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Vladimir Putin Is Tightening The Circle Of His Friends

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  • Vladimir Putin Is Tightening The Circle Of His Friends

    VLADIMIR PUTIN IS TIGHTENING THE CIRCLE OF HIS FRIENDS
    by Vladimir Soloviov, Mikhail Zygar
    Translated by A. Ignatkin

    Source: Kommersant, August 15, 2006, pp. 1, 5
    Agency WPS
    What the Papers Say Part B (Russia)
    August 15, 2006 Tuesday

    The Launch;

    A regional alternative to the World Trade Organization; An informal
    summit of the Euro-Asian Economic Community opens in Sochi today. The
    presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
    Belarus have confirmed their attendance. Armenian leader Robert
    Kocharjan and new Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych have
    been invited.

    An informal summit of the Euro-Asian Economic Community opens in
    Sochi today. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
    Tajikistan, and Belarus have confirmed their attendance. Armenian
    leader Robert Kocharjan and new Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor
    Yanukovych have also been invited to Sochi.

    The Kremlin attaches considerable importance to the forthcoming
    meeting. The Russian authorities want it to demonstrate that they are
    not concerned about the failure of World Trade Organization (WTO)
    membership talks. When negotiations with the United States broke
    down on the eve of the G8 summit in St. Petersburg, Moscow decided
    to organize an "alternative WTO" - based on the Euro-Asian Economic
    Community (EAEC).

    In fact, Russia began demonstrating exactly how it perceives the
    future economic integration within the framework of the EAEC even
    when preparations for the summit were under way. Mounting mutual
    dependance of the neighbor states (with both states' consent, that
    is) for starters. Mounting pressure applied to the neighbors still
    resisting as phase two. Expansion into the countries that have so
    far escaped being in the focus of Moscow's attention afterwards.

    Traditionally for the Kremlin, energy sphere will become the number
    one tool and lever. That is why establishment of the EAEC common
    energy market is going to become the central issue of the informal
    summit that will end on August 17.

    Kazakh media outlets report on the eve of the Sochi summit that a
    colossal project of water supply for Central Asia - Moscow's latest
    initiative - will become the most important issue on the agenda.

    Water has always been a strategic resource in and for Central Asia.

    Almost 80% of the water resources of the region are concentrated in
    Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan while the major consumers are Uzbekistan
    and Kazakhstan. Tension usually mounted in summertime when water was
    in a higher than usual demand but Kyrgyzstan began storing it up in
    reservoirs for electric power production in winter. Kazakhstan and
    Uzbekistan inevitably brought economic leverages into play to bow
    Kyrgyzstan, dependent on exported energy as it is, to their will.

    The Kremlin is trying to turn the tables now and make use of the
    opportunities this situation is presenting. The idea of an Eurasian
    water-energy consortium was first conceived of in Moscow in early
    summer. Sources in Moscow and Astana imply that the project may be
    financed by the Eurasian Bank Russia and Kazakhstan established not
    long ago... Inter RAO EES, a subsidiary of the RAO Unified Energy
    Systems, is already building the Sangtuda 1 hydroelectric power plant
    and Russian Aluminum the Rogun hydroelectric power plant in Tajikistan.

    Realization of the water-energy consortium initiative will put in the
    Kremlin's hands a major geopolitical tool that will certainly boost
    its positions in Asia. On the other hand, it will pave way to energy
    expansion into the Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese markets.

    Eager to do its neighbors great favors, Russia has never yet failed
    to encounter one and the same old problem. A great deal of CIS
    countries are in the focus of Washington's interests and attention,
    and Vladimir Putin will have to have "friendly chats" with the CIS
    leaders who seem to be on too intimate terms with the United States.

    Russia has several "problematic" countries to deal with in this
    respect and Kyrgyzstan is one of them. Encouraged by Moscow, Kyrgyzstan
    asked the United States to revise the terms of the presence of Khansi
    airbase in Bishkek airport Manas in 2005. In short, Bishkek wanted
    $207 million in rent per year. According to our sources, the Kremlin
    feared at first that Washington would accept the new terms but the
    latter turned the demand down. Moscow expected that it would result in
    curtailment of American military presence in Central Asia but Bishkek
    let it down. All of a sudden, it abandoned its new demands and let
    the Americans stay for a much lower price that it had demanded at
    first. The Kyrgyz-American talks ended on July 14. Under the terms
    of the new agreement, Washington is expected to pay $150 million per
    year for the airbase. Putin will certainly expect an explanation from
    President Kurmanbek Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan now.

    One other subject will be raised in Sochi. Russia will do its best
    to persuade Kyrgyzstan not to join the HIPC (Heavy Indebted Poor
    Countries) program under the aegis of the World Bank and International
    Monetary Fund. Kyrgyzstan will be told that membership of the program
    will cost it tis sovereignty and place it at the beck and call of
    the United States. Moscow will offer Kyrgyzstan dependence on Russia
    instead.

    Yanukovych as a special guest at the informal summit is the Kremlin's
    other potential headache. According to what information is available at
    this point, Putin invited the new Ukrainian prime minister to Moscow
    because of the alarming rumors from Kiev that Yanukovych's contacts
    with American negotiators become more and more frequent and that the
    sides have all but reached mutual understanding already.

    Neither do Yanukovych's latest statements permit the Kremlin to
    relax. The Ukrainian prime minister is resolved to demand a lower
    gas price from Russia: $95 per 1,000 cubic meters. This is not
    an initiative guaranteed to find Putin or Gazprom particularly
    sympathetic. Last but not least, Moscow cannot help noticing that
    Yanukovych, the erstwhile "pro-Russian candidate," isn't even thinking
    of keeping his central pro-Russian campaign promises. (On a working
    visit to the Crimea on August 11, Yanukovych announced that making
    Russian the second state language is not possible for the time being.)

    There are some guests expected in Sochi whose pro-Russian stance
    is not something Putin doubts, but even that doesn't make Russia's
    relations with their respective countries exactly cloudless.

    The Russian-Belarusian talks promise to be particularly difficult.

    Moscow is resolved to make no more advances to Minsk. Establishment of
    a union state is one of the worst problems in the Russian-Belarusian
    bilateral relations. Russia wants a common currency introduced in
    both countries as soon as possible but Belarus never misses a chance
    to delay and impede the process. Alexander Lukashenko demands from
    Russia a recompense for the budget losses the forthcoming unification
    of the two countries will entail. Belarusian economists maintain that
    processes of integration has cost Belarus almost $2 billion in the
    last twelve months. Russia, however, has an ace up its sleeve. The
    Kremlin is enraged - and doesn't bother concealing it - that Belarus
    is exporting Russian gas and oil products to the third countries
    without compunction. According to official estimates alone, Belarusian
    petroleum product exports increased by almost 60% in January-May 2006,
    to $3.2 billion. More than ample compensation for what losses Belarus
    claims it is suffering.

    There is one other factor that doesn't make Russian-Belarusian
    bilateral relations any more easier. When Lukashenko was re-elected
    this spring, Gazprom announced that the price of Russian gas sold
    to Belarus should be raised to match the European average. Moscow
    is even prepared to discuss the matter, as long as Beltransgaz turns
    over some elements of the gas transportation framework to Gazprom.

    But official Minsk wouldn't hear of it, so the gas price could soar
    from $46 to $180-200 per thousand cubic meters. This would be a
    near-fatal blow to the struggling Belarusian economy.

    Lukashenko has made some frantic attempts to establish a dialogue
    with Iran and Venezuela and even evinced vivid interest in the project
    of the pipeline from Iran to Pakistan to India. And yet, it is clear
    that all these contacts are merely a show, an attempt to make Moscow
    more amenable.

    Rapprochement with Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, another "faithful
    friend" of Russia, is not following the script Russia has chartered.

    Tashkent found himself in international isolation after the massacre
    in Andijan. Russia moved in, supported Karimov wholeheartedly, and
    even signed a treaty of the relations of allies with him. Expecting
    Uzbekistan to sell Russia its major assets in return. Well,
    considerably glitches have developed in the process. Establishment
    of an uranium-mining joint venture to develop the Aktau deposit came
    to grinding halt because of the Uzbek redtape on the government level.

    The future of the American-Uzbek Zarafshan-Newmont is another
    unknown. US-based Newmont Mining withdrew from the project when the
    Uzbek authorities slapped back tax claims on it ($11 million for 2005
    and $37 million for 2002-04). Moscow hoped that Interros would take
    the Americans' place, but no progress at all has been made yet...

    In fact, Moscow has a strong argument to be used in the disputes with
    Uzbekistan. The matter concerns the group of Uzbeks currently in the
    detention cell in the Russian city of Ivanovo. Suspecting them of
    organization of the revolt in Andijan, Tashkent has been clamoring
    for their extradition for a year now. Russia is prepared to turn the
    Uzbeks over to Tashkent but only in return for serious condescensions
    on the part of Uzbekistan. After all, the Russian authorities have
    already granted the men in question the status of political refugees,
    and their extradition to Uzbekistan will almost certainly make trouble
    for Moscow's image in the West (not to mention political problems it
    will generate).

    On the other hand, damage to its image in the eyes of the international
    community is not what worries Moscow that much nowadays. Mad at the
    West, the Kremlin is out to nail together a team of its own. Should
    it set the West seething, Moscow will be only pleased.
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