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EXPERT: DIVISION OF KOSOVO PRECEDENT AND KARABAKH'S CHOICE
Viktor Yakubyan - expert on South Caucasus
Regnum, Russia
Aug. 22, 2006
While Lebanon is healing its wounds, the UN is knocking together
an international peacekeeping force for deployment in the south of
that country. In its turn, the international community is trying to
understand the reason for so tough an operation against Lebanon -
a campaign that has nearly wiped that country off the world map. Was
it actually the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers?
Well-known American journalist Seymour Hersh says that Israel's war
against Hezbollah was "an experiment." He has carried out his own
investigation and has found out that the plan to invade Lebanon was
drafted long before the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. Hersh says
that the whole campaign was nothing but a test of strength before
attacking Iran. Referring to US administration sources, Hersh says
that the Israelis were supposed to test in practice the forms and
methods the Americans are planning to apply against Iran.
There are also some reports that the Pentagon is going to deploy
an interceptor-missile base in Europe. It will be the first US
anti-missile defense land base outside the US territory. Besides,
the US is planning to enlarge its presence in the South Caucasus. To
two radar stations in Azerbaijan, they may add similar facilities on
the Armenian-Iranian border - in Kapan ad Meghri (Armenia).
US block facilities are being actively built in Georgia too.
The process of base and buffer zone deployment in the South Caucasus
got especially active after the NATO Summit in Istanbul and after
the US President proclaimed the EUCOM Transformation plan in the
summer 2004. Under the guise of strengthening the security system in
the Caspian Sea basin (the zone of strategic influence of Iran and
Russia), the US is also unfolding the "Caspian Border Initiative"
program involving Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In the meantime, the US,
NATO and the EU are showing quite an unprecedented interest in the
"frozen" post-Soviet conflicts.
They in the West believe that those conflicts destabilize the situation
on the new - very close to Russia - NATO and EU borders. In this light,
the West may well be seeking to debar Russia from the peace processes
in the Caucasus and Transdnestr and to finalize them the way it wants,
based on the support of its regional partners from GUAM (Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). During a recent meeting in Baku GUAM
representatives confirmed their plans to form own peacekeeping troops.
It is exactly in this context that the Georgian government is trying
to fulfill the instruction of its parliament to ensure the withdrawal
of Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while the
parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are showing unprecedented
constructivism. Drastically differing on all the key points of the
Karabakh agenda, Yerevan and Baku are coming to an agreement on one
thing: peacekeeping forces will be deployed in the conflict zone. In
this light, we would like to compare the efficiency of the Russian
peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr with
the NATO mission in Kosovo. To remind, in Nagorno-Karabakh cease fire
has been preserved for over a decade already due to balance of forces.
Doctor of History Miroslav Jovanovic says that from June 1999 to March
2006 the NATO "peacekeeping operation" in Kosovo gave the following
results: 927 Serbs killed, 230,000 expelled, 156 Orthodox churches
and cathedrals and several thousands of Serbian houses destroyed,
almost 7,000 attacks on Serbian civilians (an average of 1,000 a year
or 3 a day). During this period, 8,000 Serbs got papers for returning
to Kosovo, but only 1,800 returned.
To compare, from 1992 until recently Russia's peacekeeping operation
in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone was regarded as unique -
no single soldier, not mentioning civilian, was killed in the zone
throughout the period. Only 4 peacekeepers and 1 civilian were blown
up by mines. After the advent of Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia in 2004
and the deployment of Georgian special purpose troops in the zone, the
situation got much worse. 4 employees of the South Ossetian Interior
Ministry were killed near the Georgian village of Tamarasheni in May
2004. In July-August 2004 Georgian troops attempted a breakthrough in
the Javi region. They shelled Tskhinvali killing three civilians. One
of them was a child.
Serviceman Gennady Sanakoyev was wounded then. He was later killed
(Georgian Ex Minister for Conflict Resolution Georgy Khaindrava
says Georgian Defense Minister Irakly Okruashvili is to blame
for this murder). Two Ossetian peacekeepers were killed in 2005. 4
Georgians (3 Khachapuridze brothers and their friend) and 11-year-old
Geno Petriashvili were kidnapped last year. With the help of the
peacekeepers, the Ossetian police disclosed all these crimes and
blamed the Georgian side.
Tskhinvali was shelled once again in 2005 during the celebration of
the Day of Independence of the Republic of South Ossetia. 10 people
were wounded, of them two were children. This year the Georgian side
attacked the Ossetian village of Khelchua. One Ossetian was killed,
but before that he had shot two attackers. In May 2006 Georgian special
purpose men captured 60 Ossetians. They beat them and let free. The
secretary of the South Ossetian Security Council Oleg Alborov was
killed in a terrorist act in July 2006. One more terrorist act a week
later killed two teenagers.
Quite strangely the explosions in Tskhinvali were followed by two
terrorist acts in Tiraspol (Tskhinvali). 10 were killed and 25 wounded.
Experts are unanimous that the authors of the terrorist acts sought
to destabilize the peaceful life in the zones guarded by Russian
peacekeepers with a view to create an illusion of poor control -
something that would allow them to lay claims against the peacekeepers.
Russia's peacekeeping operation on Dniestr started 14 years ago and is
regarded as one of the best in the world. Initially, there were 3,100
peacekeepers but in the following years their number was reduced to
385. From the very first day, the peacekeepers started active demining
of the region (first of all, the areas near Benderi and Dubossari). The
United Headquarters of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces report that
in the past 14 years they have cleared 12,000 explosives. During the
first years after the conflict 1992, the peacekeepers seized lots
of arms: 100 tommy guns and pistols, over 30 hand grenade launchers,
almost 1,200 grenades, 132,000 units of ammunition.
The peacekeepers' responsibility zone (Security Zone) has become a
kind of dividing line between the conflicting parties. The situation
in Benderi was especially complicated, that's why that town was
proclaimed a high-security zone. In 1992-2001 it was under curfew.
The Collective Peacekeeping Forces have military commandant's offices
in Benderi and Dubossari. They control the situation on a daily
basis. There were single cases of death among civilians from the
start of Russia's peacekeeping in Transdnestr up to the terrorist
acts in Tiraspol.
The CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces were deployed in the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone on June 21 1994 in line with the
May 14 1994 Cease Fire and Disengagement Agreement. 112 Russian
peacekeepers and very few civilians have been killed in the region
since then. Permanent tensions are observed in the mostly-Georgian
Gali region of Abkhazia. Skirmishes and kidnappings are due mostly
to the activities of various groups engaged in walnut and citrus
business. The number of provocations has been growing in the last
years. The Georgian side has repeatedly seized goods and cargoes,
including food, intended for the peacekeeping forces.
The situation there got remarkably more tensed after a Georgian police
contingent under the command of Defense Minister Irakly Okruashvili
was deployed in the upper part of Kodori Gorge. Shortly the region will
be monitored. Georgia objects to Russia's involvement in this process.
Thus, obviously, only certain political motives can force one to say
that Russia's peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Transdnestr is inefficient. It is clear that Russia is being gradually
forced out of these formats to give place to wider American-European
maneuvering. It is also clear that the West's attempts to "unfreeze"
the post-Soviet conflicts may lead to calamities comparable
to the tragedy in Kosovo. That's exactly why they are trying to
internationalize the conflicts by carrying out an actively propaganda
that the unrecognized republics are instability zones.
If in Abkhazia and South Ossetia the international community will
find it very hard - and almost impossible in the near future - to
push the Russian peacekeepers away, in Nagorno Karabakh they have no
such obstacle.
Here it is for the conflicting parties to choose between the Kosovo
and Abkhazian "peacemaking precedents."
It is noteworthy that during his first meetings in Pristina the
new head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Joachim
Rucker said that his priority is to get the Kosovo status finalized
by the end of this year. To remind, the US OSCE MG co-chair Matthew
Bryza is as confident in making the same forecast for the Karabakh
conflict. Well, while Rucker is hurrying to legalize the Kosovo
"peacemaking precedent," the Americans are hurrying to prevent
Nagorno-Karabakh from using the Kosovo "legal precedent." Here the
rapture of the Kosovo Albanian leaders will be probably as strong as
the pride of the Armenian leaders for the uniqueness of the Karabakh
factor.
As regards the US, it will gain strategic dominance inside the
Russia-Iran-Turkey triangle - dominance that will give it checks and
balances in the whole regional architecture of security.
Viktor Yakubyan - expert on South Caucasus
Regnum, Russia
Aug. 22, 2006
While Lebanon is healing its wounds, the UN is knocking together
an international peacekeeping force for deployment in the south of
that country. In its turn, the international community is trying to
understand the reason for so tough an operation against Lebanon -
a campaign that has nearly wiped that country off the world map. Was
it actually the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers?
Well-known American journalist Seymour Hersh says that Israel's war
against Hezbollah was "an experiment." He has carried out his own
investigation and has found out that the plan to invade Lebanon was
drafted long before the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers. Hersh says
that the whole campaign was nothing but a test of strength before
attacking Iran. Referring to US administration sources, Hersh says
that the Israelis were supposed to test in practice the forms and
methods the Americans are planning to apply against Iran.
There are also some reports that the Pentagon is going to deploy
an interceptor-missile base in Europe. It will be the first US
anti-missile defense land base outside the US territory. Besides,
the US is planning to enlarge its presence in the South Caucasus. To
two radar stations in Azerbaijan, they may add similar facilities on
the Armenian-Iranian border - in Kapan ad Meghri (Armenia).
US block facilities are being actively built in Georgia too.
The process of base and buffer zone deployment in the South Caucasus
got especially active after the NATO Summit in Istanbul and after
the US President proclaimed the EUCOM Transformation plan in the
summer 2004. Under the guise of strengthening the security system in
the Caspian Sea basin (the zone of strategic influence of Iran and
Russia), the US is also unfolding the "Caspian Border Initiative"
program involving Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. In the meantime, the US,
NATO and the EU are showing quite an unprecedented interest in the
"frozen" post-Soviet conflicts.
They in the West believe that those conflicts destabilize the situation
on the new - very close to Russia - NATO and EU borders. In this light,
the West may well be seeking to debar Russia from the peace processes
in the Caucasus and Transdnestr and to finalize them the way it wants,
based on the support of its regional partners from GUAM (Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). During a recent meeting in Baku GUAM
representatives confirmed their plans to form own peacekeeping troops.
It is exactly in this context that the Georgian government is trying
to fulfill the instruction of its parliament to ensure the withdrawal
of Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while the
parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are showing unprecedented
constructivism. Drastically differing on all the key points of the
Karabakh agenda, Yerevan and Baku are coming to an agreement on one
thing: peacekeeping forces will be deployed in the conflict zone. In
this light, we would like to compare the efficiency of the Russian
peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr with
the NATO mission in Kosovo. To remind, in Nagorno-Karabakh cease fire
has been preserved for over a decade already due to balance of forces.
Doctor of History Miroslav Jovanovic says that from June 1999 to March
2006 the NATO "peacekeeping operation" in Kosovo gave the following
results: 927 Serbs killed, 230,000 expelled, 156 Orthodox churches
and cathedrals and several thousands of Serbian houses destroyed,
almost 7,000 attacks on Serbian civilians (an average of 1,000 a year
or 3 a day). During this period, 8,000 Serbs got papers for returning
to Kosovo, but only 1,800 returned.
To compare, from 1992 until recently Russia's peacekeeping operation
in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone was regarded as unique -
no single soldier, not mentioning civilian, was killed in the zone
throughout the period. Only 4 peacekeepers and 1 civilian were blown
up by mines. After the advent of Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia in 2004
and the deployment of Georgian special purpose troops in the zone, the
situation got much worse. 4 employees of the South Ossetian Interior
Ministry were killed near the Georgian village of Tamarasheni in May
2004. In July-August 2004 Georgian troops attempted a breakthrough in
the Javi region. They shelled Tskhinvali killing three civilians. One
of them was a child.
Serviceman Gennady Sanakoyev was wounded then. He was later killed
(Georgian Ex Minister for Conflict Resolution Georgy Khaindrava
says Georgian Defense Minister Irakly Okruashvili is to blame
for this murder). Two Ossetian peacekeepers were killed in 2005. 4
Georgians (3 Khachapuridze brothers and their friend) and 11-year-old
Geno Petriashvili were kidnapped last year. With the help of the
peacekeepers, the Ossetian police disclosed all these crimes and
blamed the Georgian side.
Tskhinvali was shelled once again in 2005 during the celebration of
the Day of Independence of the Republic of South Ossetia. 10 people
were wounded, of them two were children. This year the Georgian side
attacked the Ossetian village of Khelchua. One Ossetian was killed,
but before that he had shot two attackers. In May 2006 Georgian special
purpose men captured 60 Ossetians. They beat them and let free. The
secretary of the South Ossetian Security Council Oleg Alborov was
killed in a terrorist act in July 2006. One more terrorist act a week
later killed two teenagers.
Quite strangely the explosions in Tskhinvali were followed by two
terrorist acts in Tiraspol (Tskhinvali). 10 were killed and 25 wounded.
Experts are unanimous that the authors of the terrorist acts sought
to destabilize the peaceful life in the zones guarded by Russian
peacekeepers with a view to create an illusion of poor control -
something that would allow them to lay claims against the peacekeepers.
Russia's peacekeeping operation on Dniestr started 14 years ago and is
regarded as one of the best in the world. Initially, there were 3,100
peacekeepers but in the following years their number was reduced to
385. From the very first day, the peacekeepers started active demining
of the region (first of all, the areas near Benderi and Dubossari). The
United Headquarters of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces report that
in the past 14 years they have cleared 12,000 explosives. During the
first years after the conflict 1992, the peacekeepers seized lots
of arms: 100 tommy guns and pistols, over 30 hand grenade launchers,
almost 1,200 grenades, 132,000 units of ammunition.
The peacekeepers' responsibility zone (Security Zone) has become a
kind of dividing line between the conflicting parties. The situation
in Benderi was especially complicated, that's why that town was
proclaimed a high-security zone. In 1992-2001 it was under curfew.
The Collective Peacekeeping Forces have military commandant's offices
in Benderi and Dubossari. They control the situation on a daily
basis. There were single cases of death among civilians from the
start of Russia's peacekeeping in Transdnestr up to the terrorist
acts in Tiraspol.
The CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces were deployed in the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone on June 21 1994 in line with the
May 14 1994 Cease Fire and Disengagement Agreement. 112 Russian
peacekeepers and very few civilians have been killed in the region
since then. Permanent tensions are observed in the mostly-Georgian
Gali region of Abkhazia. Skirmishes and kidnappings are due mostly
to the activities of various groups engaged in walnut and citrus
business. The number of provocations has been growing in the last
years. The Georgian side has repeatedly seized goods and cargoes,
including food, intended for the peacekeeping forces.
The situation there got remarkably more tensed after a Georgian police
contingent under the command of Defense Minister Irakly Okruashvili
was deployed in the upper part of Kodori Gorge. Shortly the region will
be monitored. Georgia objects to Russia's involvement in this process.
Thus, obviously, only certain political motives can force one to say
that Russia's peacekeeping mission in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Transdnestr is inefficient. It is clear that Russia is being gradually
forced out of these formats to give place to wider American-European
maneuvering. It is also clear that the West's attempts to "unfreeze"
the post-Soviet conflicts may lead to calamities comparable
to the tragedy in Kosovo. That's exactly why they are trying to
internationalize the conflicts by carrying out an actively propaganda
that the unrecognized republics are instability zones.
If in Abkhazia and South Ossetia the international community will
find it very hard - and almost impossible in the near future - to
push the Russian peacekeepers away, in Nagorno Karabakh they have no
such obstacle.
Here it is for the conflicting parties to choose between the Kosovo
and Abkhazian "peacemaking precedents."
It is noteworthy that during his first meetings in Pristina the
new head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo Joachim
Rucker said that his priority is to get the Kosovo status finalized
by the end of this year. To remind, the US OSCE MG co-chair Matthew
Bryza is as confident in making the same forecast for the Karabakh
conflict. Well, while Rucker is hurrying to legalize the Kosovo
"peacemaking precedent," the Americans are hurrying to prevent
Nagorno-Karabakh from using the Kosovo "legal precedent." Here the
rapture of the Kosovo Albanian leaders will be probably as strong as
the pride of the Armenian leaders for the uniqueness of the Karabakh
factor.
As regards the US, it will gain strategic dominance inside the
Russia-Iran-Turkey triangle - dominance that will give it checks and
balances in the whole regional architecture of security.