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WILL THE BOMBING OF LEBANON BURY THE AZERI-ISRAELI LOVEFEST?
By Harut Sassounian Publisher, The California Courier
ArmRadio.am
15.08.2006 15:23
As a follow up to my last month's column on Azerbaijan's efforts
to exploit Israel's clout in Washington, D.C., I would like to
present further revelations on this topic by Ilya Bourtman, a former
researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in Ramat
Gan, Israel. His article, titled, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive
Embrace," is published in the Summer 2006 edition of the Middle
East Quarterly.
Stating that "few could have foreseen how Israel's relationship with
Azerbaijan would blossom," Bourtman expresses his amazement that
"a country 93 percent Muslim would cooperate closely with Israeli
intelligence, and even provide Israeli officials a defensive platform
in such a volatile region's Israel and Azerbaijan have quietly become
strategic partners sharing intelligence, developing trade relations,
and together building regional alliances [with Turkey]." The writer
strains credulity by drawing parallels between the Arab-Israeli
conflict and that of Azerbaijan with Armenia.
This is how Bourtman explains why Azerbaijan needed the Jewish lobby's
help in Washington: "In 1991, Azerbaijan was economically fragile,
politically unstable, and militarily weak. Desperate for outside
assistance, Baku turned to Israel to provide leverage against a much
stronger Iran and a militarily superior Armenia. Israel promised
to improve Azerbaijan's weak economy by developing trade ties. It
purchased Azerbaijani oil and gas and sent medical, technological,
and agricultural experts. Most importantly for Azerbaijan, Israel's
foreign ministry vowed to lend its lobby's weight in Washington to
improve Azeri-American relations, providing a counterweight to the
influential Armenian lobby.
According to Azerbaijan's first president, Abulfas Elchibey, "Israel
could help Azerbaijan in [the] Karabakh problem by convincing the
Americans to stop the Armenians. Azerbaijani diplomats recognized
the need to diversify their contacts in Washington, especially after
the U.S. Congress imposed sanctions on Azerbaijan at the behest of
the Armenian lobby following the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani
military officials also believed that Israeli firms could better equip
the ragtag Azerbaijani army, which needed new weapons following its
defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh.
On several occasions, Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan's president between
1993 and 2003, personally requested military assistance from Israeli
prime ministers."
In describing the benefits of the Israeli lobby to Azerbaijan,
Bourtman writes: "in the mid 1990's, struggling to piece together
the weak and dysfunctional Azerbaijani state, President Aliyev moved
towards Jerusalem, thereby winning the allegiance of the pro-Israel
lobby in Washington." He then quotes Hassan Hassanov, Azerbaijan's
foreign minister, who stated in 1997: "We don't conceal that we rely
on the Israeli lobby in the U.S." Bourtman explains: "This paid
dividends when, in 2002, President Bush waived Section 907 of the
Freedom Support Act. In a rare and understated public admission, an
official at the Azerbaijani embassy in Washington acknowledged that,
"Jewish organizations made a certain contribution in the Section 907
waiving process."
Beyond lobbying assistance, Bourtman reveals the extent of Azerbaijan's
reliance on Israeli weaponry: "Following its loss in Nagorno-Karabakh,
Baku reached out to Israel for help in rebuilding its military. Israeli
defense firms obliged, selling Azerbaijan advanced aviation, antitank,
artillery, and anti-infantry weapon systems. The arms trade has
continued. In 2004, the Azerbaijani and Israeli press both reported
that an undisclosed Israeli weapons system was being sent to Turkey
where it would be assembled and then delivered to Azerbaijan. While
Israeli, Turkish, and Azerbaijani officials denied the report, Israeli
policy prohibits confirmation of such deals, an Azerbaijani military
official defended the purchase, saying "our country's interest in
Israeli weapons is natural as this country possesses up-to-date types
of weapons, military hardware, and special equipment.
Weapons sales and shared-threat perception have smoothed intelligence
and security cooperation. Israeli firms built and guard the fence
around Baku's international airport, monitor and help protect
Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure, and even provide security for
Azerbaijan's president on his foreign visits. Israeli intelligence
operatives help collect human intelligence about extremist Islamist
organizations in the region and monitor the troop deployments of
Azerbaijan's neighbors especially Iran. In a Washington Institute
for Near East Policy analysis, analysts Soner Cagaptay and Alexander
Murinson alluded to reports that Israeli intelligence maintains
listening posts along the Azerbaijani border with Iran."
Bourtman further observes that Turkey "has benefited the most from
the development of Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation." In August 1997,
when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Baku, he and
Pres. Heydar Aliyev "discussed various issues ranging from new oil
deals, to Iran's nuclear ambitions, to trilateral cooperation between
Israel, Turkey, and Azerbaijan," Bourtman writes.
Despite rosy reports by Azeri officials and American-Jewish
organizations about the freedoms enjoyed by Jews in Azerbaijan,
Bourtman refers to an article in the Feb. 15, 2006 issue of Haa'retz
newspaper which ominously reported that Israeli officials "worry
about the recent spike in violence by radical Islamists against Jewish
communities in Azerbaijan."
The month-long massive Israeli bombings of Lebanon could make
Azerbaijan's leaders more cautious in their courtship of Israel and
strain the ties between the two countries. As a sign of increasing
tensions, already there have been several public demonstrations against
these bombings in recent days in front of the Israeli Embassy in Baku
which the authorities brutally dispersed.
Even before this latest negative turn of events, Bourtman reported
that Azerbaijan had decided "to curtail expansion of cooperation with
Israel," not wanting to be seen by fellow Muslims as being too close
to the Tel Aviv government. Interestingly, he writes that Azerbaijani
authorities also feel that "they have exhausted the use of pro-Israel
groups in Washington."
It looks like the Azeris used the Israeli lobby when it served their
interests, and now that close association with Israel has become a
liability, they have decided to ditch the Jewish lobby unceremoniously!
By Harut Sassounian Publisher, The California Courier
ArmRadio.am
15.08.2006 15:23
As a follow up to my last month's column on Azerbaijan's efforts
to exploit Israel's clout in Washington, D.C., I would like to
present further revelations on this topic by Ilya Bourtman, a former
researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies in Ramat
Gan, Israel. His article, titled, "Israel and Azerbaijan's Furtive
Embrace," is published in the Summer 2006 edition of the Middle
East Quarterly.
Stating that "few could have foreseen how Israel's relationship with
Azerbaijan would blossom," Bourtman expresses his amazement that
"a country 93 percent Muslim would cooperate closely with Israeli
intelligence, and even provide Israeli officials a defensive platform
in such a volatile region's Israel and Azerbaijan have quietly become
strategic partners sharing intelligence, developing trade relations,
and together building regional alliances [with Turkey]." The writer
strains credulity by drawing parallels between the Arab-Israeli
conflict and that of Azerbaijan with Armenia.
This is how Bourtman explains why Azerbaijan needed the Jewish lobby's
help in Washington: "In 1991, Azerbaijan was economically fragile,
politically unstable, and militarily weak. Desperate for outside
assistance, Baku turned to Israel to provide leverage against a much
stronger Iran and a militarily superior Armenia. Israel promised
to improve Azerbaijan's weak economy by developing trade ties. It
purchased Azerbaijani oil and gas and sent medical, technological,
and agricultural experts. Most importantly for Azerbaijan, Israel's
foreign ministry vowed to lend its lobby's weight in Washington to
improve Azeri-American relations, providing a counterweight to the
influential Armenian lobby.
According to Azerbaijan's first president, Abulfas Elchibey, "Israel
could help Azerbaijan in [the] Karabakh problem by convincing the
Americans to stop the Armenians. Azerbaijani diplomats recognized
the need to diversify their contacts in Washington, especially after
the U.S. Congress imposed sanctions on Azerbaijan at the behest of
the Armenian lobby following the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani
military officials also believed that Israeli firms could better equip
the ragtag Azerbaijani army, which needed new weapons following its
defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh.
On several occasions, Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan's president between
1993 and 2003, personally requested military assistance from Israeli
prime ministers."
In describing the benefits of the Israeli lobby to Azerbaijan,
Bourtman writes: "in the mid 1990's, struggling to piece together
the weak and dysfunctional Azerbaijani state, President Aliyev moved
towards Jerusalem, thereby winning the allegiance of the pro-Israel
lobby in Washington." He then quotes Hassan Hassanov, Azerbaijan's
foreign minister, who stated in 1997: "We don't conceal that we rely
on the Israeli lobby in the U.S." Bourtman explains: "This paid
dividends when, in 2002, President Bush waived Section 907 of the
Freedom Support Act. In a rare and understated public admission, an
official at the Azerbaijani embassy in Washington acknowledged that,
"Jewish organizations made a certain contribution in the Section 907
waiving process."
Beyond lobbying assistance, Bourtman reveals the extent of Azerbaijan's
reliance on Israeli weaponry: "Following its loss in Nagorno-Karabakh,
Baku reached out to Israel for help in rebuilding its military. Israeli
defense firms obliged, selling Azerbaijan advanced aviation, antitank,
artillery, and anti-infantry weapon systems. The arms trade has
continued. In 2004, the Azerbaijani and Israeli press both reported
that an undisclosed Israeli weapons system was being sent to Turkey
where it would be assembled and then delivered to Azerbaijan. While
Israeli, Turkish, and Azerbaijani officials denied the report, Israeli
policy prohibits confirmation of such deals, an Azerbaijani military
official defended the purchase, saying "our country's interest in
Israeli weapons is natural as this country possesses up-to-date types
of weapons, military hardware, and special equipment.
Weapons sales and shared-threat perception have smoothed intelligence
and security cooperation. Israeli firms built and guard the fence
around Baku's international airport, monitor and help protect
Azerbaijan's energy infrastructure, and even provide security for
Azerbaijan's president on his foreign visits. Israeli intelligence
operatives help collect human intelligence about extremist Islamist
organizations in the region and monitor the troop deployments of
Azerbaijan's neighbors especially Iran. In a Washington Institute
for Near East Policy analysis, analysts Soner Cagaptay and Alexander
Murinson alluded to reports that Israeli intelligence maintains
listening posts along the Azerbaijani border with Iran."
Bourtman further observes that Turkey "has benefited the most from
the development of Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation." In August 1997,
when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Baku, he and
Pres. Heydar Aliyev "discussed various issues ranging from new oil
deals, to Iran's nuclear ambitions, to trilateral cooperation between
Israel, Turkey, and Azerbaijan," Bourtman writes.
Despite rosy reports by Azeri officials and American-Jewish
organizations about the freedoms enjoyed by Jews in Azerbaijan,
Bourtman refers to an article in the Feb. 15, 2006 issue of Haa'retz
newspaper which ominously reported that Israeli officials "worry
about the recent spike in violence by radical Islamists against Jewish
communities in Azerbaijan."
The month-long massive Israeli bombings of Lebanon could make
Azerbaijan's leaders more cautious in their courtship of Israel and
strain the ties between the two countries. As a sign of increasing
tensions, already there have been several public demonstrations against
these bombings in recent days in front of the Israeli Embassy in Baku
which the authorities brutally dispersed.
Even before this latest negative turn of events, Bourtman reported
that Azerbaijan had decided "to curtail expansion of cooperation with
Israel," not wanting to be seen by fellow Muslims as being too close
to the Tel Aviv government. Interestingly, he writes that Azerbaijani
authorities also feel that "they have exhausted the use of pro-Israel
groups in Washington."
It looks like the Azeris used the Israeli lobby when it served their
interests, and now that close association with Israel has become a
liability, they have decided to ditch the Jewish lobby unceremoniously!