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POLICY OF COMPROMISES WILL NEVER BRING ABOUT SETTLEMENT OF KARABAKH CONFLICT: RAUF RAJABOV'S INTERVIEW TO REGNUM
Regnum, Russia
Aug. 21, 2006
Rauf Rajabov is expert in conflictology, Head of World, Democracy
and Culture Research Analytical Center (Azerbaijan)
REGNUM: Mr. Rajabov, to what extent Azerbaijani and Armenian political
establishment should be involved in search and coordination of
compromises in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict?
Political elites of the two countries should occupy themselves
with settlement of the Karabakh conflict instead of searching for
concessions or compromises. One should agree, no matter how difficult
it is, that everyone has a right to choose. Moreover, the two Karabakh
communities do. So, let us give them this right, and we shall help
them in applying this right. The policy of compromises will never
bring about solving of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. It is solving
but not settlement should be the basic and strategic direction of
the negotiation process.
The policy of compromises envisages, first, positional bargaining,
which has been prevailing in the negotiation process, second,
concessions, which means giving up or giving in one's position. And
this means a loss already. Third, it is lack of stable system of
regional security.
REGNUM: And what does in this case the policy of solving the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict presume?
Firstly, it is direct cooperation of the parties in the conflict.
Secondly, these are mutually beneficial and mutually acceptable
conditions of a political agreement. Third, the abovementioned
conditions will allow the conflicting parties to establish together
a long-term national and regional security system. It is high time
for the two sides to change the strategy of the negotiation process
completely.
An attempt to settle the Karabakh conflict on the basis of compromises
in reality turns into a positional bargaining of the conflicting
parties. For instance, one side (Armenia) proposes territory in
exchange for status, the other one (Azerbaijan) communications in
exchange for territories. Meanwhile, the situation of bargaining
and the situation of searching for a mutually admissible compromise
are two different things. In the first case, each party is trying
to outbid the opponent without changing anything in its position; in
the second case, a rapprochement is envisaged and search for a common
denominator in order to get things moving. Today, an imitation game
and open bargaining are prevailing in the negotiation process. And
there is no readiness for the true cooperation. The sides have too
different positions in understanding what can and should be the subject
of compromise. Armenia after achieving a temporary military success in
the Karabakh war has been trying to establish an asymmetrical formula
of the compromise, which will be deriving from the relations between
the victorious and the losing parties. Henceforth, Yerevan expects
from Azerbaijan not just compromises, but recognizing the outcome
of the war. We are witness to willingness to put the negotiation
process in direct dependence on the fact of military success instead
of searching for real compromises. Azerbaijan has the same position,
the difference is in this case demonstration of future successes,
particularly military ones, is taking place. In other words, in one
case search for real compromises is hindered by nostalgia for past
successes, in the other one it is confidence in future successes.
REGNUM: Do you think that major aims of the conflict settlement
should be establishment of security system and development of regional
cooperation?
As Azerbaijan's security after the conflict is over does not stir
questions, let us focus on Armenia. Its main aim is not only security
of the Armenian Diaspora in Karabakh, as it could seem at first
sight. Armenia is surrounded by the countries with which it has
significant problems. The only exception is, probably, Iran, but
if the situation around it changes completely, Russia will be the
only guarantor. They understand that withdrawing from Armenia will
mean losing North Caucasus in future. The policy of isolating the
partner in negotiations cannot be treated as a pragmatic one for a
long-term perspective. It can be true for a short-term perspective,
yes, but this is an element of positional bargaining. Possible
Armenia's participation in regional projects will be effective only
in terms of establishing long-term relations that take into account
interests of both sides. Such step would demonstrate that a new stage
is starting in the negotiation process, it is cooperation aimed at
settling the conflict. On the other side, it is harmful and dangerous
to manipulate by the occupied Azerbaijani territories and present
claims for Nakhichevan.
The subject of carrying out a referendum should not be left
untouched. Miracles happen. As early as in 1923, three years after
the first Karabakh war, the Karabakh population voted for the right
to remain within Azerbaijan. However, the matter is that miracles
are result of human effort and deeds.
If in conditions of the current stand-off the referendum is held in
the whole territory of Azerbaijan, it is easy to predict a negative
outcome for Yerevan. If Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijanis is held
within Nagorno Karabakh, the result will be negative for Baku.
REGNUM: And what if by the time of the referendum Azerbaijan settles
its relations with Armenia?
It is very important. But the following thing is more important.
Irrespective of their nationality, Karabakh people should be sure
that Azerbaijan needs them not for satisfying its ambitions, but
for establishing civil society in the country and the region on the
whole. Unfortunately, the process of forming political, economic and
scientific elites of the two Nagorno Karabakh communities because
of known reasons has been passing isolated from each other. Though,
the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno Karabakh should
build bridges of trust as soon as today. And they should start from
people's diplomacy, which, as history has repeatedly shown, is a
pledge of future serious successes.
Regnum, Russia
Aug. 21, 2006
Rauf Rajabov is expert in conflictology, Head of World, Democracy
and Culture Research Analytical Center (Azerbaijan)
REGNUM: Mr. Rajabov, to what extent Azerbaijani and Armenian political
establishment should be involved in search and coordination of
compromises in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict?
Political elites of the two countries should occupy themselves
with settlement of the Karabakh conflict instead of searching for
concessions or compromises. One should agree, no matter how difficult
it is, that everyone has a right to choose. Moreover, the two Karabakh
communities do. So, let us give them this right, and we shall help
them in applying this right. The policy of compromises will never
bring about solving of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. It is solving
but not settlement should be the basic and strategic direction of
the negotiation process.
The policy of compromises envisages, first, positional bargaining,
which has been prevailing in the negotiation process, second,
concessions, which means giving up or giving in one's position. And
this means a loss already. Third, it is lack of stable system of
regional security.
REGNUM: And what does in this case the policy of solving the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict presume?
Firstly, it is direct cooperation of the parties in the conflict.
Secondly, these are mutually beneficial and mutually acceptable
conditions of a political agreement. Third, the abovementioned
conditions will allow the conflicting parties to establish together
a long-term national and regional security system. It is high time
for the two sides to change the strategy of the negotiation process
completely.
An attempt to settle the Karabakh conflict on the basis of compromises
in reality turns into a positional bargaining of the conflicting
parties. For instance, one side (Armenia) proposes territory in
exchange for status, the other one (Azerbaijan) communications in
exchange for territories. Meanwhile, the situation of bargaining
and the situation of searching for a mutually admissible compromise
are two different things. In the first case, each party is trying
to outbid the opponent without changing anything in its position; in
the second case, a rapprochement is envisaged and search for a common
denominator in order to get things moving. Today, an imitation game
and open bargaining are prevailing in the negotiation process. And
there is no readiness for the true cooperation. The sides have too
different positions in understanding what can and should be the subject
of compromise. Armenia after achieving a temporary military success in
the Karabakh war has been trying to establish an asymmetrical formula
of the compromise, which will be deriving from the relations between
the victorious and the losing parties. Henceforth, Yerevan expects
from Azerbaijan not just compromises, but recognizing the outcome
of the war. We are witness to willingness to put the negotiation
process in direct dependence on the fact of military success instead
of searching for real compromises. Azerbaijan has the same position,
the difference is in this case demonstration of future successes,
particularly military ones, is taking place. In other words, in one
case search for real compromises is hindered by nostalgia for past
successes, in the other one it is confidence in future successes.
REGNUM: Do you think that major aims of the conflict settlement
should be establishment of security system and development of regional
cooperation?
As Azerbaijan's security after the conflict is over does not stir
questions, let us focus on Armenia. Its main aim is not only security
of the Armenian Diaspora in Karabakh, as it could seem at first
sight. Armenia is surrounded by the countries with which it has
significant problems. The only exception is, probably, Iran, but
if the situation around it changes completely, Russia will be the
only guarantor. They understand that withdrawing from Armenia will
mean losing North Caucasus in future. The policy of isolating the
partner in negotiations cannot be treated as a pragmatic one for a
long-term perspective. It can be true for a short-term perspective,
yes, but this is an element of positional bargaining. Possible
Armenia's participation in regional projects will be effective only
in terms of establishing long-term relations that take into account
interests of both sides. Such step would demonstrate that a new stage
is starting in the negotiation process, it is cooperation aimed at
settling the conflict. On the other side, it is harmful and dangerous
to manipulate by the occupied Azerbaijani territories and present
claims for Nakhichevan.
The subject of carrying out a referendum should not be left
untouched. Miracles happen. As early as in 1923, three years after
the first Karabakh war, the Karabakh population voted for the right
to remain within Azerbaijan. However, the matter is that miracles
are result of human effort and deeds.
If in conditions of the current stand-off the referendum is held in
the whole territory of Azerbaijan, it is easy to predict a negative
outcome for Yerevan. If Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijanis is held
within Nagorno Karabakh, the result will be negative for Baku.
REGNUM: And what if by the time of the referendum Azerbaijan settles
its relations with Armenia?
It is very important. But the following thing is more important.
Irrespective of their nationality, Karabakh people should be sure
that Azerbaijan needs them not for satisfying its ambitions, but
for establishing civil society in the country and the region on the
whole. Unfortunately, the process of forming political, economic and
scientific elites of the two Nagorno Karabakh communities because
of known reasons has been passing isolated from each other. Though,
the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno Karabakh should
build bridges of trust as soon as today. And they should start from
people's diplomacy, which, as history has repeatedly shown, is a
pledge of future serious successes.