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KATZ: "WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ARMENIA, NONE OF AZERBAIJAN'S RIVALS ARE ALWAYS RIVALS AND NONE OF ITS FRIENDS ARE ALWAYS FRIENDS EITHER"
Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Aug. 21, 2006
A country's geopolitics can be different with regard to
different issues. This applies to Azerbaijan, where there are five
important geopolitical issues: pipelines, division of the Caspian,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Southern Azerbaijan, democratization, Mark N. Katz,
a professor of government and politics at George Mason University said.
The author proves in the article spread by United Press International
that the geopolitics of Azerbaijan are very complex.
The first issue- Pipelines. When first proposed, it was uncertain
whether the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline from Azerbaijan's oil fields through
Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean coast would ever be built,
or whether Azeri oil would continue to be exported via the existing
pipeline through Russia -- with all it implied for continued Russian
predominance in Azerbaijan. But Baku-Ceyhan was built, is functioning,
and Azerbaijan is less dependent on Russia.
On the pipeline issue, Azerbaijan's allies are the U.S., EU, Turkey,
and Georgia, while its rivals are Russia and Iran (both of which
would have preferred Azeri oil to transit their territory).
The issue now is: Can a pipeline under the Caspian be built so that
Kazakhstan can export oil via Azerbaijan, thus also reducing its
dependence on exporting via Russia? Russia could block this project if
it wanted. But this would be self-defeating since Kazakhstan can also
export its oil eastward to China. Azerbaijan is in a good position
regarding its own oil exports.
Possible side effect?
A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement: Azeri oil could then also be exported
via Iran since the U.S. would no longer object. But a U.S.-Iranian
rapprochement does not seem likely any time soon.
Turmoil in Turkey and/or Georgia: Either would shut down Baku-Ceyhan.
Both are possible. Indeed, Russia seems to be working for this in
Georgia. Azerbaijan would then have to export oil either via Russia
or Iran. Absent a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, its oil would probably
have to go through Russia -- and be subject to Russian obstruction.
The second issue:-Caspian Delimitation: Ever since the collapse of the
USSR, the maritime border in the Caspian between Iran and Azerbaijan
has been in dispute. Further, significant oil deposits are believed
to be in the disputed area. Since July 2001 when Iran successfully
employed gunboat diplomacy to halt British Petroleum exploring in
the disputed area on Azerbaijan's behalf, no further exploration has
been possible.
On the Caspian delimitation issue, Azerbaijan's allies are Russia,
Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the U.S., while its rivals are Iran and
Turkmenistan (which also has a boundary dispute with Azerbaijan in the
Caspian). Neutral (or more accurately, neutralized) parties include
EU countries with oil interests in Iran that they do not wish to risk
by supporting Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan's allies here, though, are not all allied with each other.
Russia in particular does not want "outside" powers (the U.S. and
Turkey) to be involved. Azerbaijan is nervous about depending solely
on Russia for support against Iran. It is possible that Azerbaijan and
Iran could reach a compromise on this issue. Until then, stalemate
is likely to continue. A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement would probably
result in the U.S. being less an ally of Azerbaijan on this and more
of a neutral.
Mark N. Katz particularly highlights the third issue, occupation of
Azerbaijani territories by Armenia.
Nagorno-Garabagh: Azerbaijan lost this region as well as other
territory to Armenia in fighting that took place in the years just
before and after the breakup of the USSR. A cold peace has lasted up
to the present with Azerbaijan unable to get back any of the territory
occupied by Armenia.
On the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan's only real ally is Turkey,
while its rivals are Armenia, Russia, and (because of the Southern
Azerbaijan issue that will be discussed next) Iran. Torn between the
desire both to please their influential Armenian diaspora communities
and to obtain Azeri oil, the U.S. and the EU have made efforts to
resolve this conflict, but so far without success.
Azerbaijan might hope one day to use its increasing oil wealth to
build up its forces vis-a-vis Armenia, but Azerbaijan's unfavorable
geopolitical position vis-a-vis Armenia casts doubt on its ability
to regain any territory from Armenia by force.
One possible change that could affect this calculation would be
the rise to power of a nationalist or Islamist government in Turkey
alienated from America and the EU -- which is something that might
well occur if Turkish aspirations to join the EU are spurned. Such
a Turkey might threaten the use of force against Armenia unless it
relinquishes the territory it captured from Azerbaijan. Under these
circumstances, Russia, the U.S., and even Iran might support Armenia.
A regional war could develop.
The fourth issue-Southern Azerbaijan: There are more Azeris living
in Iran than in independent, former Soviet Azerbaijan. Baku has been
extremely self-restrained about the "Southern Azerbaijan" issue. But
unrest among Azeris in Iran has been increasing.
If the situation worsens, Tehran is unlikely to blame itself for
this state of affairs but to blame Azerbaijan. If Tehran believes
(whether accurately or not) that Baku is seeking the breakup of Iran,
it might well behave threateningly toward Azerbaijan.
Although no other country supports Azeri secession from Iran,
Azerbaijan's allies in any Iranian-Azeri confrontation would be the
U.S. and Turkey, while its principal rival would, by definition, be
Iran. Russia would oppose both Iranian meddling in Azerbaijan and an
American presence there too The fifth issue-Democratization: Here it
is necessary to focus on the perceptions of the current authoritarian
Azeri government -- which has already demonstrated its disinclination
toward democratization as well as its inclination to halt meaningful
progress toward it.
On the democratization issue, the Azeri government's main allies
are Russia and Iran (which equate democratization with the spread of
American influence), while it perceives as rivals the U.S., neighboring
Georgia (where the "Rose Revolution" ushered in democratic government
in 2003), and the EU.
Strong U.S. support for an Azeri democratic movement (or even the
perception of it) could lead Azerbaijan to move closer to Russia
and even make concessions to it in other areas in exchange for
protection. The U.S. might even be pushed out of Azerbaijan.
What this analysis shows is that, with the exception of Armenia, none
of Azerbaijan's rivals are always rivals. And the Azeri government
undoubtedly feels that none of its friends are always friends either,
Mark N. Katz underscores.
Azeri Press Agency, Azerbaijan
Aug. 21, 2006
A country's geopolitics can be different with regard to
different issues. This applies to Azerbaijan, where there are five
important geopolitical issues: pipelines, division of the Caspian,
Nagorno-Karabakh, Southern Azerbaijan, democratization, Mark N. Katz,
a professor of government and politics at George Mason University said.
The author proves in the article spread by United Press International
that the geopolitics of Azerbaijan are very complex.
The first issue- Pipelines. When first proposed, it was uncertain
whether the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline from Azerbaijan's oil fields through
Georgia and Turkey to the Mediterranean coast would ever be built,
or whether Azeri oil would continue to be exported via the existing
pipeline through Russia -- with all it implied for continued Russian
predominance in Azerbaijan. But Baku-Ceyhan was built, is functioning,
and Azerbaijan is less dependent on Russia.
On the pipeline issue, Azerbaijan's allies are the U.S., EU, Turkey,
and Georgia, while its rivals are Russia and Iran (both of which
would have preferred Azeri oil to transit their territory).
The issue now is: Can a pipeline under the Caspian be built so that
Kazakhstan can export oil via Azerbaijan, thus also reducing its
dependence on exporting via Russia? Russia could block this project if
it wanted. But this would be self-defeating since Kazakhstan can also
export its oil eastward to China. Azerbaijan is in a good position
regarding its own oil exports.
Possible side effect?
A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement: Azeri oil could then also be exported
via Iran since the U.S. would no longer object. But a U.S.-Iranian
rapprochement does not seem likely any time soon.
Turmoil in Turkey and/or Georgia: Either would shut down Baku-Ceyhan.
Both are possible. Indeed, Russia seems to be working for this in
Georgia. Azerbaijan would then have to export oil either via Russia
or Iran. Absent a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, its oil would probably
have to go through Russia -- and be subject to Russian obstruction.
The second issue:-Caspian Delimitation: Ever since the collapse of the
USSR, the maritime border in the Caspian between Iran and Azerbaijan
has been in dispute. Further, significant oil deposits are believed
to be in the disputed area. Since July 2001 when Iran successfully
employed gunboat diplomacy to halt British Petroleum exploring in
the disputed area on Azerbaijan's behalf, no further exploration has
been possible.
On the Caspian delimitation issue, Azerbaijan's allies are Russia,
Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the U.S., while its rivals are Iran and
Turkmenistan (which also has a boundary dispute with Azerbaijan in the
Caspian). Neutral (or more accurately, neutralized) parties include
EU countries with oil interests in Iran that they do not wish to risk
by supporting Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan's allies here, though, are not all allied with each other.
Russia in particular does not want "outside" powers (the U.S. and
Turkey) to be involved. Azerbaijan is nervous about depending solely
on Russia for support against Iran. It is possible that Azerbaijan and
Iran could reach a compromise on this issue. Until then, stalemate
is likely to continue. A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement would probably
result in the U.S. being less an ally of Azerbaijan on this and more
of a neutral.
Mark N. Katz particularly highlights the third issue, occupation of
Azerbaijani territories by Armenia.
Nagorno-Garabagh: Azerbaijan lost this region as well as other
territory to Armenia in fighting that took place in the years just
before and after the breakup of the USSR. A cold peace has lasted up
to the present with Azerbaijan unable to get back any of the territory
occupied by Armenia.
On the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan's only real ally is Turkey,
while its rivals are Armenia, Russia, and (because of the Southern
Azerbaijan issue that will be discussed next) Iran. Torn between the
desire both to please their influential Armenian diaspora communities
and to obtain Azeri oil, the U.S. and the EU have made efforts to
resolve this conflict, but so far without success.
Azerbaijan might hope one day to use its increasing oil wealth to
build up its forces vis-a-vis Armenia, but Azerbaijan's unfavorable
geopolitical position vis-a-vis Armenia casts doubt on its ability
to regain any territory from Armenia by force.
One possible change that could affect this calculation would be
the rise to power of a nationalist or Islamist government in Turkey
alienated from America and the EU -- which is something that might
well occur if Turkish aspirations to join the EU are spurned. Such
a Turkey might threaten the use of force against Armenia unless it
relinquishes the territory it captured from Azerbaijan. Under these
circumstances, Russia, the U.S., and even Iran might support Armenia.
A regional war could develop.
The fourth issue-Southern Azerbaijan: There are more Azeris living
in Iran than in independent, former Soviet Azerbaijan. Baku has been
extremely self-restrained about the "Southern Azerbaijan" issue. But
unrest among Azeris in Iran has been increasing.
If the situation worsens, Tehran is unlikely to blame itself for
this state of affairs but to blame Azerbaijan. If Tehran believes
(whether accurately or not) that Baku is seeking the breakup of Iran,
it might well behave threateningly toward Azerbaijan.
Although no other country supports Azeri secession from Iran,
Azerbaijan's allies in any Iranian-Azeri confrontation would be the
U.S. and Turkey, while its principal rival would, by definition, be
Iran. Russia would oppose both Iranian meddling in Azerbaijan and an
American presence there too The fifth issue-Democratization: Here it
is necessary to focus on the perceptions of the current authoritarian
Azeri government -- which has already demonstrated its disinclination
toward democratization as well as its inclination to halt meaningful
progress toward it.
On the democratization issue, the Azeri government's main allies
are Russia and Iran (which equate democratization with the spread of
American influence), while it perceives as rivals the U.S., neighboring
Georgia (where the "Rose Revolution" ushered in democratic government
in 2003), and the EU.
Strong U.S. support for an Azeri democratic movement (or even the
perception of it) could lead Azerbaijan to move closer to Russia
and even make concessions to it in other areas in exchange for
protection. The U.S. might even be pushed out of Azerbaijan.
What this analysis shows is that, with the exception of Armenia, none
of Azerbaijan's rivals are always rivals. And the Azeri government
undoubtedly feels that none of its friends are always friends either,
Mark N. Katz underscores.