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EURASEC - UKRAINE'S CHESTNUTS, ARMENIA'S FEARS AND KYRGYZSTAN'S LESSONS: INTERVIEW WITH KONSTANTIN ZATULIN
Regnum, Russia
Aug. 17, 2006
Konstantin Zatulin is Member of the Russian State Duma, Head of the
CIS Institute
REGNUM: Mr. Zatulin, the EurAsEC summit in Sochi is over. Experts
say that its key topic is energy. What agreements could have been
reached at the summit, particularly, to overcome the Ukrainian-Russian
"gas conflict"?
The Sochi forum is certainly a very important event, and one of its
most important points - to me - is that Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovich is taking part in it. It is hardly a coincidence that the
head of the new Ukrainian government has first come to Russia exactly
now that it is hosting a EurAsEC summit.
Here we can see a hint from both sides that the former plans to
involve Ukraine in the Common Economic Space (CES) are coming back.
It was exactly because of Ukraine's setback from real integration
that the SEC project was stalled. Now, after some pause - the orange
policy in Ukraine and the comeback of Viktor Yanukovich - integration
projects are coming back into the spotlight. And this moment should
not be missed even despite the seemingly domineering energy agenda.
Of course, energy security is a very painful problem for Ukraine, and
in Sochi Yanukovich will have to raise the problem of energy supplies
to make it clear - first of all, to his opponents - why exactly he
is there. This is especially important as those very opponents have
left him not a very good legacy: I mean not so much the contracts
made as the very simple fact that there is very little gas in Ukraine
and the winter is not very far. No gas has been stored so far, while
Naftogaz is almost bankrupt. That's what Yanukovich has to deal with,
and even his most active supporters - somewhere deep in their hearts -
rely, first of all, on his ability to agree with Russia.
At the same time, I would like to note that today the key vexing
factor for Ukraine in its aggravating gas problems is not Russia but
Turkmenistan. Ashgabat's plans to raise the disbursing price of its
gas from $60 to $100 may cause quite a dramatic change in the structure
of the Turkmen-Russian gas cocktail Ukraine is receiving today.
REGNUM: Is there any possibility that the policy of the new Ukrainian
government or the interference of Russia in the Ukrainian-Turkmen
talks may reduce the gas tariff for Ukraine?
I don't see any possibility of Russia's reducing the tariff. It would
be a naïve and irresponsible step on Russia's part - a step that would
be contrary to the general tendencies in the world. On the other
hand, they may well review the terms of gas supplies. For example,
they may credit Ukraine or reconsider some accompanying problems,
like the ownership of Ukraine's gas networks or the possibility of
Russia, Ukraine and Germany forming a consortium. I don't see why
the sides cannot discuss these problems again, though it seems it
was the Ukrainian politicians who preferred to drive their own selves
into a deadlock.
As regards the talks with Turkmenistan, Russia has certain ways to
interest the Turkmen side, though it will be hard for the Russians to
explain why they can raise the tariffs while the Turkmens can't. The
Russians should, first of all, understand why, in the first place,
they are pulling others' chestnuts out of the fire. First of all, they
should understand the logic and the dynamics of the home politics in
Ukraine. Yanukovich himself has given cause for that by saying that,
for example, the status of the Russian language is a pragmatic problem
because of the lack of Constitutional majority. In Sochi he made a
symptomatic statement that, as soon as they form such a majority,
the Party of Regions will redeem its electoral promises.
So, what the Universal says is not a dogma for Yanukovich and
even though in considering the status of the Russian language the
Universal refers mostly to the Constitution, it also refers to the
European Charter.
I would like to especially note that, besides the problems of energy
and integration, Russia and Ukraine have many more problems to
discuss. They in Russia realize that the Yanukovich government is a
government of compromise who is capable of showing positive dynamics
in relations. This is one more coin to Yanukovich's "money-box,"
which will allow him to further strengthen his positions in Ukraine,
especially as there are different people in the new Ukrainian
government. It's no coincidence that Yanukovich has come to Sochi
without Foreign Minister Tarasyuk, who is well known for his
anti-Russian views.
REGNUM: How real is the prospect of Armenia's joining EurAsEC and
Moldova's getting closer to it?
I am not sure that Moldova will show a constructive position. There are
serious grounds for not trusting the words of Moldavian politicians.
For Armenia EurAsEC membership is certainly of strategic importance.
No coincidence that Armenian President Robert Kocharyan is now in
Sochi as an observer. Of course, Armenia should make this decision
itself, based on its own economic priorities and goals. However,
we should also keep in mind that Armenia is full member to the CSTO.
Another significant factor influencing Armenia's plans is the Karabakh
problem, which will hardly be solved in the near future.
On the other hand, Armenia's integration plans are strongly
restrained by the position and behavior of Georgia, who prevents
normal communication between the South and the North. Yerevan is
greatly suffering from Georgia's destructive policy of blockading the
Armenia-Russia railroad in Abkhazia and from its revengeful plans
with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia - something Armenia has
nothing to do with. It seems that the moment of truth is ripening
not only in Russian-Georgian but also in Armenian-Georgian relations.
Until now Armenia has been demonstratively neutral. They have tried to
avoid any tensions with Georgia, they have been consciously damping
down the problem of Javakheti and have even refused to support the
protest actions of Armenians in that Georgian region.
I think that they in Armenia should also realize that Georgia's
adventurism will certainly cause complications - and Armenia will
be the first to suffer from them - as this all is leading to drastic
changes in the force distribution in the region, which is certainly bad
for Yerevan. I can understand the fears of the Armenian authorities,
but they should realize that this problem is caused by Georgia and
does not depend on Armenia. The slapdash policy of the Georgian
leaders is a big threat to all the region's countries. In fact,
the Georgian authorities are implicating their own country into a
new civil war that may spur up new conflicts all over the regions.
As regards Armenia, it continues being dependent not so much on its
neutral relations with Georgia as on the presence of Russia and its
position in the region.
REGNUM: Some Russian experts say that Moscow will use the Sochi summit
for warning the EurAsEC member-states against getting much too close
with the US and note that this, first of all, refers to Kyrgyzstan...
They probably mean that under Akayev Kyrgyzstan was the first CIS
country to join WTO. Let's admit that this membership has given no
special happiness to the Kyrgyz people. The country has turned into
a kind of Klondike and has gone through most severe crisis. Its very
integrity is under question and is being preserved just artificially
for fear of a possible chain reaction in the region. The US' support,
particularly, its military base in Manas, has not insured the country
against such developments.
Balancing between the interests of Russia and the US in hope for
results gives no results, as a rule. Kyrgyzstan should better refrain
from hypocrisy and show more clarity in its attitudes. Left to the
mercy of the fate, many in Central Asia hoped that the role of the
US' closest friend will help them to strengthen their positions, but
later they understood that to be friend with the US means to give it
part of one's own sovereignty. The most vivid example is Karimov. The
Americans proved this with the "knack" of elephant in china-shop, which
resulted in a civil war in Kyrgyzstan and Andijan events in Uzbekistan.
At the same time, I think that today Russia has no claims against
Kyrgyzstan. The sides are cooperating on a whole range of issues,
and Kyrgyzstan is fulfilling its commitments. By the way, it
was exactly and exclusively Kyrgyzstan who officially objected to
Ukraine's admission into WTO even though they in Ukraine did much -
even against their own interests - to push their country into WTO
ahead of Russia. And their stumbling was due mostly to Kyrgyzstan.
As regards Kyrgyzstan's own membership, once they have joined
WTO, nobody is going to persuade them to leave it. True, this is
contradictory to Russia's EurAsEC plans, but this is up to the Kyrgyz
leaders to overcome all possible contradictions.
--Boundary_(ID_s2rCPwEihwapuKugE5 6oLA)--
Regnum, Russia
Aug. 17, 2006
Konstantin Zatulin is Member of the Russian State Duma, Head of the
CIS Institute
REGNUM: Mr. Zatulin, the EurAsEC summit in Sochi is over. Experts
say that its key topic is energy. What agreements could have been
reached at the summit, particularly, to overcome the Ukrainian-Russian
"gas conflict"?
The Sochi forum is certainly a very important event, and one of its
most important points - to me - is that Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovich is taking part in it. It is hardly a coincidence that the
head of the new Ukrainian government has first come to Russia exactly
now that it is hosting a EurAsEC summit.
Here we can see a hint from both sides that the former plans to
involve Ukraine in the Common Economic Space (CES) are coming back.
It was exactly because of Ukraine's setback from real integration
that the SEC project was stalled. Now, after some pause - the orange
policy in Ukraine and the comeback of Viktor Yanukovich - integration
projects are coming back into the spotlight. And this moment should
not be missed even despite the seemingly domineering energy agenda.
Of course, energy security is a very painful problem for Ukraine, and
in Sochi Yanukovich will have to raise the problem of energy supplies
to make it clear - first of all, to his opponents - why exactly he
is there. This is especially important as those very opponents have
left him not a very good legacy: I mean not so much the contracts
made as the very simple fact that there is very little gas in Ukraine
and the winter is not very far. No gas has been stored so far, while
Naftogaz is almost bankrupt. That's what Yanukovich has to deal with,
and even his most active supporters - somewhere deep in their hearts -
rely, first of all, on his ability to agree with Russia.
At the same time, I would like to note that today the key vexing
factor for Ukraine in its aggravating gas problems is not Russia but
Turkmenistan. Ashgabat's plans to raise the disbursing price of its
gas from $60 to $100 may cause quite a dramatic change in the structure
of the Turkmen-Russian gas cocktail Ukraine is receiving today.
REGNUM: Is there any possibility that the policy of the new Ukrainian
government or the interference of Russia in the Ukrainian-Turkmen
talks may reduce the gas tariff for Ukraine?
I don't see any possibility of Russia's reducing the tariff. It would
be a naïve and irresponsible step on Russia's part - a step that would
be contrary to the general tendencies in the world. On the other
hand, they may well review the terms of gas supplies. For example,
they may credit Ukraine or reconsider some accompanying problems,
like the ownership of Ukraine's gas networks or the possibility of
Russia, Ukraine and Germany forming a consortium. I don't see why
the sides cannot discuss these problems again, though it seems it
was the Ukrainian politicians who preferred to drive their own selves
into a deadlock.
As regards the talks with Turkmenistan, Russia has certain ways to
interest the Turkmen side, though it will be hard for the Russians to
explain why they can raise the tariffs while the Turkmens can't. The
Russians should, first of all, understand why, in the first place,
they are pulling others' chestnuts out of the fire. First of all, they
should understand the logic and the dynamics of the home politics in
Ukraine. Yanukovich himself has given cause for that by saying that,
for example, the status of the Russian language is a pragmatic problem
because of the lack of Constitutional majority. In Sochi he made a
symptomatic statement that, as soon as they form such a majority,
the Party of Regions will redeem its electoral promises.
So, what the Universal says is not a dogma for Yanukovich and
even though in considering the status of the Russian language the
Universal refers mostly to the Constitution, it also refers to the
European Charter.
I would like to especially note that, besides the problems of energy
and integration, Russia and Ukraine have many more problems to
discuss. They in Russia realize that the Yanukovich government is a
government of compromise who is capable of showing positive dynamics
in relations. This is one more coin to Yanukovich's "money-box,"
which will allow him to further strengthen his positions in Ukraine,
especially as there are different people in the new Ukrainian
government. It's no coincidence that Yanukovich has come to Sochi
without Foreign Minister Tarasyuk, who is well known for his
anti-Russian views.
REGNUM: How real is the prospect of Armenia's joining EurAsEC and
Moldova's getting closer to it?
I am not sure that Moldova will show a constructive position. There are
serious grounds for not trusting the words of Moldavian politicians.
For Armenia EurAsEC membership is certainly of strategic importance.
No coincidence that Armenian President Robert Kocharyan is now in
Sochi as an observer. Of course, Armenia should make this decision
itself, based on its own economic priorities and goals. However,
we should also keep in mind that Armenia is full member to the CSTO.
Another significant factor influencing Armenia's plans is the Karabakh
problem, which will hardly be solved in the near future.
On the other hand, Armenia's integration plans are strongly
restrained by the position and behavior of Georgia, who prevents
normal communication between the South and the North. Yerevan is
greatly suffering from Georgia's destructive policy of blockading the
Armenia-Russia railroad in Abkhazia and from its revengeful plans
with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia - something Armenia has
nothing to do with. It seems that the moment of truth is ripening
not only in Russian-Georgian but also in Armenian-Georgian relations.
Until now Armenia has been demonstratively neutral. They have tried to
avoid any tensions with Georgia, they have been consciously damping
down the problem of Javakheti and have even refused to support the
protest actions of Armenians in that Georgian region.
I think that they in Armenia should also realize that Georgia's
adventurism will certainly cause complications - and Armenia will
be the first to suffer from them - as this all is leading to drastic
changes in the force distribution in the region, which is certainly bad
for Yerevan. I can understand the fears of the Armenian authorities,
but they should realize that this problem is caused by Georgia and
does not depend on Armenia. The slapdash policy of the Georgian
leaders is a big threat to all the region's countries. In fact,
the Georgian authorities are implicating their own country into a
new civil war that may spur up new conflicts all over the regions.
As regards Armenia, it continues being dependent not so much on its
neutral relations with Georgia as on the presence of Russia and its
position in the region.
REGNUM: Some Russian experts say that Moscow will use the Sochi summit
for warning the EurAsEC member-states against getting much too close
with the US and note that this, first of all, refers to Kyrgyzstan...
They probably mean that under Akayev Kyrgyzstan was the first CIS
country to join WTO. Let's admit that this membership has given no
special happiness to the Kyrgyz people. The country has turned into
a kind of Klondike and has gone through most severe crisis. Its very
integrity is under question and is being preserved just artificially
for fear of a possible chain reaction in the region. The US' support,
particularly, its military base in Manas, has not insured the country
against such developments.
Balancing between the interests of Russia and the US in hope for
results gives no results, as a rule. Kyrgyzstan should better refrain
from hypocrisy and show more clarity in its attitudes. Left to the
mercy of the fate, many in Central Asia hoped that the role of the
US' closest friend will help them to strengthen their positions, but
later they understood that to be friend with the US means to give it
part of one's own sovereignty. The most vivid example is Karimov. The
Americans proved this with the "knack" of elephant in china-shop, which
resulted in a civil war in Kyrgyzstan and Andijan events in Uzbekistan.
At the same time, I think that today Russia has no claims against
Kyrgyzstan. The sides are cooperating on a whole range of issues,
and Kyrgyzstan is fulfilling its commitments. By the way, it
was exactly and exclusively Kyrgyzstan who officially objected to
Ukraine's admission into WTO even though they in Ukraine did much -
even against their own interests - to push their country into WTO
ahead of Russia. And their stumbling was due mostly to Kyrgyzstan.
As regards Kyrgyzstan's own membership, once they have joined
WTO, nobody is going to persuade them to leave it. True, this is
contradictory to Russia's EurAsEC plans, but this is up to the Kyrgyz
leaders to overcome all possible contradictions.
--Boundary_(ID_s2rCPwEihwapuKugE5 6oLA)--