referendum [...] at a date and in a manner to be decided
through further negotiations" to determine Nagorno-Karabakh's final
legal status.
Defining a referendum
What was most remarkable about the 3 July statement was the word
choice in its reference to a future referendum. Any plebiscite should
"take place in a non-coercive environment," it said, in which citizens
would have "ample opportunity to consider their positions after a
vigorous debate in the public arena."
For the past year, the Azerbaijani government has been unambiguous
in its view that any referendum to decide Nagorno-Karabakh's final
status would involve a vote in which the entire country participated -
something mandated by Azerbaijan's constitution.
The outcome of such a nationwide vote is clear. It is inconceivable
that Azerbaijan's citizens would, in the wake of a painful and bloody
war that ended with their country's defeat, endorse the separation
of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Minsk Group's statement on 3 July seemed to indicate that a
referendum should take place not in Azerbaijan as a whole, but only in
Nagorno-Karabakh - a position clearly supported by the Armenian side.
In his interview with RFE/RL on 26 July, Bryza appeared to confirm that
the OSCE had largely accepted the Armenian approach to a referendum
when he said the ultimate status of the enclave should be determined
by the "people of Karabakh."
And despite the seemingly even-handed appeals to the two presidents in
the announcements, Bryza told RFE/RL after his 29 July trip to Yerevan
that Armenian President Kocharian had displayed a "constructive,
candid attitude."
Bryza added that Kocharian accepted the OSCE's outline of a possible
settlement, which may mean that the Minsk Group sees Azerbaijan as
the main impediment to a resolution.
In an interview with ISN Security Watch, Baku political analyst Leila
Aliyeva agreed that the Minsk Group had decided on a Karabakh-only
referendum, while speculating that the co-chair states were attempting
to pressure President Aliyev.
Aliyeva stressed that an up-or-down vote on independence that takes
place only in Karabakh was "a trap" for Azerbaijan, "as it would be
for any other state" in its circumstances.
Like a handful of other Azeri analysts, Aliyeva is not against a
referendum on principle. Such a vote might give citizens a range
of choices short of full sovereignty for Nagorno-Karabakh: "Even if
legally it was possible, the questions regarding different degrees
of autonomy within the Azerbaijani state would make more sense than
questions about secession."
For its part, the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry does not accept the
interpretation that the OSCE has adopted the Armenian view. Spokesman
Tahir Taghi-Zadeh found the 3 July Minsk Group statement perplexing:
"The co-chairs are trying to stimulate the process while being as
vague as possible. A statement like this is designed to make both
sides see what they want to see."
Even the recent comments by Bryza leave room for more than one
interpretation, said Taghi-Zadeh: "The population of Karabakh has the
right to decide, which can only be utilized through participating
in a national referendum. Their participation, in fact, is a must,
if we want to make it a legitimate and lasting solution."
The Karabakh-only view, if true, has major implications for Azerbaijan,
which must now make some very difficult choices.
Preparing for peace or war?
Since the failed Rambouillet summit between the two presidents in
February, the two sides have, at least in public, displayed little
flexibility, with the war option being discussed with increasing
frequency in the Azerbaijani capital, Baku.
President Aliyev said in February that the talks were at a "dead
end," and more recently, that further negotiations in the current
framework were "hopeless" - a verdict that Minsk Group co-chairman
Bryza described as "not helpful."
The Minsk Group's appeal for the two presidents to "prepare their
publics for peace and not for war" is being given little emphasis in
Baku, where the options seem to be dwindling.
Azerbaijan's military is rated by many Western analysts as both weak
and in a state of structural torpor due to years of neglect by the late
president Heydar Aliyev. One of the few distinctive differences between
father and son is the money now being lavished on the military sector.
Military expenditures in Azerbaijan for 2006 were slated to rise to
some US$600 million, but President Aliyev said publicly on 31 July
that the actual figure would rise to US$700 million, an announcement
that came a day before the arrival of the OSCE's Bryza.
Even the lesser figure represented a doubling of the 2005 defense
budget. Aliyev says he wants Azerbaijan's military spending to
equal the total government budget for Armenia. (According to the CIA
World Factbook, Armenia's 2005 government expenditures were US$930.7
million.)
Having a large military - or at least a large defense expenditure
program - may serve not so much as a platform for a future war, but
rather as a bargaining chip. This strategy would be consistent with
Baku's approach thus far, promising a number of rewards for Yerevan
if Nagorno-Karabakh is returned to Azerbaijani control.
Analyst Leila Aliyeva believes that the burgeoning military
establishment will be used as an implied threat or a deterrent.
"Most of the politicians here think that not the actual war itself,
but rather the mere existence of a strong army, might be a deterring
factor."
When combined with the government's economic carrot-and-stick approach
to negotiations, the modernized military might begin to look like
a very real threat, although an Armenian Foreign Ministry source
told ISN Security Watch in February, "We defeated Azerbaijan in war
twice. Do they really want to try again?"
Some analysts fear that the Minsk Group has withdrawn from the peace
process. International Crisis Group analyst Sabine Freizer reportedly
told the website Armenia Now that the region was "entering a dire
stage" with the Minsk Group acknowledging "the pointlessness of
continuing their activities." The situation is bleak, according to
Freizer: "Now there is no peace process, even negotiations."
Despite such interpretations, Minsk Group co-chairman Bryza has just
completed his tour of the region, with stops in Yerevan, Baku and
Nagorno-Karabakh, activities that sound inconsistent with no longer
being involved as a mediator.
Taghi-Zadeh, however, said the Minsk Group had "no intention of
disbanding.
"I mean, first they make this announcement, and then say almost
immediately that Matthew Bryza is coming to Yerevan and Baku? That
doesn't look like they are quitting the process," he said in a
statement.
But the involvement of other actors is not being discouraged by
the Azerbaijani government, which now may welcome other mediators
with perhaps more sympathetic views - but Taghi-Zadeh denied that
Azerbaijan would seek to replace the Minsk Group.
He said that NATO and the EU had expressed interest in serving as
mediators, but said that was "due to the region's growing strategic
importance. We are not trying to replace the Minsk Group, but we'd
like to see efforts by others as well."
The US embassy in Baku declined a request by ISN Security Watch for
an interview with Bryza.
Karl Rahder has taught US foreign policy and international history
at colleges and universities in the US and Azerbaijan. In 2004, he
was a Visiting Faculty Fellow in Azerbaijan with the Civic Education
Project, an academic program funded by the Soros Foundations and the
US Department of State. He is currently based in Baku.